net: reorder 'struct net' fields to avoid false sharing
authorEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fri, 18 Oct 2019 22:20:05 +0000 (15:20 -0700)
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Sat, 19 Oct 2019 19:21:53 +0000 (12:21 -0700)
Intel test robot reported a ~7% regression on TCP_CRR tests
that they bisected to the cited commit.

Indeed, every time a new TCP socket is created or deleted,
the atomic counter net->count is touched (via get_net(net)
and put_net(net) calls)

So cpus might have to reload a contended cache line in
net_hash_mix(net) calls.

We need to reorder 'struct net' fields to move @hash_mix
in a read mostly cache line.

We move in the first cache line fields that can be
dirtied often.

We probably will have to address in a followup patch
the __randomize_layout that was added in linux-4.13,
since this might break our placement choices.

Fixes: 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
include/net/net_namespace.h

index f8712bbeb2e039657e5cf8d37b15511de8c9c694..4c2cd937869964301117bea84aeefd8174d641fd 100644 (file)
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ struct bpf_prog;
 #define NETDEV_HASHENTRIES (1 << NETDEV_HASHBITS)
 
 struct net {
+       /* First cache line can be often dirtied.
+        * Do not place here read-mostly fields.
+        */
        refcount_t              passive;        /* To decide when the network
                                                 * namespace should be freed.
                                                 */
@@ -60,7 +63,13 @@ struct net {
                                                 */
        spinlock_t              rules_mod_lock;
 
-       u32                     hash_mix;
+       unsigned int            dev_unreg_count;
+
+       unsigned int            dev_base_seq;   /* protected by rtnl_mutex */
+       int                     ifindex;
+
+       spinlock_t              nsid_lock;
+       atomic_t                fnhe_genid;
 
        struct list_head        list;           /* list of network namespaces */
        struct list_head        exit_list;      /* To linked to call pernet exit
@@ -76,11 +85,11 @@ struct net {
 #endif
        struct user_namespace   *user_ns;       /* Owning user namespace */
        struct ucounts          *ucounts;
-       spinlock_t              nsid_lock;
        struct idr              netns_ids;
 
        struct ns_common        ns;
 
+       struct list_head        dev_base_head;
        struct proc_dir_entry   *proc_net;
        struct proc_dir_entry   *proc_net_stat;
 
@@ -93,17 +102,18 @@ struct net {
 
        struct uevent_sock      *uevent_sock;           /* uevent socket */
 
-       struct list_head        dev_base_head;
        struct hlist_head       *dev_name_head;
        struct hlist_head       *dev_index_head;
-       unsigned int            dev_base_seq;   /* protected by rtnl_mutex */
-       int                     ifindex;
-       unsigned int            dev_unreg_count;
+       /* Note that @hash_mix can be read millions times per second,
+        * it is critical that it is on a read_mostly cache line.
+        */
+       u32                     hash_mix;
+
+       struct net_device       *loopback_dev;          /* The loopback */
 
        /* core fib_rules */
        struct list_head        rules_ops;
 
-       struct net_device       *loopback_dev;          /* The loopback */
        struct netns_core       core;
        struct netns_mib        mib;
        struct netns_packet     packet;
@@ -171,7 +181,6 @@ struct net {
        struct sock             *crypto_nlsk;
 #endif
        struct sock             *diag_nlsk;
-       atomic_t                fnhe_genid;
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 #include <linux/seq_file_net.h>