path: root/security/smack
diff options
authorJann Horn <>2019-07-04 20:44:44 +0200
committerCasey Schaufler <>2019-09-04 09:36:57 -0700
commit3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb (patch)
tree17e7be1715228c848eac94d506ce192255a253e8 /security/smack
parent0ecfebd2b52404ae0c54a878c872bb93363ada36 (diff)
Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set
There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds(): If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other ->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it): - task A: create task B with fork() - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some conditions - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which destroys the ptrace relationship) Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve(). Cc: Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/smack')
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 4c5e5a438f8b..d8b59480a01c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -937,7 +937,8 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- } else if (bprm->unsafe)
+ }
+ if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)
return -EPERM;
bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;