path: root/security/Kconfig
diff options
authorDaniel Micay <>2017-07-12 14:36:10 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <>2017-07-12 16:26:03 -0700
commit6974f0c4555e285ab217cee58b6e874f776ff409 (patch)
treeb9b880b737e9f7ec88872d6b859ffcbfdd789065 /security/Kconfig
parentc69a48cdb301a18697bc8c9935baf4f32861cf9e (diff)
include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions
This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [ x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: [ avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: [ move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: Link: Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <> Acked-by: Kees Cook <> Cc: Mark Rutland <> Cc: Daniel Axtens <> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <> Cc: Chris Metcalf <> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <> Cc: Ingo Molnar <> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/Kconfig')
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index d540bfe73190..e8e449444e65 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -163,6 +163,13 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
trying to find such users.
+ bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
+ help
+ Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
+ where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"