X-Git-Url: https://git.kernel.dk/?p=fio.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=verify.c;h=eb8eddc78906f4b0dcaa13a9899495e5a8670dca;hp=43dd392687ee53fac4d28161f3ee42514a6c907f;hb=9a2a86d0f6f1425a6da666459ccd379e356a30d0;hpb=0dce9bc9b21a8d91aa55a29258dfaeffc57bd466

diff --git a/verify.c b/verify.c
index 43dd3926..eb8eddc7 100644
--- a/verify.c
+++ b/verify.c
@@ -39,38 +39,24 @@ void fill_pattern(struct thread_data *td, void *p, unsigned int len, struct io_u
 			io_u->rand_seed = fill_random_buf(&td->buf_state, p, len);
 		break;
 	case 1:
-		/*
-		 * See below write barrier comment
-		 */
-#if 0
-		read_barrier();
 		if (io_u->buf_filled_len >= len) {
 			dprint(FD_VERIFY, "using already filled verify pattern b=0 len=%u\n", len);
 			return;
 		}
-#endif
 		dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill verify pattern b=0 len=%u\n", len);
 		memset(p, td->o.verify_pattern[0], len);
-		/*
-		 * We need to ensure that the pattern stores are seen before
-		 * the fill length store, or we could observe headers that
-		 * aren't valid to the extent notified by the fill length
-		 */
-		write_barrier();
 		io_u->buf_filled_len = len;
 		break;
 	default: {
 		unsigned int i = 0, size = 0;
 		unsigned char *b = p;
 
-#if 0
-		read_barrier();
 		if (io_u->buf_filled_len >= len) {
 			dprint(FD_VERIFY, "using already filled verify pattern b=%d len=%u\n",
 					td->o.verify_pattern_bytes, len);
 			return;
 		}
-#endif
+
 		dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill verify pattern b=%d len=%u\n",
 					td->o.verify_pattern_bytes, len);
 
@@ -81,7 +67,6 @@ void fill_pattern(struct thread_data *td, void *p, unsigned int len, struct io_u
 			memcpy(b+i, td->o.verify_pattern, size);
 			i += size;
 		}
-		write_barrier();
 		io_u->buf_filled_len = len;
 		break;
 		}
@@ -337,14 +322,27 @@ static int verify_io_u_pattern(struct verify_header *hdr, struct vcont *vc)
 	struct io_u *io_u = vc->io_u;
 	char *buf, *pattern;
 	unsigned int header_size = __hdr_size(td->o.verify);
-	unsigned int len, mod, i;
+	unsigned int len, mod, i, size, pattern_size;
 
 	pattern = td->o.verify_pattern;
+	pattern_size = td->o.verify_pattern_bytes;
+	if (pattern_size <= 1)
+		pattern_size = MAX_PATTERN_SIZE;
 	buf = (void *) hdr + header_size;
 	len = get_hdr_inc(td, io_u) - header_size;
-	mod = header_size % td->o.verify_pattern_bytes;
+	mod = header_size % pattern_size;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += size) {
+		size = pattern_size - mod;
+		if (size > (len - i))
+			size = len - i;
+		if (memcmp(buf + i, pattern + mod, size))
+			// Let the slow compare find the first mismatch byte.
+			break;
+		mod = 0;
+	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+	for (; i < len; i++) {
 		if (buf[i] != pattern[mod]) {
 			unsigned int bits;
 
@@ -602,10 +600,8 @@ int verify_io_u_async(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u)
 	if (io_u->file)
 		put_file_log(td, io_u->file);
 
-	io_u->file = NULL;
-
 	pthread_mutex_lock(&td->io_u_lock);
-	
+
 	if (io_u->flags & IO_U_F_IN_CUR_DEPTH) {
 		td->cur_depth--;
 		io_u->flags &= ~IO_U_F_IN_CUR_DEPTH;
@@ -1035,7 +1031,7 @@ static void *verify_async_thread(void *data)
 			put_io_u(td, io_u);
 			if (!ret)
 				continue;
-			if (td->o.continue_on_error &&
+			if (td->o.continue_on_error & ERROR_TYPE_VERIFY &&
 			    td_non_fatal_error(ret)) {
 				update_error_count(td, ret);
 				td_clear_error(td);