X-Git-Url: https://git.kernel.dk/?p=fio.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=verify.c;h=9eb532a28e080a66a2483943f09fed16efd9ecfa;hp=0d38c0e92e77444d49e3d1906a37c210325c9bb6;hb=c3afb7639f41e58e44481151e3aa4caa6be789f6;hpb=de8f6de97438d5664cd8765e60102b9109a273e2 diff --git a/verify.c b/verify.c index 0d38c0e9..9eb532a2 100644 --- a/verify.c +++ b/verify.c @@ -23,56 +23,71 @@ #include "crc/sha256.h" #include "crc/sha512.h" #include "crc/sha1.h" +#include "crc/xxhash.h" static void populate_hdr(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u, struct verify_header *hdr, unsigned int header_num, unsigned int header_len); -void fill_pattern(struct thread_data *td, void *p, unsigned int len, struct io_u *io_u, unsigned long seed, int use_seed) +static void fill_pattern(struct thread_data *td, void *p, unsigned int len, + char *pattern, unsigned int pattern_bytes) { - switch (td->o.verify_pattern_bytes) { + switch (pattern_bytes) { case 0: - dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill random bytes len=%u\n", len); - if (use_seed) - __fill_random_buf(p, len, seed); - else - io_u->rand_seed = fill_random_buf(&td->buf_state, p, len); + assert(0); break; case 1: - if (io_u->buf_filled_len >= len) { - dprint(FD_VERIFY, "using already filled verify pattern b=0 len=%u\n", len); - return; - } dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill verify pattern b=0 len=%u\n", len); - memset(p, td->o.verify_pattern[0], len); - io_u->buf_filled_len = len; + memset(p, pattern[0], len); break; default: { unsigned int i = 0, size = 0; unsigned char *b = p; - if (io_u->buf_filled_len >= len) { - dprint(FD_VERIFY, "using already filled verify pattern b=%d len=%u\n", - td->o.verify_pattern_bytes, len); - return; - } - dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill verify pattern b=%d len=%u\n", - td->o.verify_pattern_bytes, len); + pattern_bytes, len); while (i < len) { - size = td->o.verify_pattern_bytes; + size = pattern_bytes; if (size > (len - i)) size = len - i; - memcpy(b+i, td->o.verify_pattern, size); + memcpy(b+i, pattern, size); i += size; } - io_u->buf_filled_len = len; break; } } } +void fill_buffer_pattern(struct thread_data *td, void *p, unsigned int len) +{ + fill_pattern(td, p, len, td->o.buffer_pattern, td->o.buffer_pattern_bytes); +} + +void fill_verify_pattern(struct thread_data *td, void *p, unsigned int len, + struct io_u *io_u, unsigned long seed, int use_seed) +{ + if (!td->o.verify_pattern_bytes) { + dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill random bytes len=%u\n", len); + + if (use_seed) + __fill_random_buf(p, len, seed); + else + io_u->rand_seed = fill_random_buf(&td->__verify_state, p, len); + return; + } + + if (io_u->buf_filled_len >= len) { + dprint(FD_VERIFY, "using already filled verify pattern b=%d len=%u\n", + td->o.verify_pattern_bytes, len); + return; + } + + fill_pattern(td, p, len, td->o.verify_pattern, td->o.verify_pattern_bytes); + + io_u->buf_filled_len = len; +} + static unsigned int get_hdr_inc(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u) { unsigned int hdr_inc; @@ -91,7 +106,7 @@ static void fill_pattern_headers(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u, struct verify_header *hdr; void *p = io_u->buf; - fill_pattern(td, p, io_u->buflen, io_u, seed, use_seed); + fill_verify_pattern(td, p, io_u->buflen, io_u, seed, use_seed); hdr_inc = get_hdr_inc(td, io_u); header_num = 0; @@ -158,6 +173,9 @@ static inline unsigned int __hdr_size(int verify_type) case VERIFY_SHA512: len = sizeof(struct vhdr_sha512); break; + case VERIFY_XXHASH: + len = sizeof(struct vhdr_xxhash); + break; case VERIFY_META: len = sizeof(struct vhdr_meta); break; @@ -369,6 +387,19 @@ static int verify_io_u_meta(struct verify_header *hdr, struct vcont *vc) if (td->o.verify_pattern_bytes) ret |= verify_io_u_pattern(hdr, vc); + /* + * For read-only workloads, the program cannot be certain of the + * last numberio written to a block. Checking of numberio will be done + * only for workloads that write data. + * For verify_only, numberio will be checked in the last iteration when + * the correct state of numberio, that would have been written to each + * block in a previous run of fio, has been reached. + */ + if (td_write(td) || td_rw(td)) + if (!td->o.verify_only || td->o.loops == 0) + if (vh->numberio != io_u->numberio) + ret = EILSEQ; + if (!ret) return 0; @@ -377,6 +408,30 @@ static int verify_io_u_meta(struct verify_header *hdr, struct vcont *vc) return ret; } +static int verify_io_u_xxhash(struct verify_header *hdr, struct vcont *vc) +{ + void *p = io_u_verify_off(hdr, vc); + struct vhdr_xxhash *vh = hdr_priv(hdr); + uint32_t hash; + void *state; + + dprint(FD_VERIFY, "xxhash verify io_u %p, len %u\n", vc->io_u, hdr->len); + + state = XXH32_init(1); + XXH32_update(state, p, hdr->len - hdr_size(hdr)); + hash = XXH32_digest(state); + + if (vh->hash == hash) + return 0; + + vc->name = "xxhash"; + vc->good_crc = &vh->hash; + vc->bad_crc = &hash; + vc->crc_len = sizeof(hash); + log_verify_failure(hdr, vc); + return EILSEQ; +} + static int verify_io_u_sha512(struct verify_header *hdr, struct vcont *vc) { void *p = io_u_verify_off(hdr, vc); @@ -644,18 +699,17 @@ static int verify_header(struct io_u *io_u, struct verify_header *hdr) uint32_t crc; if (hdr->magic != FIO_HDR_MAGIC) - return 0; - if (hdr->len > io_u->buflen) { - log_err("fio: verify header exceeds buffer length (%u > %lu)\n", hdr->len, io_u->buflen); - return 0; - } + return 1; + if (hdr->len > io_u->buflen) + return 2; + if (hdr->rand_seed != io_u->rand_seed) + return 3; crc = fio_crc32c(p, offsetof(struct verify_header, crc32)); if (crc == hdr->crc32) - return 1; - + return 0; log_err("fio: verify header crc %x, calculated %x\n", hdr->crc32, crc); - return 0; + return 4; } int verify_io_u(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u) @@ -692,13 +746,48 @@ int verify_io_u(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u) memswp(p, p + td->o.verify_offset, header_size); hdr = p; - if (!verify_header(io_u, hdr)) { + /* + * Make rand_seed check pass when have verifysort or + * verify_backlog. + */ + if (td->o.verifysort || (td->flags & TD_F_VER_BACKLOG)) + io_u->rand_seed = hdr->rand_seed; + + ret = verify_header(io_u, hdr); + switch (ret) { + case 0: + break; + case 1: log_err("verify: bad magic header %x, wanted %x at " "file %s offset %llu, length %u\n", hdr->magic, FIO_HDR_MAGIC, io_u->file->file_name, io_u->offset + hdr_num * hdr->len, hdr->len); return EILSEQ; + break; + case 2: + log_err("fio: verify header exceeds buffer length (%u " + "> %lu)\n", hdr->len, io_u->buflen); + return EILSEQ; + break; + case 3: + log_err("verify: bad header rand_seed %"PRIu64 + ", wanted %"PRIu64" at file %s offset %llu, " + "length %u\n", + hdr->rand_seed, io_u->rand_seed, + io_u->file->file_name, + io_u->offset + hdr_num * hdr->len, hdr->len); + return EILSEQ; + break; + case 4: + return EILSEQ; + break; + default: + log_err("verify: unknown header error at file %s " + "offset %llu, length %u\n", + io_u->file->file_name, + io_u->offset + hdr_num * hdr->len, hdr->len); + return EILSEQ; } if (td->o.verify != VERIFY_NONE) @@ -732,6 +821,9 @@ int verify_io_u(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u) case VERIFY_SHA512: ret = verify_io_u_sha512(hdr, &vc); break; + case VERIFY_XXHASH: + ret = verify_io_u_xxhash(hdr, &vc); + break; case VERIFY_META: ret = verify_io_u_meta(hdr, &vc); break; @@ -768,11 +860,21 @@ static void fill_meta(struct verify_header *hdr, struct thread_data *td, vh->time_sec = io_u->start_time.tv_sec; vh->time_usec = io_u->start_time.tv_usec; - vh->numberio = td->io_issues[DDIR_WRITE]; + vh->numberio = io_u->numberio; vh->offset = io_u->offset + header_num * td->o.verify_interval; } +static void fill_xxhash(struct verify_header *hdr, void *p, unsigned int len) +{ + struct vhdr_xxhash *vh = hdr_priv(hdr); + void *state; + + state = XXH32_init(1); + XXH32_update(state, p, len); + vh->hash = XXH32_digest(state); +} + static void fill_sha512(struct verify_header *hdr, void *p, unsigned int len) { struct vhdr_sha512 *vh = hdr_priv(hdr); @@ -912,6 +1014,11 @@ static void populate_hdr(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u, io_u, hdr->len); fill_sha512(hdr, data, data_len); break; + case VERIFY_XXHASH: + dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill xxhash io_u %p, len %u\n", + io_u, hdr->len); + fill_xxhash(hdr, data, data_len); + break; case VERIFY_META: dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill meta io_u %p, len %u\n", io_u, hdr->len); @@ -942,6 +1049,8 @@ void populate_verify_io_u(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u) if (td->o.verify == VERIFY_NULL) return; + io_u->numberio = td->io_issues[io_u->ddir]; + fill_pattern_headers(td, io_u, 0, 0); } @@ -959,11 +1068,27 @@ int get_next_verify(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u) struct rb_node *n = rb_first(&td->io_hist_tree); ipo = rb_entry(n, struct io_piece, rb_node); + + /* + * Ensure that the associated IO has completed + */ + read_barrier(); + if (ipo->flags & IP_F_IN_FLIGHT) + goto nothing; + rb_erase(n, &td->io_hist_tree); assert(ipo->flags & IP_F_ONRB); ipo->flags &= ~IP_F_ONRB; } else if (!flist_empty(&td->io_hist_list)) { ipo = flist_entry(td->io_hist_list.next, struct io_piece, list); + + /* + * Ensure that the associated IO has completed + */ + read_barrier(); + if (ipo->flags & IP_F_IN_FLIGHT) + goto nothing; + flist_del(&ipo->list); assert(ipo->flags & IP_F_ONLIST); ipo->flags &= ~IP_F_ONLIST; @@ -974,6 +1099,7 @@ int get_next_verify(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u) io_u->offset = ipo->offset; io_u->buflen = ipo->len; + io_u->numberio = ipo->numberio; io_u->file = ipo->file; io_u->flags |= IO_U_F_VER_LIST; @@ -999,9 +1125,16 @@ int get_next_verify(struct thread_data *td, struct io_u *io_u) remove_trim_entry(td, ipo); free(ipo); dprint(FD_VERIFY, "get_next_verify: ret io_u %p\n", io_u); + + if (!td->o.verify_pattern_bytes) { + io_u->rand_seed = __rand(&td->__verify_state); + if (sizeof(int) != sizeof(long *)) + io_u->rand_seed *= __rand(&td->__verify_state); + } return 0; } +nothing: dprint(FD_VERIFY, "get_next_verify: empty\n"); return 1; }