From: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2011 14:32:30 +0000 (+0100)
Subject: Comment out ->buf_filled_len in pattern fill
X-Git-Tag: fio-1.50-rc3~4
X-Git-Url: https://git.kernel.dk/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=efda12bde9d13663e5cfe4ddf677bae54075fd92;p=fio.git

Comment out ->buf_filled_len in pattern fill

It's buggy, needs to be debugged. Disable for now. It can cause
verify failures.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
---

diff --git a/verify.c b/verify.c
index eb8da58e..a7344e32 100644
--- a/verify.c
+++ b/verify.c
@@ -39,23 +39,38 @@ void fill_pattern(struct thread_data *td, void *p, unsigned int len, struct io_u
 			io_u->rand_seed = fill_random_buf(p, len);
 		break;
 	case 1:
+		/*
+		 * See below write barrier comment
+		 */
+#if 0
+		read_barrier();
 		if (io_u->buf_filled_len >= len) {
 			dprint(FD_VERIFY, "using already filled verify pattern b=0 len=%u\n", len);
 			return;
 		}
+#endif
 		dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill verify pattern b=0 len=%u\n", len);
 		memset(p, td->o.verify_pattern[0], len);
+		/*
+		 * We need to ensure that the pattern stores are seen before
+		 * the fill length store, or we could observe headers that
+		 * aren't valid to the extent notified by the fill length
+		 */
+		write_barrier();
 		io_u->buf_filled_len = len;
 		break;
 	default: {
 		unsigned int i = 0, size = 0;
 		unsigned char *b = p;
 
+#if 0
+		read_barrier();
 		if (io_u->buf_filled_len >= len) {
 			dprint(FD_VERIFY, "using already filled verify pattern b=%d len=%u\n",
 					td->o.verify_pattern_bytes, len);
 			return;
 		}
+#endif
 		dprint(FD_VERIFY, "fill verify pattern b=%d len=%u\n",
 					td->o.verify_pattern_bytes, len);
 
@@ -66,6 +81,7 @@ void fill_pattern(struct thread_data *td, void *p, unsigned int len, struct io_u
 			memcpy(b+i, td->o.verify_pattern, size);
 			i += size;
 		}
+		write_barrier();
 		io_u->buf_filled_len = len;
 		break;
 		}