From: Andrey Konovalov Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 20:04:45 +0000 (+0100) Subject: kasan: improve kasan_non_canonical_hook X-Git-Tag: v6.8-rc1~180^2~81 X-Git-Url: https://git.kernel.dk/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=c20e3feadd4505c46a87dcabef5b129a97992466;p=linux-block.git kasan: improve kasan_non_canonical_hook Make kasan_non_canonical_hook to be more sure in its report (i.e. say "probably" instead of "maybe") if the address belongs to the shadow memory region for kernel addresses. Also use the kasan_shadow_to_mem helper to calculate the original address. Also improve the comments in kasan_non_canonical_hook. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/af94ef3cb26f8c065048b3158d9f20f6102bfaaa.1703188911.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h index 69e4f5e58e33..0e209b823b2c 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h @@ -307,6 +307,12 @@ struct kasan_stack_ring { #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) +static __always_inline bool addr_in_shadow(const void *addr) +{ + return addr >= (void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START && + addr < (void *)KASAN_SHADOW_END; +} + #ifndef kasan_shadow_to_mem static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr) { diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c index a938237f6882..4bc7ac9fb37d 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/report.c +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c @@ -635,37 +635,43 @@ void kasan_report_async(void) #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) /* - * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high - * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads - * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the - * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds - * shadow memory access lands in the non-canonical part of the address space. - * Help the user figure out what the original bogus pointer was. + * With compiler-based KASAN modes, accesses to bogus pointers (outside of the + * mapped kernel address space regions) cause faults when KASAN tries to check + * the shadow memory before the actual memory access. This results in cryptic + * GPF reports, which are hard for users to interpret. This hook helps users to + * figure out what the original bogus pointer was. */ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) { unsigned long orig_addr; const char *bug_type; + /* + * All addresses that came as a result of the memory-to-shadow mapping + * (even for bogus pointers) must be >= KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET. + */ if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) return; - orig_addr = (addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT; + orig_addr = (unsigned long)kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)addr); + /* * For faults near the shadow address for NULL, we can be fairly certain * that this is a KASAN shadow memory access. - * For faults that correspond to shadow for low canonical addresses, we - * can still be pretty sure - that shadow region is a fairly narrow - * chunk of the non-canonical address space. - * But faults that look like shadow for non-canonical addresses are a - * really large chunk of the address space. In that case, we still - * print the decoded address, but make it clear that this is not - * necessarily what's actually going on. + * For faults that correspond to the shadow for low or high canonical + * addresses, we can still be pretty sure: these shadow regions are a + * fairly narrow chunk of the address space. + * But the shadow for non-canonical addresses is a really large chunk + * of the address space. For this case, we still print the decoded + * address, but make it clear that this is not necessarily what's + * actually going on. */ if (orig_addr < PAGE_SIZE) bug_type = "null-ptr-deref"; else if (orig_addr < TASK_SIZE) bug_type = "probably user-memory-access"; + else if (addr_in_shadow((void *)addr)) + bug_type = "probably wild-memory-access"; else bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access"; pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,