Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another relatively small pull request for audit, nine patches total.
The only real new bit of functionality is the patch from Richard which
adds the ability to filter records based on the filesystem type.
The remainder are bug fixes and cleanups; the bug fix highlights
include:
- ensuring that we properly audit init/PID-1 (me)
- allowing the audit daemon to shutdown the kernel/auditd connection
cleanly by setting the audit PID to zero (Steve)"
* tag 'audit-pr-
20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
Audit: remove unused audit_log_secctx function
audit: Allow auditd to set pid to 0 to end auditing
audit: Add new syscalls to the perm=w filter
audit: use audit_set_enabled() in audit_enable()
audit: convert audit_ever_enabled to a boolean
audit: don't use simple_strtol() anymore
audit: initialize the audit subsystem as early as possible
audit: ensure that 'audit=1' actually enables audit for PID 1
__NR_linkat,
__NR_symlinkat,
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_renameat2
+__NR_renameat2,
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_bind
__NR_bind, /* bind can affect fs object only in one way... */
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_fallocate
+__NR_fallocate,
+#endif
extern void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation,
const struct path *link);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-extern void audit_log_secctx(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 secid);
-#else
-static inline void audit_log_secctx(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 secid)
-{ }
-#endif
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab,
static inline void audit_log_link_denied(const char *string,
const struct path *link)
{ }
-static inline void audit_log_secctx(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 secid)
-{ }
static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
return 0;
#define AUDIT_FILTER_WATCH 0x03 /* Apply rule to file system watches */
#define AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT 0x04 /* Apply rule at syscall exit */
#define AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE 0x05 /* Apply rule at audit_log_start */
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_FS 0x06 /* Apply rule at __audit_inode_child */
-#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS 6
+#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS 7
#define AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND 0x10 /* Prepend to front of list */
#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH 23
#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET 24
#define AUDIT_SESSIONID 25 /* Session ID */
+#define AUDIT_FSTYPE 26 /* FileSystem Type */
/* These are ONLY useful when checking
* at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXCLUDE_EXTEND 0x00000008
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER 0x00000010
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET 0x00000020
+#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS 0x00000040
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL (AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT | \
AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME | \
AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH | \
AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXCLUDE_EXTEND | \
AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER | \
- AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET)
+ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET | \
+ AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS)
/* deprecated: AUDIT_VERSION_* */
#define AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL
#define AUDIT_OFF 0
#define AUDIT_ON 1
#define AUDIT_LOCKED 2
-u32 audit_enabled;
-u32 audit_ever_enabled;
+u32 audit_enabled = AUDIT_OFF;
+bool audit_ever_enabled = !!AUDIT_OFF;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(audit_enabled);
/* Default state when kernel boots without any parameters. */
-static u32 audit_default;
+static u32 audit_default = AUDIT_OFF;
/* If auditing cannot proceed, audit_failure selects what happens. */
static u32 audit_failure = AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK;
pid_t auditd_pid;
struct pid *req_pid = task_tgid(current);
- /* sanity check - PID values must match */
- if (new_pid != pid_vnr(req_pid))
+ /* Sanity check - PID values must match. Setting
+ * pid to 0 is how auditd ends auditing. */
+ if (new_pid && (new_pid != pid_vnr(req_pid)))
return -EINVAL;
/* test the auditd connection */
audit_replace(req_pid);
auditd_pid = auditd_pid_vnr();
- /* only the current auditd can unregister itself */
- if ((!new_pid) && (new_pid != auditd_pid)) {
- audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid,
- auditd_pid, 0);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- /* replacing a healthy auditd is not allowed */
- if (auditd_pid && new_pid) {
- audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid,
- auditd_pid, 0);
- return -EEXIST;
+ if (auditd_pid) {
+ /* replacing a healthy auditd is not allowed */
+ if (new_pid) {
+ audit_log_config_change("audit_pid",
+ new_pid, auditd_pid, 0);
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+ /* only current auditd can unregister itself */
+ if (pid_vnr(req_pid) != auditd_pid) {
+ audit_log_config_change("audit_pid",
+ new_pid, auditd_pid, 0);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
}
if (new_pid) {
register_pernet_subsys(&audit_net_ops);
audit_initialized = AUDIT_INITIALIZED;
- audit_enabled = audit_default;
- audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default;
kauditd_task = kthread_run(kauditd_thread, NULL, "kauditd");
if (IS_ERR(kauditd_task)) {
return 0;
}
-__initcall(audit_init);
+postcore_initcall(audit_init);
/* Process kernel command-line parameter at boot time. audit=0 or audit=1. */
static int __init audit_enable(char *str)
{
- audit_default = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
- if (!audit_default)
+ long val;
+
+ if (kstrtol(str, 0, &val))
+ panic("audit: invalid 'audit' parameter value (%s)\n", str);
+ audit_default = (val ? AUDIT_ON : AUDIT_OFF);
+
+ if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF)
audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED;
+ if (audit_set_enabled(audit_default))
+ panic("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n", audit_default);
pr_info("%s\n", audit_default ?
"enabled (after initialization)" : "disabled (until reboot)");
}
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-/**
- * audit_log_secctx - Converts and logs SELinux context
- * @ab: audit_buffer
- * @secid: security number
- *
- * This is a helper function that calls security_secid_to_secctx to convert
- * secid to secctx and then adds the (converted) SELinux context to the audit
- * log by calling audit_log_format, thus also preventing leak of internal secid
- * to userspace. If secid cannot be converted audit_panic is called.
- */
-void audit_log_secctx(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 secid)
-{
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
-
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &len)) {
- audit_panic("Cannot convert secid to context");
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_secctx);
-#endif
-
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_start);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_end);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_format);
struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
};
-extern u32 audit_ever_enabled;
+extern bool audit_ever_enabled;
extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
-#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[6]),
+#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 7
#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
#endif
};
LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]),
LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]),
LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[6]),
};
DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
#endif
case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
;
}
if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) {
entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER)
return -EINVAL;
break;
+ case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
+ if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_FS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
+ switch(f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
switch(f->type) {
return -EINVAL;
/* FALL THROUGH */
case AUDIT_ARCH:
+ case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
return -EINVAL;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
int dont_count = 0;
- /* If either of these, don't count towards total */
- if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
- entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
+ /* If any of these, don't count towards total */
+ switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
dont_count = 1;
+ }
#endif
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
int dont_count = 0;
- /* If either of these, don't count towards total */
- if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
- entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
+ /* If any of these, don't count towards total */
+ switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
dont_count = 1;
+ }
#endif
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
+ int i;
if (!context->in_syscall)
return;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!list_empty(list)) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+ for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+
+ if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE) {
+ if (audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
+ f->op, f->val)) {
+ if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
if (inode)
handle_one(inode);
projects / linux-2.6-block.git / commitdiff