It will be used by other x86 mitigations.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU
buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
-Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing:
-
- mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+Kernel does the buffer clearing with x86_clear_cpu_buffers().
On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on
kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No
The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
- mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+ x86_clear_cpu_buffers()
Also macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS can be used in ASM late in exit-to-user path.
Other than CFLAGS.ZF, this macro doesn't clobber any registers.
idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
activated.
- The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
- switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
- the system.
+ The invocation is controlled by the static key cpu_buf_idle_clear which is
+ switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of the
+ system.
The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread
/*
* Define the VERW operand that is disguised as entry code so that
- * it can be referenced with KPTI enabled. This ensure VERW can be
+ * it can be referenced with KPTI enabled. This ensures VERW can be
* used late in exit-to-user path after page tables are switched.
*/
.pushsection .entry.text, "ax"
.align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc
-SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(mds_verw_sel)
+SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(x86_verw_sel)
UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
.word __KERNEL_DS
.align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc
-SYM_CODE_END(mds_verw_sel);
+SYM_CODE_END(x86_verw_sel);
/* For KVM */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_verw_sel);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_verw_sel);
.popsection
static __always_inline void native_safe_halt(void)
{
- mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory");
}
static __always_inline void native_halt(void)
{
- mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory");
}
static __always_inline void __mwait(u32 eax, u32 ecx)
{
- mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
/*
* Use the instruction mnemonic with implicit operands, as the LLVM
*/
static __always_inline void __sti_mwait(u32 eax, u32 ecx)
{
- mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
asm volatile("sti; mwait" :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
}
.endm
/*
- * Macro to execute VERW instruction that mitigate transient data sampling
- * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW
- * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF.
- *
+ * Macro to execute VERW insns that mitigate transient data sampling
+ * attacks such as MDS or TSA. On affected systems a microcode update
+ * overloaded VERW insns to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers
+ * CFLAGS.ZF.
* Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers.
*/
.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- ALTERNATIVE "", "verw mds_verw_sel(%rip)", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "verw x86_verw_sel(%rip)", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
#else
/*
* In 32bit mode, the memory operand must be a %cs reference. The data
* segments may not be usable (vm86 mode), and the stack segment may not
* be flat (ESPFIX32).
*/
- ALTERNATIVE "", "verw %cs:mds_verw_sel", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+ ALTERNATIVE "", "verw %cs:x86_verw_sel", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
#endif
.endm
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_vcpu_ibpb);
-DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
-extern u16 mds_verw_sel;
+extern u16 x86_verw_sel;
#include <asm/segment.h>
/**
- * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
+ * x86_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support for different x86 CPU vulns
*
* This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
* combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
* instruction is executed.
*/
-static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+static __always_inline void x86_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
{
static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
}
/**
- * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support in idle for the MDS
+ * vulnerability
*
* Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
*/
-static __always_inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+static __always_inline void x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
{
- if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
- mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_buf_idle_clear))
+ x86_clear_cpu_buffers();
}
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_vcpu_ibpb);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(switch_vcpu_ibpb);
-/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+/* Control CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
/*
* Controls whether l1d flush based mitigations are enabled,
* is required irrespective of SMT state.
*/
if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
- static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
cpu_smt_disable(false);
return;
if (sched_smt_active()) {
- static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
} else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
- static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ static_branch_disable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
}
}
vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
else if (static_branch_unlikely(&cpu_buf_vm_clear) &&
kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
- mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ x86_clear_cpu_buffers();
vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);