* possible, however, kvm currently does not do execution-protection.
*/
static void
-reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct kvm_mmu *context)
+reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_mmu *context)
{
struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_zero_check;
int i;
* is the shadow page table for intel nested guest.
*/
static void
-reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct kvm_mmu *context, bool execonly)
+reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_mmu *context, bool execonly)
{
__reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(&context->shadow_zero_check,
reserved_hpa_bits(), execonly,
context->gva_to_gpa = paging32_gva_to_gpa;
reset_guest_paging_metadata(vcpu, context);
- reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(vcpu, context);
+ reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(context);
}
static union kvm_mmu_role
update_permission_bitmask(context, true);
context->pkru_mask = 0;
reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(vcpu, context, execonly, huge_page_level);
- reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(vcpu, context, execonly);
+ reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(context, execonly);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu);