Here is a BUG report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hdr_delete_de+0xe0/0x150 fs/ntfs3/index.c:806
Read of size
16842960 at addr
ffff888079cc0600 by task syz-executor934/3631
Call Trace:
memmove+0x25/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:54
hdr_delete_de+0xe0/0x150 fs/ntfs3/index.c:806
indx_delete_entry+0x74f/0x3670 fs/ntfs3/index.c:2193
ni_remove_name+0x27a/0x980 fs/ntfs3/frecord.c:2910
ntfs_unlink_inode+0x3d4/0x720 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:1712
ntfs_rename+0x41a/0xcb0 fs/ntfs3/namei.c:276
Before using the meta-data in struct INDEX_HDR, we need to
check index header valid or not. Otherwise, the corruptedi
(or malicious) fs image can cause out-of-bounds access which
could make kernel panic.
Fixes:
82cae269cfa9 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Reported-by: syzbot+9c2811fd56591639ff5f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
return find_log_rec(log, *lsn, lcb);
}
-static inline bool check_index_header(const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr, size_t bytes)
+bool check_index_header(const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr, size_t bytes)
{
__le16 mask;
u32 min_de, de_off, used, total;
u32 off = PtrOffset(hdr, re);
int bytes = used - (off + esize);
+ /* check INDEX_HDR valid before using INDEX_HDR */
+ if (!check_index_header(hdr, le32_to_cpu(hdr->total)))
+ return NULL;
+
if (off >= used || esize < sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) ||
bytes < sizeof(struct NTFS_DE))
return NULL;
bool ni_is_dirty(struct inode *inode);
/* Globals from fslog.c */
+bool check_index_header(const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr, size_t bytes);
int log_replay(struct ntfs_inode *ni, bool *initialized);
/* Globals from fsntfs.c */