x86/mm: Do not use set_{pud, pmd}_safe() when splitting a large page
authorBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Wed, 17 Apr 2019 15:41:17 +0000 (15:41 +0000)
committerBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Wed, 8 May 2019 17:08:35 +0000 (19:08 +0200)
commiteccd906484d1cd4b5da00f093d678badb6f48f28
treea7dd24f4e3fed0a73fe911feb9619050294d1d11
parent0e72499c3cc0cead32f88b94a02204d2b80768bf
x86/mm: Do not use set_{pud, pmd}_safe() when splitting a large page

The commit

  0a9fe8ca844d ("x86/mm: Validate kernel_physical_mapping_init() PTE population")

triggers this warning in SEV guests:

  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h:87 phys_pmd_init+0x30d/0x386
  Call Trace:
   kernel_physical_mapping_init+0xce/0x259
   early_set_memory_enc_dec+0x10f/0x160
   kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu+0x71/0x9d
   start_kernel+0x1c9/0x50b
   secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0

A SEV guest calls kernel_physical_mapping_init() to clear the encryption
mask from an existing mapping. While doing so, it also splits large
pages into smaller.

To split a page, kernel_physical_mapping_init() allocates a new page and
updates the existing entry. The set_{pud,pmd}_safe() helpers trigger a
warning when updating an entry with a page in the present state.

Add a new kernel_physical_mapping_change() helper which uses the
non-safe variants of set_{pmd,pud,p4d}() and {pmd,pud,p4d}_populate()
routines when updating the entry.

Since kernel_physical_mapping_change() may replace an existing
entry with a new entry, the caller is responsible to flush
the TLB at the end. Change early_set_memory_enc_dec() to use
kernel_physical_mapping_change() when it wants to clear the memory
encryption mask from the page table entry.

 [ bp:
   - massage commit message.
   - flesh out comment according to dhansen's request.
   - align function arguments at opening brace. ]

Fixes: 0a9fe8ca844d ("x86/mm: Validate kernel_physical_mapping_init() PTE population")
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417154102.22613-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
arch/x86/mm/mm_internal.h