xfrm: Sanitize marks before insert
authorPaul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Wed, 7 May 2025 11:31:58 +0000 (13:31 +0200)
committerSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Wed, 14 May 2025 05:18:58 +0000 (07:18 +0200)
commit0b91fda3a1f044141e1e615456ff62508c32b202
tree336937cf7d7aff531c59d9105bd71cba56c42f30
parent417fae2c40896f0a67ce7fa7d9b8c6056ec36dd9
xfrm: Sanitize marks before insert

Prior to this patch, the mark is sanitized (applying the state's mask to
the state's value) only on inserts when checking if a conflicting XFRM
state or policy exists.

We discovered in Cilium that this same sanitization does not occur
in the hot-path __xfrm_state_lookup. In the hot-path, the sk_buff's mark
is simply compared to the state's value:

    if ((mark & x->mark.m) != x->mark.v)
        continue;

Therefore, users can define unsanitized marks (ex. 0xf42/0xf00) which will
never match any packet.

This commit updates __xfrm_state_insert and xfrm_policy_insert to store
the sanitized marks, thus removing this footgun.

This has the side effect of changing the ip output, as the
returned mark will have the mask applied to it when printed.

Fixes: 3d6acfa7641f ("xfrm: SA lookups with mark")
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Louis DeLosSantos <louis.delos.devel@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Louis DeLosSantos <louis.delos.devel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c