Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN
authorCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tue, 5 Jun 2012 22:28:30 +0000 (15:28 -0700)
committerCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fri, 13 Jul 2012 22:49:23 +0000 (15:49 -0700)
commit1880eff77e7a7cb46c68fae7cfa33f72f0a6e70e
treefc4b9a2ca7c643a30cbe2260886fdbd969bf2b50
parenteb982cb4cf6405b97ea1f9e1d10864981f269d46
Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN

Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme,
using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to
determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or
change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an
additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set
by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack
label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE.

This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected
by the onlycap mechanism.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
security/smack/smack.h
security/smack/smack_access.c
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
security/smack/smackfs.c