[PATCH] audit: support for object context filters

[linux-block.git] / security / selinux / ss / services.c

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 92e80b99d1839ca5b455266b29c2c08d0fbd8c08..d2e80e62ff0c9595414f38d00e3d5e49487cb77d 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1848,12 +1848,17 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
                /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
                if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
                        return -EINVAL;
                break;
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
                /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
                if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
                        return -EINVAL;
@@ -1875,6 +1880,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 
        switch (field) {
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
                userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
                if (!userdatum)
                        rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1882,6 +1888,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
                        tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
                break;
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
                roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
                if (!roledatum)
                        rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1889,6 +1896,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
                        tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
                break;
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
                typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
                if (!typedatum)
                        rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1897,6 +1905,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
                break;
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
                rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
                break;
        }
@@ -1949,6 +1959,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
           without a match */
        switch (field) {
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
                switch (op) {
                case AUDIT_EQUAL:
                        match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
@@ -1959,6 +1970,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
                }
                break;
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
                switch (op) {
                case AUDIT_EQUAL:
                        match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
@@ -1969,6 +1981,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
                }
                break;
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
                switch (op) {
                case AUDIT_EQUAL:
                        match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
@@ -1980,7 +1993,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
                break;
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
        case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
-               level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+       case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+               level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
+                         field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
                         &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
                switch (op) {
                case AUDIT_EQUAL: