#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
#include "include/procattr.h"
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
+
+
/*
* LSM hook functions
*/
/*
- * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
+ * free the associated aa_task_ctx and put its profiles
*/
static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
- cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
+ aa_free_task_context(cred_ctx(cred));
+ cred_ctx(cred) = NULL;
}
/*
static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
- if (!cxt)
+ struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+
+ if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
- cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
+ cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
return 0;
}
/*
- * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
+ * prepare new aa_task_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block
*/
static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
- if (!cxt)
+ struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+
+ if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
- aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
- cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
+ aa_dup_task_context(ctx, cred_ctx(old));
+ cred_ctx(new) = ctx;
return 0;
}
*/
static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
- struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+ const struct aa_task_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old);
+ struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new);
- aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
+ aa_dup_task_context(new_ctx, old_ctx);
}
static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
-static int common_perm(int op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
+static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
}
/**
- * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
+ * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
* @op: operation being checked
- * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
- * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
+ * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
* @mask: requested permissions mask
- * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
-static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, const struct path *dir,
- struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
- struct path_cond *cond)
+static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
{
- struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
+ struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
+ d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
+ };
- return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
}
/**
- * common_perm_path - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
+ * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
* @op: operation being checked
- * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
+ * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
* @mask: requested permissions mask
+ * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
-static inline int common_perm_path(int op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
+static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
+ struct path_cond *cond)
{
- struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
- d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
- };
- if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
- return 0;
+ struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
- return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
+ return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
}
/**
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
-static int common_perm_rm(int op, const struct path *dir,
+static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct path_cond cond = { };
- if (!inode || !mediated_filesystem(dentry))
+ if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
return 0;
cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
*/
-static int common_perm_create(int op, const struct path *dir,
+static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
{
struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
- if (!mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry))
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
return 0;
return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
{
- return common_perm_path(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE);
+ return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE);
}
static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
- if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
return 0;
profile = aa_current_profile();
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
- if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
return 0;
profile = aa_current_profile();
if (!unconfined(profile)) {
- struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
- struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+ struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
+ .dentry = old_dentry };
+ struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
+ .dentry = new_dentry };
struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
};
static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
{
- return common_perm_path(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
+ return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
}
static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
{
- return common_perm_path(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
+ return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
}
static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
- return common_perm_path(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_META_READ);
+ return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_META_READ);
}
static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
- struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
+ struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file->f_security;
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
- if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
+ if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
return 0;
/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
* actually execute the image.
*/
if (current->in_execve) {
- fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+ fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
return 0;
}
error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
- fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
+ fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
}
return error;
static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
+ struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file->f_security;
- aa_free_file_context(cxt);
+ aa_free_file_context(ctx);
}
-static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
+static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
{
- struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
+ struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file->f_security;
struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
int error = 0;
- BUG_ON(!fprofile);
+ AA_BUG(!fprofile);
if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
- !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
+ !path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
return 0;
profile = __aa_current_profile();
* delegation from unconfined tasks
*/
if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
- ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
+ ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fctx->allow)))
error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
return error;
return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
}
-static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags)
{
int mask = 0;
int error = -ENOENT;
/* released below */
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
+ struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
- profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
- else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
- profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
- else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
- profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ctx->profile);
+ else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous)
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ctx->previous);
+ else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ctx->onexec);
else
error = -EINVAL;
static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR);
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
- error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
- !AA_DO_TEST);
+ error = aa_change_profile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
+ !AA_DO_TEST, false);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
- error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
- AA_DO_TEST);
+ error = aa_change_profile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, AA_DO_TEST,
+ false);
} else
goto fail;
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
- error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
- !AA_DO_TEST);
+ error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_ONEXEC, !AA_DO_TEST,
+ false);
else
goto fail;
} else
return error;
fail:
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
- aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
- aad.info = name;
- aad.error = error = -EINVAL;
+ aad(&sa)->profile = aa_current_profile();
+ aad(&sa)->info = name;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
goto out;
}
module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
&aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
#endif
/* Debug mode */
-bool aa_g_debug;
+bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
/* Audit mode */
/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
* on the loaded policy is done.
+ * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
+ * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
*/
bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
-module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
- S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
/* Boot time disable flag */
static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable())
+ if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable())
+ if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_set_uint(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable())
+ if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_view_capable())
+ if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
- if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ if (!policy_view_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
- if (!policy_admin_capable())
+ if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
*/
/**
- * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
+ * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
*
* TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
*/
-static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
+static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
- cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cxt)
+ ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
- cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
- cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
+ ctx->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
+ cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
return 0;
}
+static void destroy_buffers(void)
+{
+ u32 i, j;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
+ kfree(per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j]);
+ per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
+{
+ u32 i, j;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
+ for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
+ char *buffer;
+
+ if (cpu_to_node(i) > num_online_nodes())
+ /* fallback to kmalloc for offline nodes */
+ buffer = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+ else
+ buffer = kmalloc_node(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL,
+ cpu_to_node(i));
+ if (!buffer) {
+ destroy_buffers();
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = buffer;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = {
+ { .procname = "kernel", },
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
+ .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0600,
+ .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
+static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
+{
+ return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path,
+ apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+#else
+static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
static int __init apparmor_init(void)
{
int error;
return 0;
}
+ error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
+ if (error) {
+ AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
+ goto alloc_out;
+ }
+
error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
goto alloc_out;
}
- error = set_init_cxt();
+ error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
+ if (error) {
+ AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
+ goto alloc_out;
+
+ }
+
+ error = alloc_buffers();
+ if (error) {
+ AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
+ goto buffers_out;
+ }
+
+ error = set_init_ctx();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
aa_free_root_ns();
- goto alloc_out;
+ goto buffers_out;
}
- security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks));
+ security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
+ "apparmor");
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
return error;
+buffers_out:
+ destroy_buffers();
+
alloc_out:
aa_destroy_aafs();
+ aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
apparmor_enabled = 0;
return error;
projects / linux-2.6-block.git / blobdiff