[KNL] Debugging option to set a timeout in seconds for
deferred probe to give up waiting on dependencies to
probe. Only specific dependencies (subsystems or
- drivers) that have opted in will be ignored. A timeout of 0
- will timeout at the end of initcalls. This option will also
+ drivers) that have opted in will be ignored. A timeout
+ of 0 will timeout at the end of initcalls. If the time
+ out hasn't expired, it'll be restarted by each
+ successful driver registration. This option will also
dump out devices still on the deferred probe list after
retrying.
driver later using sysfs.
driver_async_probe= [KNL]
- List of driver names to be probed asynchronously.
+ List of driver names to be probed asynchronously. *
+ matches with all driver names. If * is specified, the
+ rest of the listed driver names are those that will NOT
+ match the *.
Format: <driver_name1>,<driver_name2>...
drm.edid_firmware=[<connector>:]<file>[,[<connector>:]<file>]
srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
no_entry_flush [PPC]
no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
+ mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
Exceptions:
This does not have any effect on
Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
mds=full,nosmt [X86]
tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
+ mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt [X86]
mminit_loglevel=
[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG
so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified.
+ mmio_stale_data=
+ [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the Processor
+ MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
+
+ Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of
+ vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO
+ operation. Exposed data could originate or end in
+ the same CPU buffers as affected by MDS and TAA.
+ Therefore, similar to MDS and TAA, the mitigation
+ is to clear the affected CPU buffers.
+
+ This parameter controls the mitigation. The
+ options are:
+
+ full - Enable mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+
+ full,nosmt - Enable mitigation and disable SMT on
+ vulnerable CPUs.
+
+ off - Unconditionally disable mitigation
+
+ On MDS or TAA affected machines,
+ mmio_stale_data=off can be prevented by an active
+ MDS or TAA mitigation as these vulnerabilities are
+ mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to
+ disable this mitigation, you need to specify
+ mds=off and tsx_async_abort=off too.
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ mmio_stale_data=full.
+
+ For details see:
+ Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
+
module.sig_enforce
[KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that
modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load.