2 * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
3 * Use of this source code is governed by the GPLv2 license.
5 * Test code for seccomp bpf.
9 #include <asm/siginfo.h>
10 #define __have_siginfo_t 1
11 #define __have_sigval_t 1
12 #define __have_sigevent_t 1
15 #include <linux/filter.h>
16 #include <sys/prctl.h>
17 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
19 #include <linux/prctl.h>
20 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
21 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
23 #include <semaphore.h>
29 #include <linux/elf.h>
31 #include <sys/utsname.h>
32 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
34 #include <sys/times.h>
38 #include <sys/syscall.h>
40 #include "../kselftest_harness.h"
42 #ifndef PR_SET_PTRACER
43 # define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
46 #ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
47 #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
48 #define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
51 #ifndef PR_SECCOMP_EXT
52 #define PR_SECCOMP_EXT 43
55 #ifndef SECCOMP_EXT_ACT
56 #define SECCOMP_EXT_ACT 1
59 #ifndef SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC
60 #define SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC 1
63 #ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
64 #define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1
67 #ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
68 #define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2
71 #ifndef SECCOMP_RET_KILL
72 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL 0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
73 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
74 #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
75 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
76 #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
78 /* Masks for the return value sections. */
79 #define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION 0x7fff0000U
80 #define SECCOMP_RET_DATA 0x0000ffffU
85 __u64 instruction_pointer;
90 #if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
91 #define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]))
92 #elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
93 #define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]) + sizeof(__u32))
95 #error "wut? Unknown __BYTE_ORDER?!"
98 #define SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED 0xbadbeef
99 #define SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE 0xbadface
100 #define SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS 0xbadfeed
102 TEST(mode_strict_support)
106 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, NULL, NULL, NULL);
108 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECCOMP");
110 syscall(__NR_exit, 1);
113 TEST_SIGNAL(mode_strict_cannot_call_prctl, SIGKILL)
117 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, NULL, NULL, NULL);
119 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECCOMP");
121 syscall(__NR_prctl, PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
124 TH_LOG("Unreachable!");
128 /* Note! This doesn't test no new privs behavior */
129 TEST(no_new_privs_support)
133 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
135 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
139 /* Tests kernel support by checking for a copy_from_user() fault on NULL. */
140 TEST(mode_filter_support)
144 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0);
146 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
148 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, NULL, NULL);
150 EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
151 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER!");
155 TEST(mode_filter_without_nnp)
157 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
158 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
160 struct sock_fprog prog = {
161 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
166 ret = prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, NULL, 0, 0);
168 TH_LOG("Expected 0 or unsupported for NO_NEW_PRIVS");
171 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
172 /* Succeeds with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, fails without */
173 /* TODO(wad) check caps not euid */
176 EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
182 #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH 32768
184 TEST(filter_size_limits)
187 int count = BPF_MAXINSNS + 1;
188 struct sock_filter allow[] = {
189 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
191 struct sock_filter *filter;
192 struct sock_fprog prog = { };
195 filter = calloc(count, sizeof(*filter));
196 ASSERT_NE(NULL, filter);
198 for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
199 filter[i] = allow[0];
201 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
204 prog.filter = filter;
207 /* Too many filter instructions in a single filter. */
208 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
210 TH_LOG("Installing %d insn filter was allowed", prog.len);
213 /* One less is okay, though. */
215 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
217 TH_LOG("Installing %d insn filter wasn't allowed", prog.len);
221 TEST(filter_chain_limits)
224 int count = BPF_MAXINSNS;
225 struct sock_filter allow[] = {
226 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
228 struct sock_filter *filter;
229 struct sock_fprog prog = { };
232 filter = calloc(count, sizeof(*filter));
233 ASSERT_NE(NULL, filter);
235 for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
236 filter[i] = allow[0];
238 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
241 prog.filter = filter;
244 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
249 /* Too many total filter instructions. */
250 for (i = 0; i < MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH; i++) {
251 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
256 TH_LOG("Allowed %d %d-insn filters (total with penalties:%d)",
257 i, count, i * (count + 4));
261 TEST(mode_filter_cannot_move_to_strict)
263 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
264 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
266 struct sock_fprog prog = {
267 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
272 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
275 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
278 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, NULL, 0, 0);
280 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
284 TEST(mode_filter_get_seccomp)
286 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
287 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
289 struct sock_fprog prog = {
290 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
295 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
298 ret = prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0);
301 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
304 ret = prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0);
311 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
312 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
314 struct sock_fprog prog = {
315 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
320 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
323 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
329 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
331 struct sock_fprog prog = {
332 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
337 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
340 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
342 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
345 TEST_SIGNAL(unknown_ret_is_kill_inside, SIGSYS)
347 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
348 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, 0x10000000U),
350 struct sock_fprog prog = {
351 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
356 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
359 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
361 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid)) {
362 TH_LOG("getpid() shouldn't ever return");
366 /* return code >= 0x80000000 is unused. */
367 TEST_SIGNAL(unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow, SIGSYS)
369 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
370 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, 0x90000000U),
372 struct sock_fprog prog = {
373 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
378 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
381 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
383 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid)) {
384 TH_LOG("getpid() shouldn't ever return");
388 TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_all, SIGSYS)
390 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
391 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
393 struct sock_fprog prog = {
394 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
399 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
402 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
406 TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one, SIGSYS)
408 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
409 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
410 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
411 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
412 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
413 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
415 struct sock_fprog prog = {
416 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
420 pid_t parent = getppid();
422 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
425 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
428 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
429 /* getpid() should never return. */
430 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
433 TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one_arg_one, SIGSYS)
436 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
437 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
438 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
439 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_times, 1, 0),
440 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
441 /* Only both with lower 32-bit for now. */
442 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(0)),
443 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K,
444 (unsigned long)&fatal_address, 0, 1),
445 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
446 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
448 struct sock_fprog prog = {
449 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
453 pid_t parent = getppid();
455 clock_t clock = times(&timebuf);
457 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
460 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
463 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
464 EXPECT_LE(clock, syscall(__NR_times, &timebuf));
465 /* times() should never return. */
466 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_times, &fatal_address));
469 TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one_arg_six, SIGSYS)
472 int sysno = __NR_mmap;
474 int sysno = __NR_mmap2;
476 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
477 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
478 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
479 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, sysno, 1, 0),
480 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
481 /* Only both with lower 32-bit for now. */
482 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(5)),
483 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, 0x0C0FFEE, 0, 1),
484 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
485 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
487 struct sock_fprog prog = {
488 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
492 pid_t parent = getppid();
495 int page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
497 ASSERT_LT(0, page_size);
499 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
502 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
505 fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDONLY);
508 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
509 map1 = (void *)syscall(sysno,
510 NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, page_size);
511 EXPECT_NE(MAP_FAILED, map1);
512 /* mmap2() should never return. */
513 map2 = (void *)syscall(sysno,
514 NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0x0C0FFEE);
515 EXPECT_EQ(MAP_FAILED, map2);
517 /* The test failed, so clean up the resources. */
518 munmap(map1, page_size);
519 munmap(map2, page_size);
523 /* TODO(wad) add 64-bit versus 32-bit arg tests. */
524 TEST(arg_out_of_range)
526 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
527 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(6)),
528 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
530 struct sock_fprog prog = {
531 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
536 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
539 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
541 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
544 #define ERRNO_FILTER(name, errno) \
545 struct sock_filter _read_filter_##name[] = { \
546 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, \
547 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), \
548 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 0, 1), \
549 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | errno), \
550 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
552 struct sock_fprog prog_##name = { \
553 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(_read_filter_##name), \
554 .filter = _read_filter_##name, \
557 /* Make sure basic errno values are correctly passed through a filter. */
560 ERRNO_FILTER(valid, E2BIG);
562 pid_t parent = getppid();
564 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
567 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_valid);
570 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
571 EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(0, NULL, 0));
572 EXPECT_EQ(E2BIG, errno);
575 /* Make sure an errno of zero is correctly handled by the arch code. */
578 ERRNO_FILTER(zero, 0);
580 pid_t parent = getppid();
582 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
585 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_zero);
588 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
589 /* "errno" of 0 is ok. */
590 EXPECT_EQ(0, read(0, NULL, 0));
594 * The SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask is 16 bits wide, but errno is smaller.
595 * This tests that the errno value gets capped correctly, fixed by
596 * 580c57f10768 ("seccomp: cap SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO data to MAX_ERRNO").
600 ERRNO_FILTER(capped, 4096);
602 pid_t parent = getppid();
604 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
607 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_capped);
610 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
611 EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(0, NULL, 0));
612 EXPECT_EQ(4095, errno);
616 * Filters are processed in reverse order: last applied is executed first.
617 * Since only the SECCOMP_RET_ACTION mask is tested for return values, the
618 * SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask results will follow the most recently applied
619 * matching filter return (and not the lowest or highest value).
623 ERRNO_FILTER(first, 11);
624 ERRNO_FILTER(second, 13);
625 ERRNO_FILTER(third, 12);
627 pid_t parent = getppid();
629 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
632 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_first);
635 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_second);
638 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_third);
641 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
642 EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(0, NULL, 0));
643 EXPECT_EQ(12, errno);
647 struct sock_fprog prog;
652 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
653 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
654 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
655 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
656 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP),
657 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
660 memset(&self->prog, 0, sizeof(self->prog));
661 self->prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(filter));
662 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->prog.filter);
663 memcpy(self->prog.filter, filter, sizeof(filter));
664 self->prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter);
667 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TRAP)
669 if (self->prog.filter)
670 free(self->prog.filter);
673 TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRAP, dfl, SIGSYS)
677 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
680 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog);
682 syscall(__NR_getpid);
685 /* Ensure that SIGSYS overrides SIG_IGN */
686 TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRAP, ign, SIGSYS)
690 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
693 signal(SIGSYS, SIG_IGN);
695 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog);
697 syscall(__NR_getpid);
700 static struct siginfo TRAP_info;
701 static volatile int TRAP_nr;
702 static void TRAP_action(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
704 memcpy(&TRAP_info, info, sizeof(TRAP_info));
708 TEST_F(TRAP, handler)
711 struct sigaction act;
714 memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
716 sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
718 act.sa_sigaction = &TRAP_action;
719 act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
720 ret = sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL);
722 TH_LOG("sigaction failed");
724 ret = sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL);
726 TH_LOG("sigprocmask failed");
729 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
731 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog);
734 memset(&TRAP_info, 0, sizeof(TRAP_info));
735 /* Expect the registers to be rolled back. (nr = error) may vary
737 ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
738 /* Silence gcc warning about volatile. */
740 EXPECT_EQ(SIGSYS, test);
741 struct local_sigsys {
742 void *_call_addr; /* calling user insn */
743 int _syscall; /* triggering system call number */
744 unsigned int _arch; /* AUDIT_ARCH_* of syscall */
745 } *sigsys = (struct local_sigsys *)
747 &(TRAP_info.si_call_addr);
751 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_getpid, sigsys->_syscall);
752 /* Make sure arch is non-zero. */
753 EXPECT_NE(0, sigsys->_arch);
754 EXPECT_NE(0, (unsigned long)sigsys->_call_addr);
757 FIXTURE_DATA(precedence) {
758 struct sock_fprog allow;
759 struct sock_fprog trace;
760 struct sock_fprog error;
761 struct sock_fprog trap;
762 struct sock_fprog kill;
765 FIXTURE_SETUP(precedence)
767 struct sock_filter allow_insns[] = {
768 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
770 struct sock_filter trace_insns[] = {
771 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
772 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
773 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
774 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
775 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE),
777 struct sock_filter error_insns[] = {
778 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
779 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
780 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
781 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
782 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO),
784 struct sock_filter trap_insns[] = {
785 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
786 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
787 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
788 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
789 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP),
791 struct sock_filter kill_insns[] = {
792 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
793 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
794 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
795 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
796 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
799 memset(self, 0, sizeof(*self));
800 #define FILTER_ALLOC(_x) \
801 self->_x.filter = malloc(sizeof(_x##_insns)); \
802 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->_x.filter); \
803 memcpy(self->_x.filter, &_x##_insns, sizeof(_x##_insns)); \
804 self->_x.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(_x##_insns)
812 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(precedence)
814 #define FILTER_FREE(_x) if (self->_x.filter) free(self->_x.filter)
822 TEST_F(precedence, allow_ok)
824 pid_t parent, res = 0;
828 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
831 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
833 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
835 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
837 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
839 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->kill);
841 /* Should work just fine. */
842 res = syscall(__NR_getppid);
843 EXPECT_EQ(parent, res);
846 TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, kill_is_highest, SIGSYS)
848 pid_t parent, res = 0;
852 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
855 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
857 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
859 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
861 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
863 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->kill);
865 /* Should work just fine. */
866 res = syscall(__NR_getppid);
867 EXPECT_EQ(parent, res);
868 /* getpid() should never return. */
869 res = syscall(__NR_getpid);
873 TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, kill_is_highest_in_any_order, SIGSYS)
879 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
882 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
884 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->kill);
886 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
888 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
890 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
892 /* Should work just fine. */
893 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
894 /* getpid() should never return. */
895 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
898 TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, trap_is_second, SIGSYS)
904 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
907 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
909 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
911 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
913 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
915 /* Should work just fine. */
916 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
917 /* getpid() should never return. */
918 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
921 TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, trap_is_second_in_any_order, SIGSYS)
927 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
930 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
932 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
934 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
936 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
938 /* Should work just fine. */
939 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
940 /* getpid() should never return. */
941 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
944 TEST_F(precedence, errno_is_third)
950 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
953 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
955 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
957 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
959 /* Should work just fine. */
960 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
961 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
964 TEST_F(precedence, errno_is_third_in_any_order)
970 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
973 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
975 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
977 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
979 /* Should work just fine. */
980 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
981 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
984 TEST_F(precedence, trace_is_fourth)
990 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
993 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
995 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
997 /* Should work just fine. */
998 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1000 EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1003 TEST_F(precedence, trace_is_fourth_in_any_order)
1009 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1012 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
1014 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
1016 /* Should work just fine. */
1017 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1019 EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1022 #ifndef PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
1023 #define PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP 0x00000080
1026 /* Catch the Ubuntu 12.04 value error. */
1027 #if PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP != 7
1028 #undef PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
1031 #ifndef PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
1032 #define PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP 7
1035 #define IS_SECCOMP_EVENT(status) ((status >> 16) == PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
1036 bool tracer_running;
1037 void tracer_stop(int sig)
1039 tracer_running = false;
1042 typedef void tracer_func_t(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
1043 pid_t tracee, int status, void *args);
1045 void start_tracer(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd, pid_t tracee,
1046 tracer_func_t tracer_func, void *args, bool ptrace_syscall)
1049 struct sigaction action = {
1050 .sa_handler = tracer_stop,
1053 /* Allow external shutdown. */
1054 tracer_running = true;
1055 ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &action, NULL));
1058 while (ret == -1 && errno != EINVAL)
1059 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tracee, NULL, 0);
1061 kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
1063 /* Wait for attach stop */
1066 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, tracee, NULL, ptrace_syscall ?
1067 PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD :
1068 PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP);
1070 TH_LOG("Failed to set PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP");
1071 kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
1073 ret = ptrace(ptrace_syscall ? PTRACE_SYSCALL : PTRACE_CONT,
1077 /* Unblock the tracee */
1078 ASSERT_EQ(1, write(fd, "A", 1));
1079 ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
1081 /* Run until we're shut down. Must assert to stop execution. */
1082 while (tracer_running) {
1085 if (wait(&status) != tracee)
1087 if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || WIFEXITED(status))
1088 /* Child is dead. Time to go. */
1091 /* Check if this is a seccomp event. */
1092 ASSERT_EQ(!ptrace_syscall, IS_SECCOMP_EVENT(status));
1094 tracer_func(_metadata, tracee, status, args);
1096 ret = ptrace(ptrace_syscall ? PTRACE_SYSCALL : PTRACE_CONT,
1100 /* Directly report the status of our test harness results. */
1101 syscall(__NR_exit, _metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
1104 /* Common tracer setup/teardown functions. */
1105 void cont_handler(int num)
1107 pid_t setup_trace_fixture(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
1108 tracer_func_t func, void *args, bool ptrace_syscall)
1113 pid_t tracee = getpid();
1115 /* Setup a pipe for clean synchronization. */
1116 ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(pipefd));
1118 /* Fork a child which we'll promote to tracer */
1119 tracer_pid = fork();
1120 ASSERT_LE(0, tracer_pid);
1121 signal(SIGALRM, cont_handler);
1122 if (tracer_pid == 0) {
1124 start_tracer(_metadata, pipefd[1], tracee, func, args,
1126 syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
1129 prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, tracer_pid, 0, 0, 0);
1130 read(pipefd[0], &sync, 1);
1135 void teardown_trace_fixture(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
1141 * Extract the exit code from the other process and
1142 * adopt it for ourselves in case its asserts failed.
1144 ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(tracer, SIGUSR1));
1145 ASSERT_EQ(tracer, waitpid(tracer, &status, 0));
1146 if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
1147 _metadata->passed = 0;
1151 /* "poke" tracer arguments and function. */
1152 struct tracer_args_poke_t {
1153 unsigned long poke_addr;
1156 void tracer_poke(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee, int status,
1161 struct tracer_args_poke_t *info = (struct tracer_args_poke_t *)args;
1163 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, tracee, NULL, &msg);
1165 /* If this fails, don't try to recover. */
1166 ASSERT_EQ(0x1001, msg) {
1167 kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
1170 * Poke in the message.
1171 * Registers are not touched to try to keep this relatively arch
1174 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, tracee, info->poke_addr, 0x1001);
1178 FIXTURE_DATA(TRACE_poke) {
1179 struct sock_fprog prog;
1182 struct tracer_args_poke_t tracer_args;
1185 FIXTURE_SETUP(TRACE_poke)
1187 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1188 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1189 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1190 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 0, 1),
1191 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1001),
1192 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1196 memset(&self->prog, 0, sizeof(self->prog));
1197 self->prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(filter));
1198 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->prog.filter);
1199 memcpy(self->prog.filter, filter, sizeof(filter));
1200 self->prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter);
1202 /* Set up tracer args. */
1203 self->tracer_args.poke_addr = (unsigned long)&self->poked;
1205 /* Launch tracer. */
1206 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_poke,
1207 &self->tracer_args, false);
1210 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TRACE_poke)
1212 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1213 if (self->prog.filter)
1214 free(self->prog.filter);
1217 TEST_F(TRACE_poke, read_has_side_effects)
1221 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1224 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1227 EXPECT_EQ(0, self->poked);
1228 ret = read(-1, NULL, 0);
1230 EXPECT_EQ(0x1001, self->poked);
1233 TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)
1237 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1240 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1243 EXPECT_EQ(0, self->poked);
1244 EXPECT_NE(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1245 EXPECT_EQ(0, self->poked);
1248 #if defined(__x86_64__)
1249 # define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
1250 # define SYSCALL_NUM orig_rax
1251 # define SYSCALL_RET rax
1252 #elif defined(__i386__)
1253 # define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
1254 # define SYSCALL_NUM orig_eax
1255 # define SYSCALL_RET eax
1256 #elif defined(__arm__)
1257 # define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
1258 # define SYSCALL_NUM ARM_r7
1259 # define SYSCALL_RET ARM_r0
1260 #elif defined(__aarch64__)
1261 # define ARCH_REGS struct user_pt_regs
1262 # define SYSCALL_NUM regs[8]
1263 # define SYSCALL_RET regs[0]
1264 #elif defined(__hppa__)
1265 # define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
1266 # define SYSCALL_NUM gr[20]
1267 # define SYSCALL_RET gr[28]
1268 #elif defined(__powerpc__)
1269 # define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
1270 # define SYSCALL_NUM gpr[0]
1271 # define SYSCALL_RET gpr[3]
1272 #elif defined(__s390__)
1273 # define ARCH_REGS s390_regs
1274 # define SYSCALL_NUM gprs[2]
1275 # define SYSCALL_RET gprs[2]
1276 #elif defined(__mips__)
1277 # define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
1278 # define SYSCALL_NUM regs[2]
1279 # define SYSCALL_SYSCALL_NUM regs[4]
1280 # define SYSCALL_RET regs[2]
1281 # define SYSCALL_NUM_RET_SHARE_REG
1283 # error "Do not know how to find your architecture's registers and syscalls"
1286 /* When the syscall return can't be changed, stub out the tests for it. */
1287 #ifdef SYSCALL_NUM_RET_SHARE_REG
1288 # define EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(val, action) EXPECT_EQ(-1, action)
1290 # define EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(val, action) EXPECT_EQ(val, action)
1293 /* Use PTRACE_GETREGS and PTRACE_SETREGS when available. This is useful for
1294 * architectures without HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK (e.g. User-mode Linux).
1296 #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__)
1297 #define HAVE_GETREGS
1300 /* Architecture-specific syscall fetching routine. */
1301 int get_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee)
1305 EXPECT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, tracee, 0, ®s)) {
1306 TH_LOG("PTRACE_GETREGS failed");
1312 iov.iov_base = ®s;
1313 iov.iov_len = sizeof(regs);
1314 EXPECT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, tracee, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov)) {
1315 TH_LOG("PTRACE_GETREGSET failed");
1320 #if defined(__mips__)
1321 if (regs.SYSCALL_NUM == __NR_O32_Linux)
1322 return regs.SYSCALL_SYSCALL_NUM;
1324 return regs.SYSCALL_NUM;
1327 /* Architecture-specific syscall changing routine. */
1328 void change_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
1329 pid_t tracee, int syscall)
1334 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, tracee, 0, ®s);
1337 iov.iov_base = ®s;
1338 iov.iov_len = sizeof(regs);
1339 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, tracee, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov);
1341 EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {}
1343 #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc__) || \
1344 defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__)
1346 regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
1348 #elif defined(__mips__)
1350 if (regs.SYSCALL_NUM == __NR_O32_Linux)
1351 regs.SYSCALL_SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
1353 regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
1356 #elif defined(__arm__)
1357 # ifndef PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL
1358 # define PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL 23
1361 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL, tracee, NULL, syscall);
1365 #elif defined(__aarch64__)
1366 # ifndef NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL
1367 # define NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL 0x404
1370 iov.iov_base = &syscall;
1371 iov.iov_len = sizeof(syscall);
1372 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, tracee, NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL,
1379 TH_LOG("How is the syscall changed on this architecture?");
1383 /* If syscall is skipped, change return value. */
1385 #ifdef SYSCALL_NUM_RET_SHARE_REG
1386 TH_LOG("Can't modify syscall return on this architecture");
1388 regs.SYSCALL_RET = EPERM;
1392 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, tracee, 0, ®s);
1394 iov.iov_base = ®s;
1395 iov.iov_len = sizeof(regs);
1396 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, tracee, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov);
1401 void tracer_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee,
1402 int status, void *args)
1407 /* Make sure we got the right message. */
1408 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, tracee, NULL, &msg);
1411 /* Validate and take action on expected syscalls. */
1414 /* change getpid to getppid. */
1415 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_getpid, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
1416 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, __NR_getppid);
1420 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_gettid, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
1421 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, -1);
1424 /* do nothing (allow getppid) */
1425 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_getppid, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
1429 TH_LOG("Unknown PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG: 0x%lx", msg);
1430 kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
1436 void tracer_ptrace(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee,
1437 int status, void *args)
1443 /* Make sure we got an empty message. */
1444 ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, tracee, NULL, &msg);
1448 /* The only way to tell PTRACE_SYSCALL entry/exit is by counting. */
1453 nr = get_syscall(_metadata, tracee);
1455 if (nr == __NR_getpid)
1456 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, __NR_getppid);
1457 if (nr == __NR_open)
1458 change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, -1);
1461 FIXTURE_DATA(TRACE_syscall) {
1462 struct sock_fprog prog;
1463 pid_t tracer, mytid, mypid, parent;
1466 FIXTURE_SETUP(TRACE_syscall)
1468 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1469 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1470 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1471 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
1472 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1002),
1473 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_gettid, 0, 1),
1474 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1003),
1475 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1476 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1004),
1477 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1480 memset(&self->prog, 0, sizeof(self->prog));
1481 self->prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(filter));
1482 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->prog.filter);
1483 memcpy(self->prog.filter, filter, sizeof(filter));
1484 self->prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter);
1486 /* Prepare some testable syscall results. */
1487 self->mytid = syscall(__NR_gettid);
1488 ASSERT_GT(self->mytid, 0);
1489 ASSERT_NE(self->mytid, 1) {
1490 TH_LOG("Running this test as init is not supported. :)");
1493 self->mypid = getpid();
1494 ASSERT_GT(self->mypid, 0);
1495 ASSERT_EQ(self->mytid, self->mypid);
1497 self->parent = getppid();
1498 ASSERT_GT(self->parent, 0);
1499 ASSERT_NE(self->parent, self->mypid);
1501 /* Launch tracer. */
1502 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_syscall, NULL,
1506 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TRACE_syscall)
1508 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1509 if (self->prog.filter)
1510 free(self->prog.filter);
1513 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, ptrace_syscall_redirected)
1515 /* Swap SECCOMP_RET_TRACE tracer for PTRACE_SYSCALL tracer. */
1516 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1517 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_ptrace, NULL,
1520 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid. */
1521 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1524 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, ptrace_syscall_dropped)
1526 /* Swap SECCOMP_RET_TRACE tracer for PTRACE_SYSCALL tracer. */
1527 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1528 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_ptrace, NULL,
1531 /* Tracer should skip the open syscall, resulting in EPERM. */
1532 EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(EPERM, syscall(__NR_open));
1535 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_allowed)
1539 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1542 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1545 /* getppid works as expected (no changes). */
1546 EXPECT_EQ(self->parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1547 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getppid));
1550 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_redirected)
1554 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1557 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1560 /* getpid has been redirected to getppid as expected. */
1561 EXPECT_EQ(self->parent, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1562 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1565 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_dropped)
1569 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1572 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1575 /* gettid has been skipped and an altered return value stored. */
1576 EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(EPERM, syscall(__NR_gettid));
1577 EXPECT_NE(self->mytid, syscall(__NR_gettid));
1580 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, skip_after_RET_TRACE)
1582 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1583 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1584 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1585 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1586 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM),
1587 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1589 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1590 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1595 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1598 /* Install fixture filter. */
1599 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1602 /* Install "errno on getppid" filter. */
1603 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
1606 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should see EPERM. */
1608 EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1609 EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
1612 TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRACE_syscall, kill_after_RET_TRACE, SIGSYS)
1614 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1615 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1616 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1617 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1618 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
1619 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1621 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1622 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1627 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1630 /* Install fixture filter. */
1631 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
1634 /* Install "death on getppid" filter. */
1635 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
1638 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should die. */
1639 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1642 TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, skip_after_ptrace)
1644 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1645 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1646 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1647 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1648 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM),
1649 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1651 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1652 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1657 /* Swap SECCOMP_RET_TRACE tracer for PTRACE_SYSCALL tracer. */
1658 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1659 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_ptrace, NULL,
1662 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1665 /* Install "errno on getppid" filter. */
1666 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
1669 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should see EPERM. */
1670 EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1671 EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
1674 TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRACE_syscall, kill_after_ptrace, SIGSYS)
1676 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1677 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1678 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1679 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
1680 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
1681 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1683 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1684 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1689 /* Swap SECCOMP_RET_TRACE tracer for PTRACE_SYSCALL tracer. */
1690 teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
1691 self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_ptrace, NULL,
1694 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1697 /* Install "death on getppid" filter. */
1698 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
1701 /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should die. */
1702 EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
1705 #ifndef __NR_seccomp
1706 # if defined(__i386__)
1707 # define __NR_seccomp 354
1708 # elif defined(__x86_64__)
1709 # define __NR_seccomp 317
1710 # elif defined(__arm__)
1711 # define __NR_seccomp 383
1712 # elif defined(__aarch64__)
1713 # define __NR_seccomp 277
1714 # elif defined(__hppa__)
1715 # define __NR_seccomp 338
1716 # elif defined(__powerpc__)
1717 # define __NR_seccomp 358
1718 # elif defined(__s390__)
1719 # define __NR_seccomp 348
1721 # warning "seccomp syscall number unknown for this architecture"
1722 # define __NR_seccomp 0xffff
1726 #ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
1727 #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
1730 #ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
1731 #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
1734 #ifndef SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL
1735 #define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
1738 #ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
1739 #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
1742 #ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG
1743 #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG 2
1747 int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
1750 return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
1754 TEST(seccomp_syscall)
1756 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1757 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1759 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1760 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1765 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
1767 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
1770 /* Reject insane operation. */
1771 ret = seccomp(-1, 0, &prog);
1772 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
1773 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
1775 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
1776 TH_LOG("Did not reject crazy op value!");
1779 /* Reject strict with flags or pointer. */
1780 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, -1, NULL);
1781 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
1782 TH_LOG("Did not reject mode strict with flags!");
1784 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 0, &prog);
1785 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
1786 TH_LOG("Did not reject mode strict with uargs!");
1789 /* Reject insane args for filter. */
1790 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, -1, &prog);
1791 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
1792 TH_LOG("Did not reject crazy filter flags!");
1794 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, NULL);
1795 EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
1796 TH_LOG("Did not reject NULL filter!");
1799 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
1800 EXPECT_EQ(0, errno) {
1801 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER: %s",
1806 TEST(seccomp_syscall_mode_lock)
1808 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1809 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1811 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1812 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1817 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0);
1819 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
1822 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
1823 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
1824 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
1827 TH_LOG("Could not install filter!");
1830 /* Make sure neither entry point will switch to strict. */
1831 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, 0, 0, 0);
1832 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
1833 TH_LOG("Switched to mode strict!");
1836 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 0, NULL);
1837 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
1838 TH_LOG("Switched to mode strict!");
1843 * Test detection of known and unknown filter flags. Userspace needs to be able
1844 * to check if a filter flag is supported by the current kernel and a good way
1845 * of doing that is by attempting to enter filter mode, with the flag bit in
1846 * question set, and a NULL pointer for the _args_ parameter. EFAULT indicates
1847 * that the flag is valid and EINVAL indicates that the flag is invalid.
1849 TEST(detect_seccomp_filter_flags)
1851 unsigned int flags[] = { SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
1852 SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG };
1853 unsigned int flag, all_flags;
1857 /* Test detection of known-good filter flags */
1858 for (i = 0, all_flags = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(flags); i++) {
1860 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
1861 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
1862 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
1865 EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
1866 TH_LOG("Failed to detect that a known-good filter flag (0x%X) is supported!",
1873 /* Test detection of all known-good filter flags */
1874 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, all_flags, NULL);
1876 EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
1877 TH_LOG("Failed to detect that all known-good filter flags (0x%X) are supported!",
1881 /* Test detection of an unknown filter flag */
1883 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
1885 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
1886 TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported!",
1891 * Test detection of an unknown filter flag that may simply need to be
1892 * added to this test
1894 flag = flags[ARRAY_SIZE(flags) - 1] << 1;
1895 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
1897 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
1898 TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported! Does a new flag need to be added to this test?",
1905 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
1906 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1908 struct sock_fprog prog = {
1909 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
1914 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0);
1916 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
1919 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
1921 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
1922 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
1925 TH_LOG("Could not install initial filter with TSYNC!");
1929 #define TSYNC_SIBLINGS 2
1930 struct tsync_sibling {
1934 pthread_cond_t *cond;
1935 pthread_mutex_t *mutex;
1938 struct sock_fprog *prog;
1939 struct __test_metadata *metadata;
1943 * To avoid joining joined threads (which is not allowed by Bionic),
1944 * make sure we both successfully join and clear the tid to skip a
1945 * later join attempt during fixture teardown. Any remaining threads
1946 * will be directly killed during teardown.
1948 #define PTHREAD_JOIN(tid, status) \
1950 int _rc = pthread_join(tid, status); \
1952 TH_LOG("pthread_join of tid %u failed: %d\n", \
1953 (unsigned int)tid, _rc); \
1959 FIXTURE_DATA(TSYNC) {
1960 struct sock_fprog root_prog, apply_prog;
1961 struct tsync_sibling sibling[TSYNC_SIBLINGS];
1963 pthread_cond_t cond;
1964 pthread_mutex_t mutex;
1968 FIXTURE_SETUP(TSYNC)
1970 struct sock_filter root_filter[] = {
1971 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1973 struct sock_filter apply_filter[] = {
1974 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
1975 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
1976 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 0, 1),
1977 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
1978 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
1981 memset(&self->root_prog, 0, sizeof(self->root_prog));
1982 memset(&self->apply_prog, 0, sizeof(self->apply_prog));
1983 memset(&self->sibling, 0, sizeof(self->sibling));
1984 self->root_prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(root_filter));
1985 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->root_prog.filter);
1986 memcpy(self->root_prog.filter, &root_filter, sizeof(root_filter));
1987 self->root_prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(root_filter);
1989 self->apply_prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(apply_filter));
1990 ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->apply_prog.filter);
1991 memcpy(self->apply_prog.filter, &apply_filter, sizeof(apply_filter));
1992 self->apply_prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(apply_filter);
1994 self->sibling_count = 0;
1995 pthread_mutex_init(&self->mutex, NULL);
1996 pthread_cond_init(&self->cond, NULL);
1997 sem_init(&self->started, 0, 0);
1998 self->sibling[0].tid = 0;
1999 self->sibling[0].cond = &self->cond;
2000 self->sibling[0].started = &self->started;
2001 self->sibling[0].mutex = &self->mutex;
2002 self->sibling[0].diverge = 0;
2003 self->sibling[0].num_waits = 1;
2004 self->sibling[0].prog = &self->root_prog;
2005 self->sibling[0].metadata = _metadata;
2006 self->sibling[1].tid = 0;
2007 self->sibling[1].cond = &self->cond;
2008 self->sibling[1].started = &self->started;
2009 self->sibling[1].mutex = &self->mutex;
2010 self->sibling[1].diverge = 0;
2011 self->sibling[1].prog = &self->root_prog;
2012 self->sibling[1].num_waits = 1;
2013 self->sibling[1].metadata = _metadata;
2016 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TSYNC)
2020 if (self->root_prog.filter)
2021 free(self->root_prog.filter);
2022 if (self->apply_prog.filter)
2023 free(self->apply_prog.filter);
2025 for ( ; sib < self->sibling_count; ++sib) {
2026 struct tsync_sibling *s = &self->sibling[sib];
2031 * If a thread is still running, it may be stuck, so hit
2032 * it over the head really hard.
2034 pthread_kill(s->tid, 9);
2036 pthread_mutex_destroy(&self->mutex);
2037 pthread_cond_destroy(&self->cond);
2038 sem_destroy(&self->started);
2041 void *tsync_sibling(void *data)
2044 struct tsync_sibling *me = data;
2046 me->system_tid = syscall(__NR_gettid);
2048 pthread_mutex_lock(me->mutex);
2050 /* Just re-apply the root prog to fork the tree */
2051 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
2054 sem_post(me->started);
2055 /* Return outside of started so parent notices failures. */
2057 pthread_mutex_unlock(me->mutex);
2058 return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE;
2061 pthread_cond_wait(me->cond, me->mutex);
2062 me->num_waits = me->num_waits - 1;
2063 } while (me->num_waits);
2064 pthread_mutex_unlock(me->mutex);
2066 ret = prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
2068 return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS;
2070 return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED;
2073 void tsync_start_sibling(struct tsync_sibling *sibling)
2075 pthread_create(&sibling->tid, NULL, tsync_sibling, (void *)sibling);
2078 TEST_F(TSYNC, siblings_fail_prctl)
2082 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
2083 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
2084 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
2085 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_prctl, 0, 1),
2086 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EINVAL),
2087 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2089 struct sock_fprog prog = {
2090 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
2094 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2095 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2098 /* Check prctl failure detection by requesting sib 0 diverge. */
2099 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
2100 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2101 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2104 TH_LOG("setting filter failed");
2107 self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
2108 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2109 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2111 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2112 sem_wait(&self->started);
2113 self->sibling_count++;
2116 /* Signal the threads to clean up*/
2117 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2118 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2119 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2121 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2123 /* Ensure diverging sibling failed to call prctl. */
2124 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2125 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE, (long)status);
2126 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2127 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
2130 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_ancestor)
2135 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2136 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2139 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
2140 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2141 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2144 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
2146 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2147 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2149 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2150 sem_wait(&self->started);
2151 self->sibling_count++;
2154 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2157 TH_LOG("Could install filter on all threads!");
2159 /* Tell the siblings to test the policy */
2160 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2161 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2162 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2164 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2165 /* Ensure they are both killed and don't exit cleanly. */
2166 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2167 EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
2168 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2169 EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
2172 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_sibling_want_nnp)
2176 /* start siblings before any prctl() operations */
2177 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2178 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2179 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2180 sem_wait(&self->started);
2181 self->sibling_count++;
2184 /* Tell the siblings to test no policy */
2185 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2186 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2187 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2189 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2191 /* Ensure they are both upset about lacking nnp. */
2192 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2193 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS, (long)status);
2194 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2195 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS, (long)status);
2198 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_no_filter)
2203 /* start siblings before any prctl() operations */
2204 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2205 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2206 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2207 sem_wait(&self->started);
2208 self->sibling_count++;
2211 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2212 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2215 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2217 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2218 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2221 TH_LOG("Could install filter on all threads!");
2224 /* Tell the siblings to test the policy */
2225 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2226 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2227 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2229 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2231 /* Ensure they are both killed and don't exit cleanly. */
2232 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2233 EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
2234 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2235 EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
2238 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_one_divergence)
2243 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2244 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2247 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
2248 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2249 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2252 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
2254 self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
2255 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2256 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2258 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2259 sem_wait(&self->started);
2260 self->sibling_count++;
2263 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2265 ASSERT_EQ(self->sibling[0].system_tid, ret) {
2266 TH_LOG("Did not fail on diverged sibling.");
2269 /* Wake the threads */
2270 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2271 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2272 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2274 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2276 /* Ensure they are both unkilled. */
2277 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
2278 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
2279 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
2280 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
2283 TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_not_under_filter)
2288 ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2289 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2293 * Sibling 0 will have its own seccomp policy
2294 * and Sibling 1 will not be under seccomp at
2295 * all. Sibling 1 will enter seccomp and 0
2296 * will cause failure.
2298 self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
2299 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
2300 tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
2302 while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
2303 sem_wait(&self->started);
2304 self->sibling_count++;
2307 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
2308 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2309 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2312 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
2315 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2317 ASSERT_EQ(ret, self->sibling[0].system_tid) {
2318 TH_LOG("Did not fail on diverged sibling.");
2321 if (ret == self->sibling[0].system_tid)
2324 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2326 /* Increment the other siblings num_waits so we can clean up
2327 * the one we just saw.
2329 self->sibling[!sib].num_waits += 1;
2331 /* Signal the thread to clean up*/
2332 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2333 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2335 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2336 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[sib].tid, &status);
2337 EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
2338 /* Poll for actual task death. pthread_join doesn't guarantee it. */
2339 while (!kill(self->sibling[sib].system_tid, 0))
2341 /* Switch to the remaining sibling */
2344 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2347 TH_LOG("Expected the remaining sibling to sync");
2350 pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
2352 /* If remaining sibling didn't have a chance to wake up during
2353 * the first broadcast, manually reduce the num_waits now.
2355 if (self->sibling[sib].num_waits > 1)
2356 self->sibling[sib].num_waits = 1;
2357 ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
2358 TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
2360 pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
2361 PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[sib].tid, &status);
2362 EXPECT_EQ(0, (long)status);
2363 /* Poll for actual task death. pthread_join doesn't guarantee it. */
2364 while (!kill(self->sibling[sib].system_tid, 0))
2367 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
2369 ASSERT_EQ(0, ret); /* just us chickens */
2372 /* Make sure restarted syscalls are seen directly as "restart_syscall". */
2373 TEST(syscall_restart)
2380 siginfo_t info = { };
2381 struct sock_filter filter[] = {
2382 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
2383 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
2385 #ifdef __NR_sigreturn
2386 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_sigreturn, 6, 0),
2388 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 5, 0),
2389 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_exit, 4, 0),
2390 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_rt_sigreturn, 3, 0),
2391 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_nanosleep, 4, 0),
2392 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_restart_syscall, 4, 0),
2394 /* Allow __NR_write for easy logging. */
2395 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_write, 0, 1),
2396 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2397 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
2398 /* The nanosleep jump target. */
2399 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE|0x100),
2400 /* The restart_syscall jump target. */
2401 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE|0x200),
2403 struct sock_fprog prog = {
2404 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
2407 #if defined(__arm__)
2408 struct utsname utsbuf;
2411 ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(pipefd));
2414 ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
2415 if (child_pid == 0) {
2416 /* Child uses EXPECT not ASSERT to deliver status correctly. */
2418 struct timespec timeout = { };
2420 /* Attach parent as tracer and stop. */
2421 EXPECT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME));
2422 EXPECT_EQ(0, raise(SIGSTOP));
2424 EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1]));
2426 EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
2427 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
2430 ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
2432 TH_LOG("Failed to install filter!");
2435 EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipefd[0], &buf, 1)) {
2436 TH_LOG("Failed to read() sync from parent");
2438 EXPECT_EQ('.', buf) {
2439 TH_LOG("Failed to get sync data from read()");
2442 /* Start nanosleep to be interrupted. */
2445 EXPECT_EQ(0, nanosleep(&timeout, NULL)) {
2446 TH_LOG("Call to nanosleep() failed (errno %d)", errno);
2449 /* Read final sync from parent. */
2450 EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipefd[0], &buf, 1)) {
2451 TH_LOG("Failed final read() from parent");
2453 EXPECT_EQ('!', buf) {
2454 TH_LOG("Failed to get final data from read()");
2457 /* Directly report the status of our test harness results. */
2458 syscall(__NR_exit, _metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS
2461 EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[0]));
2463 /* Attach to child, setup options, and release. */
2464 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2465 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2466 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child_pid, NULL,
2467 PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP));
2468 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2469 ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipefd[1], ".", 1));
2471 /* Wait for nanosleep() to start. */
2472 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2473 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2474 ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP, WSTOPSIG(status));
2475 ASSERT_EQ(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, (status >> 16));
2476 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, child_pid, NULL, &msg));
2477 ASSERT_EQ(0x100, msg);
2478 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_nanosleep, get_syscall(_metadata, child_pid));
2480 /* Might as well check siginfo for sanity while we're here. */
2481 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, child_pid, NULL, &info));
2482 ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP, info.si_signo);
2483 ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP << 8), info.si_code);
2484 EXPECT_EQ(0, info.si_errno);
2485 EXPECT_EQ(getuid(), info.si_uid);
2486 /* Verify signal delivery came from child (seccomp-triggered). */
2487 EXPECT_EQ(child_pid, info.si_pid);
2489 /* Interrupt nanosleep with SIGSTOP (which we'll need to handle). */
2490 ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(child_pid, SIGSTOP));
2491 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2492 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2493 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2494 ASSERT_EQ(SIGSTOP, WSTOPSIG(status));
2495 /* Verify signal delivery came from parent now. */
2496 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, child_pid, NULL, &info));
2497 EXPECT_EQ(getpid(), info.si_pid);
2499 /* Restart nanosleep with SIGCONT, which triggers restart_syscall. */
2500 ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(child_pid, SIGCONT));
2501 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2502 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2503 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2504 ASSERT_EQ(SIGCONT, WSTOPSIG(status));
2505 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2507 /* Wait for restart_syscall() to start. */
2508 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2509 ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
2510 ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP, WSTOPSIG(status));
2511 ASSERT_EQ(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, (status >> 16));
2512 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, child_pid, NULL, &msg));
2514 ASSERT_EQ(0x200, msg);
2515 ret = get_syscall(_metadata, child_pid);
2516 #if defined(__arm__)
2519 * - native ARM registers do NOT expose true syscall.
2520 * - compat ARM registers on ARM64 DO expose true syscall.
2522 ASSERT_EQ(0, uname(&utsbuf));
2523 if (strncmp(utsbuf.machine, "arm", 3) == 0) {
2524 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_nanosleep, ret);
2528 EXPECT_EQ(__NR_restart_syscall, ret);
2531 /* Write again to end test. */
2532 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
2533 ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipefd[1], "!", 1));
2534 EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1]));
2536 ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
2537 if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status))
2538 _metadata->passed = 0;
2541 TEST_SIGNAL(filter_flag_log, SIGSYS)
2543 struct sock_filter allow_filter[] = {
2544 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2546 struct sock_filter kill_filter[] = {
2547 BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
2548 offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
2549 BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
2550 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
2551 BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
2553 struct sock_fprog allow_prog = {
2554 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(allow_filter),
2555 .filter = allow_filter,
2557 struct sock_fprog kill_prog = {
2558 .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(kill_filter),
2559 .filter = kill_filter,
2562 pid_t parent = getppid();
2564 ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
2567 /* Verify that the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag isn't accepted in strict mode */
2568 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
2570 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2571 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2574 TH_LOG("Kernel accepted FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag in strict mode!");
2576 EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
2577 TH_LOG("Kernel returned unexpected errno for FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag in strict mode!");
2580 /* Verify that a simple, permissive filter can be added with no flags */
2581 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &allow_prog);
2584 /* See if the same filter can be added with the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag */
2585 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
2587 ASSERT_NE(EINVAL, errno) {
2588 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag!");
2592 /* Ensure that the kill filter works with the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag */
2593 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
2597 EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
2598 /* getpid() should never return. */
2599 EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
2602 TEST(get_action_avail)
2604 __u32 actions[] = { SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
2605 SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE,
2606 SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW };
2607 __u32 unknown_action = 0x10000000U;
2611 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[0]);
2612 ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
2613 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
2615 ASSERT_NE(EINVAL, errno) {
2616 TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL operation!");
2620 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(actions); i++) {
2621 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[i]);
2623 TH_LOG("Expected action (0x%X) not available!",
2628 /* Check that an unknown action is handled properly (EOPNOTSUPP) */
2629 ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &unknown_action);
2631 EXPECT_EQ(errno, EOPNOTSUPP);
2636 * - add microbenchmarks
2637 * - expand NNP testing
2638 * - better arch-specific TRACE and TRAP handlers.
2639 * - endianness checking when appropriate
2640 * - 64-bit arg prodding
2641 * - arch value testing (x86 modes especially)
2642 * - verify that FILTER_FLAG_LOG filters generate log messages