2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 #include <linux/xattr.h>
22 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
23 #include <linux/mount.h>
24 #include <linux/stat.h>
26 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
28 #include <linux/tcp.h>
29 #include <linux/udp.h>
30 #include <linux/dccp.h>
31 #include <linux/slab.h>
32 #include <linux/mutex.h>
33 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
34 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
37 #include <linux/audit.h>
38 #include <linux/magic.h>
39 #include <linux/dcache.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/msg.h>
42 #include <linux/shm.h>
43 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
44 #include <linux/parser.h>
47 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
48 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
50 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
51 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
54 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
55 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
57 static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
60 static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
61 {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
62 {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
63 {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
64 {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
65 {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
69 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
70 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
71 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
72 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
73 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
74 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
77 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
87 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
89 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
100 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
101 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
103 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
107 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
110 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
111 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
112 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
116 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
119 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
120 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
123 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
124 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
128 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
131 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
132 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
133 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
134 acc, current->comm, note);
138 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
141 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
142 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
144 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
145 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
146 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
150 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
153 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
154 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
155 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
156 current->comm, otp->comm);
160 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
163 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
164 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
166 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
167 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
168 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
170 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
171 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
172 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
176 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
178 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
179 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
180 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
182 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
184 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
185 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
186 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
190 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
193 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
194 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
196 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
197 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
198 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
199 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
200 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
202 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
203 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
204 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
208 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
211 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
212 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
213 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
214 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
219 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
222 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
223 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
226 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
227 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
228 struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
229 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
230 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
232 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
233 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
234 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
238 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
241 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
242 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
243 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
244 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
249 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
253 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
254 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
255 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
256 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
258 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
259 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
261 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
266 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
268 if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
269 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
271 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
273 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
275 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
281 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
289 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
290 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
292 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
294 static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
296 struct inode_smack *isp;
298 isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
302 isp->smk_inode = skp;
304 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
310 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
311 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
312 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
313 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
315 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
317 static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
318 struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
320 struct task_smack *tsp;
322 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
326 tsp->smk_task = task;
327 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
328 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
329 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
330 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
336 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
337 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
338 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
339 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
341 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
343 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
346 struct smack_rule *nrp;
347 struct smack_rule *orp;
350 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
352 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
353 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
359 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
365 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
366 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
367 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
368 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
370 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
372 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
375 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
376 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
378 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
380 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
381 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
383 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
386 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
387 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
394 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
395 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
397 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
399 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
401 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
402 return MAY_READWRITE;
403 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
410 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
411 * @tracer: tracer process
412 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
413 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
414 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
416 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
418 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
419 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
420 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
423 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
424 struct task_smack *tsp;
425 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
427 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
428 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
429 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
434 tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
435 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
437 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
438 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
439 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
440 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
442 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
444 else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
450 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
451 tracee_known->smk_known,
458 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
459 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
467 * We he, that is fun!
471 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
472 * @ctp: child task pointer
473 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
475 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
477 * Do the capability checks.
479 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
481 struct smack_known *skp;
483 skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
485 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
489 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
490 * @ptp: parent task pointer
492 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
494 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
496 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
499 struct smack_known *skp;
501 skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
503 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
508 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
509 * @type: message type
511 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
513 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
516 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
518 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
521 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
533 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
534 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
536 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
538 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
540 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
542 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
547 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
548 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
549 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
550 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
552 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
554 sb->s_security = sbsp;
560 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
561 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
564 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
566 kfree(sb->s_security);
567 sb->s_security = NULL;
571 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
572 * @orig: where to start
573 * @smackopts: mount options string
575 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
577 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
580 static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
582 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
584 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
585 if (otheropts == NULL)
588 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
589 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
591 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
593 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
595 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
597 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
602 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
611 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
612 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
618 * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
619 * @options: mount options string
620 * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
622 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
624 * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
626 static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
627 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
630 char *fsdefault = NULL;
631 char *fsfloor = NULL;
634 char *fstransmute = NULL;
636 int num_mnt_opts = 0;
639 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
644 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
645 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
650 token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
656 fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
663 fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
670 fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
677 fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
681 case Opt_fstransmute:
684 fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
690 pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
695 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
699 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
701 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
702 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
707 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
708 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
711 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
712 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
715 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
716 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
719 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
720 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
723 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
724 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
727 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
732 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
744 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
745 * @sb: the file system superblock
746 * @opts: Smack mount options
747 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
748 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
750 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
752 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
755 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
756 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
757 unsigned long kern_flags,
758 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
760 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
761 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
762 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
763 struct inode_smack *isp;
764 struct smack_known *skp;
766 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
769 if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
772 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
774 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
775 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
777 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
780 sp->smk_default = skp;
783 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
789 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
795 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
801 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
812 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
814 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
819 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
821 skp = smk_of_current();
823 sp->smk_default = skp;
825 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
826 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
827 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
829 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
830 sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
831 sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
833 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
838 * Initialize the root inode.
840 isp = inode->i_security;
842 isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
845 inode->i_security = isp;
847 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
850 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
856 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
857 * @sb: the file system superblock
858 * @flags: the mount flags
859 * @data: the smack mount options
861 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
863 static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
866 char *options = data;
867 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
869 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
874 rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
879 rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
882 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
887 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
888 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
890 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
891 * and error code otherwise
893 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
895 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
897 struct smk_audit_info ad;
899 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
900 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
902 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
903 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
912 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
913 * @bprm: the exec information
915 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
917 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
919 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
920 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
921 struct inode_smack *isp;
922 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
925 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
928 isp = inode->i_security;
929 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
932 sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
933 if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
934 isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
937 if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
938 struct task_struct *tracer;
942 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
943 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
944 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
952 } else if (bprm->unsafe)
955 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
956 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
962 * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
965 * @bprm: binprm for exec
967 static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
969 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
971 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
972 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
976 * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
977 * @bprm: binprm for exec
979 * Returns 0 on success.
981 static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
983 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
985 if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
996 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
997 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
999 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
1001 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1003 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1005 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
1006 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
1012 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
1013 * @inode: the inode with a blob
1015 * Clears the blob pointer in inode
1017 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1019 kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
1020 inode->i_security = NULL;
1024 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
1025 * @inode: the newly created inode
1026 * @dir: containing directory object
1028 * @name: where to put the attribute name
1029 * @value: where to put the attribute value
1030 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
1032 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
1034 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1035 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
1036 void **value, size_t *len)
1038 struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1039 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1040 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1041 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1045 *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1049 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1054 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
1055 * the directory requests transmutation then
1056 * by all means transmute.
1057 * Mark the inode as changed.
1059 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1060 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
1062 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1065 *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1069 *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1076 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1077 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1079 * @new_dentry: the new object
1081 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1083 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1084 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1086 struct smack_known *isp;
1087 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1090 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1091 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1093 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1094 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1095 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1097 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1098 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1099 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1100 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1101 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1108 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1109 * @dir: containing directory object
1110 * @dentry: file to unlink
1112 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1113 * and the object, error code otherwise
1115 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1117 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1118 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1121 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1122 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1125 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1127 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1128 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1131 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1133 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1134 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1135 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1136 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1142 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1143 * @dir: containing directory object
1144 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1146 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1147 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1149 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1151 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1154 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1155 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1158 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1160 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1161 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1164 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1166 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1167 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1168 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1169 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1176 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1177 * @old_inode: unused
1178 * @old_dentry: the old object
1179 * @new_inode: unused
1180 * @new_dentry: the new object
1182 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1185 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1187 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1188 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1189 struct inode *new_inode,
1190 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1193 struct smack_known *isp;
1194 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1196 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1197 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1199 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1200 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1201 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1203 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1204 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1205 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1206 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1207 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1213 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1214 * @inode: the inode in question
1215 * @mask: the access requested
1217 * This is the important Smack hook.
1219 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
1221 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1223 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1224 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1225 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1228 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1230 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1235 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1236 if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1240 /* May be droppable after audit */
1243 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1244 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1245 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1246 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1251 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1252 * @dentry: the object
1253 * @iattr: for the force flag
1255 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1257 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1259 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1263 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1265 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1267 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1268 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1270 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1271 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1276 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1277 * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
1278 * @dentry: the object
1280 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1282 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1284 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1285 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1288 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1289 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1290 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1291 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1296 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1297 * @dentry: the object
1298 * @name: name of the attribute
1299 * @value: value of the attribute
1300 * @size: size of the value
1303 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1305 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1307 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1308 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1310 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1311 struct smack_known *skp;
1313 int check_import = 0;
1318 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1320 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1321 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1322 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1325 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1326 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1330 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1332 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1333 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1336 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1338 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1341 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1342 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1345 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1346 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1350 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1351 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1354 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1355 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1362 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1364 * @name: attribute name
1365 * @value: attribute value
1366 * @size: attribute size
1369 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1370 * in the master label list.
1372 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1373 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1375 struct smack_known *skp;
1376 struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1378 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1379 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1383 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1384 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1386 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1388 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
1389 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1390 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1392 isp->smk_task = skp;
1394 isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
1395 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1396 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1398 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1400 isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
1407 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1408 * @dentry: the object
1411 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1413 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1415 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1418 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1419 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1421 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1422 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1427 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1428 * @dentry: the object
1429 * @name: name of the attribute
1431 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1433 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1435 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1437 struct inode_smack *isp;
1438 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1441 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1442 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1443 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1444 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1445 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1446 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1447 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1450 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1455 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1456 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1458 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1459 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1463 isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1465 * Don't do anything special for these.
1466 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1467 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1469 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1470 struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1471 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
1473 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1474 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1475 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1476 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1477 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1478 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1479 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1485 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1486 * @inode: the object
1487 * @name: attribute name
1488 * @buffer: where to put the result
1491 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1493 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1494 const char *name, void **buffer,
1497 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1498 struct socket *sock;
1499 struct super_block *sbp;
1500 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1501 struct smack_known *isp;
1505 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1506 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1507 ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1508 *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1513 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1516 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1519 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1520 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1523 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1525 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1527 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1532 ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1534 *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1543 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1544 * @inode: the object
1545 * @buffer: where they go
1546 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1548 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1551 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1553 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1554 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1560 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1561 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1562 * @secid: where result will be saved
1564 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1566 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1568 *secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
1576 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1578 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1579 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1580 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1582 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1583 * label changing that SELinux does.
1587 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1590 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1591 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1593 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1594 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1598 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1600 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1602 file->f_security = skp;
1607 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1610 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1611 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1613 static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1615 file->f_security = NULL;
1619 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1624 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1626 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1628 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1632 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1633 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1635 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1636 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1638 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1639 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1640 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1643 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1644 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1645 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1652 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1656 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1658 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1660 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1662 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1664 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1665 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1666 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1667 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1672 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1674 * @cmd: what action to check
1677 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1678 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1679 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1681 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1683 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1686 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1688 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1695 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1696 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1697 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1698 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1702 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1703 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1704 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1705 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1716 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1717 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1718 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1719 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1720 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1721 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1722 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1724 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1725 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1726 unsigned long flags)
1728 struct smack_known *skp;
1729 struct smack_known *mkp;
1730 struct smack_rule *srp;
1731 struct task_smack *tsp;
1732 struct smack_known *okp;
1733 struct inode_smack *isp;
1734 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1743 isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
1744 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1746 sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
1747 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1748 isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1750 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1752 tsp = current_security();
1753 skp = smk_of_current();
1758 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1759 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1760 * to that rule's object label.
1762 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1763 okp = srp->smk_object;
1765 * Matching labels always allows access.
1767 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1770 * If there is a matching local rule take
1771 * that into account as well.
1773 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1777 may = srp->smk_access;
1779 may &= srp->smk_access;
1781 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1782 * possibly have less access.
1788 * Fetch the global list entry.
1789 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1790 * can't have as much access as current.
1792 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1794 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1799 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1800 * potential access, too.
1802 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1804 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1808 * If there is any access available to current that is
1809 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1812 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1824 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1825 * @file: object in question
1828 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1830 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1834 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1835 * @tsk: The target task
1836 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1839 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1841 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1842 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1844 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1845 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1847 struct smack_known *skp;
1848 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1851 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1854 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1856 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1858 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1859 skp = file->f_security;
1860 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1861 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1862 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1865 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1866 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1867 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1872 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1875 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1877 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1881 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1882 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1883 struct socket *sock;
1884 struct task_smack *tsp;
1885 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1887 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1890 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1891 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1893 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
1894 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1895 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1896 tsp = current_security();
1898 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1899 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1900 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1901 * the passed socket.
1903 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1904 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1907 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1908 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1912 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1914 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1916 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1919 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1920 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1925 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1927 * @cred: task credential
1929 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1930 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1931 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1932 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1936 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1938 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1939 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1940 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1943 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1946 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1947 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1948 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1949 rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1959 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1960 * @new: the new credentials
1961 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1963 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1964 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1965 * complete without error.
1967 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1969 struct task_smack *tsp;
1971 tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1975 cred->security = tsp;
1982 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1983 * @cred: the credentials in question
1986 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1988 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1989 struct smack_rule *rp;
1990 struct list_head *l;
1991 struct list_head *n;
1995 cred->security = NULL;
1997 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1999 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
2000 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
2001 list_del(&rp->list);
2008 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
2009 * @new: the new credentials
2010 * @old: the original credentials
2011 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2013 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
2015 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2018 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2019 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
2022 new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
2023 if (new_tsp == NULL)
2026 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2030 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2035 new->security = new_tsp;
2040 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2041 * @new: the new credentials
2042 * @old: the original credentials
2044 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2046 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2048 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2049 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2051 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
2052 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
2053 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
2054 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
2057 /* cbs copy rule list */
2061 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2062 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2063 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2065 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2067 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2069 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2070 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2075 new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
2080 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2081 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2082 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2084 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2085 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2087 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2088 struct inode *inode)
2090 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2091 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
2093 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2094 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2099 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2100 * @p: the task object
2101 * @access: the access requested
2102 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2104 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2106 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2109 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2110 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2113 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2114 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2115 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2116 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2121 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2122 * @p: the task object
2125 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2127 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2129 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2133 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2134 * @p: the object task
2136 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2138 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2140 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2144 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2145 * @p: the object task
2147 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2149 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2151 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2155 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2156 * @p: the object task
2157 * @secid: where to put the result
2159 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2161 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2163 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2165 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2169 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2170 * @p: the task object
2173 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2175 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2177 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2181 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2182 * @p: the task object
2185 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2187 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2189 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2193 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2194 * @p: the task object
2196 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2198 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2200 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2204 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2205 * @p: the task object
2209 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2211 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2213 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2217 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2218 * @p: the task object
2220 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2222 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2224 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2228 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2229 * @p: the task object
2231 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2233 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2235 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2239 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2240 * @p: the task object
2243 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
2245 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2247 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
2248 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
2250 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2253 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2254 struct smack_known *skp;
2255 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2259 return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2261 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2262 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2264 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2265 * can write the receiver.
2268 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2269 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2273 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
2274 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2275 * we can't take privilege into account.
2277 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2278 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2279 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2284 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
2285 * @p: task to wait for
2289 static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2292 * Allow the operation to succeed.
2294 * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
2295 * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
2296 * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
2297 * may expect to know when the child exits.
2303 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2304 * @p: task to copy from
2305 * @inode: inode to copy to
2307 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2309 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2311 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2312 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2314 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2322 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2325 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2327 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2329 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2331 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2333 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2334 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2336 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2342 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2344 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2350 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2353 * Clears the blob pointer
2355 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2357 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2361 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2362 * @sip: the object end
2364 * looks for host based access restrictions
2366 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2367 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2368 * taken before calling this function.
2370 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2372 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2374 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2375 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2377 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2380 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2382 * we break after finding the first match because
2383 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2384 * so we have found the most specific match
2386 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2387 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2388 return snp->smk_label;
2393 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2395 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2398 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2400 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2402 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2403 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2405 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2406 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2412 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2413 * @sip: the object end
2415 * looks for host based access restrictions
2417 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2418 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2419 * taken before calling this function.
2421 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2423 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2425 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2426 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2431 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2433 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2436 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2438 * we break after finding the first match because
2439 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2440 * so we have found the most specific match
2442 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2444 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2445 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2447 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2449 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2450 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2456 return snp->smk_label;
2461 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2464 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
2466 * @labeled: socket label scheme
2468 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
2469 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
2471 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2473 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
2475 struct smack_known *skp;
2476 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2480 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
2481 * packet labeling based on the label.
2482 * The case of a single label host is different, because
2483 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
2484 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
2488 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2490 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
2491 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
2492 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2495 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2505 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
2507 * @sap: the destination address
2509 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2510 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2512 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2515 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2517 struct smack_known *skp;
2520 struct smack_known *hkp;
2521 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2522 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2525 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2528 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2530 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2531 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2532 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2533 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2535 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
2537 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2538 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2540 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
2547 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
2550 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2552 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2553 * @subject: subject Smack label
2554 * @object: object Smack label
2556 * @act: the action being taken
2558 * Check an IPv6 access
2560 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2561 struct smack_known *object,
2562 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2565 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2567 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2571 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2572 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2573 ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2574 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2575 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2577 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2579 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2580 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2583 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2585 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2587 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2591 * Create or update the port list entry
2593 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2595 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2596 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2597 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2598 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2599 unsigned short port = 0;
2601 if (address == NULL) {
2603 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2604 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2607 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2608 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2610 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2611 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2615 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2616 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2621 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2622 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2624 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2630 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2631 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2633 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2634 if (spp->smk_port != port)
2636 spp->smk_port = port;
2638 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2639 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2644 * A new port entry is required.
2646 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2650 spp->smk_port = port;
2652 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2653 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2655 list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2660 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2664 * Create or update the port list entry
2666 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2669 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2670 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2671 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2672 unsigned short port;
2673 struct smack_known *object;
2675 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2676 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2677 object = ssp->smk_in;
2680 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2684 * The other end is a single label host.
2686 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2687 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2689 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2691 object = smack_net_ambient;
2694 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2696 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2697 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2700 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2702 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2705 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2706 list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2707 if (spp->smk_port != port)
2709 object = spp->smk_in;
2710 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2711 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2715 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2717 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2720 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2721 * @inode: the object
2722 * @name: attribute name
2723 * @value: attribute value
2724 * @size: size of the attribute
2727 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2729 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2731 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2732 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2734 struct smack_known *skp;
2735 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
2736 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2737 struct socket *sock;
2740 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2743 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2745 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2747 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2748 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2749 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2753 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2755 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2758 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2759 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2762 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2764 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2766 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2768 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2769 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2772 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2778 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2779 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2780 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2787 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2789 * @family: protocol family
2794 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2796 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2798 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2799 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2801 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2803 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2807 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2809 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2810 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2811 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2812 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2815 if (family != PF_INET)
2818 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2820 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2823 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2825 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2827 * @address: the port address
2828 * @addrlen: size of the address
2830 * Records the label bound to a port.
2834 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2837 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2838 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2841 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2844 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2846 * @sap: the other end
2847 * @addrlen: size of sap
2849 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2851 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2853 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2857 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2858 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2860 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2861 struct smack_known *rsp;
2862 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2865 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2868 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
2870 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2872 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2875 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
2877 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2878 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2880 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2883 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2884 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2892 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2893 * @flags: the S_ value
2895 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2897 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2901 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2903 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2905 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2912 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2917 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2919 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2921 msg->security = skp;
2926 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2929 * Clears the blob pointer
2931 static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2933 msg->security = NULL;
2937 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2940 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2942 static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2944 return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2948 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2953 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2955 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2956 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2958 isp->security = skp;
2963 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2966 * Clears the blob pointer
2968 static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2970 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2972 isp->security = NULL;
2976 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2978 * @access : access requested
2980 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2982 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2984 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2985 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2989 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2990 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
2992 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2993 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
2998 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
3000 * @shmflg: access requested
3002 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3004 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3008 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3009 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3013 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
3015 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3017 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3019 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3032 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3037 * System level information.
3043 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3047 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3050 * @shmflg: access requested
3052 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3054 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
3059 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3060 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3064 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
3067 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3069 static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
3071 return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
3075 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
3080 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3082 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3083 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3085 isp->security = skp;
3090 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
3093 * Clears the blob pointer
3095 static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3097 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3099 isp->security = NULL;
3103 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3105 * @access : access requested
3107 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3109 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
3111 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
3112 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3116 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3117 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
3119 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3120 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3125 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3127 * @semflg: access requested
3129 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3131 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3135 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3136 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3140 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3142 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3144 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3146 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3164 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3169 * System level information
3176 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3180 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3186 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3188 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3190 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
3191 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3193 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
3197 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
3202 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3204 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3205 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3207 kisp->security = skp;
3212 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
3215 * Clears the blob pointer
3217 static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3219 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3221 kisp->security = NULL;
3225 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
3228 * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
3230 static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
3232 return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
3236 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3238 * @access : access requested
3240 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3242 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
3244 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
3245 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3249 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3250 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
3252 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3253 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3258 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3260 * @msqflg: access requested
3262 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3264 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3268 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3269 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3273 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3275 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3277 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3279 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3290 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3295 * System level information
3302 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3306 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3309 * @msqflg: access requested
3311 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3313 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3318 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3319 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3323 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3330 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3332 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3333 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3335 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
3339 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3340 * @ipp: the object permissions
3341 * @flag: access requested
3343 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3345 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3347 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3348 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3349 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3353 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3354 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3356 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3357 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3362 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3363 * @ipp: the object permissions
3364 * @secid: where result will be saved
3366 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3368 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3370 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3374 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3375 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3376 * @inode: the object
3378 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3380 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3382 struct super_block *sbp;
3383 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3384 struct inode_smack *isp;
3385 struct smack_known *skp;
3386 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3387 struct smack_known *final;
3388 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3396 isp = inode->i_security;
3398 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
3400 * If the inode is already instantiated
3401 * take the quick way out
3403 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3407 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3409 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3410 * if there's no label on the file.
3412 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3415 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3416 * may be in the process of initialization.
3417 * If that is the case use the root value out
3418 * of the superblock.
3420 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3421 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3422 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3424 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3425 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3428 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3429 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3430 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3434 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3435 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3437 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3440 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3443 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3446 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3451 * This is pretty hackish.
3452 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3453 * file system specific code, but it does help
3454 * with keeping it simple.
3456 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3460 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3462 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3463 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3464 * extended attributes.
3466 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
3468 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3469 * structures associated with the task involved.
3471 * Cgroupfs is special
3473 final = &smack_known_star;
3475 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3477 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3478 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3483 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3485 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3486 * The superblock default suffices.
3491 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3492 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3493 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3495 final = &smack_known_star;
3499 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3500 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3501 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3502 * superblock default.
3506 * This isn't an understood special case.
3507 * Get the value from the xattr.
3511 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3513 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3514 final = &smack_known_star;
3518 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3519 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3520 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3521 * does not match that assigned.
3523 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3526 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3528 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3529 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3530 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3534 * Transmuting directory
3536 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3538 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3539 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3540 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3541 * and mark the inode.
3543 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3544 * directory mark the inode.
3546 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3547 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3548 rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode,
3549 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3550 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3553 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3554 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3556 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3557 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3561 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3564 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3566 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3567 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3568 skp == &smack_known_web)
3570 isp->smk_task = skp;
3572 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3573 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3574 skp == &smack_known_web)
3576 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3583 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3585 isp->smk_inode = final;
3587 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3590 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
3595 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3596 * @p: the object task
3597 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3598 * @value: where to put the result
3600 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3602 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3604 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3606 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3610 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3613 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3623 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3624 * @p: the object task
3625 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3626 * @value: the value to set
3627 * @size: the size of the value
3629 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3630 * is permitted and only with privilege
3632 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3634 static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
3635 void *value, size_t size)
3637 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
3639 struct smack_known *skp;
3640 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3644 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
3645 * and supports no sane use case.
3650 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3653 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3656 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3659 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3661 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3664 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
3666 if (skp == &smack_known_web)
3669 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3671 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3672 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3680 new = prepare_creds();
3684 tsp = new->security;
3685 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3687 * process can change its label only once
3689 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3696 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3698 * @other: the other sock
3701 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3702 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3704 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3705 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3707 struct smack_known *skp;
3708 struct smack_known *okp;
3709 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3710 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3711 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3712 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3715 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3718 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3722 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3723 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3725 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3726 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3730 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3731 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3737 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3740 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3741 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3748 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3750 * @other: the other socket
3752 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3753 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3755 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3757 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3758 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3759 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3763 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3765 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3766 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3769 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3772 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3773 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3778 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3781 * @size: the size of the message
3783 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3784 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3785 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3787 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3790 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3791 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3792 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3794 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3795 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3796 struct smack_known *rsp;
3801 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3806 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3808 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
3811 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3812 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3814 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3817 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3818 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3826 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3827 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3828 * @ssp: socket security information
3830 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3832 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3833 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3835 struct smack_known *skp;
3840 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3842 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3843 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3844 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3846 * Look it up in the label table
3847 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3848 * for the packet fall back on the network
3852 list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3853 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3856 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3858 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3859 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3860 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3864 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3865 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3867 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3868 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3870 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3883 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3884 return &smack_known_web;
3885 return &smack_known_star;
3887 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
3889 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3891 skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3893 * This has got to be a bug because it is
3894 * impossible to specify a fallback without
3895 * specifying the label, which will ensure
3896 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
3897 * secid is from a fallback.
3899 BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
3903 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3904 * for the packet fall back on the network
3907 return smack_net_ambient;
3910 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3911 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3915 int proto = -EINVAL;
3916 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3917 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3919 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3920 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3921 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3925 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3926 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3929 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3931 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3932 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3933 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3940 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3942 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3945 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3947 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3950 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3952 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3957 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3960 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3964 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3966 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3968 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3969 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3970 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3972 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3974 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3976 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3977 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3979 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3981 switch (sk->sk_family) {
3983 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3985 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3986 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3987 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3989 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
3990 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3993 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
3995 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3997 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3999 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
4001 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4003 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4005 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4007 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4011 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4012 ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4013 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4014 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4017 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
4018 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
4019 * This is the simplist possible security model
4022 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4023 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4026 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, sk->sk_family, rc, 0);
4028 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4030 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4031 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
4033 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4034 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
4035 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4037 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4039 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4041 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4042 ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4043 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4044 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4045 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4046 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4047 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4049 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4050 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4051 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4052 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4054 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4061 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4063 * @optval: user's destination
4064 * @optlen: size thereof
4067 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4069 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4070 char __user *optval,
4071 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4073 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4078 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4079 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4080 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4081 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4086 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4089 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4097 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4098 * @sock: the peer socket
4100 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4102 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4104 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4105 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4108 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4109 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4110 struct smack_known *skp;
4111 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4112 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4116 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4118 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4119 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4121 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4123 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4124 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4128 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4129 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4132 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4138 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4140 if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
4141 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4142 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4143 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4145 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4148 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4151 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4163 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4165 * @parent: parent socket
4167 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4168 * is creating the new socket.
4170 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4172 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4173 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4176 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4179 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4182 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4186 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4187 * @sk: socket involved
4191 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4192 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4194 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4195 struct request_sock *req)
4197 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4198 struct smack_known *skp;
4199 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4200 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4201 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4203 struct smack_known *hskp;
4205 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4207 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4210 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4211 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4213 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4214 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4215 * processing on IPv6.
4217 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4222 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4224 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4226 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4227 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4228 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4230 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4231 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4234 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4236 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4237 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4239 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4241 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4242 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4244 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4249 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4250 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4251 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4252 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4255 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4256 * here. Read access is not required.
4258 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4259 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4264 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4265 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4267 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4270 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4271 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4272 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4275 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4277 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4281 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4283 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4289 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4290 * @sk: the new socket
4291 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4293 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4295 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4296 const struct request_sock *req)
4298 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4299 struct smack_known *skp;
4301 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4302 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4303 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4305 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4309 * Key management security hooks
4311 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4312 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4313 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4318 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4320 * @cred: the credentials to use
4323 * No allocation required
4327 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4328 unsigned long flags)
4330 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4332 key->security = skp;
4337 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4340 * Clear the blob pointer
4342 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4344 key->security = NULL;
4348 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4349 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4350 * @cred: the credentials to use
4351 * @perm: requested key permissions
4353 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4354 * an error code otherwise
4356 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4357 const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
4360 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4361 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4365 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4369 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4372 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4375 * This should not occur
4380 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4381 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4382 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4384 if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
4386 if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
4387 request = MAY_WRITE;
4388 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4389 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4394 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4395 * @key points to the key to be queried
4396 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4397 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4398 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4400 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4402 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4404 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4408 if (key->security == NULL) {
4413 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4416 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4422 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4427 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4428 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4429 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4430 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4432 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4433 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4434 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4435 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4440 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4441 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4442 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4443 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4444 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4446 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4447 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4449 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4451 struct smack_known *skp;
4452 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4455 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4458 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4461 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4463 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4465 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4471 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4472 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4474 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4475 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4476 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4478 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4480 struct audit_field *f;
4483 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4484 f = &krule->fields[i];
4486 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4494 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4495 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4496 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4497 * @op: required testing operator
4498 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4499 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
4501 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4502 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4504 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
4505 struct audit_context *actx)
4507 struct smack_known *skp;
4510 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4511 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4515 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4518 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4521 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4522 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4525 if (op == Audit_equal)
4526 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4527 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4528 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4534 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4535 * No memory was allocated.
4538 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4541 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4542 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4544 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4546 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4551 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4552 * @secid: incoming integer
4553 * @secdata: destination
4554 * @seclen: how long it is
4556 * Exists for networking code.
4558 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4560 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4563 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4564 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4569 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4570 * @secdata: smack label
4571 * @seclen: how long result is
4572 * @secid: outgoing integer
4574 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4576 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4578 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4581 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4588 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4589 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4590 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4593 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4595 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4598 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4600 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4603 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4606 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
4614 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
4615 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4616 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4620 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
4622 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
4623 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4624 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4625 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
4627 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
4628 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
4629 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
4631 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4632 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
4633 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4634 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4635 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4636 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4637 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4638 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4639 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4640 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4641 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4642 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4643 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4644 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4645 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4646 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4647 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4648 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4650 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4651 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
4652 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4653 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4654 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4655 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4656 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4657 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4658 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4659 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4661 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4663 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4664 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4665 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4666 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4667 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4668 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4669 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4670 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4671 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4672 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4673 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4674 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4675 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4676 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4677 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4678 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4679 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4680 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
4681 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4683 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4684 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4686 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4687 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
4689 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
4690 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
4691 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4692 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4693 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4694 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4696 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
4697 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
4698 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4699 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4700 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4702 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
4703 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
4704 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4705 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4706 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4708 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4710 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4716 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4717 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4718 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4720 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4721 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4722 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4723 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4724 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4725 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4726 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4727 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4728 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4729 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4731 /* key management security hooks */
4733 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4734 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4735 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4736 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4737 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4741 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4742 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4743 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4744 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4746 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4747 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4748 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4749 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4750 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4751 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4755 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4758 * Initialize rule list locks
4760 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4761 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4762 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4763 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4764 mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
4765 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4767 * Initialize rule lists
4769 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4770 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4771 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4772 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4773 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
4774 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4776 * Create the known labels list
4778 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4779 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4780 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4781 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4782 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_invalid);
4783 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4787 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4791 static __init int smack_init(void)
4794 struct task_smack *tsp;
4796 if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
4799 smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
4800 if (!smack_inode_cache)
4803 tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
4806 kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
4812 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
4813 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4814 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
4816 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4817 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4819 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4820 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4824 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4826 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4827 cred->security = tsp;
4829 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4830 init_smack_known_list();
4835 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
4841 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4842 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4844 security_initcall(smack_init);