2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
65 #include "conditional.h"
73 /* Policy capability names */
74 char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
75 "network_peer_controls",
77 "extended_socket_class",
78 "always_check_network",
80 "nnp_nosuid_transition"
83 static struct selinux_ss selinux_ss;
85 void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss)
87 rwlock_init(&selinux_ss.policy_rwlock);
88 mutex_init(&selinux_ss.status_lock);
92 /* Forward declaration. */
93 static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
94 struct context *context,
98 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
99 struct context *scontext,
100 struct context *tcontext,
102 struct av_decision *avd,
103 struct extended_perms *xperms);
105 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
106 struct security_class_mapping *map,
107 struct selinux_map *out_map)
111 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
113 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
120 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
121 out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC);
122 if (!out_map->mapping)
125 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
127 while (map[j].name) {
128 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
129 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
131 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
132 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
133 p_out->num_perms = 0;
137 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
140 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
142 if (pol->reject_unknown)
144 p_out->num_perms = 0;
145 print_unknown_handle = true;
150 while (p_in->perms[k]) {
151 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
152 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
156 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
158 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
160 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
161 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
162 if (pol->reject_unknown)
164 print_unknown_handle = true;
169 p_out->num_perms = k;
172 if (print_unknown_handle)
173 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
174 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
179 kfree(out_map->mapping);
180 out_map->mapping = NULL;
185 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
188 static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass)
190 if (tclass < map->size)
191 return map->mapping[tclass].value;
197 * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
199 static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value)
203 for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) {
204 if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value)
208 return SECCLASS_NULL;
211 static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
212 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
215 if (tclass < map->size) {
216 struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
217 unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
220 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
221 if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
223 if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
226 avd->allowed = result;
228 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
229 if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
231 avd->auditallow = result;
233 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
234 if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
236 if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
240 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
241 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
242 * should audit that denial
244 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
246 avd->auditdeny = result;
250 int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
252 struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
254 return p->mls_enabled;
258 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
259 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
262 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
263 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
264 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
265 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
266 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
268 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb,
269 struct context *scontext,
270 struct context *tcontext,
271 struct context *xcontext,
272 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
276 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
277 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
278 struct constraint_expr *e;
279 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
282 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
283 switch (e->expr_type) {
299 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
303 val1 = scontext->user;
304 val2 = tcontext->user;
307 val1 = scontext->type;
308 val2 = tcontext->type;
311 val1 = scontext->role;
312 val2 = tcontext->role;
313 r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
314 r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
317 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
321 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
325 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
327 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
335 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
336 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
339 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
340 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
343 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
344 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
347 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
348 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
351 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
352 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
355 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
356 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
361 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
364 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
367 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
370 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
373 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
387 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
390 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
398 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
401 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
403 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
410 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
412 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
414 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
423 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
426 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
444 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
445 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
447 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
449 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
450 char **permission_names = args;
452 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
454 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
459 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
460 struct context *scontext,
461 struct context *tcontext,
466 struct common_datum *common_dat;
467 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
468 struct audit_buffer *ab;
470 char *scontext_name = NULL;
471 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
472 char *permission_names[32];
475 bool need_comma = false;
480 tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
481 tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
482 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
484 /* init permission_names */
486 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
487 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
490 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
491 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
494 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
495 if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext,
496 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
499 if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext,
500 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
503 /* audit a message */
504 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
505 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
509 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
510 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
511 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
513 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
514 u32 mask = (1 << index);
516 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
519 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
520 need_comma ? "," : "",
521 permission_names[index]
522 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
527 /* release scontext/tcontext */
528 kfree(tcontext_name);
529 kfree(scontext_name);
535 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
536 * on boundary constraint.
538 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
539 struct context *scontext,
540 struct context *tcontext,
542 struct av_decision *avd)
544 struct context lo_scontext;
545 struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
546 struct av_decision lo_avd;
547 struct type_datum *source;
548 struct type_datum *target;
551 source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
558 target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
562 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
564 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
565 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
567 if (target->bounds) {
568 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
569 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
570 tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
573 context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext,
579 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
582 return; /* no masked permission */
584 /* mask violated permissions */
585 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
587 /* audit masked permissions */
588 security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
589 tclass, masked, "bounds");
593 * flag which drivers have permissions
594 * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
596 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
597 struct extended_perms *xperms,
598 struct avtab_node *node)
602 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
603 /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
604 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
605 xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
606 } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
607 /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
608 security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
609 node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
612 /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
613 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
618 * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
619 * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
621 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
622 struct context *scontext,
623 struct context *tcontext,
625 struct av_decision *avd,
626 struct extended_perms *xperms)
628 struct constraint_node *constraint;
629 struct role_allow *ra;
630 struct avtab_key avkey;
631 struct avtab_node *node;
632 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
633 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
634 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
639 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
641 memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
645 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
646 if (printk_ratelimit())
647 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
651 tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
654 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
655 * this permission check, then use it.
657 avkey.target_class = tclass;
658 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
659 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
662 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
665 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
666 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
667 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
668 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
669 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
672 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
673 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
674 avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
675 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
676 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
677 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
678 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
679 else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
680 services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
683 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
684 cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
691 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
694 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
696 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
697 !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL,
699 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
701 constraint = constraint->next;
705 * If checking process transition permission and the
706 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
709 if (tclass == policydb->process_class &&
710 (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) &&
711 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
712 for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
713 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
714 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
718 avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms;
722 * If the given source and target types have boundary
723 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
724 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
726 type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
730 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state,
731 struct context *ocontext,
732 struct context *ncontext,
733 struct context *tcontext,
736 struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
737 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
738 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
740 if (context_struct_to_string(p, ocontext, &o, &olen))
742 if (context_struct_to_string(p, ncontext, &n, &nlen))
744 if (context_struct_to_string(p, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
746 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
747 "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
748 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
749 o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
755 if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
760 static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
761 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
762 u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
764 struct policydb *policydb;
765 struct sidtab *sidtab;
766 struct context *ocontext;
767 struct context *ncontext;
768 struct context *tcontext;
769 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
770 struct constraint_node *constraint;
775 if (!state->initialized)
778 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
780 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
781 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
784 tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
786 tclass = orig_tclass;
788 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
792 tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
794 ocontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, oldsid);
796 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
802 ncontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, newsid);
804 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
810 tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tasksid);
812 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
818 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
820 if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, ocontext, ncontext,
821 tcontext, constraint->expr)) {
825 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(state,
832 constraint = constraint->next;
836 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
840 int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
841 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
844 return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
848 int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
849 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
852 return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
857 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
858 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
859 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
860 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
862 * @oldsid : current security identifier
863 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
865 int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
866 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
868 struct policydb *policydb;
869 struct sidtab *sidtab;
870 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
871 struct type_datum *type;
875 if (!state->initialized)
878 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
880 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
881 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
884 old_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, old_sid);
886 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
892 new_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, new_sid);
894 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
900 /* type/domain unchanged */
901 if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
904 index = new_context->type;
906 type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
910 /* not bounded anymore */
915 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
917 if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
920 index = type->bounds;
924 char *old_name = NULL;
925 char *new_name = NULL;
928 if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, old_context,
929 &old_name, &length) &&
930 !context_struct_to_string(policydb, new_context,
931 &new_name, &length)) {
932 audit_log(audit_context(),
933 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
934 "op=security_bounded_transition "
936 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
943 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
948 static void avd_init(struct selinux_state *state, struct av_decision *avd)
952 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
953 avd->seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
957 void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
958 struct avtab_node *node)
962 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
963 if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
965 } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
966 if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
973 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
974 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
975 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
976 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
977 sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
979 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
980 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
981 xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
982 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
984 } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
985 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
986 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
987 memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
988 sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
990 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
991 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
992 xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
993 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
995 } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
996 xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
997 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
998 memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
999 sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
1001 if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
1002 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
1003 xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
1004 node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
1011 void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
1016 struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
1018 struct policydb *policydb;
1019 struct sidtab *sidtab;
1021 struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
1022 struct avtab_key avkey;
1023 struct avtab_node *node;
1024 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
1025 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
1028 xpermd->driver = driver;
1030 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1031 memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
1032 memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
1034 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1035 if (!state->initialized)
1038 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
1039 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
1041 scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
1043 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1048 tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
1050 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1055 tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
1056 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1057 if (policydb->allow_unknown)
1063 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
1064 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
1068 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1069 avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
1070 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
1071 scontext->type - 1);
1073 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
1074 tcontext->type - 1);
1076 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
1077 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
1078 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
1079 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
1080 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
1083 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
1084 services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
1086 cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab,
1091 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1094 memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
1099 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
1100 * @ssid: source security identifier
1101 * @tsid: target security identifier
1102 * @tclass: target security class
1103 * @avd: access vector decisions
1104 * @xperms: extended permissions
1106 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
1107 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
1109 void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
1113 struct av_decision *avd,
1114 struct extended_perms *xperms)
1116 struct policydb *policydb;
1117 struct sidtab *sidtab;
1119 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1121 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1122 avd_init(state, avd);
1124 if (!state->initialized)
1127 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
1128 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
1130 scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
1132 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1137 /* permissive domain? */
1138 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
1139 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1141 tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
1143 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1148 tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
1149 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
1150 if (policydb->allow_unknown)
1154 context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
1156 map_decision(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass, avd,
1157 policydb->allow_unknown);
1159 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1162 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1166 void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
1170 struct av_decision *avd)
1172 struct policydb *policydb;
1173 struct sidtab *sidtab;
1174 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
1176 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1177 avd_init(state, avd);
1178 if (!state->initialized)
1181 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
1182 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
1184 scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
1186 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1191 /* permissive domain? */
1192 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
1193 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
1195 tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
1197 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1202 if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
1203 if (policydb->allow_unknown)
1208 context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
1211 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1214 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1219 * Write the security context string representation of
1220 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
1221 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
1222 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
1223 * the length of the string.
1225 static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
1226 struct context *context,
1227 char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1236 *scontext_len = context->len;
1238 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1245 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1246 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
1247 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
1248 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
1249 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context);
1254 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1255 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1258 *scontext = scontextp;
1261 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1263 scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1264 sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
1265 sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
1266 sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
1268 mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp);
1275 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1277 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1279 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1281 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1284 static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
1285 u32 sid, char **scontext,
1286 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1288 struct policydb *policydb;
1289 struct sidtab *sidtab;
1290 struct context *context;
1297 if (!state->initialized) {
1298 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1301 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1304 scontextp = kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string[sid],
1305 *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1310 *scontext = scontextp;
1313 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1314 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1318 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1319 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
1320 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
1322 context = sidtab_search_force(sidtab, sid);
1324 context = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
1326 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1331 rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
1334 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1341 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1342 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1343 * @scontext: security context
1344 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1346 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1347 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1348 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1350 int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state,
1351 u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1353 return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
1357 int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
1358 char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1360 return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
1365 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1367 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1368 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1371 struct context *ctx,
1374 struct role_datum *role;
1375 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1376 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1377 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1382 /* Parse the security context. */
1385 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1387 /* Extract the user. */
1389 while (*p && *p != ':')
1397 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1401 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1405 while (*p && *p != ':')
1413 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1416 ctx->role = role->value;
1420 while (*p && *p != ':')
1425 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1426 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1429 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1431 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1436 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
1439 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1440 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
1445 context_destroy(ctx);
1449 static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
1450 const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1451 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1454 struct policydb *policydb;
1455 struct sidtab *sidtab;
1456 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1457 struct context context;
1460 /* An empty security context is never valid. */
1464 /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */
1465 scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags);
1469 if (!state->initialized) {
1472 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1473 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext2)) {
1478 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1484 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1486 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1490 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1491 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
1492 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
1493 rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
1494 scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
1495 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1497 context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
1501 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
1502 context_destroy(&context);
1504 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1512 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1513 * @scontext: security context
1514 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1515 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1516 * @gfp: context for the allocation
1518 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1519 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1520 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1521 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1523 int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
1524 const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
1527 return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
1528 sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
1531 int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
1532 const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
1534 return security_context_to_sid(state, scontext, strlen(scontext),
1539 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1540 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1542 * @scontext: security context
1543 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1544 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1545 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1547 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1548 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1549 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1550 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1551 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1552 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1553 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1554 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1556 int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
1557 const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1558 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1560 return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
1561 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1564 int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
1565 const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1568 return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
1569 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1572 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1573 struct selinux_state *state,
1574 struct context *scontext,
1575 struct context *tcontext,
1577 struct context *newcontext)
1579 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
1580 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1581 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1583 if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext, &s, &slen))
1585 if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
1587 if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen))
1589 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1590 "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
1594 n, s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
1599 if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
1604 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
1605 struct context *newcontext,
1606 u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
1607 const char *objname)
1609 struct filename_trans ft;
1610 struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
1613 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
1614 * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
1615 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
1617 if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
1625 otype = hashtab_search(policydb->filename_trans, &ft);
1627 newcontext->type = otype->otype;
1630 static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
1635 const char *objname,
1639 struct policydb *policydb;
1640 struct sidtab *sidtab;
1641 struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
1642 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1643 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1644 struct avtab_key avkey;
1645 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1646 struct avtab_node *node;
1651 if (!state->initialized) {
1652 switch (orig_tclass) {
1653 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1663 context_init(&newcontext);
1665 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1668 tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
1669 sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
1671 tclass = orig_tclass;
1672 sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&state->ss->map,
1676 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
1677 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
1679 scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
1681 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1686 tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
1688 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1694 if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim)
1695 cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
1697 /* Set the user identity. */
1698 switch (specified) {
1699 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1701 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1702 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1704 /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
1705 /* Use the process user identity. */
1706 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1710 /* Use the related object owner. */
1711 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1715 /* Set the role to default values. */
1716 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1717 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1718 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1719 newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
1721 if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true))
1722 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1724 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1727 /* Set the type to default values. */
1728 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1729 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1730 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1731 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1733 if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true)) {
1734 /* Use the type of process. */
1735 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1737 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1738 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1742 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1743 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1744 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1745 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1746 avkey.specified = specified;
1747 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
1749 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1751 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1752 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1753 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1754 avdatum = &node->datum;
1761 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1762 newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
1765 /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
1767 filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
1768 tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
1770 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1771 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1772 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1773 for (roletr = policydb->role_tr; roletr;
1774 roletr = roletr->next) {
1775 if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
1776 (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
1777 (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
1778 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1779 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1785 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1786 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1787 rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
1792 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1793 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
1794 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(state, scontext,
1801 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1802 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1804 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
1805 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1811 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1812 * @ssid: source security identifier
1813 * @tsid: target security identifier
1814 * @tclass: target security class
1815 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1817 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1818 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1819 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1820 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1821 * computed successfully.
1823 int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
1824 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1825 const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
1827 return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
1829 qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
1832 int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
1833 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1834 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
1836 return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
1838 objname, out_sid, false);
1842 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1843 * @ssid: source security identifier
1844 * @tsid: target security identifier
1845 * @tclass: target security class
1846 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1848 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1849 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1850 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1851 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1852 * computed successfully.
1854 int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
1860 return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
1866 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1867 * @ssid: source security identifier
1868 * @tsid: target security identifier
1869 * @tclass: target security class
1870 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1872 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1873 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1874 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1875 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1876 * computed successfully.
1878 int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
1884 return security_compute_sid(state,
1885 ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
1889 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1890 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1891 struct context *context,
1894 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1896 if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1897 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1902 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
1903 struct selinux_state *state,
1904 struct context *context)
1906 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
1910 if (enforcing_enabled(state))
1913 if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
1914 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
1920 struct convert_context_args {
1921 struct selinux_state *state;
1922 struct policydb *oldp;
1923 struct policydb *newp;
1927 * Convert the values in the security context
1928 * structure `c' from the values specified
1929 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1930 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1931 * context is valid under the new policy.
1933 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1937 struct convert_context_args *args;
1938 struct context oldc;
1939 struct ocontext *oc;
1940 struct mls_range *range;
1941 struct role_datum *role;
1942 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1943 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1948 if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1957 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1961 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1962 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1965 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1967 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1969 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1971 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1972 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1976 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1977 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1983 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1987 /* Convert the user. */
1989 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1990 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
1993 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1995 /* Convert the role. */
1997 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1998 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
2001 c->role = role->value;
2003 /* Convert the type. */
2005 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
2006 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
2009 c->type = typdatum->value;
2011 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
2012 if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
2013 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
2016 } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
2018 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
2019 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
2020 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
2022 mls_context_destroy(c);
2023 } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
2025 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
2026 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
2027 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
2028 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
2031 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
2032 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
2036 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
2037 " the initial SIDs list\n");
2040 range = &oc->context[0].range;
2041 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
2046 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2047 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
2048 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state,
2054 context_destroy(&oldc);
2060 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
2061 rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, &oldc, &s, &len);
2064 context_destroy(&oldc);
2068 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
2074 static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state)
2076 struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
2078 struct ebitmap_node *node;
2080 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++)
2081 state->policycap[i] = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i);
2083 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
2084 pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n",
2085 selinux_policycap_names[i],
2086 ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
2088 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) {
2089 if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
2090 pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n",
2095 static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
2096 struct policydb *newpolicydb);
2099 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
2100 * @data: binary policy data
2101 * @len: length of data in bytes
2103 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
2104 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
2105 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
2106 * loading the new policy.
2108 int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
2110 struct policydb *policydb;
2111 struct sidtab *sidtab;
2112 struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
2113 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
2114 struct selinux_mapping *oldmapping;
2115 struct selinux_map newmap;
2116 struct convert_context_args args;
2119 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
2121 oldpolicydb = kcalloc(2, sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
2126 newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
2128 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2129 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2131 if (!state->initialized) {
2132 rc = policydb_read(policydb, fp);
2136 policydb->len = len;
2137 rc = selinux_set_mapping(policydb, secclass_map,
2140 policydb_destroy(policydb);
2144 rc = policydb_load_isids(policydb, sidtab);
2146 policydb_destroy(policydb);
2150 security_load_policycaps(state);
2151 state->initialized = 1;
2152 seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
2153 selinux_complete_init();
2154 avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
2155 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2156 selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
2157 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2158 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2163 sidtab_hash_eval(sidtab, "sids");
2166 rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
2170 newpolicydb->len = len;
2171 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
2172 if (policydb->mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2173 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
2174 else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
2175 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
2177 rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
2179 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
2180 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2184 rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &newmap);
2188 rc = security_preserve_bools(state, newpolicydb);
2190 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
2194 /* Clone the SID table. */
2195 sidtab_shutdown(sidtab);
2197 rc = sidtab_map(sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
2202 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
2203 * in the new SID table.
2206 args.oldp = policydb;
2207 args.newp = newpolicydb;
2208 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
2210 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
2211 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
2216 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
2217 memcpy(oldpolicydb, policydb, sizeof(*policydb));
2218 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, sidtab);
2220 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
2221 write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2222 memcpy(policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(*policydb));
2223 sidtab_set(sidtab, &newsidtab);
2224 security_load_policycaps(state);
2225 oldmapping = state->ss->map.mapping;
2226 state->ss->map.mapping = newmap.mapping;
2227 state->ss->map.size = newmap.size;
2228 seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
2229 write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2231 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
2232 policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
2233 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
2236 avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
2237 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2238 selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
2239 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2240 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2246 kfree(newmap.mapping);
2247 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
2248 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
2255 size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state)
2257 struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
2260 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2262 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2268 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
2269 * @protocol: protocol number
2270 * @port: port number
2271 * @out_sid: security identifier
2273 int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
2274 u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
2276 struct policydb *policydb;
2277 struct sidtab *sidtab;
2281 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2283 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2284 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2286 c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
2288 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
2289 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
2290 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
2297 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
2303 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2305 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
2309 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2314 * security_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
2315 * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
2316 * @pkey_num: pkey number
2317 * @out_sid: security identifier
2319 int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
2320 u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
2322 struct policydb *policydb;
2323 struct sidtab *sidtab;
2327 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2329 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2330 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2332 c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
2334 if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
2335 c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
2336 c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
2344 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
2350 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2352 *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2355 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2360 * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
2361 * @dev_name: device name
2362 * @port: port number
2363 * @out_sid: security identifier
2365 int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
2366 const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
2368 struct policydb *policydb;
2369 struct sidtab *sidtab;
2373 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2375 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2376 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2378 c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
2380 if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
2381 !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
2383 IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
2391 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
2397 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2399 *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2402 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2407 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
2408 * @name: interface name
2409 * @if_sid: interface SID
2411 int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
2412 char *name, u32 *if_sid)
2414 struct policydb *policydb;
2415 struct sidtab *sidtab;
2419 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2421 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2422 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2424 c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
2426 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
2432 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
2433 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
2438 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
2444 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
2446 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
2449 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2453 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
2457 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
2458 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
2467 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2468 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2470 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2471 * @out_sid: security identifier
2473 int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
2479 struct policydb *policydb;
2480 struct sidtab *sidtab;
2484 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2486 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2487 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2494 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
2497 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
2499 c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
2501 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
2510 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
2512 c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
2514 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
2523 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2529 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
2535 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2537 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2542 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2549 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2550 * @fromsid: starting SID
2551 * @username: username
2552 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2553 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2555 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2556 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2557 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2558 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2559 * number of elements in the array.
2562 int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
2568 struct policydb *policydb;
2569 struct sidtab *sidtab;
2570 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2571 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2572 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2573 struct user_datum *user;
2574 struct role_datum *role;
2575 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2581 if (!state->initialized)
2584 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2586 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2587 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2589 context_init(&usercon);
2592 fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid);
2597 user = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, username);
2601 usercon.user = user->value;
2604 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2608 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2609 role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i];
2610 usercon.role = i + 1;
2611 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2612 usercon.type = j + 1;
2614 if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user,
2618 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2621 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2622 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2626 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2629 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2632 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2638 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2645 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2650 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2651 struct av_decision dummy_avd;
2652 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state,
2654 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2655 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2658 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2670 * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2671 * @fstype: filesystem type
2672 * @path: path from root of mount
2673 * @sclass: file security class
2674 * @sid: SID for path
2676 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2677 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2678 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2680 * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
2682 static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
2688 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2689 struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2692 struct genfs *genfs;
2696 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2699 sclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_sclass);
2700 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2702 for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2703 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2712 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2713 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2714 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2715 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2724 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
2736 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2737 * @fstype: filesystem type
2738 * @path: path from root of mount
2739 * @sclass: file security class
2740 * @sid: SID for path
2742 * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
2745 int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
2753 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2754 retval = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
2755 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2760 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2761 * @sb: superblock in question
2763 int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
2765 struct policydb *policydb;
2766 struct sidtab *sidtab;
2769 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2770 const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
2772 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2774 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2775 sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2777 c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2779 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2785 sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
2787 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
2792 sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
2794 rc = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
2797 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2800 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2805 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2809 int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
2810 int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2812 struct policydb *policydb;
2815 if (!state->initialized) {
2822 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2824 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2830 *len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
2835 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2840 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2844 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2845 (*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2848 (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
2855 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2859 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2867 int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int len, int *values)
2869 struct policydb *policydb;
2871 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2872 struct cond_node *cur;
2874 write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2876 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2879 lenp = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
2883 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2884 if (!!values[i] != policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2885 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC,
2886 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2887 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2888 sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
2890 policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2891 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
2892 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2895 policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2897 policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2900 for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2901 rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
2906 seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
2909 write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2911 avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
2912 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2913 selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
2914 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2919 int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
2922 struct policydb *policydb;
2926 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2928 policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2931 len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
2935 rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
2937 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
2941 static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
2942 struct policydb *policydb)
2944 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2945 char **bnames = NULL;
2946 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2947 struct cond_node *cur;
2949 rc = security_get_bools(state, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2952 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2953 booldatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2955 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2957 for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2958 rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
2965 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2974 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2975 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2977 int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
2978 u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2980 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
2981 struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
2982 struct context *context1;
2983 struct context *context2;
2984 struct context newcon;
2990 if (!state->initialized || !policydb->mls_enabled) {
2995 context_init(&newcon);
2997 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3000 context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
3002 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3008 context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
3010 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3015 newcon.user = context1->user;
3016 newcon.role = context1->role;
3017 newcon.type = context1->type;
3018 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
3022 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
3023 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) {
3024 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(state, &newcon);
3026 if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s,
3028 audit_log(audit_context(),
3029 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3030 "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
3031 "invalid_context=%s", s);
3038 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
3040 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3041 context_destroy(&newcon);
3047 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
3048 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
3049 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
3050 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
3053 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
3054 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
3055 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
3056 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
3058 * | function return | @sid
3059 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
3060 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
3061 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
3062 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
3063 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
3066 int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
3067 u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
3071 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
3072 struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
3074 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
3075 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
3077 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3079 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
3080 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
3081 * single or absent peer SID/label */
3082 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3083 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
3086 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
3087 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
3089 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
3090 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
3095 * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both
3096 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
3097 * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true.
3099 if (!policydb->mls_enabled)
3102 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3105 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
3107 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3108 __func__, nlbl_sid);
3112 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
3114 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3115 __func__, xfrm_sid);
3118 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
3122 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
3123 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
3124 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
3125 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
3127 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
3129 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3133 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
3135 struct class_datum *datum = d;
3136 char *name = k, **classes = args;
3137 int value = datum->value - 1;
3139 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
3140 if (!classes[value])
3146 int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
3147 char ***classes, int *nclasses)
3149 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
3152 if (!state->initialized) {
3158 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3161 *nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim;
3162 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
3166 rc = hashtab_map(policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
3170 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
3171 kfree((*classes)[i]);
3176 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3180 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
3182 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
3183 char *name = k, **perms = args;
3184 int value = datum->value - 1;
3186 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
3193 int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
3194 char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
3196 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
3198 struct class_datum *match;
3200 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3203 match = hashtab_search(policydb->p_classes.table, class);
3205 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
3211 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
3212 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
3216 if (match->comdatum) {
3217 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
3218 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
3223 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
3229 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3233 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3234 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
3240 int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
3242 return state->ss->policydb.reject_unknown;
3245 int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
3247 return state->ss->policydb.allow_unknown;
3251 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
3252 * @req_cap: capability
3255 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
3256 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
3257 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
3260 int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
3261 unsigned int req_cap)
3263 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
3266 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3267 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->policycaps, req_cap);
3268 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3273 struct selinux_audit_rule {
3275 struct context au_ctxt;
3278 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
3280 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3283 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
3288 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
3290 struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
3291 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
3292 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
3293 struct role_datum *roledatum;
3294 struct type_datum *typedatum;
3295 struct user_datum *userdatum;
3296 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
3301 if (!state->initialized)
3305 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3306 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3307 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3308 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3309 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3310 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3311 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
3312 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
3315 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3316 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3317 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3318 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3319 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
3320 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
3324 /* only the above fields are valid */
3328 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
3332 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
3334 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3336 tmprule->au_seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
3339 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3340 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3342 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, rulestr);
3345 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
3347 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3348 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3350 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_roles.table, rulestr);
3353 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
3355 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3356 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3358 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_types.table, rulestr);
3361 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
3363 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3364 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3365 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3366 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3367 rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
3375 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3378 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
3387 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
3388 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
3392 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
3393 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
3395 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3396 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3397 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3398 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3399 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3400 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3401 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3402 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3403 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3404 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3412 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
3413 struct audit_context *actx)
3415 struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
3416 struct context *ctxt;
3417 struct mls_level *level;
3418 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
3421 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
3422 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
3426 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3428 if (rule->au_seqno < state->ss->latest_granting) {
3433 ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
3434 if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
3435 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3441 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
3444 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
3445 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
3448 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
3450 case Audit_not_equal:
3451 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
3455 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
3456 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
3459 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
3461 case Audit_not_equal:
3462 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
3466 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3467 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3470 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
3472 case Audit_not_equal:
3473 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
3477 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3478 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3479 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3480 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3481 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
3482 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
3483 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
3486 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3489 case Audit_not_equal:
3490 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3494 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3496 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3500 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3504 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
3505 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
3506 !mls_level_eq(level,
3507 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
3510 match = mls_level_dom(level,
3511 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
3517 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3521 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
3523 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
3527 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
3528 err = aurule_callback();
3532 static int __init aurule_init(void)
3536 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
3538 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
3542 __initcall(aurule_init);
3544 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3546 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3547 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3548 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3551 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3552 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
3553 * already been initialized.
3556 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3561 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
3562 if (sid_cache == NULL)
3564 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
3565 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
3571 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
3572 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
3573 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
3577 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3578 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3579 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3582 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3583 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3584 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
3585 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3586 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3587 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3591 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
3592 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3595 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
3596 struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
3598 struct context *ctx;
3599 struct context ctx_new;
3601 if (!state->initialized) {
3606 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3608 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
3609 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
3610 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
3611 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3612 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3614 ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3618 context_init(&ctx_new);
3619 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3620 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3621 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3622 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
3623 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3624 rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
3629 if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new))
3632 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3636 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3638 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3642 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3645 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3647 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3652 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3653 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3654 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3657 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3658 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3661 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
3662 u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3664 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
3666 struct context *ctx;
3668 if (!state->initialized)
3671 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3674 ctx = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
3679 secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
3681 if (secattr->domain == NULL)
3684 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3685 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3686 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
3687 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
3689 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3692 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3695 * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3696 * @data: binary policy data
3697 * @len: length of data in bytes
3700 int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
3701 void **data, size_t *len)
3703 struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
3705 struct policy_file fp;
3707 if (!state->initialized)
3710 *len = security_policydb_len(state);
3712 *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
3719 read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3720 rc = policydb_write(policydb, &fp);
3721 read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
3726 *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;