2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <net/netlabel.h>
63 #include "conditional.h"
71 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
73 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
74 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
76 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
78 static struct sidtab sidtab;
79 struct policydb policydb;
83 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
84 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
85 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
88 static u32 latest_granting;
90 /* Forward declaration. */
91 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
94 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
95 struct context *tcontext,
97 struct av_decision *avd);
99 struct selinux_mapping {
100 u16 value; /* policy value */
102 u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
105 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
106 static u16 current_mapping_size;
108 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
109 struct security_class_mapping *map,
110 struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
113 struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
114 size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
117 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
119 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
126 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
127 out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
131 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
133 while (map[j].name) {
134 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
135 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
137 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
138 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
139 p_out->num_perms = 0;
143 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
146 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
148 if (pol->reject_unknown)
150 p_out->num_perms = 0;
151 print_unknown_handle = true;
156 while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
157 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
158 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
162 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
164 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
166 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
167 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
168 if (pol->reject_unknown)
170 print_unknown_handle = true;
175 p_out->num_perms = k;
178 if (print_unknown_handle)
179 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
180 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
182 *out_map_p = out_map;
191 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
194 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
196 if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
197 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
202 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
205 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
206 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
209 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
210 if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
212 if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
215 avd->allowed = result;
217 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
218 if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
220 avd->auditallow = result;
222 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
223 if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
225 if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
229 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
230 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
231 * should audit that denial
233 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
235 avd->auditdeny = result;
239 int security_mls_enabled(void)
241 return policydb.mls_enabled;
245 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
246 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
249 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
250 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
251 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
252 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
253 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
255 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
256 struct context *tcontext,
257 struct context *xcontext,
258 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
262 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
263 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
264 struct constraint_expr *e;
265 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
268 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
269 switch (e->expr_type) {
285 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
289 val1 = scontext->user;
290 val2 = tcontext->user;
293 val1 = scontext->type;
294 val2 = tcontext->type;
297 val1 = scontext->role;
298 val2 = tcontext->role;
299 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
300 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
303 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
307 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
311 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
313 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
321 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
322 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
325 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
326 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
329 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
330 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
333 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
334 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
337 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
338 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
341 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
342 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
347 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
350 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
353 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
356 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
359 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
373 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
376 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
384 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
387 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
389 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
396 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
398 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
400 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
409 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
412 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
430 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
431 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
433 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
435 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
436 char **permission_names = args;
438 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
440 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
445 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
446 struct context *tcontext,
451 struct common_datum *common_dat;
452 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
453 struct audit_buffer *ab;
455 char *scontext_name = NULL;
456 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
457 char *permission_names[32];
460 bool need_comma = false;
465 tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
466 tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
467 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
469 /* init permission_names */
471 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
472 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
475 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
476 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
479 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
480 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
481 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
484 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
485 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
488 /* audit a message */
489 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
490 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
494 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
495 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
496 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
498 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
499 u32 mask = (1 << index);
501 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
504 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
505 need_comma ? "," : "",
506 permission_names[index]
507 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
512 /* release scontext/tcontext */
513 kfree(tcontext_name);
514 kfree(scontext_name);
520 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
521 * on boundary constraint.
523 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
524 struct context *tcontext,
526 struct av_decision *avd)
528 struct type_datum *source
529 = policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
531 if (source->bounds) {
532 struct context lo_scontext;
533 struct av_decision lo_avd;
536 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
538 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
539 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
541 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
545 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
546 return; /* no masked permission */
547 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
549 /* mask violated permissions */
550 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
552 /* audit masked permissions */
553 security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
554 tclass, masked, "bounds");
559 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
560 * the permissions in a particular class.
562 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
563 struct context *tcontext,
565 struct av_decision *avd)
567 struct constraint_node *constraint;
568 struct role_allow *ra;
569 struct avtab_key avkey;
570 struct avtab_node *node;
571 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
572 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
573 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
578 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
580 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
581 if (printk_ratelimit())
582 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
586 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
589 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
590 * this permission check, then use it.
592 avkey.target_class = tclass;
593 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
594 sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
595 tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
596 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
597 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
598 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
599 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
600 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
602 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
603 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
604 avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
605 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
606 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
607 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
608 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
611 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
612 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
618 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
621 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
623 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
624 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
626 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
628 constraint = constraint->next;
632 * If checking process transition permission and the
633 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
636 if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
637 (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
638 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
639 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
640 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
641 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
645 avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
649 * If the given source and target types have boundary
650 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
651 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
653 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
657 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
658 struct context *ncontext,
659 struct context *tcontext,
662 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
663 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
665 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
667 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
669 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
671 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
672 "security_validate_transition: denied for"
673 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
674 o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
680 if (!selinux_enforcing)
685 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
688 struct context *ocontext;
689 struct context *ncontext;
690 struct context *tcontext;
691 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
692 struct constraint_node *constraint;
699 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
701 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
703 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
704 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
709 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
711 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
713 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
719 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
721 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
727 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
729 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
735 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
737 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
739 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
743 constraint = constraint->next;
747 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
752 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
753 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
754 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
755 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
757 * @oldsid : current security identifier
758 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
760 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
762 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
763 struct type_datum *type;
767 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
769 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
771 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
776 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
778 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
783 /* type/domain unchanged */
784 if (old_context->type == new_context->type) {
789 index = new_context->type;
791 type = policydb.type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
794 /* not bounded anymore */
800 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
801 if (type->bounds == old_context->type) {
805 index = type->bounds;
809 char *old_name = NULL;
810 char *new_name = NULL;
813 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
814 &old_name, &length) &&
815 !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
816 &new_name, &length)) {
817 audit_log(current->audit_context,
818 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
819 "op=security_bounded_transition "
821 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
828 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
833 static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
837 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
838 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
844 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
845 * @ssid: source security identifier
846 * @tsid: target security identifier
847 * @tclass: target security class
848 * @avd: access vector decisions
850 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
851 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
853 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
856 struct av_decision *avd)
859 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
861 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
866 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
868 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
873 /* permissive domain? */
874 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
875 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
877 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
879 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
884 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
885 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
886 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
890 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
891 map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
893 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
896 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
900 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
903 struct av_decision *avd)
905 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
907 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
912 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
914 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
919 /* permissive domain? */
920 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
921 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
923 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
925 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
930 if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
931 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
936 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
938 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
941 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
946 * Write the security context string representation of
947 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
948 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
949 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
950 * the length of the string.
952 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
960 *scontext_len = context->len;
961 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
967 /* Compute the size of the context. */
968 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
969 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
970 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
971 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
973 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
974 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
977 *scontext = scontextp;
980 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
982 sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
983 policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
984 policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
985 policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
986 scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
987 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
988 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
990 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
997 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
999 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1001 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1003 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1006 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1007 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1009 struct context *context;
1015 if (!ss_initialized) {
1016 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1019 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1020 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1025 strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
1026 *scontext = scontextp;
1029 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1030 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1034 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1036 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1038 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1040 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1045 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1047 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1054 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1055 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1056 * @scontext: security context
1057 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1059 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1060 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1061 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1063 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1065 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1068 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1070 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1074 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1076 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1077 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1080 struct context *ctx,
1083 struct role_datum *role;
1084 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1085 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1086 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1091 /* Parse the security context. */
1094 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1096 /* Extract the user. */
1098 while (*p && *p != ':')
1106 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1110 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1114 while (*p && *p != ':')
1122 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1125 ctx->role = role->value;
1129 while (*p && *p != ':')
1134 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1135 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1138 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1140 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1144 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len) {
1149 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1150 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) {
1157 context_destroy(ctx);
1161 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1162 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1165 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1166 struct context context;
1169 if (!ss_initialized) {
1172 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1173 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
1178 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1183 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1184 scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags);
1187 memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
1188 scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
1191 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1192 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1199 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1200 rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab,
1201 scontext2, scontext_len,
1203 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1205 context.len = scontext_len;
1209 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1210 context_destroy(&context);
1212 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1219 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1220 * @scontext: security context
1221 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1222 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1224 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1225 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1226 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1227 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1229 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
1231 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1232 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
1236 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1237 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1239 * @scontext: security context
1240 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1241 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1242 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1244 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1245 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1246 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1247 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1248 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1249 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1250 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1251 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1253 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1254 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1256 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1257 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1260 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1263 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1264 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1267 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1268 struct context *scontext,
1269 struct context *tcontext,
1271 struct context *newcontext)
1273 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1274 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1276 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
1278 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
1280 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
1282 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1283 "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
1287 n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
1292 if (!selinux_enforcing)
1297 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1304 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1305 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1306 struct avtab_key avkey;
1307 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1308 struct avtab_node *node;
1312 if (!ss_initialized) {
1313 switch (orig_tclass) {
1314 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1324 context_init(&newcontext);
1326 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1329 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1331 tclass = orig_tclass;
1333 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1335 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1340 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1342 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1348 /* Set the user identity. */
1349 switch (specified) {
1350 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1352 /* Use the process user identity. */
1353 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1356 /* Use the related object owner. */
1357 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1361 /* Set the role and type to default values. */
1362 if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
1363 /* Use the current role and type of process. */
1364 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1365 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1367 /* Use the well-defined object role. */
1368 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1369 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1370 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1373 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1374 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1375 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1376 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1377 avkey.specified = specified;
1378 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1380 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1382 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1383 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1384 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1385 avdatum = &node->datum;
1392 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1393 newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
1396 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1397 if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
1398 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1399 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1400 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
1401 roletr = roletr->next) {
1402 if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
1403 roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
1404 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1405 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1412 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1413 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1414 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
1418 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1419 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1420 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1427 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1428 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1430 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1431 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1437 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1438 * @ssid: source security identifier
1439 * @tsid: target security identifier
1440 * @tclass: target security class
1441 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1443 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1444 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1445 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1446 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1447 * computed successfully.
1449 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
1454 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1458 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid,
1463 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1468 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1469 * @ssid: source security identifier
1470 * @tsid: target security identifier
1471 * @tclass: target security class
1472 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1474 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1475 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1476 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1477 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1478 * computed successfully.
1480 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1485 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid,
1490 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1491 * @ssid: source security identifier
1492 * @tsid: target security identifier
1493 * @tclass: target security class
1494 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1496 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1497 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1498 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1499 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1500 * computed successfully.
1502 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1507 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid,
1511 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1512 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1513 struct context *context,
1516 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1518 if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1519 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1524 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1528 if (selinux_enforcing) {
1534 if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1536 "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
1544 struct convert_context_args {
1545 struct policydb *oldp;
1546 struct policydb *newp;
1550 * Convert the values in the security context
1551 * structure `c' from the values specified
1552 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1553 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1554 * context is valid under the new policy.
1556 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1560 struct convert_context_args *args;
1561 struct context oldc;
1562 struct ocontext *oc;
1563 struct mls_range *range;
1564 struct role_datum *role;
1565 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1566 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1571 if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1578 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1583 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1584 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1588 "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1590 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1592 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1594 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1595 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1599 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1601 "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1607 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1613 /* Convert the user. */
1614 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1615 args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
1618 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1620 /* Convert the role. */
1621 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1622 args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
1625 c->role = role->value;
1627 /* Convert the type. */
1628 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1629 args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
1632 c->type = typdatum->value;
1634 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1635 if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1636 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1639 } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1641 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1642 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1643 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1645 mls_context_destroy(c);
1646 } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1648 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1649 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1650 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1651 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1654 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
1655 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
1658 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
1659 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1662 range = &oc->context[0].range;
1663 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
1668 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1669 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1670 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1675 context_destroy(&oldc);
1680 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1681 if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len))
1683 context_destroy(&oldc);
1688 "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1694 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1696 selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1697 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
1698 selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1699 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
1702 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
1703 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
1706 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1707 * @data: binary policy data
1708 * @len: length of data in bytes
1710 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
1711 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
1712 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
1713 * loading the new policy.
1715 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
1717 struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
1718 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
1719 struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
1720 struct convert_context_args args;
1724 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
1726 if (!ss_initialized) {
1728 if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
1729 avtab_cache_destroy();
1732 if (selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
1734 ¤t_mapping_size)) {
1735 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1736 avtab_cache_destroy();
1739 if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
1740 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1741 avtab_cache_destroy();
1744 security_load_policycaps();
1746 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1747 selinux_complete_init();
1748 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1749 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1750 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1751 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1756 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
1759 if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp))
1762 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
1763 if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
1764 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
1765 else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
1766 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
1768 rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
1770 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
1771 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1775 if (selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map,
1779 rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
1781 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
1785 /* Clone the SID table. */
1786 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
1787 if (sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
1793 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
1794 * in the new SID table.
1796 args.oldp = &policydb;
1797 args.newp = &newpolicydb;
1798 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
1800 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
1801 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
1806 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
1807 memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
1808 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
1810 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
1811 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1812 memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
1813 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
1814 security_load_policycaps();
1815 oldmap = current_mapping;
1816 current_mapping = map;
1817 current_mapping_size = map_size;
1818 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1819 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1821 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
1822 policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
1823 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
1826 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1827 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1828 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1829 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1835 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
1836 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1842 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
1843 * @protocol: protocol number
1844 * @port: port number
1845 * @out_sid: security identifier
1847 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
1852 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1854 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
1856 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
1857 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
1858 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
1865 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1871 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
1873 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
1877 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1882 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
1883 * @name: interface name
1884 * @if_sid: interface SID
1886 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
1891 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1893 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
1895 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
1901 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
1902 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1907 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1913 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
1915 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
1918 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1922 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
1926 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
1927 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
1936 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
1937 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
1939 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
1940 * @out_sid: security identifier
1942 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
1950 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1956 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
1961 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
1963 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
1965 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
1973 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
1977 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
1979 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
1987 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
1993 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1999 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2001 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2005 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2012 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2013 * @fromsid: starting SID
2014 * @username: username
2015 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2016 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2018 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2019 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2020 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2021 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2022 * number of elements in the array.
2025 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2030 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2031 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2032 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2033 struct user_datum *user;
2034 struct role_datum *role;
2035 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2041 if (!ss_initialized)
2044 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2046 context_init(&usercon);
2048 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2054 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2059 usercon.user = user->value;
2061 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2067 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2068 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2070 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2073 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2076 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2079 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2080 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2083 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2088 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2091 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2097 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2103 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2109 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2110 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2111 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2112 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2115 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2127 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2128 * @fstype: filesystem type
2129 * @path: path from root of mount
2130 * @sclass: file security class
2131 * @sid: SID for path
2133 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2134 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2135 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2137 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2144 struct genfs *genfs;
2146 int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
2148 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2151 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2153 sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2155 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2156 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2161 if (!genfs || cmp) {
2162 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2167 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2168 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2169 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2170 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2175 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2181 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2190 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2195 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2196 * @fstype: filesystem type
2197 * @behavior: labeling behavior
2198 * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
2200 int security_fs_use(
2202 unsigned int *behavior,
2208 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2210 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2212 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2218 *behavior = c->v.behavior;
2220 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2228 rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
2230 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2233 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2238 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2242 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2244 int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
2246 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2250 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2256 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2260 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2264 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2266 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2267 name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
2268 (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
2271 strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
2272 (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
2276 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2280 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2288 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2291 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2292 struct cond_node *cur;
2294 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2296 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2302 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2303 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2304 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2305 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2306 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2307 policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
2309 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2310 audit_get_loginuid(current),
2311 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2314 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2316 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2319 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2320 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2325 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2328 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2330 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2331 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2332 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2337 int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
2342 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2344 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2350 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
2352 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2356 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2358 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2359 char **bnames = NULL;
2360 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2361 struct cond_node *cur;
2363 rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2366 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2367 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2369 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2371 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2372 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2379 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2388 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2389 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2391 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2393 struct context *context1;
2394 struct context *context2;
2395 struct context newcon;
2400 if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
2405 context_init(&newcon);
2407 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2408 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2410 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2416 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2418 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2424 newcon.user = context1->user;
2425 newcon.role = context1->role;
2426 newcon.type = context1->type;
2427 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2431 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2432 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2433 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2438 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2442 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2443 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2444 "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
2449 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2450 context_destroy(&newcon);
2456 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2457 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2458 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2459 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2462 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2463 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2464 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2465 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2467 * | function return | @sid
2468 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2469 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2470 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2471 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2472 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2475 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2480 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2481 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2483 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2484 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2485 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2486 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2487 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2490 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2491 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2493 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2494 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2498 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2499 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2500 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2501 if (!policydb.mls_enabled) {
2502 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2506 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2508 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2510 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2511 __func__, nlbl_sid);
2515 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2517 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2518 __func__, xfrm_sid);
2522 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2525 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2527 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2528 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2529 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2530 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2532 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2534 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2538 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2540 struct class_datum *datum = d;
2541 char *name = k, **classes = args;
2542 int value = datum->value - 1;
2544 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2545 if (!classes[value])
2551 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
2555 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2557 *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
2558 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
2562 rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
2566 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
2567 kfree((*classes)[i]);
2572 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2576 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2578 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
2579 char *name = k, **perms = args;
2580 int value = datum->value - 1;
2582 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2589 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
2591 int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
2592 struct class_datum *match;
2594 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2596 match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
2598 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2604 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
2605 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
2609 if (match->comdatum) {
2610 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
2611 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
2616 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
2622 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2626 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2627 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
2633 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2635 return policydb.reject_unknown;
2638 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2640 return policydb.allow_unknown;
2644 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2645 * @req_cap: capability
2648 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2649 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2650 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
2653 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
2657 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2658 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
2659 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2664 struct selinux_audit_rule {
2666 struct context au_ctxt;
2669 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
2671 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2674 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
2679 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
2681 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
2682 struct role_datum *roledatum;
2683 struct type_datum *typedatum;
2684 struct user_datum *userdatum;
2685 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
2690 if (!ss_initialized)
2694 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2695 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2696 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2697 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2698 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2699 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2700 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
2701 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
2704 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2705 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2706 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2707 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2708 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
2709 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
2713 /* only the above fields are valid */
2717 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
2721 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
2723 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2725 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
2728 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2729 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2730 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
2734 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
2736 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2737 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2738 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
2742 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
2744 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2745 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2746 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
2750 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
2752 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2753 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2754 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2755 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2756 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
2760 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2763 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
2772 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
2773 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
2777 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
2778 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
2780 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2781 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2782 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2783 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2784 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2785 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2786 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2787 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2788 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2789 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2797 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
2798 struct audit_context *actx)
2800 struct context *ctxt;
2801 struct mls_level *level;
2802 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2806 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2807 "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
2811 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2813 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
2814 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2815 "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
2820 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2822 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2823 "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2829 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
2832 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2833 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2836 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
2838 case Audit_not_equal:
2839 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
2843 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2844 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2847 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
2849 case Audit_not_equal:
2850 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
2854 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2855 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2858 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
2860 case Audit_not_equal:
2861 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
2865 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2866 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2867 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2868 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2869 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
2870 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
2871 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
2874 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2877 case Audit_not_equal:
2878 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2882 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2884 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2888 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2892 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
2893 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
2894 !mls_level_eq(level,
2895 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
2898 match = mls_level_dom(level,
2899 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
2905 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2909 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
2911 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
2912 u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
2916 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
2917 err = aurule_callback();
2921 static int __init aurule_init(void)
2925 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
2926 SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
2928 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
2932 __initcall(aurule_init);
2934 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
2936 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
2937 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
2938 * @sid: the SELinux SID
2941 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
2942 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
2943 * already been initialized.
2946 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
2951 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
2952 if (sid_cache == NULL)
2954 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
2955 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
2961 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
2962 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
2963 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
2967 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
2968 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
2969 * @sid: the SELinux SID
2972 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
2973 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
2974 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the
2975 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
2976 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
2977 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
2981 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
2985 struct context *ctx;
2986 struct context ctx_new;
2988 if (!ss_initialized) {
2993 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2995 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
2996 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
2998 } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) {
2999 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3001 } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3002 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3004 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3006 context_init(&ctx_new);
3007 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3008 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3009 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3010 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3011 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3012 if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3013 secattr->attr.mls.cat) != 0)
3014 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3015 memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
3016 &ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3017 sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
3019 if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new) != 1)
3020 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
3022 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3024 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
3026 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3028 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3034 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return:
3035 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3037 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
3038 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3039 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3043 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3044 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3045 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3048 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3049 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3052 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3055 struct context *ctx;
3057 if (!ss_initialized)
3060 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3061 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3064 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3066 secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
3068 if (secattr->domain == NULL) {
3070 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3072 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3073 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3074 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3075 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3077 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3078 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3082 netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
3083 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3086 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */