1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
24 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
31 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40 #include <linux/swap.h>
41 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
42 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
43 #include <linux/dcache.h>
44 #include <linux/file.h>
45 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
46 #include <linux/namei.h>
47 #include <linux/mount.h>
48 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
49 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52 #include <linux/tty.h>
54 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
64 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65 #include <net/netlink.h>
66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
67 #include <linux/udp.h>
68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
69 #include <linux/sctp.h>
70 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71 #include <linux/quota.h>
72 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74 #include <linux/parser.h>
75 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
77 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78 #include <linux/personality.h>
79 #include <linux/audit.h>
80 #include <linux/string.h>
81 #include <linux/mutex.h>
82 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83 #include <linux/syslog.h>
84 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85 #include <linux/export.h>
86 #include <linux/msg.h>
87 #include <linux/shm.h>
88 #include <uapi/linux/shm.h>
89 #include <linux/bpf.h>
90 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
91 #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
92 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
93 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
94 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
95 #include <linux/io_uring/cmd.h>
96 #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
105 #include "netlabel.h"
109 #define SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1
111 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
113 /* SECMARK reference count */
114 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
117 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
119 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
121 unsigned long enforcing;
122 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
123 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
128 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
131 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
132 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
133 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
135 unsigned long enabled;
136 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
137 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
140 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
143 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
145 unsigned long checkreqprot;
147 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
149 pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is no longer supported.\n");
153 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
166 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
182 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
188 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
199 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
210 * initialise the security for the init task
212 static void cred_init_security(void)
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
216 tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
217 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
221 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
223 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
225 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
227 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
231 static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad,
232 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
233 int ifindex, struct sock *sk, u16 family)
235 ad->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
237 net->netif = ifindex;
239 net->family = family;
242 static void ad_net_init_from_sk(struct common_audit_data *ad,
243 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
246 __ad_net_init(ad, net, 0, sk, 0);
249 static void ad_net_init_from_iif(struct common_audit_data *ad,
250 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
251 int ifindex, u16 family)
253 __ad_net_init(ad, net, ifindex, NULL, family);
257 * get the objective security ID of a task
259 static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
264 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
269 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
272 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
273 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
274 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
275 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
277 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
278 struct dentry *dentry,
281 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
283 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
286 * The check of isec->initialized below is racy but
287 * inode_doinit_with_dentry() will recheck with
290 if (selinux_initialized() &&
291 data_race(isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED)) {
296 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
297 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
298 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
300 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
305 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
307 return selinux_inode(inode);
310 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
314 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
316 return ERR_PTR(error);
317 return selinux_inode(inode);
321 * Get the security label of an inode.
323 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
325 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
326 return selinux_inode(inode);
329 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
331 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
333 return selinux_inode(inode);
337 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
339 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
341 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
343 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
344 return selinux_inode(inode);
347 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
349 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
350 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
354 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
356 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
357 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
358 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
360 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
361 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
362 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
363 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
365 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
366 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
367 list_del_init(&isec->list);
368 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
372 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
379 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
393 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
394 static const struct {
403 A(rootcontext, true),
408 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
412 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
413 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
414 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
416 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
417 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
422 return tokens[i].opt;
427 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
429 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
430 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
431 const struct cred *cred)
433 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
436 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
437 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
441 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
442 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
446 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
448 const struct cred *cred)
450 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
452 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
453 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
457 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
458 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
462 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
464 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
465 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
466 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
467 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
468 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
469 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
470 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
471 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
472 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
475 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
477 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
480 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
481 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
483 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
485 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
486 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
487 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
488 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
489 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
492 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
493 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
495 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
496 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
497 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
503 static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
505 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
506 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
507 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
512 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
513 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
514 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
515 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
516 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
518 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
519 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
520 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
524 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
525 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
526 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
527 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
528 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
531 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
532 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
539 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
540 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, "/",
545 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
546 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
547 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
552 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
554 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
555 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
556 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
559 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
560 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
565 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
568 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
569 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
570 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
572 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
573 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
575 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
577 /* Initialize the root inode. */
578 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
580 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
581 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
582 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
584 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
585 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
586 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
587 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
588 struct inode_security_struct, list);
589 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
590 list_del_init(&isec->list);
591 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
592 inode = igrab(inode);
594 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
595 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
598 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
600 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
604 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
605 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
607 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
609 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
610 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
611 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
612 (old_sid != new_sid))
615 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
616 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
618 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
619 if (mnt_flags & flag)
625 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
626 * labeling information.
628 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
630 unsigned long kern_flags,
631 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
633 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
634 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
635 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
636 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
637 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
638 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
639 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
643 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
644 * place the results is not allowed
646 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
649 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
651 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
653 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
654 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
655 server is ready to handle calls. */
656 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
657 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
658 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
663 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
664 "before the security server is initialized\n");
669 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
670 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
671 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
672 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
674 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
675 * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
676 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
677 * will be used for both mounts)
679 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
683 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
686 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
687 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
688 * than once with different security options.
691 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
692 fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
693 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
695 goto out_double_mount;
696 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
698 if (opts->context_sid) {
699 context_sid = opts->context_sid;
700 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
702 goto out_double_mount;
703 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
705 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
706 rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
707 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
709 goto out_double_mount;
710 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
712 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
713 defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
714 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
716 goto out_double_mount;
717 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
721 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
722 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
723 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
724 goto out_double_mount;
729 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
730 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
732 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
733 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
734 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
735 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
736 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
737 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
738 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
740 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
741 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
742 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
743 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
745 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
747 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
750 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
752 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
753 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
759 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
760 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
761 * line and security labels must be ignored.
763 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
764 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
765 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
766 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
767 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
768 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
773 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
774 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
775 rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(),
778 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
785 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
787 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
791 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
795 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
796 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
797 * the superblock context if not already set.
799 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBNATIVE) {
801 * This means we are initializing a superblock that has been
802 * mounted before the SELinux was initialized and the
803 * filesystem requested native labeling. We had already
804 * returned SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in *set_kern_flags
805 * in the original mount attempt, so now we just need to set
806 * the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior.
808 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
809 } else if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
810 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
811 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
815 if (!fscontext_sid) {
816 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
820 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
822 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
827 if (!rootcontext_sid)
828 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
830 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
831 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
834 if (rootcontext_sid) {
835 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
840 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
841 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
844 if (defcontext_sid) {
845 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
846 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
848 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
849 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
853 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
854 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
860 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
864 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
866 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
870 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
871 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
876 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
877 const struct super_block *newsb)
879 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
880 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
881 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
882 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
884 if (oldflags != newflags)
886 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
888 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
890 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
892 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
893 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
894 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
895 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
900 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
901 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
902 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
906 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
907 struct super_block *newsb,
908 unsigned long kern_flags,
909 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
912 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
913 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
914 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
916 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
917 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
918 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
921 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
922 * place the results is not allowed.
924 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
927 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
930 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
931 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
933 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
934 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
935 newsbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
936 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
941 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
942 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
944 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
945 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
946 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
947 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
948 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
949 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
952 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
954 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
955 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
956 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
958 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
959 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
960 rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
965 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
966 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
967 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
971 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
975 if (!set_rootcontext) {
976 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
979 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
981 if (set_rootcontext) {
982 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
983 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
985 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
988 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
990 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
995 * NOTE: the caller is responsible for freeing the memory even if on error.
997 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
999 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
1003 if (token == Opt_seclabel)
1004 /* eaten and completely ignored */
1009 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
1010 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
1015 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1023 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1025 dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
1028 if (opts->fscontext_sid)
1030 dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
1032 case Opt_rootcontext:
1033 if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
1035 dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
1037 case Opt_defcontext:
1038 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1040 dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
1046 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
1048 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
1053 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1057 static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1059 char *context = NULL;
1063 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
1065 bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
1070 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1078 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1080 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1083 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1086 if (!selinux_initialized())
1089 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1091 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1092 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1096 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1098 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1099 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1103 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1105 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1106 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1110 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1111 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1112 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1114 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1115 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1119 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1121 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1126 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1128 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1130 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1132 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1134 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1136 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1138 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1140 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1142 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1146 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1149 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1151 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1152 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1155 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1157 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1160 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1162 bool extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1168 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1169 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1172 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1179 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1180 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1181 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1182 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1183 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1185 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1187 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1188 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1189 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1190 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1191 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1193 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1195 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1197 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1203 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1204 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1205 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1207 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1209 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1210 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1211 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1213 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1215 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1216 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1217 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1218 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1219 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1220 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1221 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1222 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1223 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1224 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1225 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1226 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1227 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1228 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1229 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1231 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1232 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1233 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1235 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1238 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1240 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1242 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1248 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1250 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1252 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1254 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1256 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1258 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1260 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1262 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1264 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1266 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1268 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1270 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1272 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1274 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1276 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1278 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1280 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1282 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1284 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1286 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1288 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1290 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1292 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1294 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1296 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1298 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1300 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1302 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1304 return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1306 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1311 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1314 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1320 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1321 char *buffer, *path;
1323 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1327 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1331 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1332 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1333 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1334 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1335 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1340 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name,
1342 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1343 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1344 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1348 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1352 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1353 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1355 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1360 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1361 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1365 context[len] = '\0';
1366 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1367 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1370 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1371 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1376 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1380 context[len] = '\0';
1381 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1386 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1387 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1388 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1395 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, sid,
1398 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1399 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1401 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1402 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1405 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1406 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1413 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1414 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1416 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1417 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1418 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1420 struct dentry *dentry;
1423 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1426 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1427 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1430 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1431 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1433 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1434 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1435 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1436 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1437 server is ready to handle calls. */
1438 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1439 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1440 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1441 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1445 sclass = isec->sclass;
1446 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1448 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1449 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1451 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1453 * In case of SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE we need to re-fetch the labels
1454 * via xattr when called from delayed_superblock_init().
1456 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1457 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1458 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1459 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1462 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1463 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1465 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1466 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1469 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1470 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1471 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1472 * two, depending upon that...
1474 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1476 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1480 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1481 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1482 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1483 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1484 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1485 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1486 * be used again by userspace.
1491 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1497 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1500 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1501 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1504 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1505 rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid,
1506 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1510 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1511 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1514 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1517 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1518 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1519 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1520 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1523 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1524 * d_splice_alias. */
1525 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1527 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1528 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1529 * a connected one, so try that first.
1531 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1533 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1536 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1537 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1538 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1539 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1540 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1541 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1542 * could be used again by userspace.
1546 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1547 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1553 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1554 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1555 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1568 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1569 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1571 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1574 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1579 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1583 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1584 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1585 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1588 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1592 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1593 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1599 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1600 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1603 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1604 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1607 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1608 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1611 /* All other signals. */
1612 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1619 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1620 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1623 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1624 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1625 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1627 struct common_audit_data ad;
1628 struct av_decision avd;
1630 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1631 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1634 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1637 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1639 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1642 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1645 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1650 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1651 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1652 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1659 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1660 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1661 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1662 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1663 struct inode *inode,
1665 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1667 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1670 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1673 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1674 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1676 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1679 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1680 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1681 pathname if needed. */
1682 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1683 struct dentry *dentry,
1686 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1687 struct common_audit_data ad;
1689 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1690 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1691 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1692 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1695 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1696 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1697 pathname if needed. */
1698 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1699 const struct path *path,
1702 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1703 struct common_audit_data ad;
1705 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1707 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1708 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1711 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1712 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1716 struct common_audit_data ad;
1718 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1720 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1723 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1724 static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
1727 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1728 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1729 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1730 check a particular permission to the file.
1731 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1732 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1733 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1734 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1735 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1739 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1740 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1741 struct common_audit_data ad;
1742 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1745 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1748 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1749 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1757 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1758 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1763 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1766 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1773 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1776 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1778 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1781 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1782 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1784 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1785 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1786 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1787 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1789 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1791 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1792 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
1800 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1801 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1802 struct dentry *dentry,
1805 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1806 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1807 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1809 struct common_audit_data ad;
1812 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1813 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1817 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1818 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1820 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1821 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1826 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1831 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1835 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1836 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1837 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1841 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1844 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1845 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1846 struct dentry *dentry,
1850 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1851 struct common_audit_data ad;
1852 u32 sid = current_sid();
1856 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1857 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1859 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1860 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1863 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1864 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1879 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1884 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1888 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1889 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1890 struct inode *new_dir,
1891 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1893 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1894 struct common_audit_data ad;
1895 u32 sid = current_sid();
1897 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1900 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1901 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1902 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1903 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1905 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1907 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1908 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1909 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1912 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1913 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1916 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1917 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1918 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1923 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1924 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1925 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1926 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1927 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1930 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1931 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1932 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1933 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1935 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1943 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1944 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1945 const struct super_block *sb,
1947 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1949 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1950 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1952 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1953 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1956 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1957 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1961 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1962 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1963 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1964 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1967 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1969 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1973 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1975 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1977 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1984 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1985 static inline u32 file_to_av(const struct file *file)
1989 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1991 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1992 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1999 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2008 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
2011 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2013 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2014 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2016 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2017 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2023 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2025 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
2027 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
2028 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2031 static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2032 const struct cred *to)
2034 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2035 u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2036 u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2039 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2040 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2041 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2046 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid,
2047 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2050 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2051 const struct cred *to)
2053 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2054 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2058 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2059 const struct cred *to,
2060 const struct file *file)
2062 u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2063 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2064 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2065 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2066 struct common_audit_data ad;
2069 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2070 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2072 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2073 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
2081 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2082 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2087 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2090 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2091 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2095 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2098 u32 sid = current_sid();
2099 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2101 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2102 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ,
2105 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
2109 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2111 return avc_has_perm(task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2112 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2115 static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2116 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2118 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target),
2119 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2122 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2123 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2124 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2125 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2127 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2128 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2132 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2133 * which was removed).
2135 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2136 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2137 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2138 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2141 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2142 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2144 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2147 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
2149 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2164 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2172 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2173 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2176 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2182 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2184 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2186 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2189 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2192 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2193 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2194 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2195 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2196 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2197 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2198 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2199 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2200 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2201 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2204 /* All other syslog types */
2205 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2206 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2210 * Check permission for allocating a new virtual mapping. Returns
2211 * 0 if permission is granted, negative error code if not.
2213 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2214 * processes that allocate mappings.
2216 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2218 return cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2219 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2222 /* binprm security operations */
2224 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2227 struct task_struct *tracer;
2230 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2232 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2238 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2239 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2240 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2242 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2243 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2247 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2248 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2250 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2251 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2254 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2255 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2256 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2257 * the old and new contexts.
2259 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2262 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2264 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2265 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2266 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2272 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2273 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2274 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2276 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid,
2282 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2283 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2284 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2291 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2293 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2294 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2295 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2296 struct common_audit_data ad;
2297 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2300 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2301 * the script interpreter */
2303 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2304 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2305 isec = inode_security(inode);
2307 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2308 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2309 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2311 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2312 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2313 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2314 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2317 * Before policy is loaded, label any task outside kernel space
2318 * as SECINITSID_INIT, so that any userspace tasks surviving from
2319 * early boot end up with a label different from SECINITSID_KERNEL
2320 * (if the policy chooses to set SECINITSID_INIT != SECINITSID_KERNEL).
2322 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
2323 new_tsec->sid = SECINITSID_INIT;
2324 /* also clear the exec_sid just in case */
2325 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2329 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2330 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2331 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2332 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2334 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2335 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2339 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2340 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid,
2341 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2347 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2350 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2352 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2355 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2356 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2358 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2359 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2360 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2364 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2365 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2366 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2370 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2371 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2375 /* Check for shared state */
2376 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2377 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2378 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2384 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2385 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2386 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2387 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2389 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2391 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2397 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2398 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2400 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2401 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2402 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2403 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2404 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2406 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2412 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2414 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2417 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2418 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2419 struct files_struct *files)
2421 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2422 struct tty_struct *tty;
2426 tty = get_current_tty();
2428 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2429 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2430 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2432 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2433 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2434 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2435 open file may belong to another process and we are
2436 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2437 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2438 struct tty_file_private, list);
2439 file = file_priv->file;
2440 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2443 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2446 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2450 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2451 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2452 if (!n) /* none found? */
2455 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2456 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2458 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2460 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2461 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2467 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2469 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2471 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2472 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2475 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2476 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2479 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2480 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2482 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2483 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2485 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2486 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2487 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2489 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2490 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2491 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2492 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2493 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2495 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2496 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2498 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2500 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2501 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2502 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2503 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2505 task_unlock(current);
2506 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2507 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2512 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2515 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2517 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2527 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2528 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2529 * flush and unblock signals.
2531 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2532 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2534 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2538 spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2539 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2540 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2541 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2542 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2543 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2544 recalc_sigpending();
2546 spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2549 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2550 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2551 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2552 __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
2553 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2556 /* superblock security operations */
2558 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2562 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2563 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2564 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2565 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2566 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2567 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2572 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2574 bool open_quote = false;
2578 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2580 open_quote = !open_quote;
2581 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2587 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2589 char *from = options;
2595 int len = opt_len(from);
2599 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2601 if (token != Opt_error) {
2606 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2611 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2617 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2624 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2629 memmove(to, from, len);
2642 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2648 static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2650 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2651 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2654 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2655 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2657 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2658 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2661 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2662 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2665 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2667 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2669 opts->fscontext_sid))
2672 if (opts->context_sid) {
2673 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2677 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2678 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2680 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2681 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2682 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2685 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2686 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2687 opts->defcontext_sid))
2693 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2695 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2696 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2698 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2704 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2705 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2706 opts->fscontext_sid))
2707 goto out_bad_option;
2709 if (opts->context_sid) {
2710 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2712 goto out_bad_option;
2714 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2715 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2716 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2717 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2718 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2719 goto out_bad_option;
2721 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2722 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2723 opts->defcontext_sid))
2724 goto out_bad_option;
2729 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2730 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2735 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
2737 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2738 struct common_audit_data ad;
2740 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2741 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2742 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2745 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2747 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2748 struct common_audit_data ad;
2750 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2751 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2752 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2755 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2756 const struct path *path,
2758 unsigned long flags,
2761 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2763 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2764 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2765 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2767 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2770 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2771 const struct path *to_path)
2773 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2775 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2778 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2780 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2782 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2783 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2786 static int selinux_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
2787 struct super_block *reference)
2789 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference);
2790 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2793 * Ensure that fc->security remains NULL when no options are set
2794 * as expected by selinux_set_mnt_opts().
2796 if (!(sbsec->flags & (FSCONTEXT_MNT|CONTEXT_MNT|DEFCONTEXT_MNT)))
2799 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2803 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT)
2804 opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid;
2805 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT)
2806 opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2807 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT)
2808 opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid;
2809 fc->security = opts;
2813 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2814 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2816 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2821 fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
2822 return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2825 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2826 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2827 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2828 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2829 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2830 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2834 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2835 struct fs_parameter *param)
2837 struct fs_parse_result result;
2840 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2844 return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2847 /* inode security operations */
2849 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2851 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2852 u32 sid = current_sid();
2854 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2855 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2856 isec->inode = inode;
2857 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2858 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2859 isec->task_sid = sid;
2860 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2865 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2867 inode_free_security(inode);
2870 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2871 const struct qstr *name,
2872 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
2878 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2879 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2880 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2886 *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
2888 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx,
2892 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2894 const struct cred *old,
2899 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2901 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2902 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2903 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2908 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2909 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2913 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2914 const struct qstr *qstr,
2915 struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
2917 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2918 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2919 struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
2925 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2927 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2928 newsclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2929 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr, newsclass, &newsid);
2933 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2934 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2935 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2936 isec->sclass = newsclass;
2938 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2941 if (!selinux_initialized() ||
2942 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2946 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
2950 xattr->value = context;
2951 xattr->value_len = clen;
2952 xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2958 static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
2959 const struct qstr *name,
2960 const struct inode *context_inode)
2962 u32 sid = current_sid();
2963 struct common_audit_data ad;
2964 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2967 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized()))
2970 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2973 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
2974 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
2978 if (context_inode) {
2979 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
2980 selinux_inode(context_inode);
2981 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
2982 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized\n");
2986 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
2987 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
2989 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
2990 rc = security_transition_sid(
2992 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
2997 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2999 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
3000 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
3003 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
3004 ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
3006 return avc_has_perm(sid,
3013 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3015 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3018 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3020 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3023 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3025 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3028 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3030 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3033 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3035 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3038 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3040 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3043 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3045 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3048 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3049 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3051 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3054 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3056 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3058 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3061 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3064 struct common_audit_data ad;
3065 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3066 u32 sid = current_sid();
3068 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3069 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3070 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3072 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3074 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3077 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3078 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3081 struct common_audit_data ad;
3082 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3084 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3087 return slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3088 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3091 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3095 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3096 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3097 u32 sid = current_sid();
3098 struct av_decision avd;
3100 u32 audited, denied;
3102 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3103 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3105 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3109 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3112 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3114 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3116 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3118 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3120 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3121 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3123 if (likely(!audited))
3126 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3132 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
3133 struct iattr *iattr)
3135 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3136 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3137 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3138 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3140 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3141 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3142 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3148 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3149 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3150 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3152 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3153 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3154 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3155 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3158 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3161 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3163 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3166 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3168 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3169 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3171 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3173 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3179 * selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks?
3180 * @name: name of the xattr
3182 * Returns 1 to indicate that SELinux "owns" the access control rights to xattrs
3183 * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional
3184 * capability based access controls on this xattr. Returns 0 to indicate that
3185 * SELinux does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is
3186 * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability
3189 static int selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name)
3191 /* require capability check if not a selinux xattr */
3192 return !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3195 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3196 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3197 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3199 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3200 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3201 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3202 struct common_audit_data ad;
3203 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3206 /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */
3207 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3208 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3210 if (!selinux_initialized())
3211 return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3213 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3214 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3217 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
3220 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3221 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3223 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3224 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3225 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3229 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3231 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3232 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3233 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3236 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3237 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3239 const char *str = value;
3241 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3242 audit_size = size - 1;
3248 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3249 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3252 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3253 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3258 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value,
3264 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3265 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3269 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid,
3274 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3276 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3277 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3281 static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3282 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
3283 struct posix_acl *kacl)
3285 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3288 static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3289 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3291 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3294 static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3295 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3297 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3300 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3301 const void *value, size_t size,
3304 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3305 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3309 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3310 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3314 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
3315 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3316 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3317 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3318 * we've since initialized.
3323 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
3326 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3327 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3328 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3332 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3333 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3336 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3337 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3340 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3342 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3344 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3347 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3349 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3351 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3354 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3355 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3357 /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */
3358 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3359 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3361 if (!selinux_initialized())
3364 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3365 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3369 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3370 unsigned int obj_type)
3375 struct common_audit_data ad;
3377 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3381 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3382 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3385 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3386 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3388 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3389 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3390 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3391 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3395 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3402 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3403 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3404 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3406 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3407 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3408 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3410 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3414 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3416 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3418 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3419 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3420 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3424 char *context = NULL;
3425 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3428 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3429 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3431 if (!selinux_initialized() ||
3432 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3436 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3437 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3438 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3439 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3440 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3441 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3442 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3444 isec = inode_security(inode);
3445 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3446 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3449 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid,
3463 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3464 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3466 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3467 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3471 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3474 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3475 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3478 if (!value || !size)
3481 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3486 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3487 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3489 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3490 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3494 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3496 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3498 if (!selinux_initialized())
3501 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3502 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3506 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3508 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3512 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3515 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3516 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3518 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3519 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3524 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3525 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3526 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3527 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3532 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3534 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3535 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3536 * xattrs up. Instead, filter out SELinux-related xattrs following
3539 if (selinux_initialized() && !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3540 return -ECANCELED; /* Discard */
3542 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3548 /* kernfs node operations */
3550 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3551 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3553 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3554 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3558 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3565 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3569 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3575 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, clen, &parent_sid,
3581 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3582 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3584 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3588 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3590 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3591 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3597 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
3602 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3609 /* file security operations */
3611 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3613 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3614 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3616 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3617 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3620 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3621 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3624 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3626 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3627 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3628 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3629 u32 sid = current_sid();
3632 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3635 isec = inode_security(inode);
3636 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3637 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3638 /* No change since file_open check. */
3641 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3644 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3646 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3647 u32 sid = current_sid();
3650 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3656 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3657 * operation to an inode.
3659 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3660 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3662 struct common_audit_data ad;
3663 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3664 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3665 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3666 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3667 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3669 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3670 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3672 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3675 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3677 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3678 rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
3686 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3689 isec = inode_security(inode);
3690 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3691 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3696 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3699 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3706 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3707 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3708 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3711 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3712 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3713 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3716 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3719 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3724 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3725 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3730 if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
3731 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3734 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3735 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3738 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3743 static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3747 * If we are in a 64-bit kernel running 32-bit userspace, we need to
3748 * make sure we don't compare 32-bit flags to 64-bit flags.
3751 case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
3752 cmd = FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
3754 case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
3755 cmd = FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
3757 case FS_IOC32_GETVERSION:
3758 cmd = FS_IOC_GETVERSION;
3760 case FS_IOC32_SETVERSION:
3761 cmd = FS_IOC_SETVERSION;
3767 return selinux_file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
3770 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3772 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3774 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3775 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3778 if (default_noexec &&
3779 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3780 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3782 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3783 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3784 * This has an additional check.
3786 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3787 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3793 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3794 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3796 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3797 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3800 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3801 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3803 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3810 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3814 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3815 u32 sid = current_sid();
3816 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3817 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3823 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
3824 unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3825 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3827 struct common_audit_data ad;
3831 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3833 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3839 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3840 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3843 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3844 unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3847 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3848 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3850 if (default_noexec &&
3851 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3854 * We don't use the vma_is_initial_heap() helper as it has
3855 * a history of problems and is currently broken on systems
3856 * where there is no heap, e.g. brk == start_brk. Before
3857 * replacing the conditional below with vma_is_initial_heap(),
3858 * or something similar, please ensure that the logic is the
3859 * same as what we have below or you have tested every possible
3860 * corner case you can think to test.
3862 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3863 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3864 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3865 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3866 } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
3867 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3868 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3869 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3870 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3872 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3873 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3874 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3875 * modified content. This typically should only
3876 * occur for text relocations.
3878 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3884 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3887 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3889 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3891 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3894 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3897 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3902 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3903 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3912 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3913 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3914 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3922 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3927 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3934 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3936 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3938 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3939 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3942 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3943 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3946 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3948 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3950 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3953 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3956 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3958 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3960 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3961 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3964 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3966 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3968 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3971 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3973 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3974 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3976 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3977 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3979 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3980 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3981 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3982 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3983 * struct as its SID.
3985 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3986 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3988 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3989 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3990 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3991 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3992 * new inode label or new policy.
3993 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3995 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3998 /* task security operations */
4000 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
4001 unsigned long clone_flags)
4003 u32 sid = current_sid();
4005 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
4009 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
4011 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
4014 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4015 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4022 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
4024 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
4026 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4027 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4032 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
4034 *secid = cred_sid(c);
4038 * set the security data for a kernel service
4039 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
4041 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
4043 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4044 u32 sid = current_sid();
4047 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
4048 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4049 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
4053 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4054 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4055 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4061 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4062 * objective context of the specified inode
4064 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4066 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4067 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4068 u32 sid = current_sid();
4071 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4072 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4073 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4077 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4081 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4083 struct common_audit_data ad;
4085 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4086 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4088 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4089 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4092 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4094 struct common_audit_data ad;
4095 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4096 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4097 u32 sid = current_sid();
4102 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4103 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4107 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4110 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4111 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4112 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4117 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4118 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4119 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4122 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4123 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4129 case READING_MODULE:
4130 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4139 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4144 case LOADING_MODULE:
4145 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4154 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4156 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4157 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4160 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4162 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4163 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4166 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4168 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4169 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4172 static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
4174 *secid = current_sid();
4177 static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4179 *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4182 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4184 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4185 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4188 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4190 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4191 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4194 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4196 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4197 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4200 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4207 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4208 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4209 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4210 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4211 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4212 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4215 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4216 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4218 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4220 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4221 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4222 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4223 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4224 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4225 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4226 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4231 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4233 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4234 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4237 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4239 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4240 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4243 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4245 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4246 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4249 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4250 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4256 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4258 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4260 secid = current_sid();
4262 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4263 return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4266 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4267 struct inode *inode)
4269 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4270 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4272 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4273 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4275 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4276 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4279 static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
4281 u32 sid = current_sid();
4283 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
4284 USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
4287 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4288 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4289 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4291 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4292 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4294 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4295 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4299 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4300 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4303 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4304 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4308 *proto = ih->protocol;
4310 switch (ih->protocol) {
4312 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4314 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4318 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4322 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4323 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4328 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4330 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4334 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4338 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4339 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4343 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4344 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4346 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4350 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4354 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4355 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4359 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4360 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4361 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4363 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4367 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4371 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4372 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4383 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4385 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4386 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4387 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4390 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4391 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4394 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4395 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4399 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4400 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4403 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4404 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4405 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4414 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4416 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4420 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4421 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4426 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4428 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4432 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4433 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4437 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4438 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4440 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4444 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4445 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4449 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4450 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4451 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4453 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4457 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4458 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4462 /* includes fragments */
4472 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4473 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4478 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4480 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4483 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4484 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4487 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4489 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4492 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4493 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4503 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4504 " unable to parse packet\n");
4514 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4516 * @family: protocol family
4517 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4520 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4521 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4522 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4523 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4524 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4528 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4535 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4538 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4542 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid,
4543 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4544 if (unlikely(err)) {
4546 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4547 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4555 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4556 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4557 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4558 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4560 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4561 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4562 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4563 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4566 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4570 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4571 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid,
4579 /* socket security operations */
4581 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4582 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4584 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4585 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4589 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4590 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4593 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4595 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
4596 struct common_audit_data ad;
4597 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4599 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4603 * Before POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT, sockets that
4604 * inherited the kernel context from early boot used to be skipped
4605 * here, so preserve that behavior unless the capability is set.
4607 * By setting the capability the policy signals that it is ready
4608 * for this quirk to be fixed. Note that sockets created by a kernel
4609 * thread or a usermode helper executed without a transition will
4610 * still be skipped in this check regardless of the policycap
4613 if (!selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context() &&
4614 sksec->sid == SECINITSID_INIT)
4617 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
4619 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4623 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4624 int protocol, int kern)
4626 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4634 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4635 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4639 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4642 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4643 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4645 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4646 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4647 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4648 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4649 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4653 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4658 isec->sclass = sclass;
4660 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4663 sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
4664 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4666 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4667 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4668 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4670 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4676 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4677 struct socket *sockb)
4679 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
4680 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
4682 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4683 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4688 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4689 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4690 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4692 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4694 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4695 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
4699 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4703 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4704 family = sk->sk_family;
4705 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4707 struct common_audit_data ad;
4708 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4709 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4710 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4712 unsigned short snum;
4716 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4717 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4718 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4719 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4721 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4723 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4724 switch (family_sa) {
4727 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4729 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4730 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4731 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4732 /* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
4733 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4735 /* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
4738 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4739 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4741 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4743 family_sa = AF_INET;
4745 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4746 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4749 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4751 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4752 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4753 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4759 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4761 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4762 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4767 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4769 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4770 snum < low || snum > high) {
4771 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4775 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4777 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4783 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4784 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4785 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4788 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4789 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4792 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4793 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4796 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4797 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4801 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4805 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4809 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4810 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4812 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4814 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4815 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4822 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4823 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4825 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4828 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4829 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4831 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4832 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4834 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4835 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
4838 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4841 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4844 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4845 * way to disconnect the socket
4847 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4851 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4854 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4855 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4856 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4857 struct common_audit_data ad;
4858 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4859 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4860 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4861 unsigned short snum;
4864 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4865 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4866 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4867 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4869 switch (address->sa_family) {
4871 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4872 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4874 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4877 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4878 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4880 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4883 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4884 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4886 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4889 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4892 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4896 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4897 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4898 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4900 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4901 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4903 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4904 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4908 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4910 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4911 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4912 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4920 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4921 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4922 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4925 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4927 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4931 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4934 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4936 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4939 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4942 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4943 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4947 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4951 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4952 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4953 sclass = isec->sclass;
4955 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4957 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4958 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4960 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4965 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4968 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4971 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4972 int size, int flags)
4974 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4977 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4979 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4982 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4984 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4987 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4991 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4995 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4998 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
5001 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
5004 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
5006 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
5009 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
5013 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
5014 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
5015 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
5016 struct common_audit_data ad;
5017 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5020 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
5022 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
5023 sksec_other->sclass,
5024 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
5028 /* server child socket */
5029 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
5030 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid,
5031 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
5035 /* connecting socket */
5036 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
5041 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
5042 struct socket *other)
5044 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
5045 struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
5046 struct common_audit_data ad;
5047 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5049 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
5051 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5055 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5056 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5057 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5063 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5066 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5067 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5071 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5074 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5075 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5078 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5082 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5083 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5084 struct common_audit_data ad;
5085 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5088 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5089 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5093 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5094 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5100 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5103 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5108 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5110 int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active;
5111 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5112 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5113 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5114 struct common_audit_data ad;
5115 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5118 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5121 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5122 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5125 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5126 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5127 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5128 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5129 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5130 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5132 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5133 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5134 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5137 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5138 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5142 if (peerlbl_active) {
5145 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5148 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5149 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5151 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5154 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5157 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5162 if (secmark_active) {
5163 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5172 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
5173 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
5177 char *scontext = NULL;
5179 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
5180 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5182 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5183 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5184 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5185 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5186 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5187 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5189 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext,
5193 if (scontext_len > len) {
5198 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5201 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
5207 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
5208 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5210 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5213 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5215 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5218 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5220 *secid = SECSID_NULL;
5224 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5225 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5226 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5227 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5229 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5231 *secid = peer_secid;
5232 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5233 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5237 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5239 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5241 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5242 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5243 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5244 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5249 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5251 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5253 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5256 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5258 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5259 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
5261 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5262 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5263 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5265 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5268 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5271 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5273 const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5275 *secid = sksec->sid;
5279 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5281 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5282 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5283 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5285 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5286 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5287 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5288 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5292 * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
5293 * if it's the first association on the socket.
5295 static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5296 struct sk_buff *skb)
5298 struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
5299 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5300 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5301 struct common_audit_data ad;
5302 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5305 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5306 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5309 if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
5310 asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5312 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5313 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5315 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
5319 if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5320 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5322 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5325 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5326 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5328 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5329 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5330 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5331 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5333 sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5334 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
5335 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5336 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5338 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk);
5339 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
5340 sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
5348 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
5349 * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
5350 * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
5352 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5353 struct sk_buff *skb)
5355 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
5359 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5362 err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5366 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5367 * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5368 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5369 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5370 * plug this into the new socket.
5372 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
5376 asoc->secid = conn_sid;
5378 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5379 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
5382 /* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
5383 * response to an association request (initited by us).
5385 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5386 struct sk_buff *skb)
5388 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
5390 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5393 /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
5394 * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
5395 * into a new socket.
5397 asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
5399 return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5402 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5403 * based on their @optname.
5405 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5406 struct sockaddr *address,
5409 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5411 struct sockaddr *addr;
5412 struct socket *sock;
5414 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5417 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5418 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5421 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5422 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5426 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5429 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5432 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5438 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5444 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5445 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5446 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5447 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5449 /* Connect checks */
5450 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5451 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5452 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5453 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5454 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5458 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5459 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5460 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5461 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5462 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5463 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5464 * primary address is selected.
5465 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5466 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5467 * selinux_socket_connect().
5469 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5483 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5484 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
5487 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5488 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
5490 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5491 * the non-sctp clone version.
5493 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5494 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5496 newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
5497 newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5498 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5499 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5502 static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
5504 struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = selinux_sock(ssk);
5505 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5507 ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5508 ssksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5510 /* replace the existing subflow label deleting the existing one
5511 * and re-recreating a new label using the updated context
5513 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssksec);
5514 return selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(ssk, ssk->sk_family);
5517 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5518 struct request_sock *req)
5520 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5522 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5526 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5529 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5532 req->secid = connsid;
5533 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5535 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5538 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5539 const struct request_sock *req)
5541 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
5543 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5544 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5545 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5546 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5547 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5548 time it will have been created and available. */
5550 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5551 * thread with access to newsksec */
5552 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5555 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5557 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5558 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5560 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5561 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5564 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5567 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5569 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5573 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5575 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5578 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5580 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5583 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5584 struct flowi_common *flic)
5586 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5589 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void *security)
5591 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
5593 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5597 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5599 u32 sid = current_sid();
5601 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5602 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5603 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5604 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5605 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5606 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5608 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5612 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5614 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
5616 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5617 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5620 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5622 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
5623 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5625 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5626 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5627 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5628 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5629 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5630 * protocols were being used */
5632 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5633 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5638 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5640 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
5641 u32 sid = current_sid();
5644 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5645 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5648 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5649 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5657 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5659 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5660 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5666 struct common_audit_data ad;
5667 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5668 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5670 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5673 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5674 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5675 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5679 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5682 ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
5683 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5684 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5687 if (peerlbl_active) {
5690 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
5691 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5693 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5699 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5700 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5703 if (netlbl_enabled())
5704 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5705 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5706 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5708 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5714 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5715 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5720 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5723 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5724 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5725 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5728 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5730 if (sk_listener(sk))
5731 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5732 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5733 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5734 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5735 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5736 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5737 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5738 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5739 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5740 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5741 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5742 * best we can do. */
5745 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5746 sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5749 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5750 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
5757 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5758 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5761 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5762 struct common_audit_data ad;
5763 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5766 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5769 sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5771 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf);
5772 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
5775 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5776 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5777 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5778 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5780 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5781 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5786 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
5787 struct sk_buff *skb,
5788 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5795 struct common_audit_data ad;
5796 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5798 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5800 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5801 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5802 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5803 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5804 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5805 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
5807 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5808 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5809 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5812 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5815 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5816 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5817 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5818 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5819 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5820 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5821 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5822 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5823 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5824 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5826 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5827 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5833 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5834 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5835 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5836 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5838 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5839 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5842 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5843 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5845 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5846 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5847 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5848 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5849 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5850 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5851 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5852 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5853 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5854 * for similar problems. */
5856 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5858 sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5859 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5861 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5862 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5863 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5864 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5865 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5866 * pass the packet. */
5867 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5870 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5874 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5878 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5881 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5883 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5885 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5886 * associated socket. */
5887 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5888 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5889 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5892 ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
5893 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5894 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5898 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5899 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5900 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5902 if (peerlbl_active) {
5906 if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
5908 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5909 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5910 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5912 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5914 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5915 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5916 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5921 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5923 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5926 unsigned int msg_len;
5927 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5928 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5929 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5930 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5931 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5934 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5935 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5937 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5938 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5939 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5940 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5941 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5943 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5946 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5948 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5951 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5952 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5953 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5954 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5955 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5956 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5957 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5958 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5959 if (enforcing_enabled() &&
5960 !security_get_allow_unknown())
5963 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5964 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5970 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5971 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5972 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5974 data_len -= msg_len;
5981 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5983 isec->sclass = sclass;
5984 isec->sid = current_sid();
5987 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5990 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5991 struct common_audit_data ad;
5992 u32 sid = current_sid();
5994 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5996 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5997 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5999 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
6002 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6004 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6006 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6007 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6012 /* message queue security operations */
6013 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6015 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6016 struct common_audit_data ad;
6017 u32 sid = current_sid();
6019 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6020 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6022 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6023 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6025 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6029 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6031 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6032 struct common_audit_data ad;
6033 u32 sid = current_sid();
6035 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6037 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6038 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6040 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6041 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6044 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6051 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6052 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6053 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6057 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6060 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6063 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6069 return ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6072 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6074 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6075 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6076 struct common_audit_data ad;
6077 u32 sid = current_sid();
6080 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6081 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6084 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6086 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6088 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6089 * message queue this message will be stored in
6091 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid,
6092 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6097 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6098 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6100 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6101 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6104 /* Can this process send the message */
6105 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6108 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6109 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6110 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6115 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6116 struct task_struct *target,
6117 long type, int mode)
6119 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6120 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6121 struct common_audit_data ad;
6122 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6125 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6126 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6128 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6129 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6131 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
6132 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6134 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
6135 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6139 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6140 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6142 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6143 struct common_audit_data ad;
6144 u32 sid = current_sid();
6146 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6147 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6149 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6150 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6152 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6156 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6158 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6159 struct common_audit_data ad;
6160 u32 sid = current_sid();
6162 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6164 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6165 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6167 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6168 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6171 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6172 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6179 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6180 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6181 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6185 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6188 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6195 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6201 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6204 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6205 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6209 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6212 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6214 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6217 /* Semaphore security operations */
6218 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6220 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6221 struct common_audit_data ad;
6222 u32 sid = current_sid();
6224 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6225 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6227 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6228 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6230 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6234 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6236 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6237 struct common_audit_data ad;
6238 u32 sid = current_sid();
6240 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6242 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6243 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6245 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6246 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6249 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6250 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6258 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6259 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6260 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6264 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6275 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6278 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6283 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6289 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6293 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6294 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6299 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6303 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6306 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6312 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6314 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6319 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6322 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6324 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6328 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6331 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6334 static int selinux_lsm_getattr(unsigned int attr, struct task_struct *p,
6337 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6343 tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6345 error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tsec->sid,
6346 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6351 case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
6358 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
6360 case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
6361 sid = tsec->create_sid;
6363 case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
6364 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6366 case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
6367 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6370 error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
6375 if (sid == SECSID_NULL) {
6380 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
6390 static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
6392 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6394 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6399 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6403 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6404 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6406 case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
6407 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6408 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6410 case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
6411 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6412 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6414 case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
6415 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6416 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6418 case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
6419 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6420 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6423 error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
6429 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6430 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6431 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6435 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size,
6437 if (error == -EINVAL && attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
6438 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6439 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6442 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end,
6443 * otherwise the context contains a nul and
6444 * we should audit that */
6445 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6446 audit_size = size - 1;
6449 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6454 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6455 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value,
6461 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
6468 new = prepare_creds();
6472 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6473 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6474 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6475 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6476 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6477 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6478 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6479 if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) {
6480 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6481 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
6482 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6483 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE) {
6485 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid,
6486 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6490 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6491 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE) {
6492 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6493 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) {
6498 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6499 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
6504 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6505 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6506 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6510 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6511 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6512 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6514 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6515 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6535 * selinux_getselfattr - Get SELinux current task attributes
6536 * @attr: the requested attribute
6537 * @ctx: buffer to receive the result
6538 * @size: buffer size (input), buffer size used (output)
6541 * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
6544 * Returns the number of attributes on success, an error code otherwise.
6545 * There will only ever be one attribute.
6547 static int selinux_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx,
6548 u32 *size, u32 flags)
6554 val_len = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, current, &val);
6557 rc = lsm_fill_user_ctx(ctx, size, val, val_len, LSM_ID_SELINUX, 0);
6559 return (!rc ? 1 : rc);
6562 static int selinux_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
6563 u32 size, u32 flags)
6567 rc = selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
6573 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6574 const char *name, char **value)
6576 unsigned int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
6580 rc = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, p, value);
6581 if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
6588 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6590 int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
6593 return selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, value, size);
6597 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6599 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6602 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6604 return security_sid_to_context(secid,
6608 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6610 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen,
6614 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6619 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6621 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6623 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6624 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6625 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6629 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6631 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6633 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6635 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6636 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6640 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6642 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6644 return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6645 ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
6648 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6651 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,
6652 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6660 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6661 unsigned long flags)
6663 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6664 struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k);
6666 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6667 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6668 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6670 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6675 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6676 const struct cred *cred,
6677 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6680 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6683 switch (need_perm) {
6690 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6693 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6699 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6700 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6702 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6703 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6704 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6705 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6713 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6714 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6715 ksec = selinux_key(key);
6717 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6720 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6722 struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
6723 char *context = NULL;
6727 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid,
6735 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6736 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6738 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6739 u32 sid = current_sid();
6741 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6746 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6747 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6749 struct common_audit_data ad;
6752 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6753 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6755 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6759 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6760 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6761 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6762 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6763 return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6764 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6765 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6768 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6771 struct common_audit_data ad;
6774 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6775 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6777 err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num,
6783 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6784 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6785 ibendport.port = port_num;
6786 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6787 return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6788 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6789 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6792 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void *ib_sec)
6794 struct ib_security_struct *sec = selinux_ib(ib_sec);
6796 sec->sid = current_sid();
6801 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6802 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6805 u32 sid = current_sid();
6809 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6810 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6814 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6825 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6829 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6830 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6831 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6832 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6836 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6837 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
6838 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6839 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6840 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6841 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6842 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6844 static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid)
6846 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6847 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6848 struct bpf_map *map;
6851 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6852 map = file->private_data;
6853 bpfsec = map->security;
6854 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6855 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6858 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6859 prog = file->private_data;
6860 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6861 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6862 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6869 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6871 u32 sid = current_sid();
6872 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6874 bpfsec = map->security;
6875 return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6876 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6879 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6881 u32 sid = current_sid();
6882 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6884 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6885 return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6886 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6889 static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
6890 struct bpf_token *token)
6892 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6894 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6898 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6899 map->security = bpfsec;
6904 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6906 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6908 map->security = NULL;
6912 static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
6913 struct bpf_token *token)
6915 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6917 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6921 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6922 prog->aux->security = bpfsec;
6927 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6929 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6931 prog->aux->security = NULL;
6935 static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
6938 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6940 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6944 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6945 token->security = bpfsec;
6950 static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
6952 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
6954 token->security = NULL;
6959 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
6960 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6961 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6962 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6963 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6964 .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
6965 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6966 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6967 .lbs_perf_event = sizeof(struct perf_event_security_struct),
6969 .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
6970 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
6971 .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
6972 .lbs_tun_dev = sizeof(struct tun_security_struct),
6973 .lbs_ib = sizeof(struct ib_security_struct),
6976 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6977 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6979 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6981 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6982 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6983 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6984 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6985 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6986 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6987 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6988 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6992 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6996 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6998 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
7000 perfsec = selinux_perf_event(event->security);
7001 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
7006 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
7008 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7009 u32 sid = current_sid();
7011 return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
7012 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
7015 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
7017 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7018 u32 sid = current_sid();
7020 return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
7021 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
7025 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7027 * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
7028 * @new: the target creds
7030 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
7031 * to service an io_uring operation.
7033 static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
7035 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
7036 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
7040 * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
7042 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
7043 * kernel polling thread.
7045 static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
7047 u32 sid = current_sid();
7049 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid,
7050 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
7054 * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
7055 * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
7057 * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
7058 * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
7061 static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
7063 struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
7064 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
7065 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
7066 struct common_audit_data ad;
7068 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
7071 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
7072 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
7074 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
7076 static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
7078 .id = LSM_ID_SELINUX,
7082 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7083 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7084 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7085 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7087 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7088 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7090 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7092 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
7155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat),
7169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7209 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, selinux_getselfattr),
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, selinux_setselfattr),
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7230 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7231 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7233 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7234 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7236 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7237 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7239 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7240 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7241 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7242 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7244 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7246 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7247 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7248 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7251 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7252 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7253 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7254 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7255 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7256 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7257 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7258 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7260 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7261 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7262 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7263 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7264 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
7265 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mptcp_add_subflow, selinux_mptcp_add_subflow),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7267 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7268 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7269 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7270 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7271 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7275 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7276 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7277 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7278 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7280 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7282 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7283 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7284 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7285 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7286 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7289 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7290 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7294 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7295 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7296 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7302 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7304 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7307 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7308 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7310 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7311 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7312 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free),
7316 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7317 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7318 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7319 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7322 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7323 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
7324 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
7325 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
7329 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7331 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, selinux_fs_context_submount),
7332 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7333 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7334 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7335 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7336 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7340 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7342 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7343 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7344 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7345 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7346 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7347 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7348 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7349 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7350 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7351 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7352 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7353 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7354 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7356 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7357 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7358 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7359 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7360 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7363 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7366 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7368 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7369 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_create, selinux_bpf_map_create),
7370 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_load, selinux_bpf_prog_load),
7371 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_create, selinux_bpf_token_create),
7373 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7374 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7378 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7380 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7382 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7383 enforcing_set(selinux_enforcing_boot);
7385 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7386 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7388 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7389 cred_init_security();
7391 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7392 if (!default_noexec)
7393 pr_notice("SELinux: virtual memory is executable by default\n");
7399 ebitmap_cache_init();
7401 hashtab_cache_init();
7403 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
7406 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7407 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7409 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7410 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7412 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7413 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7415 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7417 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7422 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7424 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7427 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7429 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7431 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7432 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7433 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7436 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7437 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7438 DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7440 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7441 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7442 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7443 .init = selinux_init,
7446 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7447 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7449 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7451 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7452 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7455 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7457 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7458 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7461 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7463 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7464 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7466 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7468 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7470 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7471 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7474 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7476 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7477 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7480 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7482 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7483 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7488 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7490 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7491 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7494 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7496 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7497 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7500 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7501 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7502 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7505 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7509 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7512 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7514 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7516 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7520 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7521 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */