2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
23 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
24 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
27 #include <linux/init.h>
29 #include <linux/kernel.h>
30 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
31 #include <linux/errno.h>
32 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
33 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
34 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
35 #include <linux/xattr.h>
36 #include <linux/capability.h>
37 #include <linux/unistd.h>
39 #include <linux/mman.h>
40 #include <linux/slab.h>
41 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
42 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
43 #include <linux/swap.h>
44 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
45 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
46 #include <linux/dcache.h>
47 #include <linux/file.h>
48 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
50 #include <linux/mount.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53 #include <linux/tty.h>
55 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
59 #include <net/netlabel.h>
60 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
61 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
62 #include <linux/atomic.h>
63 #include <linux/bitops.h>
64 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
65 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66 #include <net/netlink.h>
67 #include <linux/tcp.h>
68 #include <linux/udp.h>
69 #include <linux/dccp.h>
70 #include <linux/sctp.h>
71 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72 #include <linux/quota.h>
73 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75 #include <linux/parser.h>
76 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
78 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79 #include <linux/personality.h>
80 #include <linux/audit.h>
81 #include <linux/string.h>
82 #include <linux/selinux.h>
83 #include <linux/mutex.h>
84 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
85 #include <linux/syslog.h>
86 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
87 #include <linux/export.h>
88 #include <linux/msg.h>
89 #include <linux/shm.h>
90 #include <linux/bpf.h>
103 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
105 /* SECMARK reference count */
106 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
108 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
109 static int selinux_enforcing_boot;
111 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
113 unsigned long enforcing;
114 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
115 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
118 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
120 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
123 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
124 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
126 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
128 unsigned long enabled;
129 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
130 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
133 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
135 int selinux_enabled = 1;
138 static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
139 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
141 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
143 unsigned long checkreqprot;
145 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
146 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
149 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
151 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
152 static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
155 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
158 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
159 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
160 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
161 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
162 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
165 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
167 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
168 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
172 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
175 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
176 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
177 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
178 * is always considered enabled.
181 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
183 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
184 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
187 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
189 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
198 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
200 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
202 call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
209 * initialise the security for the init task
211 static void cred_init_security(void)
213 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
216 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
218 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
220 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
221 cred->security = tsec;
225 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
227 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
229 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
231 tsec = cred->security;
236 * get the objective security ID of a task
238 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
243 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
248 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
250 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
252 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
253 u32 sid = current_sid();
255 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
259 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
260 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
262 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
263 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
264 isec->task_sid = sid;
265 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
266 inode->i_security = isec;
271 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
274 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
275 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
276 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
277 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
279 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
280 struct dentry *dentry,
283 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
285 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
287 if (selinux_state.initialized &&
288 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
293 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
294 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
295 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
297 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
302 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
304 return inode->i_security;
307 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
311 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
313 return ERR_PTR(error);
314 return inode->i_security;
318 * Get the security label of an inode.
320 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
322 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
323 return inode->i_security;
326 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
328 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
330 return inode->i_security;
334 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
336 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
338 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
340 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
341 return inode->i_security;
344 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
346 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
348 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
349 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
352 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
354 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
355 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
358 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
359 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
360 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
362 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
363 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
364 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
365 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
367 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
368 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
369 list_del_init(&isec->list);
370 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
374 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
375 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
376 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
377 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
378 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
379 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
380 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
382 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
385 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
387 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
388 u32 sid = current_sid();
390 fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
395 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
396 file->f_security = fsec;
401 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
403 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
404 file->f_security = NULL;
405 kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
408 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
410 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
412 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
416 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
417 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
418 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
420 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
421 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
422 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
423 sb->s_security = sbsec;
428 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
430 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
431 sb->s_security = NULL;
435 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
437 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
446 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
450 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
452 static const match_table_t tokens = {
453 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
454 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
455 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
456 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
457 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
461 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
463 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
464 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
465 const struct cred *cred)
467 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
470 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
471 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
472 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
476 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
477 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
478 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
482 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
483 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
484 const struct cred *cred)
486 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
488 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
489 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
490 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
494 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
495 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
496 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
500 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
502 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
504 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
505 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
506 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
507 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
508 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
509 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
510 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
511 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
512 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
513 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
514 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
515 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
516 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
519 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
521 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
522 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
523 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
526 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
527 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
528 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
529 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
530 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
531 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
532 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
533 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
534 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
539 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
540 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
541 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
542 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
543 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
544 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
546 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
547 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
548 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
553 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
556 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
557 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
558 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
560 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
561 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
563 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
565 /* Initialize the root inode. */
566 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
568 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
569 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
570 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
572 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
574 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
575 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
576 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
577 struct inode_security_struct, list);
578 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
579 list_del_init(&isec->list);
580 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
581 inode = igrab(inode);
583 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
587 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
590 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
596 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
597 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
598 * mount options, or whatever.
600 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
601 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
604 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
605 char *context = NULL;
609 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
611 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
614 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
617 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
618 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
620 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
621 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
622 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
624 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
627 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
628 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
629 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
631 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
632 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
637 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
638 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
644 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
645 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->sid,
649 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
650 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
652 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
653 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state,
658 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
659 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
662 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid,
666 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
667 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
669 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
670 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
671 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
673 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
677 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
678 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
680 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
681 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
682 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
685 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
690 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
694 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
695 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
697 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
699 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
700 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
701 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
702 (old_sid != new_sid))
705 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
706 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
708 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
709 if (mnt_flags & flag)
715 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
716 * labeling information.
718 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
719 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
720 unsigned long kern_flags,
721 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
723 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
725 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
726 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
727 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
728 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
729 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
730 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
731 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
732 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
733 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
735 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
737 if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
739 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
740 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
741 server is ready to handle calls. */
745 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
746 "before the security server is initialized\n");
749 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
750 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
751 * place the results is not allowed */
757 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
758 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
759 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
760 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
762 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
763 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
764 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
765 * will be used for both mounts)
767 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
771 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
774 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
775 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
776 * than once with different security options.
778 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
781 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
783 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
784 mount_options[i], &sid,
787 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
788 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
789 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
796 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
798 goto out_double_mount;
800 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
805 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
807 goto out_double_mount;
809 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
811 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
812 rootcontext_sid = sid;
814 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
816 goto out_double_mount;
818 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
822 defcontext_sid = sid;
824 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
826 goto out_double_mount;
828 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
837 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
838 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
839 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
840 goto out_double_mount;
845 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
846 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
848 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
849 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
850 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
851 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
852 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
853 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
854 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
856 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
858 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
861 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
864 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
865 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
871 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
872 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
873 * line and security labels must be ignored.
875 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
876 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
877 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
878 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
879 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
884 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
885 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
886 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
890 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
897 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
899 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
903 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
907 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
908 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
909 * the superblock context if not already set.
911 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
912 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
913 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
917 if (!fscontext_sid) {
918 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
922 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
924 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
929 if (!rootcontext_sid)
930 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
932 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
933 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
936 if (rootcontext_sid) {
937 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
942 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
943 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
946 if (defcontext_sid) {
947 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
948 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
950 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
951 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
955 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
956 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
962 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
966 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
968 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
972 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
973 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
977 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
978 const struct super_block *newsb)
980 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
981 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
982 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
983 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
985 if (oldflags != newflags)
987 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
989 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
991 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
993 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
994 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
995 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
996 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
1001 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
1002 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
1003 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
1007 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
1008 struct super_block *newsb,
1009 unsigned long kern_flags,
1010 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
1013 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
1014 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
1016 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
1017 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
1018 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
1021 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
1022 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
1024 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
1028 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
1029 * place the results is not allowed.
1031 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
1034 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
1035 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
1037 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
1038 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
1039 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
1041 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
1043 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
1045 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
1046 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
1047 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
1049 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
1050 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
1051 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
1056 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
1057 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
1058 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
1062 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1065 newsbsec->sid = sid;
1066 if (!set_rootcontext) {
1067 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
1070 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
1072 if (set_rootcontext) {
1073 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
1074 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
1076 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
1079 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
1081 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
1085 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
1086 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1089 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
1090 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
1091 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
1093 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
1095 /* Standard string-based options. */
1096 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
1098 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
1103 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
1107 if (context || defcontext) {
1109 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1112 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1122 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1125 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1132 case Opt_rootcontext:
1135 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1138 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1145 case Opt_defcontext:
1146 if (context || defcontext) {
1148 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1151 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1157 case Opt_labelsupport:
1161 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1168 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
1169 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1172 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
1174 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
1178 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1179 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1182 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1183 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1186 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1187 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1190 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1191 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1194 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1198 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
1206 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1208 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1211 char *options = data;
1212 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1214 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1219 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1221 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1226 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1229 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1233 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1234 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1239 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1242 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1243 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1247 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1249 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1252 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1254 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1255 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1257 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1258 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1262 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1268 /* we need a comma before each option */
1270 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1273 seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
1279 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1281 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1284 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1286 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1292 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1294 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1299 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1301 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1303 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1305 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1307 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1309 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1311 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1313 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1315 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1319 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1322 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1324 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1327 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1329 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1332 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1334 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1340 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1341 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1344 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1351 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1352 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1353 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1354 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1355 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1357 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1359 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1360 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1361 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1362 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1363 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1365 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1367 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1369 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1375 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1376 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1377 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1379 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1381 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1382 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1383 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1385 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1387 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1388 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1389 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1390 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1391 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1392 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1393 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1394 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1395 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1396 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1397 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1398 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1399 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1400 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1401 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1403 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1404 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1405 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1407 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1410 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1412 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1414 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1420 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1422 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1424 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1426 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1428 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1430 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1432 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1434 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1436 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1438 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1440 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1442 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1444 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1446 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1448 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1450 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1452 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1454 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1456 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1458 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1460 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1462 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1464 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1466 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1468 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1470 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1472 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1474 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1479 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1482 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1488 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1489 char *buffer, *path;
1491 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1495 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1499 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1500 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1501 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1502 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1503 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1508 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1511 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1515 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1516 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1518 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1519 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1520 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1522 struct dentry *dentry;
1523 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1524 char *context = NULL;
1528 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1531 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1532 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1535 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1536 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1538 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1539 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1540 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1541 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1542 server is ready to handle calls. */
1543 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1544 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1545 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1546 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1550 sclass = isec->sclass;
1551 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1553 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1554 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1556 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1557 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1559 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1560 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1561 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1564 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1565 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1567 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1568 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1571 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1572 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1573 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1574 * two, depending upon that...
1576 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1578 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1582 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1583 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1584 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1585 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1586 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1587 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1588 * be used again by userspace.
1593 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1594 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1600 context[len] = '\0';
1601 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1602 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1605 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1606 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1612 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1618 context[len] = '\0';
1619 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1623 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1624 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1625 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1626 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1630 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1631 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1634 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
1639 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1640 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1642 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1643 if (printk_ratelimit())
1644 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1645 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1646 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1648 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1649 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1650 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1653 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1660 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1663 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1664 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1667 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1668 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1669 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1673 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1674 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1677 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1680 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1681 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1684 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1685 * d_splice_alias. */
1686 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1688 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1689 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1690 * a connected one, so try that first.
1692 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1694 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1697 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1698 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1699 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1700 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1701 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1702 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1703 * could be used again by userspace.
1707 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1708 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1717 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1718 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1720 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1724 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1729 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1733 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1734 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1740 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1741 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1744 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1745 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1748 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1749 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1752 /* All other signals. */
1753 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1760 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1761 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1764 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1765 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1766 int cap, int audit, bool initns)
1768 struct common_audit_data ad;
1769 struct av_decision avd;
1771 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1772 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1778 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1780 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1783 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1787 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1792 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1793 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1794 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1795 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1796 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1803 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1804 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1805 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1806 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1807 struct inode *inode,
1809 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1811 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1814 validate_creds(cred);
1816 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1819 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1820 isec = inode->i_security;
1822 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1823 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1826 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1827 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1828 pathname if needed. */
1829 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1830 struct dentry *dentry,
1833 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1834 struct common_audit_data ad;
1836 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1837 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1838 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1839 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1842 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1843 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1844 pathname if needed. */
1845 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1846 const struct path *path,
1849 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1850 struct common_audit_data ad;
1852 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1854 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1855 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1858 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1859 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1863 struct common_audit_data ad;
1865 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1867 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1870 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1871 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1874 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1875 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1876 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1877 check a particular permission to the file.
1878 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1879 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1880 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1881 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1882 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1886 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1887 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1888 struct common_audit_data ad;
1889 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1892 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1895 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1896 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1905 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1906 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1911 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1914 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1921 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1924 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1926 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1929 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1931 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1932 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1933 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1934 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1936 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1938 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1939 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1947 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1948 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1949 struct dentry *dentry,
1952 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1953 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1954 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1956 struct common_audit_data ad;
1959 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1960 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1964 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1965 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1967 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1968 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1969 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1974 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
1975 &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
1979 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1980 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1984 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1986 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1987 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1991 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1994 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1995 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1996 struct dentry *dentry,
2000 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
2001 struct common_audit_data ad;
2002 u32 sid = current_sid();
2006 dsec = inode_security(dir);
2007 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2009 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2010 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2013 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
2014 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2015 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
2030 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
2035 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2036 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
2040 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
2041 struct dentry *old_dentry,
2042 struct inode *new_dir,
2043 struct dentry *new_dentry)
2045 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
2046 struct common_audit_data ad;
2047 u32 sid = current_sid();
2049 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
2052 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
2053 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
2054 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
2055 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
2057 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2059 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
2060 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2061 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
2062 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
2065 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2067 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
2070 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
2071 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2073 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
2078 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
2079 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
2080 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
2081 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
2082 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2083 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
2086 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
2087 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
2088 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
2089 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2092 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
2100 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
2101 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
2102 struct super_block *sb,
2104 struct common_audit_data *ad)
2106 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2107 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2109 sbsec = sb->s_security;
2110 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2111 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
2114 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
2115 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
2119 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
2120 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2121 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2122 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2125 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
2127 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2131 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2133 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2135 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2142 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2143 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2147 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2149 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2150 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2157 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2166 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2169 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2171 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2172 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2174 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2175 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2181 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2183 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2185 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2186 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2188 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2189 mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2190 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2193 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2194 struct task_struct *to)
2196 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2197 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2198 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2201 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2202 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2203 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2204 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2209 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2210 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2214 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2215 struct task_struct *to)
2217 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2218 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2220 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2221 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2225 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2226 struct task_struct *to,
2229 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2230 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2231 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2232 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2233 struct common_audit_data ad;
2236 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2237 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2239 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2240 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2249 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2250 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2255 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2258 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2259 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2260 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2264 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2267 u32 sid = current_sid();
2268 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2270 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2271 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2272 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2274 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2275 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2278 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2280 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2281 task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2282 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2285 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2286 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2288 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2289 current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2290 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2293 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2294 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2295 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2296 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2298 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2299 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2300 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2304 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2305 * which was removed).
2307 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2308 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2309 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2310 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2313 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2316 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
2319 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2321 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2333 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2338 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2341 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2347 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2349 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2351 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2354 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2357 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2358 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2359 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2360 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2361 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2362 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2363 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2364 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2365 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2366 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2367 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2368 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2371 /* All other syslog types */
2372 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2373 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2374 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2378 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2379 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2380 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2382 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2383 * processes that allocate mappings.
2385 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2387 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2389 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2390 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
2394 return cap_sys_admin;
2397 /* binprm security operations */
2399 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2402 struct task_struct *tracer;
2405 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2407 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2413 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2414 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2415 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2417 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2418 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2422 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2423 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2425 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2426 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2429 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2430 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2431 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2432 * the old and new contexts.
2434 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2437 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2439 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2440 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2441 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2442 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2448 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2449 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2450 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2452 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2458 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2459 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2460 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2467 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2469 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2470 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2471 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2472 struct common_audit_data ad;
2473 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2476 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2477 * the script interpreter */
2478 if (bprm->called_set_creds)
2481 old_tsec = current_security();
2482 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2483 isec = inode_security(inode);
2485 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2486 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2487 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2489 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2490 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2491 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2492 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2494 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2495 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2496 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2497 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2499 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2500 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2504 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2505 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2506 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2512 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2515 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2517 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2520 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2521 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2523 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2524 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2525 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2526 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2530 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2531 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2532 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2533 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2537 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2538 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2539 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2543 /* Check for shared state */
2544 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2545 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2546 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2547 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2553 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2554 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2555 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2556 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2558 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2559 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2561 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2567 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2568 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2570 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2571 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2572 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2573 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2574 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2575 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2577 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2583 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2585 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2588 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2589 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2590 struct files_struct *files)
2592 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2593 struct tty_struct *tty;
2597 tty = get_current_tty();
2599 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2600 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2601 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2603 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2604 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2605 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2606 open file may belong to another process and we are
2607 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2608 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2609 struct tty_file_private, list);
2610 file = file_priv->file;
2611 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2614 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2617 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2621 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2622 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2623 if (!n) /* none found? */
2626 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2627 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2629 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2631 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2632 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2638 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2640 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2642 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2643 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2646 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2647 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2650 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2651 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2653 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2654 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2656 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2657 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2658 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2660 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2661 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2662 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2663 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2664 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2666 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2667 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2668 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2670 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2672 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2673 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2674 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2675 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2677 task_unlock(current);
2678 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2679 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2684 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2687 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2689 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2690 struct itimerval itimer;
2700 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2701 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2702 * flush and unblock signals.
2704 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2705 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2707 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2708 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2710 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
2711 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2712 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2713 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2715 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2716 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2717 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2718 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2719 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2720 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2721 recalc_sigpending();
2723 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2726 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2727 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2728 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2729 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2730 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2733 /* superblock security operations */
2735 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2737 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2740 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2742 superblock_free_security(sb);
2745 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2750 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2753 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2755 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2756 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2757 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2758 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2759 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2762 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2769 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2773 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2776 int current_size = 0;
2784 while (current_size < len) {
2794 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2796 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2797 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2798 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2804 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2812 in_save = in_end = orig;
2816 open_quote = !open_quote;
2817 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2819 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2821 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2822 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2824 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2826 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2828 } while (*in_end++);
2830 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2831 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2836 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2839 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2840 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2841 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2843 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2849 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2852 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2853 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2856 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2858 goto out_free_secdata;
2860 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2862 goto out_free_secdata;
2864 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2865 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2867 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2870 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2872 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
2873 mount_options[i], &sid,
2876 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
2877 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2878 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2884 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2885 goto out_bad_option;
2888 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2889 goto out_bad_option;
2891 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2892 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2893 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2895 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2896 goto out_bad_option;
2899 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2900 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2901 goto out_bad_option;
2910 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2912 free_secdata(secdata);
2915 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2916 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2921 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2923 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2924 struct common_audit_data ad;
2927 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2931 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2932 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2935 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2936 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2937 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2940 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2942 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2943 struct common_audit_data ad;
2945 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2946 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2947 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2950 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2951 const struct path *path,
2953 unsigned long flags,
2956 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2958 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2959 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2960 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2962 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2965 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2967 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2969 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2970 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2973 /* inode security operations */
2975 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2977 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2980 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2982 inode_free_security(inode);
2985 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2986 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2992 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
2993 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2994 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2999 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
3003 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
3005 const struct cred *old,
3010 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3012 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
3013 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
3014 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
3019 tsec = new->security;
3020 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
3024 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
3025 const struct qstr *qstr,
3027 void **value, size_t *len)
3029 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3030 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3035 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
3037 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3039 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
3041 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
3046 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
3047 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
3048 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3049 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3051 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3054 if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3058 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
3061 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3072 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3074 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3077 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3079 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3082 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3084 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3087 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3089 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3092 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3094 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3097 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3099 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3102 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3104 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3107 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3108 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3110 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3113 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3115 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3117 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3120 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3123 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3124 struct common_audit_data ad;
3125 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3128 validate_creds(cred);
3130 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3131 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3132 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3133 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3135 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3137 return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
3138 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
3139 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
3142 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3143 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3147 struct common_audit_data ad;
3148 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3151 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3154 rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3155 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3156 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
3162 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3164 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3167 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3168 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3170 struct av_decision avd;
3172 u32 audited, denied;
3174 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3175 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3177 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3181 validate_creds(cred);
3183 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3186 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3188 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3189 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
3191 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3193 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3194 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
3195 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3196 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3198 if (likely(!audited))
3201 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
3207 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3209 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3210 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3211 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3212 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3214 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3215 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3216 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3222 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3223 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3224 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3226 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3227 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3228 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3229 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3232 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3235 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3237 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3240 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3242 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3243 int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
3245 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
3247 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
3252 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3253 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3255 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3256 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3257 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3258 struct common_audit_data ad;
3259 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3262 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3263 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3267 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3268 ordinary setattr permission. */
3269 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3272 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3273 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3276 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3279 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3280 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3282 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3283 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3284 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3285 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3289 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3291 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3292 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3293 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3296 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3297 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3299 const char *str = value;
3301 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3302 audit_size = size - 1;
3308 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3309 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3310 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3315 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3321 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3322 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3323 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3327 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3332 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3335 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3336 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3340 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3341 const void *value, size_t size,
3344 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3345 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3349 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3350 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3354 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3357 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3358 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3359 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3363 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3364 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3365 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3367 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3368 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3373 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3375 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3377 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3380 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3382 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3384 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3387 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3389 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3390 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
3394 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3395 ordinary setattr permission. */
3396 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3399 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3400 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3405 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3407 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3409 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3413 char *context = NULL;
3414 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3416 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3420 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3421 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3422 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3423 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3424 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3425 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3426 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3428 isec = inode_security(inode);
3429 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3430 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3431 isec->sid, &context,
3434 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3448 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3449 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3451 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3455 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3458 if (!value || !size)
3461 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3466 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3467 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3469 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3470 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3474 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3476 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3477 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3478 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3482 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3484 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3488 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3491 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3492 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3494 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3495 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3500 tsec = new_creds->security;
3501 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3502 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3503 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3508 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3510 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3511 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3512 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3514 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3515 return 1; /* Discard */
3517 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3523 /* file security operations */
3525 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3527 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3528 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3530 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3531 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3534 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3535 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3538 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3540 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3541 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3542 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3543 u32 sid = current_sid();
3546 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3549 isec = inode_security(inode);
3550 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3551 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3552 /* No change since file_open check. */
3555 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3558 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3560 return file_alloc_security(file);
3563 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3565 file_free_security(file);
3569 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3570 * operation to an inode.
3572 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3573 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3575 struct common_audit_data ad;
3576 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3577 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3578 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3579 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3580 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3582 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3583 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3585 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3588 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3590 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3591 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3600 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3603 isec = inode_security(inode);
3604 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3605 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3606 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3611 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3614 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3624 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3626 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3627 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3630 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3632 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3633 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3636 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3640 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3645 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3646 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
3649 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3650 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3653 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3658 static int default_noexec;
3660 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3662 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3663 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3666 if (default_noexec &&
3667 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3668 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3670 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3671 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3672 * This has an additional check.
3674 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3675 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3676 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3682 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3683 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3685 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3686 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3689 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3690 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3692 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3699 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3703 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3704 u32 sid = current_sid();
3705 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3706 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3707 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3713 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3714 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3716 struct common_audit_data ad;
3720 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3722 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3728 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3731 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3732 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3735 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3736 unsigned long reqprot,
3739 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3740 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3742 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3745 if (default_noexec &&
3746 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3748 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3749 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3750 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3751 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3752 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3753 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3754 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3755 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3756 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3757 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3758 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3759 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3760 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3762 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3763 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3764 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3765 * modified content. This typically should only
3766 * occur for text relocations.
3768 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3774 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3777 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3779 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3781 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3784 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3787 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3792 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3793 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3802 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3803 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3804 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3812 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3817 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3824 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3826 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3828 fsec = file->f_security;
3829 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3832 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3833 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3836 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3838 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3840 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3841 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3843 fsec = file->f_security;
3846 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3848 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3850 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3851 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3852 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3855 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3857 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3859 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3862 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3864 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3865 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3867 fsec = file->f_security;
3868 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3870 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3871 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3872 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3873 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3874 * struct as its SID.
3876 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3877 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3879 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3880 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3881 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3882 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3883 * new inode label or new policy.
3884 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3886 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3889 /* task security operations */
3891 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3892 unsigned long clone_flags)
3894 u32 sid = current_sid();
3896 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3897 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3901 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3903 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3905 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3907 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3911 cred->security = tsec;
3916 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3918 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3920 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3923 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3924 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3926 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3927 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3932 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3934 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3937 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3938 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3940 old_tsec = old->security;
3942 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3946 new->security = tsec;
3951 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3953 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3955 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3956 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3961 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3963 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3967 * set the security data for a kernel service
3968 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3970 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3972 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3973 u32 sid = current_sid();
3976 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3978 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3979 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3983 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3984 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3985 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3991 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3992 * objective context of the specified inode
3994 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3996 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3997 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3998 u32 sid = current_sid();
4001 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4003 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4004 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4008 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4012 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4014 struct common_audit_data ad;
4016 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4017 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4019 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4020 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4021 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4024 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4026 struct common_audit_data ad;
4027 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4028 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4029 u32 sid = current_sid();
4034 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4035 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4036 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4040 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4043 fsec = file->f_security;
4044 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4045 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4046 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4051 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4052 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4053 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4054 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4057 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4058 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
4063 case READING_MODULE:
4064 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
4073 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4075 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4076 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4077 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4080 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4082 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4083 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4084 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4087 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4089 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4090 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4091 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4094 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4096 *secid = task_sid(p);
4099 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4101 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4102 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4103 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4106 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4108 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4109 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4110 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4113 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4115 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4116 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4117 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4120 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4127 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4128 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4129 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4130 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4131 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4132 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4133 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4136 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4137 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4139 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4141 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4142 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4143 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4144 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4145 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4146 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4147 current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4148 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4153 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4155 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4156 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4157 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4160 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4162 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4163 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4164 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4167 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4169 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4170 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4171 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4174 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
4175 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4181 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4183 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4185 secid = current_sid();
4187 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4188 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4189 secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4192 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4193 struct inode *inode)
4195 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
4196 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4198 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4199 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4201 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4202 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4205 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4206 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4207 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4209 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4210 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4212 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4213 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4217 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4218 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4221 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4222 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4226 *proto = ih->protocol;
4228 switch (ih->protocol) {
4230 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4232 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4236 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4240 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4241 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4246 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4248 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4252 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4256 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4257 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4261 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4262 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4264 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4268 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4272 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4273 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4277 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4278 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4279 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4281 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4285 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4289 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4290 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4301 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4303 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4304 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4305 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4308 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4309 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4312 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4313 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4317 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4318 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4321 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4322 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4323 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4332 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4334 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4338 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4339 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4344 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4346 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4350 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4351 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4355 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4356 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4358 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4362 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4363 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4367 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4368 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4369 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4371 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4375 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4376 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4380 /* includes fragments */
4390 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4391 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4396 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4398 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4401 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4402 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4405 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4407 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4410 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4411 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4421 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4422 " unable to parse packet\n");
4432 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4434 * @family: protocol family
4435 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4438 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4439 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4440 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4441 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4442 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4446 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4453 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4456 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4460 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4461 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4462 if (unlikely(err)) {
4464 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4465 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4473 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4474 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4475 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4476 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4478 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4479 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4480 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4481 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4484 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4488 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4489 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4497 /* socket security operations */
4499 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4500 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4502 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4503 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4507 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4508 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4511 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4513 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4514 struct common_audit_data ad;
4515 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4517 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4520 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4524 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4525 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4529 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4530 int protocol, int kern)
4532 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4540 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4541 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4545 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4546 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4549 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4550 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4552 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4553 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4554 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4555 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4556 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4560 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4565 isec->sclass = sclass;
4567 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4570 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4571 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4573 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4574 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4575 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4577 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4583 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4584 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4585 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4587 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4589 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4590 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4594 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4598 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4599 family = sk->sk_family;
4600 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4602 struct common_audit_data ad;
4603 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4604 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4605 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4606 u16 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4607 unsigned short snum;
4611 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4612 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4613 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4614 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4616 switch (family_sa) {
4619 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4621 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4622 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4623 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4624 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4626 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4628 family_sa = AF_INET;
4630 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4631 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4634 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4636 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4637 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4638 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4644 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4646 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4647 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4652 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4654 if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) ||
4656 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4660 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4663 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4669 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4670 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4671 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4674 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4675 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4678 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4679 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4682 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4683 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4687 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4691 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4695 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4696 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4698 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4700 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4702 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4709 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4710 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4712 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4715 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4716 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt
4718 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4719 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4721 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4722 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4725 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4730 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4733 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4734 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4735 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4736 struct common_audit_data ad;
4737 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4738 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4739 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4740 unsigned short snum;
4743 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4744 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4745 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4746 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4748 switch (address->sa_family) {
4750 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4751 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4753 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4756 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4757 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4759 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4762 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4763 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4765 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4768 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4771 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4775 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4776 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4777 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4779 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4780 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4782 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4783 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4787 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4789 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4790 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4791 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4792 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4800 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4801 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4802 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4805 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4807 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4811 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4814 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4816 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4819 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4822 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4823 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4827 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4831 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4832 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4833 sclass = isec->sclass;
4835 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4837 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4838 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4840 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4845 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4848 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4851 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4852 int size, int flags)
4854 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4857 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4859 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4862 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4864 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4867 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4871 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4875 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4878 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4881 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4884 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4886 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4889 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4893 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4894 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4895 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4896 struct common_audit_data ad;
4897 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4900 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4902 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4904 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4905 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4906 sksec_other->sclass,
4907 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4911 /* server child socket */
4912 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4913 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4914 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4918 /* connecting socket */
4919 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4924 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4925 struct socket *other)
4927 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4928 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4929 struct common_audit_data ad;
4930 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4932 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4934 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4936 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4937 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4941 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4942 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4943 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4949 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4952 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4954 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4958 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4961 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4963 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4966 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4970 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4971 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4972 struct common_audit_data ad;
4973 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4976 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4978 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4979 ad.u.net->family = family;
4980 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4984 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4985 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4986 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4992 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4995 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5000 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5003 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5004 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5005 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5006 struct common_audit_data ad;
5007 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5012 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5015 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5016 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5019 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5020 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5021 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5022 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5023 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5024 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5026 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5027 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5028 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5031 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5033 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5034 ad.u.net->family = family;
5035 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5039 if (peerlbl_active) {
5042 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5045 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5046 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5048 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5051 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5052 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5055 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5060 if (secmark_active) {
5061 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5062 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5071 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5072 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5077 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5078 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5080 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5081 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5082 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5083 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5084 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5085 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5087 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5092 if (scontext_len > len) {
5097 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5101 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5107 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5109 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5111 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5113 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5115 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5118 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5122 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5123 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5124 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5126 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5129 *secid = peer_secid;
5130 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5135 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5137 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5139 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5143 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5144 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5145 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5146 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5147 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5152 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5154 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5156 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5157 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5161 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5163 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5164 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5166 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5167 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5168 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5170 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5173 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5176 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5178 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5180 *secid = sksec->sid;
5184 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5186 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5187 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5188 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5190 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5191 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5192 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5193 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5196 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5197 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5200 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5201 struct sk_buff *skb)
5203 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5204 struct common_audit_data ad;
5205 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5207 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5211 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5214 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5216 if (peerlbl_active) {
5217 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5218 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5220 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5225 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5226 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5229 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5230 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5232 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5233 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5234 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5235 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5237 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5238 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5239 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5240 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5242 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5244 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5245 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5246 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5247 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5252 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5253 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5254 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5255 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5256 * plug this into the new socket.
5258 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5262 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5263 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5265 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5266 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5269 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5270 * based on their @optname.
5272 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5273 struct sockaddr *address,
5276 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5278 struct sockaddr *addr;
5279 struct socket *sock;
5281 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5284 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5285 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5288 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5290 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5293 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5296 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5305 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5306 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5307 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5308 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5310 /* Connect checks */
5311 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5312 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5313 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5314 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5315 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5319 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5320 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5321 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
5322 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5323 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5324 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5325 * primary address is selected.
5326 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5327 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5328 * selinux_socket_connect().
5330 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5344 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5345 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5348 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5349 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5351 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5352 * the non-sctp clone version.
5354 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5355 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5357 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5358 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5359 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5360 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5363 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5364 struct request_sock *req)
5366 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5368 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5372 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5375 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5378 req->secid = connsid;
5379 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5381 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5384 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5385 const struct request_sock *req)
5387 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5389 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5390 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5391 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5392 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5393 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5394 time it will have been created and available. */
5396 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5397 * thread with access to newsksec */
5398 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5401 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5403 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5404 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5406 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5407 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5410 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5413 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5415 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5418 __tsec = current_security();
5421 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5422 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5426 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5428 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5431 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5433 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5436 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5439 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5442 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5444 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5446 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5449 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5455 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5460 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5462 u32 sid = current_sid();
5464 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5465 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5466 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5467 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5468 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5469 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5471 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5472 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5476 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5478 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5480 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5481 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5482 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5485 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5487 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5488 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5490 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5491 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5492 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5493 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5494 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5495 * protocols were being used */
5497 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5498 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5503 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5505 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5506 u32 sid = current_sid();
5509 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5510 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5511 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5514 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5515 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5516 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5524 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5528 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5529 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5531 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
5535 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
5537 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5539 if (err == -EINVAL) {
5540 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5541 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5542 " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
5543 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5544 secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
5545 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5546 if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
5547 security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5557 err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5562 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5564 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5565 const struct net_device *indev,
5571 struct common_audit_data ad;
5572 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5577 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5580 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5581 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5582 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5583 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5586 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5589 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5591 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5592 ad.u.net->family = family;
5593 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5596 if (peerlbl_active) {
5597 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5598 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5600 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5606 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5607 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5608 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5612 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5613 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5614 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5616 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5622 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5623 struct sk_buff *skb,
5624 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5626 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5629 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5630 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5631 struct sk_buff *skb,
5632 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5634 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5638 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5644 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5647 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5648 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5649 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5652 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5654 if (sk_listener(sk))
5655 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5656 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5657 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5658 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5659 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5660 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5661 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5662 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5663 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5664 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5665 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5666 * best we can do. */
5669 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5670 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5673 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5674 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5680 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5681 struct sk_buff *skb,
5682 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5684 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5687 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5688 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5689 struct sk_buff *skb,
5690 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5692 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5696 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5700 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5701 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5702 struct common_audit_data ad;
5703 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5709 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5711 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5713 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5714 ad.u.net->family = family;
5715 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5718 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5719 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5720 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5721 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5722 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5724 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5725 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5730 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5731 const struct net_device *outdev,
5736 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5738 struct common_audit_data ad;
5739 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5744 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5745 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5746 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5747 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5748 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5749 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5751 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5752 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5753 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5756 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5759 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5760 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5761 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5762 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5763 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5764 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5765 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5766 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5767 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5768 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5770 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5771 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5776 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5777 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5778 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5779 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5781 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5782 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5785 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5786 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5788 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5789 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5790 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5791 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5792 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5793 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5794 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5795 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5796 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5797 * for similar problems. */
5799 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5801 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5802 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5804 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5805 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5806 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5807 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5808 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5809 * pass the packet. */
5810 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5813 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5817 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5821 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5824 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5826 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5828 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5829 * associated socket. */
5830 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5831 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5832 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5835 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5837 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5838 ad.u.net->family = family;
5839 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5843 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5844 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5845 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5846 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5848 if (peerlbl_active) {
5852 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5854 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5856 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5857 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5859 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5861 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5863 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5864 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5870 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5871 struct sk_buff *skb,
5872 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5874 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5877 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5878 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5879 struct sk_buff *skb,
5880 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5882 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5886 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5888 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5890 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5893 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5896 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5898 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5902 isec->sclass = sclass;
5903 isec->sid = current_sid();
5904 perm->security = isec;
5909 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5911 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5912 perm->security = NULL;
5916 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5918 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5920 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5924 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5925 msg->security = msec;
5930 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5932 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5934 msg->security = NULL;
5938 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5941 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5942 struct common_audit_data ad;
5943 u32 sid = current_sid();
5945 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5947 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5948 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5950 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5951 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5954 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5956 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5959 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5961 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5964 /* message queue security operations */
5965 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5967 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5968 struct common_audit_data ad;
5969 u32 sid = current_sid();
5972 rc = ipc_alloc_security(msq, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5976 isec = msq->security;
5978 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5979 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5981 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5982 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5985 ipc_free_security(msq);
5991 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5993 ipc_free_security(msq);
5996 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5998 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5999 struct common_audit_data ad;
6000 u32 sid = current_sid();
6002 isec = msq->security;
6004 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6005 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6007 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6008 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6009 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6012 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6020 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6021 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6022 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6023 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6027 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6030 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6033 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6039 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6043 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6045 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6046 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6047 struct common_audit_data ad;
6048 u32 sid = current_sid();
6051 isec = msq->security;
6052 msec = msg->security;
6055 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6057 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6059 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6060 * message queue this message will be stored in
6062 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6063 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6068 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6069 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6071 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6072 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6073 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6076 /* Can this process send the message */
6077 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6078 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6081 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6082 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6083 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6084 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6089 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6090 struct task_struct *target,
6091 long type, int mode)
6093 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6094 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6095 struct common_audit_data ad;
6096 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
6099 isec = msq->security;
6100 msec = msg->security;
6102 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6103 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6105 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6107 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6109 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6111 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6115 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6116 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6118 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6119 struct common_audit_data ad;
6120 u32 sid = current_sid();
6123 rc = ipc_alloc_security(shp, SECCLASS_SHM);
6127 isec = shp->security;
6129 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6130 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6132 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6133 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6136 ipc_free_security(shp);
6142 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6144 ipc_free_security(shp);
6147 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6149 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6150 struct common_audit_data ad;
6151 u32 sid = current_sid();
6153 isec = shp->security;
6155 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6156 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6158 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6159 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6160 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6163 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6164 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6172 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6173 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6174 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6175 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6179 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6182 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6189 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6195 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6199 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6200 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6204 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6207 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6209 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6212 /* Semaphore security operations */
6213 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6215 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6216 struct common_audit_data ad;
6217 u32 sid = current_sid();
6220 rc = ipc_alloc_security(sma, SECCLASS_SEM);
6224 isec = sma->security;
6226 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6227 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6229 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6230 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6233 ipc_free_security(sma);
6239 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6241 ipc_free_security(sma);
6244 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6246 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6247 struct common_audit_data ad;
6248 u32 sid = current_sid();
6250 isec = sma->security;
6252 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6253 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6255 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6256 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6257 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6260 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6261 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6269 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6270 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6271 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6272 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6276 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6287 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6290 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6295 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6301 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6305 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6306 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6311 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6315 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6318 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6324 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6326 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6331 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6334 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6336 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
6340 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6343 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6346 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6347 char *name, char **value)
6349 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6355 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
6358 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6359 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6360 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6365 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6367 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6369 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6370 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6371 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6372 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6373 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6374 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6375 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6376 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6386 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6396 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6398 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6400 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6405 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6407 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6408 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6409 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6410 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6411 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6412 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6413 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6414 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6415 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6416 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6417 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6418 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6419 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6420 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6421 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6422 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6423 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6424 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6425 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6426 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6432 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6433 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6434 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6438 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6440 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6441 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6442 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6445 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6446 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6447 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6448 audit_size = size - 1;
6451 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6452 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6453 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6458 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6466 new = prepare_creds();
6470 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6471 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6472 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6473 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
6474 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6475 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6476 tsec = new->security;
6477 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6478 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6479 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6480 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6481 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6482 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6483 mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
6487 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6488 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6489 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6490 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6495 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6497 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6498 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6504 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6505 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6506 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6507 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6511 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6512 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6513 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6515 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6516 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6517 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6536 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6538 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6541 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6543 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6547 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6549 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6553 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6558 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6560 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
6562 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6563 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6564 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6568 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6570 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6572 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6576 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6578 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6580 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6583 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6586 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6595 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6596 unsigned long flags)
6598 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6599 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6601 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6605 tsec = cred->security;
6606 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6607 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6609 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6615 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6617 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6623 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6624 const struct cred *cred,
6628 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6631 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
6632 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
6633 appear to be created. */
6637 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6639 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6640 ksec = key->security;
6642 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6643 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6646 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6648 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6649 char *context = NULL;
6653 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6662 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6663 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6665 struct common_audit_data ad;
6668 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6669 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6671 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6675 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6676 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6677 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6678 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6679 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6681 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6682 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6685 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6688 struct common_audit_data ad;
6691 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6692 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6694 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6700 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6701 strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6702 ibendport.port = port_num;
6703 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6704 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6706 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6707 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6710 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6712 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6714 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6717 sec->sid = current_sid();
6723 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6729 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6730 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6733 u32 sid = current_sid();
6737 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6738 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6739 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6743 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6744 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6755 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6759 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6760 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6761 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6762 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6766 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6767 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6768 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6769 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6770 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6771 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6772 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6774 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6776 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6777 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6778 struct bpf_map *map;
6781 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6782 map = file->private_data;
6783 bpfsec = map->security;
6784 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6785 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6786 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6789 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6790 prog = file->private_data;
6791 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6792 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6793 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6794 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6801 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6803 u32 sid = current_sid();
6804 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6806 bpfsec = map->security;
6807 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6808 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6809 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6812 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6814 u32 sid = current_sid();
6815 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6817 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6818 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6819 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6820 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6823 static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6825 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6827 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6831 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6832 map->security = bpfsec;
6837 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6839 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6841 map->security = NULL;
6845 static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6847 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6849 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6853 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6854 aux->security = bpfsec;
6859 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6861 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6863 aux->security = NULL;
6868 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6869 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6870 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6871 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6872 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6874 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6875 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6876 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6877 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6878 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6879 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6880 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6881 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6882 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6884 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6886 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
6887 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6890 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
6891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
6893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6896 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6898 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6900 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6901 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
6903 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6904 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6906 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
6907 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6908 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6909 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6911 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6912 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6913 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
6914 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
6915 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
6916 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
6917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
6918 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
6919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
6920 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
6921 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
6922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
6923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
6924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
6925 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
6926 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
6927 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
6928 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
6929 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
6930 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
6931 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
6932 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
6934 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
6935 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
6936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
6937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
6938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
6939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
6940 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
6941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
6942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
6943 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
6944 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
6945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
6947 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
6949 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
6950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
6951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
6952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
6953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
6954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
6955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
6956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
6957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
6958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
6959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
6960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
6961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
6962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
6963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
6964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
6965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
6966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
6967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
6968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
6970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
6971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
6972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
6974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
6977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
6978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
6980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
6981 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
6982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
6983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
6984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
6985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
6988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
6989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
6990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
6992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
6994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
6995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
6997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7032 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7055 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7058 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7062 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7069 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7074 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7092 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7103 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7105 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
7106 selinux_enabled = 0;
7110 if (!selinux_enabled) {
7111 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
7115 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7117 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7118 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7119 selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
7120 selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
7121 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7123 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7124 cred_init_security();
7126 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7128 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
7129 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
7130 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
7131 file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
7132 sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
7133 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
7138 ebitmap_cache_init();
7140 hashtab_cache_init();
7142 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7144 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7145 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7147 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7148 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7150 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7151 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7153 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7158 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7160 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
7163 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7165 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7167 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7168 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7169 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7172 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7173 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7174 security_initcall(selinux_init);
7176 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7178 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7180 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7182 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7183 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7186 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7188 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7189 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7192 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7194 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7195 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7197 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7199 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7201 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7202 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7205 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7207 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7208 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7211 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7213 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7214 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7219 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7221 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7222 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7225 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7227 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7228 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7231 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7232 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7233 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7236 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7240 if (!selinux_enabled)
7243 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7245 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7247 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7251 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7253 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7254 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7256 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7258 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7262 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7264 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7265 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7268 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7270 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7271 int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7273 if (state->initialized) {
7274 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7278 if (state->disabled) {
7279 /* Only do this once. */
7283 state->disabled = 1;
7285 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7287 selinux_enabled = 0;
7289 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7291 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7294 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
7295 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7297 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */