2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
359 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
366 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
368 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
369 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
370 const struct cred *cred)
372 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
375 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
376 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
380 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
381 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
385 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
386 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
387 const struct cred *cred)
389 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
391 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
392 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
396 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
397 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
401 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
403 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
404 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
405 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
408 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
409 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
410 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
411 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
412 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
413 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
414 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
415 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
416 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
420 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
421 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
422 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
423 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
424 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
425 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
427 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
428 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
429 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
434 sbsec->initialized = 1;
436 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
437 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
438 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
440 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
441 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
442 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
444 /* Initialize the root inode. */
445 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
447 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
448 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
449 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
451 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
453 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
454 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
455 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
456 struct inode_security_struct, list);
457 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
458 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
459 inode = igrab(inode);
461 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
465 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
466 list_del_init(&isec->list);
469 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
475 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
476 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
477 * mount options, or whatever.
479 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
480 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
483 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
484 char *context = NULL;
488 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
490 if (!sbsec->initialized)
497 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
498 * settings this is going to need a mask
501 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
502 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
504 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
508 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
509 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
514 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
515 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
521 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
522 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
525 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
526 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
528 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
544 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
546 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
549 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
550 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
553 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
558 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
562 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
563 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
565 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
566 if (sbsec->initialized)
567 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
568 (old_sid != new_sid))
571 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
572 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
574 if (!sbsec->initialized)
575 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
581 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
582 * labeling information.
584 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
585 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
587 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
589 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
590 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
591 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
592 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
593 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
594 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
595 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
596 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
597 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
599 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
601 if (!ss_initialized) {
603 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
604 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
605 server is ready to handle calls. */
606 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
607 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
608 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
609 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
614 "before the security server is initialized\n");
619 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
620 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
621 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
622 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
624 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
625 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
626 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
627 * will be used for both mounts)
629 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
634 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
635 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
636 * than once with different security options.
638 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
640 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
641 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
644 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
645 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
652 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
654 goto out_double_mount;
656 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
663 goto out_double_mount;
665 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
667 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
668 rootcontext_sid = sid;
670 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
672 goto out_double_mount;
674 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
678 defcontext_sid = sid;
680 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
682 goto out_double_mount;
684 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
693 if (sbsec->initialized) {
694 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
695 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
696 goto out_double_mount;
701 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
704 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
705 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
707 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
708 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
712 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
714 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
718 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
722 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
723 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
724 * the superblock context if not already set.
727 if (!fscontext_sid) {
728 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
732 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
734 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
739 if (!rootcontext_sid)
740 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
742 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
746 if (rootcontext_sid) {
747 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
752 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
753 root_isec->initialized = 1;
756 if (defcontext_sid) {
757 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
759 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
760 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
764 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
765 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
771 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
774 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
776 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
780 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
781 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
785 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
786 struct super_block *newsb)
788 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
789 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
791 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
792 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
793 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
796 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
797 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
800 if (!ss_initialized) {
801 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
802 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
803 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
804 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
808 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
809 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
811 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
812 if (newsbsec->initialized)
815 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
817 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
819 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
820 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
821 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
824 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
828 if (!set_rootcontext) {
829 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
830 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
833 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
835 if (set_rootcontext) {
836 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
837 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
838 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
839 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
841 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
844 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
845 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
848 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
849 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
852 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
853 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
854 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
856 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
858 /* Standard string-based options. */
859 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
861 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
866 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
870 if (context || defcontext) {
872 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
875 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
885 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
888 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
895 case Opt_rootcontext:
898 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
901 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
909 if (context || defcontext) {
911 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
914 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
923 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
930 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
934 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
935 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
936 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
941 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
942 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
945 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
946 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
949 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
950 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
953 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
954 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
957 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
968 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
970 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
973 char *options = data;
974 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
976 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
981 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
983 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
988 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
991 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
995 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
996 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1001 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1002 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1004 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1006 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1009 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1011 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1012 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1014 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1015 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1020 /* we need a comma before each option */
1022 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1025 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1031 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1033 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1036 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1038 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1044 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1046 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1051 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1053 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1055 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1057 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1059 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1061 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1063 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1065 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1067 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1071 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1074 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1076 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1079 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1081 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1084 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1090 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1091 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1093 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1100 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1101 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1105 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1106 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1119 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1120 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1121 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1122 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1124 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1126 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1127 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1128 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1130 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1131 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1132 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1133 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1134 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1135 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1136 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1141 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1145 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1148 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1151 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1152 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1157 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1159 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1164 end = buffer+buflen;
1169 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1170 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1174 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1179 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1180 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1184 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1192 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1193 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1195 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1196 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1198 struct dentry *dentry;
1199 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1200 char *context = NULL;
1204 if (isec->initialized)
1207 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1208 if (isec->initialized)
1211 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1212 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1213 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1214 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1215 server is ready to handle calls. */
1216 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1217 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1218 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1219 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1223 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1224 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1225 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1226 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1230 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1231 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1233 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1234 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1236 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1237 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1240 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1241 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1246 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1247 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1253 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1255 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1256 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1257 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1265 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1271 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1277 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1278 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1279 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1280 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1284 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1285 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1288 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1292 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1293 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1294 __func__, context, -rc,
1295 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1297 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1305 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1306 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1308 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1309 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1310 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1312 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1313 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1314 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1322 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1323 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1326 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1327 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1329 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1330 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1332 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1333 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1344 isec->initialized = 1;
1347 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1349 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1350 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1354 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1355 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1361 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1362 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1365 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1366 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1369 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1370 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1373 /* All other signals. */
1374 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1382 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1383 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1385 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1386 const struct cred *target,
1389 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1391 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1395 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1396 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1397 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1398 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1400 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1401 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1404 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1408 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1409 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1415 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1416 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1417 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1418 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1420 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1425 sid = current_sid();
1426 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1427 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1430 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1431 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1434 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1435 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1438 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1439 struct av_decision avd;
1441 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1442 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1445 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1449 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1451 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1454 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1458 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1462 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1463 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1464 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1468 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1469 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1472 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1474 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1475 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1478 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1479 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1480 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1481 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1482 struct inode *inode,
1484 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1486 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1487 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1490 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1493 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1494 isec = inode->i_security;
1498 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1499 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1502 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1505 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1506 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1507 pathname if needed. */
1508 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1510 struct dentry *dentry,
1513 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1514 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1516 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1517 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1518 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1519 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1522 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1523 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1524 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1525 check a particular permission to the file.
1526 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1527 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1528 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1529 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1530 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1534 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1535 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1536 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1537 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1540 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1541 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1543 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1544 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1552 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1555 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1561 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1562 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1563 struct dentry *dentry,
1566 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1567 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1568 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1569 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1571 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1574 dsec = dir->i_security;
1575 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1578 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1580 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1581 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1583 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1584 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1589 if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1590 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1595 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1599 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1600 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1601 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1604 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1605 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1606 struct task_struct *ctx)
1608 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1610 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1614 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1617 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1618 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1619 struct dentry *dentry,
1623 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1624 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1625 u32 sid = current_sid();
1629 dsec = dir->i_security;
1630 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1632 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1633 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1636 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1637 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1652 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1657 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1661 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1662 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1663 struct inode *new_dir,
1664 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1666 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1667 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1668 u32 sid = current_sid();
1670 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1673 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1674 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1675 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1676 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1678 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1680 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1682 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1685 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1686 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1689 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1690 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1691 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1696 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1697 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1698 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1699 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1700 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1703 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1704 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1705 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1706 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1708 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1716 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1717 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1718 struct super_block *sb,
1720 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1722 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1723 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1725 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1726 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1729 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1730 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1734 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1735 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1736 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1737 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1740 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1742 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1746 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1748 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1750 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1757 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1758 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1762 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1764 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1765 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1772 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1781 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1784 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1786 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1788 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1789 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1791 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1795 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1796 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1797 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1798 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1799 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1800 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1801 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1804 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1805 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1810 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1812 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1817 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1821 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1822 u32 sid = current_sid();
1823 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1824 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1827 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1830 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1834 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1838 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1841 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1842 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1846 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1850 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1853 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1854 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1855 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1856 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1860 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1861 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1865 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1868 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
1872 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
1876 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
1879 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1882 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1885 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1890 end = buffer+buflen;
1896 const char *name = table->procname;
1897 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1898 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1902 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1905 table = table->parent;
1911 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1913 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1915 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1920 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1927 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1931 sid = current_sid();
1933 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1934 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1936 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1937 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1940 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1941 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1943 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1944 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1952 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1953 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1959 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1961 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1973 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1978 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1981 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1987 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1991 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1994 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1998 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2003 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2004 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2005 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2007 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2008 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2009 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2010 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2012 case 0: /* Close log */
2013 case 1: /* Open log */
2014 case 2: /* Read from log */
2015 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2016 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2018 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2025 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2026 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2027 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2029 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2030 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2031 * the capability is granted.
2033 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2034 * processes that allocate mappings.
2036 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2038 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2040 rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2044 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2047 /* binprm security operations */
2049 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2051 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2052 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2053 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2054 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2055 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2058 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2062 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2063 * the script interpreter */
2064 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2067 old_tsec = current_security();
2068 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2069 isec = inode->i_security;
2071 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2072 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2073 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2075 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2076 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2077 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2078 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2080 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2081 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2082 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2083 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2085 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2086 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2087 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2092 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2093 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2095 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2096 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2098 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2099 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2100 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2104 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2105 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2106 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2110 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2111 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2115 /* Check for shared state */
2116 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2117 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2118 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2124 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2125 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2127 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2128 struct task_struct *tracer;
2129 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2133 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2134 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2135 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2141 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2143 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2149 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2150 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2156 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2158 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2161 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2163 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2164 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2172 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2173 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2174 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2175 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2177 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2180 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2183 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2184 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2186 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2187 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2188 struct files_struct *files)
2190 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2191 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2192 struct tty_struct *tty;
2193 struct fdtable *fdt;
2197 tty = get_current_tty();
2200 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2201 struct inode *inode;
2203 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2204 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2205 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2206 file may belong to another process and we are only
2207 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2208 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2209 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2210 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2211 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2218 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2222 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2224 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2226 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2228 unsigned long set, i;
2233 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2234 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2236 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2239 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2240 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2245 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2247 file_to_av(file))) {
2249 fd = get_unused_fd();
2259 devnull = dentry_open(
2261 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2263 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2270 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2275 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2278 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2282 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2284 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2286 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2287 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2290 secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
2292 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2293 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2296 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2297 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2299 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2300 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2302 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2303 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2304 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2306 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2307 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2308 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2309 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2310 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2312 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2313 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2315 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2316 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2317 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2318 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2320 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2325 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2328 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2330 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2331 struct itimerval itimer;
2332 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2335 unsigned long flags;
2337 secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
2345 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2346 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2347 * flush and unblock signals.
2349 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2350 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2352 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2354 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2355 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2356 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2357 flush_signals(current);
2358 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2359 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2360 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2361 recalc_sigpending();
2362 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2365 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2366 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2367 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2368 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2369 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2370 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2371 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2372 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2375 /* superblock security operations */
2377 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2379 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2382 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2384 superblock_free_security(sb);
2387 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2392 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2395 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2397 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2398 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2399 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2400 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2403 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2410 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2414 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2417 int current_size = 0;
2425 while (current_size < len) {
2435 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2437 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2438 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2439 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2445 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2453 in_save = in_end = orig;
2457 open_quote = !open_quote;
2458 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2460 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2462 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2463 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2465 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2467 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2469 } while (*in_end++);
2471 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2472 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2477 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2479 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2480 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2483 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2487 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2488 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2489 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2492 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2494 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2495 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2497 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2498 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2499 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2502 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2505 unsigned long flags,
2508 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2511 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2515 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2516 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2517 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2519 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2523 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2525 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2528 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2532 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2533 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2536 /* inode security operations */
2538 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2540 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2543 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2545 inode_free_security(inode);
2548 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2549 char **name, void **value,
2552 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2553 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2554 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2555 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2556 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2558 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2560 dsec = dir->i_security;
2561 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2564 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2566 if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2567 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2568 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2571 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2572 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2575 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2580 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2581 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2582 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2583 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2585 isec->initialized = 1;
2588 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2592 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2599 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2611 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2613 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2616 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2620 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2623 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2626 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2630 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2633 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2636 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2638 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2641 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2643 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2646 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2648 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2651 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2655 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2659 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2662 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2663 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2665 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2668 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2670 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2672 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2675 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2677 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2680 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2683 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2686 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2688 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2691 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2696 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2700 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2701 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2704 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2706 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2709 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2713 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2716 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2717 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2718 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2720 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2723 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2725 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2727 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2730 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2732 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2734 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2735 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2736 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2737 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2739 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2740 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2741 Restrict to administrator. */
2746 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2747 ordinary setattr permission. */
2748 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2751 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2752 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2754 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2755 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2756 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2757 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2758 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2761 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2762 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2764 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2765 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2768 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2771 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2772 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2774 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2775 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2779 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2780 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2781 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2783 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2788 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2789 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2793 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2798 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2800 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2801 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2805 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2806 const void *value, size_t size,
2809 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2810 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2814 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2815 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2819 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2821 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2822 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2823 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2831 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2833 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2835 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2838 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2840 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2842 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2845 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2847 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2848 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2850 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2851 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2856 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2858 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2860 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2864 char *context = NULL;
2865 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2867 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2871 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2872 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2873 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2874 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2875 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2876 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2877 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2879 error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2881 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2884 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2897 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2898 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2900 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2904 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2907 if (!value || !size)
2910 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2918 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2920 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2921 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2922 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2926 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2928 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2931 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2933 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2936 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2938 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2942 /* file security operations */
2944 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2946 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2948 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2951 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2955 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2956 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2959 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2960 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2964 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2967 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2969 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2970 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2971 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2972 u32 sid = current_sid();
2975 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2979 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2980 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2981 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2983 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2986 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2988 return file_alloc_security(file);
2991 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2993 file_free_security(file);
2996 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2999 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3002 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3004 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3009 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3012 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3014 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3017 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3018 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3020 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3021 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3022 * This has an additional check.
3024 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3031 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3032 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3034 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3035 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3038 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3039 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3041 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3048 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3049 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3050 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3053 u32 sid = current_sid();
3055 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3056 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3057 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3058 if (rc || addr_only)
3061 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3064 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3065 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3068 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3069 unsigned long reqprot,
3072 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3075 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3079 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3082 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3083 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3085 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3086 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3087 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3088 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3089 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3090 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3091 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3092 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3094 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3095 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3096 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3097 * modified content. This typically should only
3098 * occur for text relocations.
3100 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3107 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3110 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3112 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3114 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3117 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3120 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3125 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3130 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3131 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3140 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3141 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3146 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3151 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3155 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3162 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3164 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3166 fsec = file->f_security;
3167 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3172 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3173 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3176 u32 sid = current_sid();
3178 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3180 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3181 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3183 fsec = file->f_security;
3186 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3188 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3190 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3191 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3194 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3196 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3198 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3201 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3203 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3204 struct inode *inode;
3205 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3207 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3208 fsec = file->f_security;
3209 isec = inode->i_security;
3211 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3212 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3213 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3214 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3215 * struct as its SID.
3217 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3218 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3220 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3221 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3222 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3223 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3224 * new inode label or new policy.
3225 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3227 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3230 /* task security operations */
3232 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3236 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3240 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3244 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3246 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3248 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3249 cred->security = NULL;
3254 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3256 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3259 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3260 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3262 old_tsec = old->security;
3264 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3268 new->security = tsec;
3273 * commit new credentials
3275 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3277 secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3280 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3282 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3283 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3284 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3285 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3286 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3291 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3294 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3297 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3299 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3303 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3305 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3308 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3310 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3313 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3315 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3318 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3320 *secid = task_sid(p);
3323 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3325 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3329 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3333 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3337 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3340 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3344 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3348 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3351 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3353 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3356 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3358 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3361 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3365 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3366 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3367 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3368 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3369 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3370 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3375 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3379 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3383 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3386 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3388 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3391 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3393 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3396 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3402 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3407 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3409 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3411 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3412 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3414 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3418 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3424 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3425 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3426 the state of the current process. */
3427 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3430 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3432 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3435 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3436 struct inode *inode)
3438 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3439 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3442 isec->initialized = 1;
3445 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3446 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3447 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3449 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3450 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3452 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3453 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3457 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3458 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3461 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3462 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3466 *proto = ih->protocol;
3468 switch (ih->protocol) {
3470 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3472 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3476 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3480 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3481 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3486 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3488 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3492 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3496 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3497 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3501 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3502 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3504 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3508 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3512 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3513 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3524 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3526 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3527 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3528 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3531 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3532 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3534 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3535 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3539 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3540 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3543 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3544 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3545 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3554 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3556 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3560 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3561 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3566 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3568 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3572 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3573 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3577 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3578 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3580 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3584 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3585 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3589 /* includes fragments */
3599 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3600 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3605 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3607 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3610 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3611 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3614 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3616 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3619 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3620 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3630 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3631 " unable to parse packet\n");
3641 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3643 * @family: protocol family
3644 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3647 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3648 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3649 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3650 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3651 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3655 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3662 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3663 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3665 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3666 if (unlikely(err)) {
3668 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3669 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3676 /* socket security operations */
3677 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3680 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3681 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3685 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3687 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3689 sid = task_sid(task);
3691 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3692 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3693 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3699 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3700 int protocol, int kern)
3702 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3703 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3712 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3714 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3715 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3721 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3722 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3724 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3725 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3726 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3727 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3732 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3734 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3737 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3743 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3744 isec->initialized = 1;
3747 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3748 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3749 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3750 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3756 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3757 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3758 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3760 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3765 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3770 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3771 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3772 * check the first address now.
3774 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3775 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3777 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3778 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3779 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3780 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3781 unsigned short snum;
3782 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3785 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3787 if (family == PF_INET) {
3788 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3789 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3790 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3792 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3793 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3794 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3800 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3802 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3803 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3807 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3808 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3809 ad.u.net.family = family;
3810 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3812 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3818 switch (isec->sclass) {
3819 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3820 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3823 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3824 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3827 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3828 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3832 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3836 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3840 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3841 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3842 ad.u.net.family = family;
3844 if (family == PF_INET)
3845 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3847 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3849 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3850 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3858 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3860 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3861 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3864 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3869 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3871 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3872 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3873 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3874 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3875 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3876 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3877 unsigned short snum;
3880 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3881 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3882 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3884 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3886 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3887 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3889 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3892 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3896 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3897 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3899 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3900 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3901 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3902 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3907 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3913 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3915 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3918 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3921 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3922 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3924 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3928 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3930 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3931 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3932 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3933 newisec->initialized = 1;
3938 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3943 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3947 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3950 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3951 int size, int flags)
3953 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3956 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3958 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3961 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3963 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3966 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3970 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3974 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3977 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3980 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3983 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3985 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3988 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3989 struct socket *other,
3992 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3993 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3994 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3995 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3998 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4002 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4003 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4005 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4006 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4008 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4010 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4014 /* connecting socket */
4015 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4016 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4018 /* server child socket */
4019 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4020 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4021 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4026 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4027 struct socket *other)
4029 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4030 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4031 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4034 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4035 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4037 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4038 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4040 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4041 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4048 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4050 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4056 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4059 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4060 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4064 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4067 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4068 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4071 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4072 struct sk_buff *skb,
4073 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4078 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4080 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4081 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4083 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4084 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4087 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4088 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4089 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4090 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4092 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4093 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4094 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4095 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4097 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4098 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4099 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4100 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4103 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4104 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4109 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4112 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4116 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4119 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4125 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4126 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4127 if (unlikely(err)) {
4129 "SELinux: failure in"
4130 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4131 " network port label not found\n");
4134 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4137 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4141 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4143 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4144 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4147 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4148 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4149 ad.u.net.family = family;
4150 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4154 if (selinux_compat_net)
4155 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4158 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4163 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4164 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4167 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4168 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4170 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4172 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4175 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4181 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4184 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4185 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4186 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4187 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4192 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4195 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4196 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4199 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4200 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4201 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4202 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4203 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4204 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4206 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4207 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4208 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4211 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4212 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4213 ad.u.net.family = family;
4214 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4218 if (peerlbl_active) {
4221 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4224 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4227 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4230 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4233 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4236 if (secmark_active) {
4237 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4246 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4247 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4252 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4253 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4254 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4256 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4258 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4259 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4260 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4261 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4263 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4268 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4273 if (scontext_len > len) {
4278 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4282 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4290 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4292 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4295 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4297 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4300 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4304 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4305 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4307 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4310 *secid = peer_secid;
4311 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4316 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4318 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4321 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4323 sk_free_security(sk);
4326 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4328 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4329 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4331 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4332 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4333 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4335 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4338 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4341 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4343 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4345 *secid = sksec->sid;
4349 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4351 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4352 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4354 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4355 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4356 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4357 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4360 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4361 struct request_sock *req)
4363 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4365 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4369 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4370 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4373 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4376 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4377 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4378 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4382 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4386 req->secid = newsid;
4387 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4391 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4392 const struct request_sock *req)
4394 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4396 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4397 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4398 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4399 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4400 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4401 time it will have been created and available. */
4403 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4404 * thread with access to newsksec */
4405 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4408 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4410 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4411 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4413 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4414 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4417 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4419 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4422 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4425 fl->secid = req->secid;
4428 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4432 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4433 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4434 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4436 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4440 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4442 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4444 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4445 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4446 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4447 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4448 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4449 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4459 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4464 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4466 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4472 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4477 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4480 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4481 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4482 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4483 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4486 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4489 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4490 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4491 ad.u.net.family = family;
4492 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4495 if (peerlbl_active) {
4496 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4499 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4505 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4506 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4510 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4511 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4512 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4514 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4520 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4521 struct sk_buff *skb,
4522 const struct net_device *in,
4523 const struct net_device *out,
4524 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4526 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4529 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4530 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4531 struct sk_buff *skb,
4532 const struct net_device *in,
4533 const struct net_device *out,
4534 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4536 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4540 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4545 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4548 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4549 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4550 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4552 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4555 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4556 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4562 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4563 struct sk_buff *skb,
4564 const struct net_device *in,
4565 const struct net_device *out,
4566 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4568 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4571 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4573 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4574 u16 family, char *addrp)
4577 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4579 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4580 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4582 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4583 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4586 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4587 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4588 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4589 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4591 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4592 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4593 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4594 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4596 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4597 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4598 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4599 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4602 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4603 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4608 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4611 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4614 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4617 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4624 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4625 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4626 if (unlikely(err)) {
4628 "SELinux: failure in"
4629 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4630 " network port label not found\n");
4633 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4636 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4640 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4641 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4642 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4648 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4650 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4651 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4652 ad.u.net.family = family;
4653 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4656 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4657 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4658 &ad, family, addrp))
4661 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4662 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4666 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4667 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4673 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4679 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4684 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4685 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4686 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4687 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4688 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4689 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4691 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4692 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4693 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4694 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4695 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4696 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4697 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4700 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4701 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4702 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4705 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4706 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4707 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4708 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4713 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4714 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4716 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4719 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4720 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4722 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4727 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4728 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4731 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4733 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4734 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4735 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4738 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4739 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4740 ad.u.net.family = family;
4741 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4745 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4746 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4749 if (peerlbl_active) {
4753 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4755 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4756 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4759 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4761 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4762 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4769 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4770 struct sk_buff *skb,
4771 const struct net_device *in,
4772 const struct net_device *out,
4773 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4775 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4778 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4779 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4780 struct sk_buff *skb,
4781 const struct net_device *in,
4782 const struct net_device *out,
4783 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4785 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4789 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4791 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4795 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4799 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4800 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4805 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4808 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4810 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4814 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4815 ad.u.cap = capability;
4817 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4818 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4821 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4822 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4825 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4828 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4832 sid = task_sid(task);
4833 isec->sclass = sclass;
4835 perm->security = isec;
4840 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4842 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4843 perm->security = NULL;
4847 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4849 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4851 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4855 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4856 msg->security = msec;
4861 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4863 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4865 msg->security = NULL;
4869 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4872 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4873 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4874 u32 sid = current_sid();
4876 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4878 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4879 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4881 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4884 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4886 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4889 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4891 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4894 /* message queue security operations */
4895 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4897 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4898 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4899 u32 sid = current_sid();
4902 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4906 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4908 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4909 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4911 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4914 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4920 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4922 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4925 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4927 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4928 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4929 u32 sid = current_sid();
4931 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4933 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4934 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4936 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4937 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4940 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4948 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4949 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4952 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4955 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4958 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4964 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4968 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4970 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4971 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4972 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4973 u32 sid = current_sid();
4976 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4977 msec = msg->security;
4980 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4982 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4984 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4985 * message queue this message will be stored in
4987 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4993 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4994 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4996 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4997 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5000 /* Can this process send the message */
5001 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5004 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5005 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5006 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5011 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5012 struct task_struct *target,
5013 long type, int mode)
5015 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5016 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5017 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5018 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5021 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5022 msec = msg->security;
5024 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5025 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5027 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5028 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5030 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5031 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5035 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5036 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5038 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5039 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5040 u32 sid = current_sid();
5043 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5047 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5049 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5050 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5052 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5055 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5061 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5063 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5066 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5068 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5069 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5070 u32 sid = current_sid();
5072 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5074 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5075 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5077 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5078 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5081 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5082 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5090 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5091 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5094 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5097 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5104 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5110 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5114 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5115 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5120 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5124 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5127 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5129 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5132 /* Semaphore security operations */
5133 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5135 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5136 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5137 u32 sid = current_sid();
5140 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5144 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5146 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5147 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5149 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5152 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5158 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5160 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5163 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5165 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5166 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5167 u32 sid = current_sid();
5169 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5171 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5172 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5174 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5175 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5178 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5179 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5187 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5188 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5192 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5203 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5206 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5210 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5216 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5220 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5221 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5226 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5230 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5233 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5239 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5241 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5246 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5249 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5251 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5255 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5258 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5261 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5262 char *name, char **value)
5264 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5270 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5276 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5278 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5280 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5282 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5283 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5284 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5285 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5286 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5287 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5288 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5289 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5297 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5307 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5308 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5310 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5311 struct task_struct *tracer;
5318 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5319 security attributes. */
5324 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5325 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5326 * above restriction is ever removed.
5328 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5329 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5330 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5331 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5332 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5333 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5334 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5335 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5336 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5337 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5343 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5344 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5345 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5349 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5350 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5351 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5353 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5360 new = prepare_creds();
5364 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5365 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5366 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5367 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5368 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5369 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5370 tsec = new->security;
5371 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5372 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5373 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5374 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5375 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5376 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5379 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5380 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5381 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5382 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5387 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5389 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5390 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5395 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5396 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5397 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5401 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5402 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5405 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5407 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5411 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5412 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5431 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5433 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5436 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5438 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5441 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5448 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5449 unsigned long flags)
5451 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5452 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5454 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5458 tsec = cred->security;
5459 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5460 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5462 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5468 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5470 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5476 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5477 const struct cred *cred,
5481 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5484 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5485 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5486 appear to be created. */
5490 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5492 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5493 ksec = key->security;
5495 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5498 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5500 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5501 char *context = NULL;
5505 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5514 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5517 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5518 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5519 .capget = selinux_capget,
5520 .capset = selinux_capset,
5521 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5522 .capable = selinux_capable,
5523 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5524 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5525 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5526 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5528 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5529 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5531 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5532 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5533 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5534 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5535 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5537 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5538 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5539 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5540 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5541 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5542 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5543 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5544 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5545 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5546 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5547 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5550 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5551 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5552 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5553 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5554 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5555 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5556 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5557 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5558 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5559 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5560 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5561 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5562 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5563 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5564 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5565 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5566 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5567 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5568 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5569 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5570 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5571 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5572 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5573 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5574 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5575 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5576 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5578 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5579 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5580 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5581 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5582 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5583 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5584 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5585 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5586 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5587 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5588 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5590 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5592 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5593 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5594 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5595 .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
5596 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5597 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5598 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5599 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5600 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5601 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5602 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5603 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5604 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5605 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5606 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5607 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5608 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5609 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5610 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5611 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5612 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5613 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5614 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5616 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5617 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5619 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5620 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5622 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5623 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5624 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5625 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5626 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5627 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5629 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5630 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5631 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5632 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5633 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5635 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5636 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5637 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5638 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5639 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5641 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5643 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5644 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5646 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5647 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5648 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5650 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5651 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5653 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5654 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5655 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5656 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5657 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5658 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5659 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5660 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5661 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5662 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5663 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5664 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5665 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5666 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5667 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5668 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5669 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5670 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5671 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5672 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5673 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5674 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5675 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5676 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5677 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5679 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5680 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5681 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5682 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5683 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5684 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5685 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5686 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5687 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5688 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5689 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5693 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5694 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5695 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5696 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5700 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5701 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5702 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5703 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5707 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5709 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5710 selinux_enabled = 0;
5714 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5715 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5719 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5721 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5722 cred_init_security();
5724 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5725 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5726 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5729 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5731 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5732 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5733 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5735 if (selinux_enforcing)
5736 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5738 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5743 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5745 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5747 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5748 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5749 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5750 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5752 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5753 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5754 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5755 struct superblock_security_struct,
5757 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5759 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5760 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5761 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5763 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5765 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5766 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5767 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5770 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5771 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5774 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5775 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5776 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5778 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5780 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5782 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5783 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5785 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5786 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5789 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5790 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5792 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5793 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5796 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5797 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5799 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5800 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5804 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5806 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5808 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5809 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5811 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5812 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5815 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5816 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5818 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5819 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5825 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5829 if (!selinux_enabled)
5832 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5834 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5836 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5838 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5839 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5841 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5848 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5850 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5851 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5853 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5855 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5856 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5857 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5862 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5864 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5865 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5868 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5870 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5871 static int selinux_disabled;
5873 int selinux_disable(void)
5875 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5877 if (ss_initialized) {
5878 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5882 if (selinux_disabled) {
5883 /* Only do this once. */
5887 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5889 selinux_disabled = 1;
5890 selinux_enabled = 0;
5892 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5893 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5895 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5896 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5898 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */