2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
56 #include <net/netlabel.h>
57 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
58 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
59 #include <linux/atomic.h>
60 #include <linux/bitops.h>
61 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
62 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
63 #include <linux/netlink.h>
64 #include <linux/tcp.h>
65 #include <linux/udp.h>
66 #include <linux/dccp.h>
67 #include <linux/quota.h>
68 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <linux/parser.h>
71 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
74 #include <linux/personality.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
81 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
82 #include <linux/export.h>
83 #include <linux/msg.h>
84 #include <linux/shm.h>
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing;
106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
108 unsigned long enforcing;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
110 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
121 unsigned long enabled;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
123 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
149 * initialise the security for the init task
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
153 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
160 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
161 cred->security = tsec;
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
167 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
169 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
171 tsec = cred->security;
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
183 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
191 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
223 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
225 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
227 list_del_init(&isec->list);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
230 inode->i_security = NULL;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
237 u32 sid = current_sid();
239 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
244 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
245 file->f_security = fsec;
250 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
253 file->f_security = NULL;
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
261 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
265 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
267 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
269 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
271 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
272 sb->s_security = sbsec;
277 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
279 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
280 sb->s_security = NULL;
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
288 "uses transition SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
308 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
311 static const match_table_t tokens = {
312 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
323 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
324 const struct cred *cred)
326 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
329 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
334 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 const struct cred *cred)
343 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
358 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
359 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
362 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
374 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
375 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
376 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
383 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
388 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
390 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
391 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
396 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
398 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
401 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
419 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
420 struct inode_security_struct, list);
421 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
423 inode = igrab(inode);
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
429 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
430 list_del_init(&isec->list);
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
444 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
448 char *context = NULL;
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
454 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
460 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
464 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
471 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
472 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
477 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
484 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
485 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
489 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
491 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
492 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
496 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
498 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
499 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
505 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
506 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
507 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
509 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
513 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
515 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
544 if (mnt_flags & flag)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
594 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
720 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
721 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid) {
725 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
733 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
739 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
754 struct super_block *newsb)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
757 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
759 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
779 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
781 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
782 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
783 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
786 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
790 if (!set_rootcontext) {
791 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
792 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
795 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
797 if (set_rootcontext) {
798 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
799 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
800 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
803 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
811 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
814 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
815 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
816 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
818 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
823 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
828 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
832 if (context || defcontext) {
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
837 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
850 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
857 case Opt_rootcontext:
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
863 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
871 if (context || defcontext) {
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
876 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
882 case Opt_labelsupport:
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
959 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
964 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
968 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
972 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
974 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
977 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
980 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
983 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
987 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
993 /* we need a comma before each option */
998 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1004 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1006 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1009 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1011 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1017 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1019 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1024 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1026 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1028 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1038 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1040 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1044 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1047 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1049 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1052 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1054 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1057 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1063 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1073 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1074 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1079 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1085 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1116 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1121 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1124 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1125 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1130 char *buffer, *path;
1132 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1136 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1140 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1141 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1142 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1143 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1147 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1149 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1153 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1161 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1162 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1164 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1167 struct dentry *dentry;
1168 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1169 char *context = NULL;
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1177 if (isec->initialized)
1180 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1181 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1182 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1183 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1184 server is ready to handle calls. */
1185 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1186 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1187 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1188 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1192 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1193 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1194 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1195 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1199 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1200 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1202 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1203 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1205 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1206 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1210 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1211 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1212 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1213 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1214 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1215 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1216 * be used again by userspace.
1221 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1222 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1228 context[len] = '\0';
1229 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1231 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1235 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1242 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1248 context[len] = '\0';
1249 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1255 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1257 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1258 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1263 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1270 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1271 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1273 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1274 if (printk_ratelimit())
1275 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1276 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1277 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1279 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1280 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1281 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1293 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1296 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1299 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1300 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1301 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1302 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1308 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1311 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1314 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1317 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1328 isec->initialized = 1;
1331 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1333 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1338 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1339 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1345 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1346 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1349 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1350 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1353 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1354 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1357 /* All other signals. */
1358 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1366 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1367 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1369 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1370 const struct cred *target,
1373 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1375 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1379 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1380 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1381 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1382 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1384 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1385 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1388 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1392 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1393 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1395 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1399 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1402 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1404 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1409 sid = current_sid();
1410 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1414 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1415 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1419 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1422 struct common_audit_data ad;
1423 struct av_decision avd;
1425 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1426 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1429 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1432 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1434 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1437 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1441 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1446 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1447 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1448 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1455 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1456 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1459 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1461 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1462 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1465 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1466 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1467 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1468 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1469 struct inode *inode,
1471 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1474 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1477 validate_creds(cred);
1479 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1482 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1483 isec = inode->i_security;
1485 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1488 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1489 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1490 pathname if needed. */
1491 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1492 struct dentry *dentry,
1495 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1496 struct common_audit_data ad;
1498 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1499 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1500 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1503 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1504 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1505 pathname if needed. */
1506 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1510 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1511 struct common_audit_data ad;
1513 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1515 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1518 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1519 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1520 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1521 check a particular permission to the file.
1522 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1523 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1524 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1525 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1526 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1530 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1531 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1532 struct common_audit_data ad;
1533 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1536 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1537 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1539 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1540 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1548 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1551 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1557 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1558 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1559 struct dentry *dentry,
1562 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1563 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1564 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1566 struct common_audit_data ad;
1569 dsec = dir->i_security;
1570 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1573 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1575 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1576 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1578 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1579 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1584 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1585 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1586 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1591 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1595 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1596 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1597 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1600 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1601 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1602 struct task_struct *ctx)
1604 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1606 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1610 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1613 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1614 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1615 struct dentry *dentry,
1619 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1620 struct common_audit_data ad;
1621 u32 sid = current_sid();
1625 dsec = dir->i_security;
1626 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1628 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1629 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1632 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1633 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1648 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1653 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1657 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1658 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1659 struct inode *new_dir,
1660 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1662 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1663 struct common_audit_data ad;
1664 u32 sid = current_sid();
1666 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1669 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1670 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1671 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1672 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1674 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1676 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1677 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1678 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1682 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1685 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1686 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1687 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1692 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1693 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1694 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1695 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1696 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1699 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1700 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1701 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1702 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1704 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1712 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1713 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1714 struct super_block *sb,
1716 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1718 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1719 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1721 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1722 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1725 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1726 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1730 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1731 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1732 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1733 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1736 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1738 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1742 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1744 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1746 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1753 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1754 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1758 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1760 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1761 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1768 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1777 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1780 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1782 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1784 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1790 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1792 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1797 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1801 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1802 u32 sid = current_sid();
1803 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1804 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1807 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1810 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1814 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1818 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1821 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1822 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1826 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1830 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1833 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1834 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1835 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1836 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1840 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1841 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1845 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1849 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1850 * which was removed).
1852 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1853 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1854 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1855 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1858 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1863 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1867 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1870 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1872 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1884 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1889 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1892 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1898 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1900 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1902 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1905 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1910 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1911 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1912 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1914 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1915 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1916 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1917 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1918 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1920 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1921 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1922 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1923 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1926 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1933 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1934 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1935 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1937 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1938 * processes that allocate mappings.
1940 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1942 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1944 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1945 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1949 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1952 /* binprm security operations */
1954 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1956 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1957 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1958 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1959 struct common_audit_data ad;
1960 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1963 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1967 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1968 * the script interpreter */
1969 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1972 old_tsec = current_security();
1973 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1974 isec = inode->i_security;
1976 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1977 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1978 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1980 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1981 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1982 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1983 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1985 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
1986 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
1987 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1988 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1991 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
1992 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
1994 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
1997 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1998 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1999 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2005 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2006 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2008 if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
2009 (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
2010 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2012 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2013 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2014 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2018 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2019 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2020 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2024 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2025 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2029 /* Check for shared state */
2030 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2031 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2032 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2038 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2039 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2041 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2042 struct task_struct *tracer;
2043 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2047 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2048 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2049 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2055 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2057 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2063 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2064 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2070 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2072 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2080 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2081 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2082 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2083 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2085 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2088 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2091 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2093 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2096 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2097 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2098 struct files_struct *files)
2100 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2101 struct tty_struct *tty;
2105 tty = get_current_tty();
2107 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2108 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2109 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2111 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2112 Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
2113 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2114 file may belong to another process and we are only
2115 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2116 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2117 struct tty_file_private, list);
2118 file = file_priv->file;
2119 if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2122 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2125 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2129 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2130 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2131 if (!n) /* none found? */
2134 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2135 if (!IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2136 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2139 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2140 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2143 /* just close all the matching ones */
2145 replace_fd(n - 1, NULL, 0);
2146 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2151 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2153 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2155 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2156 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2159 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2160 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2163 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2164 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2166 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2167 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2169 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2170 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2171 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2173 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2174 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2175 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2176 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2177 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2179 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2180 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2182 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2184 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2185 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2186 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2187 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2189 task_unlock(current);
2190 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2195 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2198 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2200 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2201 struct itimerval itimer;
2211 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2212 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2213 * flush and unblock signals.
2215 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2216 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2218 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2220 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2221 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2222 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2223 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2224 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2225 __flush_signals(current);
2226 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2227 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2229 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2232 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2233 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2234 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2235 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2236 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2239 /* superblock security operations */
2241 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2243 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2246 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2248 superblock_free_security(sb);
2251 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2256 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2259 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2261 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2262 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2263 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2264 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2265 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2268 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2275 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2279 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2282 int current_size = 0;
2290 while (current_size < len) {
2300 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2302 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2303 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2304 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2310 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2318 in_save = in_end = orig;
2322 open_quote = !open_quote;
2323 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2325 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2327 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2328 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2330 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2332 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2334 } while (*in_end++);
2336 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2337 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2342 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2345 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2346 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2347 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2349 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2355 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2358 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2359 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2362 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2364 goto out_free_secdata;
2366 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2368 goto out_free_secdata;
2370 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2371 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2373 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2377 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2379 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2380 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2382 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2383 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2384 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2390 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2391 goto out_bad_option;
2394 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2395 goto out_bad_option;
2397 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2398 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2399 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2401 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2402 goto out_bad_option;
2405 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2406 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2407 goto out_bad_option;
2416 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2418 free_secdata(secdata);
2421 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2422 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2427 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2429 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2430 struct common_audit_data ad;
2433 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2437 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2438 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2441 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2442 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2443 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2446 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2448 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2449 struct common_audit_data ad;
2451 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2452 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2453 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2456 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2459 unsigned long flags,
2462 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2464 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2465 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2466 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2468 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2471 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2473 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2475 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2476 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2479 /* inode security operations */
2481 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2483 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2486 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2488 inode_free_security(inode);
2491 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2492 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2493 void **value, size_t *len)
2495 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2496 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2497 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2498 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2500 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2502 dsec = dir->i_security;
2503 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2506 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2508 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2509 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2510 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2511 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2512 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2513 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2516 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2517 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2520 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2525 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2526 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2527 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2528 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2530 isec->initialized = 1;
2533 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2537 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2544 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2556 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2558 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2561 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2563 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2566 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2568 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2571 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2573 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2576 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2578 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2581 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2583 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2586 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2588 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2591 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2592 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2594 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2597 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2599 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2601 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2604 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2606 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2608 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2611 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2612 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2615 struct common_audit_data ad;
2616 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2619 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2622 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2623 audited, denied, &ad, flags);
2629 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2631 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2634 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2635 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2637 struct av_decision avd;
2639 u32 audited, denied;
2641 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2642 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2644 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2648 validate_creds(cred);
2650 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2653 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2655 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2656 isec = inode->i_security;
2658 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2659 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2660 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2662 if (likely(!audited))
2665 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
2671 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2673 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2674 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2675 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2677 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2678 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2679 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2685 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2686 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2687 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2689 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2692 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2695 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2697 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2700 path.dentry = dentry;
2703 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2706 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2708 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2710 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2711 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2712 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2713 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2715 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2716 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2717 Restrict to administrator. */
2722 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2723 ordinary setattr permission. */
2724 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2727 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2728 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2730 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2731 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2732 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2733 struct common_audit_data ad;
2734 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2737 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2738 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2740 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2741 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2744 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2747 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2748 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2750 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2751 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2755 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2756 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2757 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2758 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2762 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2763 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2766 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2767 audit_size = size - 1;
2774 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2775 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2776 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2781 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2786 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2787 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2791 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2796 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2798 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2799 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2803 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2804 const void *value, size_t size,
2807 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2808 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2812 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2813 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2817 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2819 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2820 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2821 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2829 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2831 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2833 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2836 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2838 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2840 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2843 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2845 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2846 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2848 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2849 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2854 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2856 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2858 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2862 char *context = NULL;
2863 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2865 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2869 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2870 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2871 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2872 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2873 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2874 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2875 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2877 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2878 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2880 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2883 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2896 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2897 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2899 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2903 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2906 if (!value || !size)
2909 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2914 isec->initialized = 1;
2918 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2920 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2921 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2922 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2926 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2928 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2932 /* file security operations */
2934 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2936 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2937 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2939 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2940 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2943 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2944 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2947 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2949 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2950 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2951 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2952 u32 sid = current_sid();
2955 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2958 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2959 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2960 /* No change since file_open check. */
2963 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2966 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2968 return file_alloc_security(file);
2971 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2973 file_free_security(file);
2976 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2979 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2989 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2991 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
2992 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2995 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2997 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
2998 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3001 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3005 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3010 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3011 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3014 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3015 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3018 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3023 static int default_noexec;
3025 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3027 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3030 if (default_noexec &&
3031 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3033 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3034 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3035 * This has an additional check.
3037 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3043 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3044 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3046 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3047 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3050 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3051 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3053 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3060 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3063 u32 sid = current_sid();
3066 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3067 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3068 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3069 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3071 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3072 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3073 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3078 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3079 return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3082 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3083 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3085 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3088 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3089 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3092 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3093 unsigned long reqprot,
3096 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3098 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3101 if (default_noexec &&
3102 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3104 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3105 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3106 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3107 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3108 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3109 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3110 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3111 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3113 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3114 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3115 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3116 * modified content. This typically should only
3117 * occur for text relocations.
3119 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3125 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3128 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3130 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3132 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3135 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3138 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3143 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3148 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3149 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3158 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3159 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3160 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3165 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3170 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3174 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3181 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3183 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3185 fsec = file->f_security;
3186 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3191 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3192 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3195 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3197 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3199 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3200 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3202 fsec = file->f_security;
3205 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3207 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3209 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3210 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3213 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3215 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3217 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3220 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3222 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3223 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3225 fsec = file->f_security;
3226 isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
3228 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3229 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3230 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3231 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3232 * struct as its SID.
3234 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3235 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3237 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3238 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3239 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3240 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3241 * new inode label or new policy.
3242 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3244 return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
3247 /* task security operations */
3249 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3251 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3255 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3257 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3259 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3261 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3265 cred->security = tsec;
3270 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3272 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3274 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3277 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3278 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3280 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3281 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3286 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3288 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3291 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3292 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3294 old_tsec = old->security;
3296 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3300 new->security = tsec;
3305 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3307 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3309 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3310 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3316 * set the security data for a kernel service
3317 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3319 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3321 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3322 u32 sid = current_sid();
3325 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3326 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3327 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3331 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3332 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3333 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3339 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3340 * objective context of the specified inode
3342 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3344 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3345 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3346 u32 sid = current_sid();
3349 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3350 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3351 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3355 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3359 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3362 struct common_audit_data ad;
3364 sid = task_sid(current);
3366 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3367 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3369 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3370 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3373 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3375 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3378 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3380 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3383 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3385 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3388 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3390 *secid = task_sid(p);
3393 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3397 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3401 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3404 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3408 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3412 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3415 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3417 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3420 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3421 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3423 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3425 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3426 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3427 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3428 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3429 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3430 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3435 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3439 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3443 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3446 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3448 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3451 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3453 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3456 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3463 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3465 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3467 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3468 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3470 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3474 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3476 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3479 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3480 struct inode *inode)
3482 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3483 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3486 isec->initialized = 1;
3489 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3490 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3491 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3493 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3494 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3496 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3497 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3501 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3502 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3505 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3506 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3510 *proto = ih->protocol;
3512 switch (ih->protocol) {
3514 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3516 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3520 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3524 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3525 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3530 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3532 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3536 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3540 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3541 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3545 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3546 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3548 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3552 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3556 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3557 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3568 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3570 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3571 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3572 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3575 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3576 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3579 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3580 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3584 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3585 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3588 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3589 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3590 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3599 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3601 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3605 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3606 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3611 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3613 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3617 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3618 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3622 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3623 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3625 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3629 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3630 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3634 /* includes fragments */
3644 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3645 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3650 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3652 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3655 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3656 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3659 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3661 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3664 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3665 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3675 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3676 " unable to parse packet\n");
3686 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3688 * @family: protocol family
3689 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3692 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3693 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3694 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3695 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3696 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3700 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3707 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3708 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3710 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3711 if (unlikely(err)) {
3713 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3714 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3721 /* socket security operations */
3723 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3724 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3726 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3727 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3731 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3735 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3737 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3738 struct common_audit_data ad;
3739 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3740 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3742 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3745 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3749 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3752 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3753 int protocol, int kern)
3755 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3763 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3764 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3768 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3771 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3772 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3774 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3775 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3776 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3779 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3782 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3784 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3789 isec->initialized = 1;
3792 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3793 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3794 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3795 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3801 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3802 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3803 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3805 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3807 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3811 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3816 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3817 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3818 * check the first address now.
3820 family = sk->sk_family;
3821 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3823 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3824 struct common_audit_data ad;
3825 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3826 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3827 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3828 unsigned short snum;
3831 if (family == PF_INET) {
3832 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3833 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3834 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3836 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3837 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3838 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3844 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3846 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3847 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3851 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3853 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3854 ad.u.net->family = family;
3855 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3857 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3863 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3864 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3865 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3868 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3869 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3872 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3873 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3877 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3881 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3885 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3887 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3888 ad.u.net->family = family;
3890 if (family == PF_INET)
3891 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3893 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3895 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3896 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3904 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3906 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3907 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3910 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3915 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3917 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3918 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3919 struct common_audit_data ad;
3920 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3921 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3922 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3923 unsigned short snum;
3926 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3927 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3928 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3930 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3932 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3933 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3935 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3938 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3942 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3943 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3945 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3947 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
3948 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
3949 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3954 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3960 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3962 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3965 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3968 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3969 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3971 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3975 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3977 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3978 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3979 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3980 newisec->initialized = 1;
3985 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3988 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3991 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3992 int size, int flags)
3994 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3997 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3999 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4002 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4004 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4007 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4011 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4015 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4018 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4021 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4024 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4026 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4029 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4033 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4034 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4035 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4036 struct common_audit_data ad;
4037 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4040 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4042 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4044 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4045 sksec_other->sclass,
4046 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4050 /* server child socket */
4051 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4052 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4057 /* connecting socket */
4058 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4063 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4064 struct socket *other)
4066 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4067 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4068 struct common_audit_data ad;
4069 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4071 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4073 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4075 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4079 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4081 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4087 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4090 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4091 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4095 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4098 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4099 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4102 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4106 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4107 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4108 struct common_audit_data ad;
4109 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4112 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4114 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4115 ad.u.net->family = family;
4116 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4120 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4121 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4127 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4130 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4135 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4138 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4139 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4140 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4141 struct common_audit_data ad;
4142 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4147 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4150 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4151 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4154 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4155 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4156 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4157 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4158 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4159 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4161 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4162 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4163 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4166 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4168 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4169 ad.u.net->family = family;
4170 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4174 if (peerlbl_active) {
4177 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4180 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4183 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4186 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4189 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4192 if (secmark_active) {
4193 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4202 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4203 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4208 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4209 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4211 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4212 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4213 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4214 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4215 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4217 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4221 if (scontext_len > len) {
4226 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4230 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4236 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4238 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4241 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4243 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4246 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4250 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4251 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4253 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4256 *secid = peer_secid;
4257 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4262 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4264 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4266 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4270 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4271 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4272 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4273 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4278 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4280 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4282 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4283 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4287 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4289 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4290 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4292 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4293 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4294 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4296 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4299 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4302 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4304 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4306 *secid = sksec->sid;
4310 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4312 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4313 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4315 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4316 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4317 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4318 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4321 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4322 struct request_sock *req)
4324 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4326 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4330 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4331 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4334 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4337 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4338 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4339 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4341 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4344 req->secid = newsid;
4345 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4348 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4351 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4352 const struct request_sock *req)
4354 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4356 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4357 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4358 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4359 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4360 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4361 time it will have been created and available. */
4363 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4364 * thread with access to newsksec */
4365 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4368 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4370 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4371 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4373 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4374 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4377 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4380 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4382 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4385 __tsec = current_security();
4388 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4391 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4393 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4396 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4398 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4401 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4404 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4407 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4409 u32 sid = current_sid();
4411 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4412 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4413 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4414 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4415 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4416 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4418 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4422 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4424 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4426 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4427 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4428 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4429 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4430 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4431 * protocols were being used */
4433 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4434 * the sockcreate SID here */
4436 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4437 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4440 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4442 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4443 u32 sid = current_sid();
4446 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4447 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4450 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4451 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4460 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4464 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4465 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4467 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4471 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4473 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4475 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4476 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4477 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4478 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4479 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4480 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4490 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4495 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4497 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4503 struct common_audit_data ad;
4504 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4509 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4512 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4513 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4514 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4515 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4518 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4521 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4523 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4524 ad.u.net->family = family;
4525 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4528 if (peerlbl_active) {
4529 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4532 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4538 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4539 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4543 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4544 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4545 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4547 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4553 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4554 struct sk_buff *skb,
4555 const struct net_device *in,
4556 const struct net_device *out,
4557 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4559 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4562 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4563 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4564 struct sk_buff *skb,
4565 const struct net_device *in,
4566 const struct net_device *out,
4567 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4569 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4573 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4578 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4581 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4582 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4583 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4585 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4588 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4589 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4595 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4596 struct sk_buff *skb,
4597 const struct net_device *in,
4598 const struct net_device *out,
4599 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4601 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4604 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4608 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4609 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4610 struct common_audit_data ad;
4611 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4617 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4619 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4621 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4622 ad.u.net->family = family;
4623 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4626 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4627 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4628 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4629 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4631 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4632 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4637 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4643 struct common_audit_data ad;
4644 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4649 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4650 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4651 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4652 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4653 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4654 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4656 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4657 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4658 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4659 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4660 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4661 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4662 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4665 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4666 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4667 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4670 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4671 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4672 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4673 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4677 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4678 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4681 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4682 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4685 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4686 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4687 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4690 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4692 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4693 ad.u.net->family = family;
4694 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4698 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4699 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4700 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4702 if (peerlbl_active) {
4706 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4708 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4709 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4710 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4712 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4714 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4715 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4716 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4722 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4723 struct sk_buff *skb,
4724 const struct net_device *in,
4725 const struct net_device *out,
4726 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4728 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4731 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4732 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4733 struct sk_buff *skb,
4734 const struct net_device *in,
4735 const struct net_device *out,
4736 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4738 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4742 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4744 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4748 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4752 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4755 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4756 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4759 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4762 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4766 sid = task_sid(task);
4767 isec->sclass = sclass;
4769 perm->security = isec;
4774 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4776 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4777 perm->security = NULL;
4781 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4783 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4785 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4789 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4790 msg->security = msec;
4795 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4797 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4799 msg->security = NULL;
4803 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4806 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4807 struct common_audit_data ad;
4808 u32 sid = current_sid();
4810 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4812 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4813 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4815 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4818 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4820 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4823 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4825 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4828 /* message queue security operations */
4829 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4831 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4832 struct common_audit_data ad;
4833 u32 sid = current_sid();
4836 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4840 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4842 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4843 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4845 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4848 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4854 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4856 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4859 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4861 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4862 struct common_audit_data ad;
4863 u32 sid = current_sid();
4865 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4867 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4868 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4870 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4871 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4874 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4882 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4883 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4886 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4889 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4892 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4898 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4902 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4904 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4905 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4906 struct common_audit_data ad;
4907 u32 sid = current_sid();
4910 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4911 msec = msg->security;
4914 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4916 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4918 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4919 * message queue this message will be stored in
4921 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4927 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4928 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4930 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4931 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4934 /* Can this process send the message */
4935 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4938 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4939 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4940 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4945 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4946 struct task_struct *target,
4947 long type, int mode)
4949 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4950 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4951 struct common_audit_data ad;
4952 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4955 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4956 msec = msg->security;
4958 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4959 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4961 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4962 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4964 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4965 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4969 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4970 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4972 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4973 struct common_audit_data ad;
4974 u32 sid = current_sid();
4977 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4981 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4983 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4984 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4986 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4989 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4995 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4997 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5000 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5002 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5003 struct common_audit_data ad;
5004 u32 sid = current_sid();
5006 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5008 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5009 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5011 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5012 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5015 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5016 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5024 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5025 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5028 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5031 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5038 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5044 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5048 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5049 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5053 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5056 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5058 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5061 /* Semaphore security operations */
5062 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5064 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5065 struct common_audit_data ad;
5066 u32 sid = current_sid();
5069 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5073 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5075 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5076 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5078 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5081 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5087 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5089 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5092 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5094 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5095 struct common_audit_data ad;
5096 u32 sid = current_sid();
5098 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5100 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5101 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5103 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5104 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5107 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5108 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5116 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5117 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5121 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5132 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5135 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5139 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5145 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5149 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5150 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5155 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5159 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5162 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5168 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5170 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5175 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5178 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5180 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5184 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5187 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5190 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5191 char *name, char **value)
5193 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5199 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5205 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5207 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5209 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5211 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5212 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5213 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5214 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5215 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5216 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5217 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5218 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5226 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5236 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5237 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5239 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5240 struct task_struct *tracer;
5247 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5248 security attributes. */
5253 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5254 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5255 * above restriction is ever removed.
5257 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5258 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5259 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5260 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5261 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5262 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5263 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5264 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5265 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5266 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5272 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5273 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5274 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5278 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5279 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5280 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5281 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5284 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5285 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5286 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5287 audit_size = size - 1;
5290 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5291 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5292 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5297 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5304 new = prepare_creds();
5308 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5309 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5310 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5311 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5312 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5313 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5314 tsec = new->security;
5315 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5316 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5317 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5318 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5319 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5320 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5323 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5324 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5325 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5326 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5331 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5333 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5334 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5339 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5340 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5341 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5345 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5346 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5349 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5351 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5355 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5356 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5375 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5377 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5380 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5382 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5385 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5391 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5393 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5395 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5399 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5401 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5403 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5406 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5409 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5418 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5419 unsigned long flags)
5421 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5422 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5424 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5428 tsec = cred->security;
5429 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5430 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5432 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5438 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5440 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5446 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5447 const struct cred *cred,
5451 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5454 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5455 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5456 appear to be created. */
5460 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5462 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5463 ksec = key->security;
5465 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5468 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5470 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5471 char *context = NULL;
5475 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5484 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5487 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5488 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5489 .capget = selinux_capget,
5490 .capset = selinux_capset,
5491 .capable = selinux_capable,
5492 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5493 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5494 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5495 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5497 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5499 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5500 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5501 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5502 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5504 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5505 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5506 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5507 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5508 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5509 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5510 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5511 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5512 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5513 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5514 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5515 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5518 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5519 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5520 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5521 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5522 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5523 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5524 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5525 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5526 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5527 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5528 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5529 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5530 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5531 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5532 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5533 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5534 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5535 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5536 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5537 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5538 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5539 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5540 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5541 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5542 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5544 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5545 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5546 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5547 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5548 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5549 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5550 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5551 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5552 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5553 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5554 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5555 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5557 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5559 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5560 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5561 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5562 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5563 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5564 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5565 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5566 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5567 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5568 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5569 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5570 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5571 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5572 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5573 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5574 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5575 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5576 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5577 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5578 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5579 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5580 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5582 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5583 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5585 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5586 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5588 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5589 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5590 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5591 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5592 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5593 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5595 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5596 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5597 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5598 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5599 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5601 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5602 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5603 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5604 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5605 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5607 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5609 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5610 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5612 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5613 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5614 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5615 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5616 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5617 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5619 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5620 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5622 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5623 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5624 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5625 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5626 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5627 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5628 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5629 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5630 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5631 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5632 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5633 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5634 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5635 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5636 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5637 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5638 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5639 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5640 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5641 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5642 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5643 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5644 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5645 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5646 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5647 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5648 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5649 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5650 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5651 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5652 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5654 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5655 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5656 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5657 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5658 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5659 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5660 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5661 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5662 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5663 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5664 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5668 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5669 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5670 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5671 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5675 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5676 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5677 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5678 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5682 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5684 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5685 selinux_enabled = 0;
5689 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5690 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5694 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5696 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5697 cred_init_security();
5699 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5701 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5702 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5703 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5706 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5707 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5709 if (selinux_enforcing)
5710 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5712 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5717 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5719 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5722 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5724 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5726 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5727 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5728 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5731 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5732 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5733 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5735 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5737 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5739 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5740 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5742 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5743 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5746 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5747 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5749 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5750 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5753 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5754 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5756 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5757 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5761 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5763 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5765 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5766 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5768 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5769 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5772 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5773 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5775 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5776 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5782 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5786 if (!selinux_enabled)
5789 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5791 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5793 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5795 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5796 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5798 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5805 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5807 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5808 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5810 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5812 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5813 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5814 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5819 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5821 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5822 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5825 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5827 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5828 static int selinux_disabled;
5830 int selinux_disable(void)
5832 if (ss_initialized) {
5833 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5837 if (selinux_disabled) {
5838 /* Only do this once. */
5842 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5844 selinux_disabled = 1;
5845 selinux_enabled = 0;
5847 reset_security_ops();
5849 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5852 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5853 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5855 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */