2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
161 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
163 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
170 task->cred->security = tsec;
175 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
177 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->cred->security;
178 task->cred->security = NULL;
182 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
184 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
185 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
187 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
191 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
192 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
194 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
195 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
196 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
197 inode->i_security = isec;
202 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
204 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
205 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
207 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
208 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
209 list_del_init(&isec->list);
210 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
212 inode->i_security = NULL;
213 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
216 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
218 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
219 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
221 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
225 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
226 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
227 file->f_security = fsec;
232 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
234 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
235 file->f_security = NULL;
239 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
241 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
243 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
247 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
249 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
250 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
252 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
253 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
254 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
255 sb->s_security = sbsec;
260 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
262 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
264 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
265 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
266 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
267 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
269 sb->s_security = NULL;
273 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
275 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
277 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
281 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sk->sk_security = ssec;
285 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
290 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
294 sk->sk_security = NULL;
295 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
299 /* The security server must be initialized before
300 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
301 extern int ss_initialized;
303 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
305 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
307 "uses transition SIDs",
309 "uses genfs_contexts",
310 "not configured for labeling",
311 "uses mountpoint labeling",
314 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
316 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
318 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
329 static const match_table_t tokens = {
330 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
333 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
337 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
339 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
355 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
356 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
357 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
360 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
361 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
365 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
366 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
370 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
372 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
373 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
374 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
377 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
378 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
379 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
380 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
381 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
382 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
383 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
384 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
385 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
389 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
390 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
391 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
392 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
393 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
396 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
397 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
398 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
403 sbsec->initialized = 1;
405 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
406 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
407 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
409 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
410 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
411 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
413 /* Initialize the root inode. */
414 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
416 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
417 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
418 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
420 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
422 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
423 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
424 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
425 struct inode_security_struct, list);
426 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
427 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
428 inode = igrab(inode);
430 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
434 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
435 list_del_init(&isec->list);
438 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
444 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
445 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
446 * mount options, or whatever.
448 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
449 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
452 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
453 char *context = NULL;
457 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
459 if (!sbsec->initialized)
466 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
467 * settings this is going to need a mask
470 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
471 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
473 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
477 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
483 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
484 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
490 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
491 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
494 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
495 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
497 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
498 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
501 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
502 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
504 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
505 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
508 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
509 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
511 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
512 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
513 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
515 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
518 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
519 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
522 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
527 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
531 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
532 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->initialized)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!sbsec->initialized)
544 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
557 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
575 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
576 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
577 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
578 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
582 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
583 "before the security server is initialized\n");
588 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
589 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
590 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
591 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
593 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
594 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
595 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
596 * will be used for both mounts)
598 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
603 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
604 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
605 * than once with different security options.
607 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
609 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
610 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
612 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
613 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
614 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
621 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
623 goto out_double_mount;
625 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
630 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
632 goto out_double_mount;
634 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
636 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
637 rootcontext_sid = sid;
639 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
641 goto out_double_mount;
643 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
647 defcontext_sid = sid;
649 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
651 goto out_double_mount;
653 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
662 if (sbsec->initialized) {
663 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
664 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
665 goto out_double_mount;
670 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
673 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
674 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
676 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
677 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
681 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
684 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
688 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
692 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
693 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
694 * the superblock context if not already set.
697 if (!fscontext_sid) {
698 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
701 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
703 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
719 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
720 root_isec->initialized = 1;
723 if (defcontext_sid) {
724 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
726 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
727 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
731 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
732 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
738 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
741 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
743 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
747 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
748 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
752 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
753 struct super_block *newsb)
755 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
756 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
758 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
763 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
764 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
767 if (!ss_initialized) {
768 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
769 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
770 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
771 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
775 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
776 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
778 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
779 if (newsbsec->initialized)
782 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
784 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
786 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
787 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
788 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
791 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
795 if (!set_rootcontext) {
796 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
797 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
800 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
802 if (set_rootcontext) {
803 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
804 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
805 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
806 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
808 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
811 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
812 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
815 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
816 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
819 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
820 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
821 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
823 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
825 /* Standard string-based options. */
826 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
828 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
833 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
837 if (context || defcontext) {
839 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
842 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
852 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
855 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
862 case Opt_rootcontext:
865 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
868 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
876 if (context || defcontext) {
878 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
881 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
890 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
897 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
901 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
902 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
903 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
920 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
921 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
924 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
935 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
937 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
940 char *options = data;
941 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
943 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
948 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
950 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
955 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
958 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
962 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
963 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
968 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
969 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
971 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
973 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
976 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
978 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
979 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
982 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
987 /* we need a comma before each option */
992 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
998 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1000 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1003 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1005 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1011 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1013 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1018 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1020 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1022 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1024 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1026 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1028 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1032 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1038 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1041 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1043 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1046 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1048 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1051 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1057 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1058 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1060 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1067 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1068 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1070 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1072 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1073 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1075 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1079 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1085 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1086 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1087 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1088 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1102 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1115 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1118 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1119 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1124 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1126 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1131 end = buffer+buflen;
1136 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1137 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1141 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1146 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1147 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1151 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1159 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1160 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1162 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1163 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1165 struct dentry *dentry;
1166 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1167 char *context = NULL;
1171 if (isec->initialized)
1174 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1175 if (isec->initialized)
1178 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1179 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1180 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1181 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1182 server is ready to handle calls. */
1183 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1184 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1185 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1186 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1190 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1191 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1192 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1193 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1197 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1198 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1200 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1201 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1203 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1204 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1207 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1208 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1213 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1214 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1220 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1222 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1223 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1224 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1232 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1238 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1244 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1245 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1246 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1247 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1251 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1252 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1255 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1259 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1260 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1261 __func__, context, -rc,
1262 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1264 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1272 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1273 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1275 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1276 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1277 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1279 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1280 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1281 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1289 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1290 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1293 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1294 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1296 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1297 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1299 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1300 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1311 isec->initialized = 1;
1314 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1316 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1317 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1321 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1322 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1328 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1329 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1332 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1333 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1336 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1337 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1340 /* All other signals. */
1341 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1348 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1349 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1350 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1351 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1354 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1356 tsec1 = tsk1->cred->security;
1357 tsec2 = tsk2->cred->security;
1358 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1359 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1362 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1363 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1366 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1367 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1370 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1371 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1372 struct av_decision avd;
1374 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1377 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1379 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1383 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1385 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1388 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1392 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1396 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1397 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1398 avc_audit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1402 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1403 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1406 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1408 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1410 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1411 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1414 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1415 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1416 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1417 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1418 struct inode *inode,
1420 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1422 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1423 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1424 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1426 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1429 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1430 isec = inode->i_security;
1434 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1435 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1438 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1441 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1442 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1443 pathname if needed. */
1444 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1445 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1446 struct dentry *dentry,
1449 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1450 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1451 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1452 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1453 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1454 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1457 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1458 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1459 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1460 check a particular permission to the file.
1461 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1462 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1463 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1464 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1465 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1469 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1470 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1471 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1472 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1475 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1476 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1478 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1479 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1487 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1489 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1494 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1495 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1496 struct dentry *dentry,
1499 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1500 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1501 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1503 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1506 tsec = current->cred->security;
1507 dsec = dir->i_security;
1508 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1510 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1511 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1513 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1514 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1519 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1520 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1522 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1528 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1532 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1533 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1534 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1537 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1538 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1539 struct task_struct *ctx)
1541 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1543 tsec = ctx->cred->security;
1545 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1549 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1552 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1553 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1554 struct dentry *dentry,
1558 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1559 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1560 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564 tsec = current->cred->security;
1565 dsec = dir->i_security;
1566 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1568 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1569 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1572 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1573 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1588 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1593 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1597 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1598 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1599 struct inode *new_dir,
1600 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1602 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1603 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1604 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1606 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1609 tsec = current->cred->security;
1610 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1611 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1612 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1613 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1615 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1617 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1618 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1619 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1622 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1623 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1626 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1627 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1628 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1633 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1634 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1635 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1636 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1637 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1640 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1641 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1642 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1643 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1645 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1653 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1654 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1655 struct super_block *sb,
1657 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1659 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1660 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1662 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
1663 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1664 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1668 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1669 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1673 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1674 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1675 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1676 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1679 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1681 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1685 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1687 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1689 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1696 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1697 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1701 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1703 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1704 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1711 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1720 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1723 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1725 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1727 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1728 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1730 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1734 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1735 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1736 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1737 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1738 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1739 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1740 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1743 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1744 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1749 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1751 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1756 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1760 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1761 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
1762 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->cred->security;
1763 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1764 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1767 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1770 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1774 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1778 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1781 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1782 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1786 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1790 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1793 static int selinux_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1794 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1795 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1799 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
1803 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1806 static void selinux_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1807 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1808 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1810 secondary_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
1813 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
1817 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
1821 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
1824 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1827 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1830 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1835 end = buffer+buflen;
1841 const char *name = table->procname;
1842 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1843 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1847 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1850 table = table->parent;
1856 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1858 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1860 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1865 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1869 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1873 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1877 tsec = current->cred->security;
1879 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1880 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1882 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1883 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1886 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1887 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1889 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1890 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1898 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1899 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1905 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1918 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1924 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1928 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1934 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1936 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1939 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1943 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1948 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1949 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1950 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1952 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1953 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1954 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1955 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1957 case 0: /* Close log */
1958 case 1: /* Open log */
1959 case 2: /* Read from log */
1960 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1961 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1963 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1970 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1971 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1972 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1974 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1975 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1976 * the capability is granted.
1978 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1979 * processes that allocate mappings.
1981 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1983 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1985 rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1989 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1992 /* binprm security operations */
1994 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1996 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1998 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2002 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2005 bprm->security = bsec;
2009 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2011 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2012 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2013 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2014 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2016 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2019 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2023 bsec = bprm->security;
2028 tsec = current->cred->security;
2029 isec = inode->i_security;
2031 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2032 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2034 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2035 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2036 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2037 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2039 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2040 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2041 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2044 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2045 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2046 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2051 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2052 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2054 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2057 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2058 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2059 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2063 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2064 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2065 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2069 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2070 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2074 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2075 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2077 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2085 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2087 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2091 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2093 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
2096 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2097 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2098 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2099 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2100 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2102 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2105 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2108 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2110 kfree(bprm->security);
2111 bprm->security = NULL;
2114 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2115 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2117 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2118 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2120 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2121 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2122 struct tty_struct *tty;
2123 struct fdtable *fdt;
2127 tty = get_current_tty();
2130 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2131 struct inode *inode;
2133 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2134 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2135 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2136 file may belong to another process and we are only
2137 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2138 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2139 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2140 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2141 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2148 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2152 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2154 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2156 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2158 unsigned long set, i;
2163 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2164 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2166 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2169 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2170 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2175 if (file_has_perm(current,
2177 file_to_av(file))) {
2179 fd = get_unused_fd();
2189 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2190 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2197 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2202 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2205 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2208 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2210 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2211 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2215 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2217 tsec = current->cred->security;
2219 bsec = bprm->security;
2222 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2224 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2225 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2226 unchanged and kill. */
2227 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2228 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2229 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2236 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2237 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2238 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2239 struct task_struct *tracer;
2240 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2244 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2245 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2246 sec = tracer->cred->security;
2252 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2253 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2265 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2267 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2269 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2270 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2271 struct itimerval itimer;
2272 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2273 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2275 unsigned long flags;
2277 tsec = current->cred->security;
2278 bsec = bprm->security;
2281 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2284 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2287 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2288 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2290 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2291 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2292 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2293 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2294 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2295 will be checked against the new SID. */
2296 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2297 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2299 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2300 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2301 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2302 flush_signals(current);
2303 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2304 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2305 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2306 recalc_sigpending();
2307 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2310 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2311 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2313 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2314 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2315 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2316 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2317 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2318 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2319 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2320 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2321 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2323 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2324 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2326 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2327 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2328 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2329 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2331 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2334 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2335 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2336 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2337 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2338 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2339 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2340 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2341 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2344 /* superblock security operations */
2346 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2348 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2351 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2353 superblock_free_security(sb);
2356 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2361 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2364 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2366 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2367 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2368 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2369 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2372 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2379 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2383 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2386 int current_size = 0;
2394 while (current_size < len) {
2404 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2406 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2407 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2408 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2414 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2422 in_save = in_end = orig;
2426 open_quote = !open_quote;
2427 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2429 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2431 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2432 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2434 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2436 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2438 } while (*in_end++);
2440 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2441 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2446 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2448 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2451 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2455 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2456 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2457 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2460 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2462 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2464 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2465 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2466 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2469 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2472 unsigned long flags,
2477 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2481 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2482 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2483 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2485 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2489 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2493 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2497 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2498 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2501 /* inode security operations */
2503 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2505 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2508 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2510 inode_free_security(inode);
2513 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2514 char **name, void **value,
2517 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2518 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2519 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2522 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2524 tsec = current->cred->security;
2525 dsec = dir->i_security;
2526 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2528 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2529 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2531 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2532 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2535 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2536 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2539 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2544 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2545 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2546 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2547 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2549 isec->initialized = 1;
2552 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2556 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2563 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2575 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2577 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2580 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2584 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2587 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2590 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2594 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2597 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2600 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2602 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2605 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2607 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2610 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2612 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2615 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2619 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2623 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2626 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2627 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2629 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2632 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2634 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2637 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2641 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2644 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2647 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2651 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2656 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2660 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2661 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2664 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2668 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2672 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2675 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2676 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2677 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2679 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2682 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2684 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2687 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2689 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2690 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2691 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2692 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2694 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2695 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2696 Restrict to administrator. */
2701 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2702 ordinary setattr permission. */
2703 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2706 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2707 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2709 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
2710 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2711 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2712 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2713 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2717 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2718 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2720 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2721 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2724 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2727 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2728 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2730 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2731 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2735 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2736 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2737 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2739 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2744 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2745 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2749 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2754 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2756 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2757 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2761 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2762 const void *value, size_t size,
2765 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2766 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2770 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2771 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2775 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2777 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2778 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2779 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2787 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2789 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2792 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2794 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2797 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2799 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2800 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2802 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2803 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2808 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2810 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2812 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2816 char *context = NULL;
2817 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2819 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2823 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2824 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2825 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2826 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2827 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2828 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2829 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2831 error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2833 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2836 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2849 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2850 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2852 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2856 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2859 if (!value || !size)
2862 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2870 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2872 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2873 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2874 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2878 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2880 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2883 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2885 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2888 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2890 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2894 /* file security operations */
2896 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2899 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2902 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2906 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2907 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2910 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2911 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2915 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2918 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2920 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2921 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
2922 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2923 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2926 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2930 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2931 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2932 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2934 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2937 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2939 return file_alloc_security(file);
2942 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2944 file_free_security(file);
2947 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2952 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2954 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2959 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2962 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2964 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2965 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2967 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2968 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2969 * This has an additional check.
2971 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2978 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2979 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2981 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2982 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2985 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2986 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2988 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2993 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2994 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2995 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2998 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)
2999 (current->cred->security))->sid;
3001 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3002 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3003 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3004 if (rc || addr_only)
3007 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3010 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3011 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3014 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3015 unsigned long reqprot,
3020 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3024 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3027 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3028 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3030 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3031 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3032 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3034 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3035 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3036 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3037 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3038 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3040 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3041 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3042 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3043 * modified content. This typically should only
3044 * occur for text relocations.
3046 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3054 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3057 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3059 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3062 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3069 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3074 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3075 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3084 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3085 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3090 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3095 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3099 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3106 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3108 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3109 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3111 tsec = current->cred->security;
3112 fsec = file->f_security;
3113 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3118 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3119 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3123 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3124 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3126 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3127 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3129 tsec = tsk->cred->security;
3130 fsec = file->f_security;
3133 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3135 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3137 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3138 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3141 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3143 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3146 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3148 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3149 struct inode *inode;
3150 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3151 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3152 fsec = file->f_security;
3153 isec = inode->i_security;
3155 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3156 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3157 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3158 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3159 * struct as its SID.
3161 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3162 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3164 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3165 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3166 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3167 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3168 * new inode label or new policy.
3169 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3171 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3174 /* task security operations */
3176 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3180 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3184 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3187 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3189 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3192 tsec1 = current->cred->security;
3194 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3197 tsec2 = tsk->cred->security;
3199 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3200 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3202 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3203 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3204 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3205 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3206 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3211 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3213 task_free_security(tsk);
3216 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3218 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3219 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3220 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3221 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3222 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3227 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3229 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3232 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3234 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3238 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3240 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3243 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3245 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3248 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3250 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3253 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3255 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security;
3259 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3261 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3265 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3269 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3273 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3276 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3280 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3284 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3287 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3289 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3292 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3294 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3297 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3301 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3302 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3303 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3304 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3305 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3306 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3311 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3315 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3319 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3322 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3324 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3327 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3329 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3332 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3337 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3339 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3344 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3346 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3347 tsec = p->cred->security;
3349 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3351 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3355 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3362 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3363 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3364 the state of the current process. */
3365 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3368 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3370 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3373 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3375 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3377 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3379 tsec = p->cred->security;
3380 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3381 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3385 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3386 struct inode *inode)
3388 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security;
3389 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3391 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3392 isec->initialized = 1;
3396 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3397 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3398 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3400 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3401 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3403 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3404 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3408 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3409 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3412 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3413 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3417 *proto = ih->protocol;
3419 switch (ih->protocol) {
3421 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3423 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3427 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3431 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3432 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3437 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3439 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3443 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3447 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3448 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3452 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3453 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3455 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3459 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3463 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3464 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3475 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3477 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3478 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3479 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3482 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3483 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3485 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3486 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3490 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3491 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3494 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3495 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3496 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3505 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3507 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3511 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3512 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3517 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3519 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3523 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3524 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3528 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3529 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3531 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3535 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3536 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3540 /* includes fragments */
3550 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3551 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3556 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3558 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3561 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3562 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3565 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3567 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3570 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3571 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3581 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3582 " unable to parse packet\n");
3592 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3594 * @family: protocol family
3595 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3598 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3599 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3600 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3601 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3602 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3606 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3613 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3614 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3616 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3617 if (unlikely(err)) {
3619 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3620 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3627 /* socket security operations */
3628 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3631 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3632 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3633 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3636 tsec = task->cred->security;
3637 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3639 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3642 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3643 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3644 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3650 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3651 int protocol, int kern)
3654 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3660 tsec = current->cred->security;
3661 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3662 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3663 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3664 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3670 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3671 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3674 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3675 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3676 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3679 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3681 tsec = current->cred->security;
3682 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3683 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3684 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3685 isec->initialized = 1;
3688 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3689 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3690 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3691 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3697 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3698 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3699 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3701 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3706 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3711 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3712 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3713 * check the first address now.
3715 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3716 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3718 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3719 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3720 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3721 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3722 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3723 unsigned short snum;
3724 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3727 tsec = current->cred->security;
3728 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3730 if (family == PF_INET) {
3731 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3732 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3733 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3735 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3736 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3737 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3743 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3745 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3746 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3750 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3751 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3752 ad.u.net.family = family;
3753 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3755 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3761 switch (isec->sclass) {
3762 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3763 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3766 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3767 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3770 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3771 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3775 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3779 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3783 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3784 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3785 ad.u.net.family = family;
3787 if (family == PF_INET)
3788 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3790 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3792 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3793 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3801 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3803 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3804 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3807 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3812 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3814 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3815 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3816 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3817 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3818 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3819 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3820 unsigned short snum;
3823 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3824 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3825 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3827 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3829 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3830 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3832 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3835 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3839 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3840 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3842 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3843 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3844 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3845 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3850 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3856 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3858 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3861 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3864 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3865 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3867 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3871 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3873 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3874 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3875 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3876 newisec->initialized = 1;
3881 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3886 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3890 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3893 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3894 int size, int flags)
3896 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3899 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3901 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3904 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3906 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3909 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3913 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3917 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3920 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3923 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3926 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3928 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3931 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3932 struct socket *other,
3935 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3936 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3937 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3938 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3941 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3945 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3946 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3948 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3949 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3951 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3953 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3957 /* connecting socket */
3958 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3959 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3961 /* server child socket */
3962 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3963 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3964 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3969 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3970 struct socket *other)
3972 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3973 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3974 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3977 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3978 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3980 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3981 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3983 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3984 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3991 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3993 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3999 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4002 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4003 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4007 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4010 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4011 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4014 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4015 struct sk_buff *skb,
4016 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4021 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4023 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4024 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4026 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4027 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4030 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4031 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4032 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4033 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4035 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4036 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4037 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4038 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4040 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4041 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4042 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4043 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4046 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4047 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4052 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4055 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4059 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4062 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4068 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4069 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4070 if (unlikely(err)) {
4072 "SELinux: failure in"
4073 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4074 " network port label not found\n");
4077 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4080 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4084 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4086 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4087 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4090 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4091 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4092 ad.u.net.family = family;
4093 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4097 if (selinux_compat_net)
4098 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4101 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4106 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4107 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4110 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4111 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4113 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4115 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4118 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4124 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4127 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4128 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4129 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4130 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4135 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4138 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4139 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4142 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4143 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4144 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4145 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4146 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4147 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4149 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4150 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4151 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4154 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4155 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4156 ad.u.net.family = family;
4157 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4161 if (peerlbl_active) {
4164 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4167 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4170 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4173 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4176 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4179 if (secmark_active) {
4180 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4189 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4190 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4195 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4196 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4197 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4199 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4201 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4202 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4203 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4204 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4206 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4211 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4216 if (scontext_len > len) {
4221 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4225 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4233 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4235 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4238 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4240 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4243 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4247 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4248 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4250 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4253 *secid = peer_secid;
4254 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4259 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4261 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4264 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4266 sk_free_security(sk);
4269 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4271 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4272 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4274 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4275 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4276 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4278 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4281 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4284 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4286 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4288 *secid = sksec->sid;
4292 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4294 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4295 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4297 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4298 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4299 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4300 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4303 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4304 struct request_sock *req)
4306 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4308 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4312 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4313 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4316 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4319 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4320 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4321 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4325 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4329 req->secid = newsid;
4330 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4334 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4335 const struct request_sock *req)
4337 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4339 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4340 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4341 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4342 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4343 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4344 time it will have been created and available. */
4346 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4347 * thread with access to newsksec */
4348 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4351 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4353 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4354 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4356 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4357 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4360 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4362 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4365 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4368 fl->secid = req->secid;
4371 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4375 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4376 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4377 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4379 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4383 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4385 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4387 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4388 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4389 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4390 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4391 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4392 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4402 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4407 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4409 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4415 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4420 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4423 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4424 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4425 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4426 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4429 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4432 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4433 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4434 ad.u.net.family = family;
4435 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4438 if (peerlbl_active) {
4439 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4442 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4448 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4449 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4453 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4454 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4455 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4457 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4463 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4464 struct sk_buff *skb,
4465 const struct net_device *in,
4466 const struct net_device *out,
4467 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4469 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4472 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4473 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4474 struct sk_buff *skb,
4475 const struct net_device *in,
4476 const struct net_device *out,
4477 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4479 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4483 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4488 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4491 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4492 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4493 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4495 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4498 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4499 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4505 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4506 struct sk_buff *skb,
4507 const struct net_device *in,
4508 const struct net_device *out,
4509 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4511 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4514 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4516 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4517 u16 family, char *addrp)
4520 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4522 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4523 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4525 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4526 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4529 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4530 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4531 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4532 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4534 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4535 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4536 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4537 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4539 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4540 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4541 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4542 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4545 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4546 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4551 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4554 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4557 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4560 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4567 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4568 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4569 if (unlikely(err)) {
4571 "SELinux: failure in"
4572 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4573 " network port label not found\n");
4576 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4579 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4583 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4584 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4585 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4591 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4593 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4594 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4595 ad.u.net.family = family;
4596 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4599 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4600 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4601 &ad, family, addrp))
4604 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4605 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4609 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4610 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4616 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4622 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4627 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4628 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4629 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4630 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4631 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4632 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4634 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4635 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4636 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4637 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4638 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4639 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4640 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4643 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4644 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4645 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4648 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4649 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4650 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4651 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4656 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4657 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4659 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4662 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4663 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4665 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4670 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4671 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4674 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4676 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4677 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4678 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4681 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4682 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4683 ad.u.net.family = family;
4684 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4688 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4689 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4692 if (peerlbl_active) {
4696 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4698 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4699 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4702 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4704 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4705 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4712 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4713 struct sk_buff *skb,
4714 const struct net_device *in,
4715 const struct net_device *out,
4716 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4718 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4721 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4722 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4723 struct sk_buff *skb,
4724 const struct net_device *in,
4725 const struct net_device *out,
4726 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4728 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4732 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4734 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4738 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4742 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4743 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4748 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4751 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4753 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4757 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4758 ad.u.cap = capability;
4760 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4761 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4764 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4765 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4768 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->cred->security;
4769 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4771 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4775 isec->sclass = sclass;
4776 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4777 perm->security = isec;
4782 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4784 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4785 perm->security = NULL;
4789 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4791 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4793 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4797 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4798 msg->security = msec;
4803 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4805 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4807 msg->security = NULL;
4811 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4814 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4815 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4816 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4818 tsec = current->cred->security;
4819 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4821 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4822 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4824 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4827 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4829 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4832 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4834 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4837 /* message queue security operations */
4838 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4840 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4841 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4842 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4845 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4849 tsec = current->cred->security;
4850 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4852 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4853 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4855 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4858 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4864 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4866 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4869 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4871 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4872 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4873 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4875 tsec = current->cred->security;
4876 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4878 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4879 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4881 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4882 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4885 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4893 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4894 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4897 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4900 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4903 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4909 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4913 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4915 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4916 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4917 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4918 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4921 tsec = current->cred->security;
4922 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4923 msec = msg->security;
4926 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4928 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4930 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4931 * message queue this message will be stored in
4933 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4941 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4942 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4944 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4945 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4948 /* Can this process send the message */
4949 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4950 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4952 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4953 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4954 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4959 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4960 struct task_struct *target,
4961 long type, int mode)
4963 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4964 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4965 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4966 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4969 tsec = target->cred->security;
4970 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4971 msec = msg->security;
4973 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4974 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4976 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4977 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4979 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4980 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4984 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4985 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4987 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4988 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4989 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4992 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4996 tsec = current->cred->security;
4997 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4999 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5000 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5002 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5005 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5011 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5013 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5016 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5018 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5019 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5020 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5022 tsec = current->cred->security;
5023 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5025 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5026 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5028 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5029 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5032 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5033 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5041 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5042 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5045 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5048 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5055 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5061 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5065 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5066 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5071 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5075 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5078 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5080 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5083 /* Semaphore security operations */
5084 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5086 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5087 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5088 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5091 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5095 tsec = current->cred->security;
5096 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5098 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5099 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5101 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5104 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5110 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5112 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5115 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5117 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5118 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5119 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5121 tsec = current->cred->security;
5122 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5124 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5125 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5127 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5128 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5131 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5132 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5140 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5141 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5145 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5156 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5159 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5163 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5169 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5173 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5174 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5179 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5183 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5186 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5192 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5194 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5199 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5202 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5204 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5208 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5211 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5214 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5215 char *name, char **value)
5217 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5223 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5228 tsec = p->cred->security;
5230 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5232 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5234 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5235 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5236 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5237 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5238 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5239 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5240 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5241 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5248 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5254 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5255 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5257 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5258 struct task_struct *tracer;
5264 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5265 security attributes. */
5270 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5271 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5272 * above restriction is ever removed.
5274 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5275 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5276 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5277 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5278 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5279 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5280 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5281 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5282 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5283 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5289 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5290 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5291 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5295 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5296 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5297 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5299 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5306 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5307 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5308 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5309 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5310 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5311 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5312 tsec = p->cred->security;
5313 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5314 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5315 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5316 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5317 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5318 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5321 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5322 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5323 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5324 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5325 struct av_decision avd;
5330 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5331 * - Single threaded processes.
5332 * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5333 * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5335 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5336 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5337 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5338 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5339 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5340 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5341 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5342 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5348 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5349 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5353 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5354 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5355 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5359 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5360 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5363 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5364 if (tracer != NULL) {
5365 struct task_security_struct *ptsec =
5366 tracer->cred->security;
5367 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5369 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5371 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5375 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5376 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5390 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5392 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5395 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5397 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5400 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5407 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5408 unsigned long flags)
5410 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security;
5411 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5413 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5417 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5418 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5420 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5426 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5428 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5434 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5435 struct task_struct *ctx,
5439 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5440 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5442 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5444 tsec = ctx->cred->security;
5445 ksec = key->security;
5447 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5448 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5449 appear to be created. */
5453 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5454 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5457 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5459 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5460 char *context = NULL;
5464 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5473 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5476 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5477 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5478 .capget = selinux_capget,
5479 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5480 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5481 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5482 .capable = selinux_capable,
5483 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5484 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5485 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5486 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5488 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5489 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5491 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5492 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5493 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5494 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5495 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5496 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5497 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5499 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5500 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5501 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5502 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5503 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5504 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5505 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5506 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5507 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5508 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5509 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5512 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5513 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5514 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5515 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5516 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5517 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5518 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5519 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5520 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5521 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5522 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5523 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5524 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5525 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5526 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5527 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5528 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5529 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5530 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5531 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5532 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5533 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5534 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5535 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5536 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5537 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5538 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5540 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5541 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5542 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5543 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5544 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5545 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5546 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5547 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5548 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5549 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5550 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5552 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5554 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5555 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5556 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5557 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5558 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5559 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5560 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5561 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5562 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5563 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5564 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5565 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5566 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5567 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5568 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5569 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5570 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5571 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5572 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5573 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5574 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5575 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5576 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5578 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5579 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5581 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5582 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5584 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5585 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5586 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5587 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5588 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5589 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5591 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5592 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5593 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5594 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5595 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5597 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5598 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5599 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5600 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5601 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5603 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5605 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5606 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5608 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5609 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5610 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5612 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5613 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5615 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5616 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5617 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5618 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5619 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5620 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5621 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5622 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5623 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5624 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5625 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5626 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5627 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5628 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5629 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5630 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5631 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5632 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5633 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5634 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5635 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5636 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5637 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5638 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5639 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5641 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5642 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5643 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5644 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5645 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5646 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5647 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5648 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5649 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5650 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5651 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5655 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5656 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5657 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5658 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5662 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5663 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5664 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5665 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5669 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5671 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5673 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5674 selinux_enabled = 0;
5678 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5679 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5683 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5685 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5686 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5687 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5688 tsec = current->cred->security;
5689 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5691 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5692 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5693 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5696 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5698 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5699 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5700 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5702 if (selinux_enforcing)
5703 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5705 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5710 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5712 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5714 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5715 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5716 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5717 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5719 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5720 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5721 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5722 struct superblock_security_struct,
5724 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5726 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5727 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5728 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5730 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5732 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5733 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5734 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5737 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5738 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5741 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5742 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5743 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5745 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5747 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5749 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5750 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5752 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5753 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5756 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5757 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5759 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5760 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5763 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5764 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5766 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5767 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5771 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5773 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5775 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5776 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5778 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5779 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5782 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5783 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5785 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5786 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5792 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5796 if (!selinux_enabled)
5799 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5801 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5803 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5805 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5806 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5808 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5815 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5817 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5818 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5820 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5822 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5823 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5824 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5829 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5831 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5832 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5835 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5837 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5838 static int selinux_disabled;
5840 int selinux_disable(void)
5842 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5844 if (ss_initialized) {
5845 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5849 if (selinux_disabled) {
5850 /* Only do this once. */
5854 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5856 selinux_disabled = 1;
5857 selinux_enabled = 0;
5859 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5860 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5862 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5863 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5865 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */