2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
16 #include <linux/security.h>
17 #include <linux/magic.h>
18 #include <linux/parser.h>
19 #include <linux/slab.h>
20 #include <linux/rculist.h>
21 #include <linux/genhd.h>
22 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
26 /* flags definitions */
27 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
28 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
29 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
30 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
31 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
32 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
33 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
34 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
37 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
38 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
39 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
40 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
44 static int temp_ima_appraise;
46 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
47 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
48 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
51 enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
53 struct ima_rule_entry {
54 struct list_head list;
59 unsigned long fsmagic;
64 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
65 void *args_p; /* audit value */
66 int type; /* audit type */
71 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
72 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
76 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
77 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
78 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
79 * and running executables.
81 static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = {
82 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
83 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
84 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
85 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
86 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
87 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
88 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
89 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
90 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
91 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
92 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
95 static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] = {
96 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
97 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
98 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
99 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
100 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
101 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
102 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
103 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
106 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
107 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
108 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
109 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
110 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
111 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
112 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
113 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
114 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
115 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
116 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
117 {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
120 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
121 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
122 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
123 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
124 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
125 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
126 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
127 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
128 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
129 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
130 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
131 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
132 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
133 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
134 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
136 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
137 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
139 /* force signature */
140 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
141 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
145 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
146 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
147 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
148 static struct list_head *ima_rules;
150 static int ima_policy __initdata;
152 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
157 ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
160 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
162 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
167 if (strcmp(str, "tcb") == 0)
168 ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
172 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
174 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
175 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
177 ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
180 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
183 * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
184 * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
185 * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if
188 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
190 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
194 list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
195 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
196 if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
198 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
200 entry->lsm[i].args_p,
201 &entry->lsm[i].rule);
202 BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
208 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
209 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
210 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
211 * @func: LIM hook identifier
212 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
214 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
216 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
217 enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
219 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
220 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
223 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
224 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
226 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
227 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
229 if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
230 (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
232 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
233 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
235 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
236 memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
238 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
240 if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
241 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
242 if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
243 && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
244 && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
246 } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
250 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
252 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
257 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
264 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
265 rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
274 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
275 rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
283 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
285 ima_lsm_update_rules();
295 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
296 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
298 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
300 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
301 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
305 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
307 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
310 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
311 case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
313 return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
318 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
319 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
320 * @func: IMA hook identifier
321 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
323 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
326 * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the
327 * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
328 * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
330 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
333 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
334 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
337 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
339 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
342 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
345 action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
347 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
348 if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE)
349 action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
351 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
352 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
354 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
365 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
366 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
367 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
368 * can be made earlier.
370 void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
372 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
374 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
375 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
376 ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
379 ima_appraise |= temp_ima_appraise;
381 ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
385 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
387 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
388 * the new ima_policy_rules.
390 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
392 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
394 /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
395 measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
396 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
397 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
399 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
400 list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
402 switch (ima_policy) {
404 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
405 list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
409 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
410 list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
416 for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
417 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
419 if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
420 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
423 ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
424 ima_update_policy_flag();
427 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
428 int ima_check_policy(void)
430 if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
436 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
438 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
439 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
440 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
443 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
444 * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
446 void ima_update_policy(void)
448 struct list_head *first, *last, *policy;
450 /* append current policy with the new rules */
451 first = (&ima_temp_rules)->next;
452 last = (&ima_temp_rules)->prev;
453 policy = &ima_policy_rules;
458 rcu_assign_pointer(list_next_rcu(policy->prev), first);
459 first->prev = policy->prev;
462 /* prepare for the next policy rules addition */
463 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_temp_rules);
465 if (ima_rules != policy) {
469 ima_update_policy_flag();
474 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
475 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
477 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
478 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
479 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
480 Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
481 Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio
484 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
485 {Opt_measure, "measure"},
486 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
487 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
488 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
489 {Opt_audit, "audit"},
490 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
491 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
492 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
493 {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
494 {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
495 {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
496 {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
497 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
498 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
499 {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
501 {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
502 {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
503 {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
504 {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
508 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
509 substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
513 if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
516 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
517 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
520 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
521 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
523 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
524 &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
525 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
526 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
533 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
535 audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
536 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
537 audit_log_format(ab, " ");
540 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
542 struct audit_buffer *ab;
547 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
549 entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
550 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
551 entry->action = UNKNOWN;
552 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
553 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
559 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
561 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
564 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
566 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
569 entry->action = MEASURE;
571 case Opt_dont_measure:
572 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
574 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
577 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
580 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
582 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
585 entry->action = APPRAISE;
587 case Opt_dont_appraise:
588 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
590 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
593 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
596 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
598 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
601 entry->action = AUDIT;
604 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
609 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
610 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
611 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
612 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
613 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
614 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
615 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
616 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
617 entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
618 else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
619 || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
620 entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
621 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
622 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
623 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
625 entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
626 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
628 entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
629 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
630 entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
634 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
637 ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
646 if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
647 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
648 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
649 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
650 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
651 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
652 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
653 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
657 entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
658 ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
661 ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
663 if (entry->fsmagic) {
668 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
670 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
673 ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
675 if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00,
676 sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) {
681 result = blk_part_pack_uuid(args[0].from,
684 entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
687 ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
689 if (token == Opt_euid)
690 ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
692 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
697 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
699 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
701 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
705 entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
706 ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
710 ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
712 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
717 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
719 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
720 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
723 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
727 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
728 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
733 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
734 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
739 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
740 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
745 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
746 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
751 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
752 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
757 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
758 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
762 case Opt_appraise_type:
763 if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
768 ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
769 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
770 entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
774 case Opt_permit_directio:
775 entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
778 ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
783 if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
785 else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
786 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
787 else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
788 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
789 else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
790 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
791 audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
797 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
798 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
800 * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
801 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
803 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
805 static const char op[] = "update_policy";
807 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
811 p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
813 p += strspn(p, " \t");
815 if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
818 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
820 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
821 NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
825 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
827 result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
830 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
831 NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
836 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules);
842 * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
843 * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
844 * different from the active one. There is also only one user of
845 * ima_delete_rules() at a time.
847 void ima_delete_rules(void)
849 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
852 temp_ima_appraise = 0;
853 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
854 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
855 kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
857 list_del(&entry->list);
862 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
864 mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
867 static char *mask_tokens[] = {
875 func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
876 func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
877 func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs,
881 static char *func_tokens[] = {
887 "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
888 "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK",
893 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
896 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
899 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
909 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
911 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
914 entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list);
918 return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry;
921 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
925 #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern
926 #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
927 #define ft(token) func_tokens[token]
930 * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
932 static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
934 char tbuf[64] = {0,};
938 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file));
941 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap));
944 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm));
947 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
950 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware));
953 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
955 case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
956 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_kernel));
958 case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
959 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_initramfs));
962 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy));
965 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func);
966 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
972 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
974 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
976 char tbuf[64] = {0,};
980 if (entry->action & MEASURE)
981 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure));
982 if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE)
983 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure));
984 if (entry->action & APPRAISE)
985 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise));
986 if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE)
987 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise));
988 if (entry->action & AUDIT)
989 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit));
993 if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
994 policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
996 if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) {
997 if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
998 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec));
999 if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE)
1000 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write));
1001 if (entry->mask & MAY_READ)
1002 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read));
1003 if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
1004 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append));
1008 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) {
1009 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic);
1010 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf);
1014 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
1015 seq_puts(m, "fsuuid=");
1016 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(entry->fsuuid); ++i) {
1024 seq_printf(m, "%x", entry->fsuuid[i]);
1029 if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) {
1030 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1031 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid), tbuf);
1035 if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) {
1036 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1037 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid), tbuf);
1041 if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) {
1042 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner));
1043 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner), tbuf);
1047 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
1048 if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
1051 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
1052 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1055 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
1056 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1059 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
1060 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1063 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
1064 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1067 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
1068 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1071 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
1072 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1077 if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
1078 seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
1079 if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
1080 seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
1085 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */