1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
6 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
7 * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
10 * implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
11 * evm_inode_removexattr, evm_verifyxattr, and evm_inode_set_acl.
14 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
16 #include <linux/init.h>
17 #include <linux/crypto.h>
18 #include <linux/audit.h>
19 #include <linux/xattr.h>
20 #include <linux/integrity.h>
21 #include <linux/evm.h>
22 #include <linux/magic.h>
23 #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
25 #include <crypto/hash.h>
26 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
27 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
32 static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
33 "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label",
34 "no_xattrs", "unknown"
38 static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = {
40 .name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
41 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)
44 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
45 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
48 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC,
49 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
52 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
53 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
56 .name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP,
57 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS)
60 .name = XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR,
61 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)
64 .name = XATTR_NAME_IMA,
65 .enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE)
68 .name = XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
73 LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames);
75 static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init;
76 static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
78 if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
81 pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str);
85 __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
87 static void __init evm_init_config(void)
91 xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames);
93 pr_info("Initialising EVM extended attributes:\n");
94 for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) {
95 pr_info("%s%s\n", evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].name,
96 !evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].enabled ?
98 list_add_tail(&evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].list,
99 &evm_config_xattrnames);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
103 evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
105 pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
108 static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
110 return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK);
114 * This function determines whether or not it is safe to ignore verification
115 * errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key
116 * is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the
117 * EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the
118 * attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid.
120 static bool evm_hmac_disabled(void)
122 if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
125 if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
131 static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
133 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
134 struct xattr_list *xattr;
138 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
141 list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
142 error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
144 if (error == -ENODATA)
155 * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
157 * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes
158 * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr.
161 * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
163 * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available.
165 * Returns integrity status
167 static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
168 const char *xattr_name,
170 size_t xattr_value_len,
171 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
173 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
174 struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr;
175 enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
176 struct evm_digest digest;
178 int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;
180 if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
181 iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
182 return iint->evm_status;
184 /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
186 /* first need to know the sig type */
187 rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
188 (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
190 evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
191 if (rc == -ENODATA) {
192 rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
194 evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
196 evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
197 } else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
198 evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
205 /* check value type */
206 switch (xattr_data->type) {
208 if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) {
209 evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
213 digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
214 rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
215 xattr_value_len, &digest);
218 rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest,
223 case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
226 case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
227 /* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */
228 if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) {
229 evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
233 hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data;
234 digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo;
235 rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
236 xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest);
239 rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
240 (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
241 digest.digest, digest.hdr.length);
243 inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
245 if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
247 iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
248 evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE;
249 } else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) &&
250 !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) &&
251 !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) {
252 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
265 evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS;
266 else if (evm_immutable)
267 evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE;
269 evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
271 pr_debug("digest: (%d) [%*phN]\n", digest.hdr.length, digest.hdr.length,
275 iint->evm_status = evm_status;
280 static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
285 struct xattr_list *xattr;
287 namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
288 list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
289 if (!all_xattrs && !xattr->enabled)
292 if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
293 && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
297 if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
298 xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
299 strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
308 static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
310 return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
313 int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name)
315 return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, true);
319 * evm_read_protected_xattrs - read EVM protected xattr names, lengths, values
320 * @dentry: dentry of the read xattrs
321 * @inode: inode of the read xattrs
322 * @buffer: buffer xattr names, lengths or values are copied to
323 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
324 * @type: n: names, l: lengths, v: values
325 * @canonical_fmt: data format (true: little endian, false: native format)
327 * Read protected xattr names (separated by |), lengths (u32) or values for a
328 * given dentry and return the total size of copied data. If buffer is NULL,
329 * just return the total size.
331 * Returns the total size on success, a negative value on error.
333 int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
334 int buffer_size, char type, bool canonical_fmt)
336 struct xattr_list *xattr;
337 int rc, size, total_size = 0;
339 list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
340 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, d_backing_inode(dentry),
341 xattr->name, NULL, 0);
342 if (rc < 0 && rc == -ENODATA)
349 size = strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
352 *(buffer + total_size - 1) = '|';
354 memcpy(buffer + total_size, xattr->name, size);
361 rc = (__force int)cpu_to_le32(rc);
363 *(u32 *)(buffer + total_size) = rc;
369 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry,
370 d_backing_inode(dentry), xattr->name,
372 buffer_size - total_size);
388 * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr
389 * @dentry: object of the verify xattr
390 * @xattr_name: requested xattr
391 * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
392 * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
394 * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
395 * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
396 * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC.
398 * Returns the xattr integrity status.
400 * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
403 enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
404 const char *xattr_name,
405 void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
406 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
408 if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
409 return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
412 iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
414 return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
416 return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
417 xattr_value_len, iint);
419 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
422 * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity
423 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
425 * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are
426 * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode.
428 static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
430 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
432 if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
433 return INTEGRITY_PASS;
434 return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
438 * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value
439 * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
440 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
441 * @xattr_name: requested xattr
442 * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
443 * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
445 * Check if passed xattr value differs from current value.
447 * Returns 1 if passed xattr value differs from current value, 0 otherwise.
449 static int evm_xattr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
450 struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
451 const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
453 char *xattr_data = NULL;
456 rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data,
463 if (rc == xattr_value_len)
464 rc = !!memcmp(xattr_value, xattr_data, rc);
474 * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
476 * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the
477 * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid.
479 * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
480 * affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
481 * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
482 * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
483 * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable.
485 static int evm_protect_xattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
486 struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
487 const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
489 enum integrity_status evm_status;
491 if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
492 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
494 } else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) {
495 if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
497 evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
498 if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
499 (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
504 evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
505 if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
506 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
508 /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
509 if (evm_hmac_disabled())
512 iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
513 if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
516 /* exception for pseudo filesystems */
517 if (dentry->d_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC
518 || dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC)
521 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
522 dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name,
524 integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
528 /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
529 if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
530 evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
534 * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable
535 * signatures are immutable and can never be updated.
537 if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)
540 if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
541 !evm_xattr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
545 if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS &&
546 evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
547 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
548 dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
549 integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
551 return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
555 * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
556 * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
557 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
558 * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
559 * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
560 * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
562 * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
563 * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have
564 * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
565 * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires
566 * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
568 int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
569 const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
570 size_t xattr_value_len)
572 const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
574 /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
575 * there's no HMAC key loaded
577 if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
580 if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
581 if (!xattr_value_len)
583 if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
584 xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
587 return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
592 * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
593 * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
594 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
595 * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
597 * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
598 * the current value is valid.
600 int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
601 struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
603 /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
604 * there's no HMAC key loaded
606 if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
609 return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
612 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
613 static int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
614 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
615 struct posix_acl *kacl)
620 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
625 rc = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode, &mode, &kacl);
626 if (rc || (inode->i_mode != mode))
632 static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
633 struct dentry *dentry,
635 struct posix_acl *kacl)
642 * evm_inode_set_acl - protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
643 * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
644 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
645 * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
646 * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
648 * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
649 * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
652 int evm_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
653 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
655 enum integrity_status evm_status;
657 /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
658 * there's no HMAC key loaded
660 if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
663 evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
664 if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
665 (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
668 /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
669 if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
670 evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
674 * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable
675 * signatures are immutable and can never be updated.
677 if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)
680 if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
681 !evm_inode_set_acl_change(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name, kacl))
684 if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
685 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
686 dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
687 integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
692 static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
694 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
696 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
698 iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
702 * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary
703 * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
705 * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the
708 * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise.
710 bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
712 if (!evm_key_loaded())
715 /* evm_inode_post_setattr() passes NULL */
719 if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name) &&
720 strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
727 * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
728 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
729 * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
730 * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
731 * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
733 * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
735 * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
736 * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's
739 void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
740 const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
742 if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
745 evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
747 if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
750 if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
753 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
757 * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
758 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
759 * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
761 * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
763 * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
764 * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
766 void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
768 if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
771 evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
773 if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM))
776 if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
779 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
782 static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
783 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
785 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
786 struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_idmap_owner(idmap);
787 unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
789 if (!i_uid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) &&
790 !i_gid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) &&
791 (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode))
798 * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
799 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
801 * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
802 * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
804 int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
807 unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
808 enum integrity_status evm_status;
810 /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though
811 * there's no HMAC key loaded
813 if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
816 if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
818 evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
820 * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures
821 * are immutable and can never be updated.
823 if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
824 (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) ||
825 (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) ||
826 (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
827 evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)))
830 if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
831 !evm_attr_change(idmap, dentry, attr))
834 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
835 dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
836 integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
841 * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
842 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
843 * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
845 * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID
848 * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
849 * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
851 void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
853 if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
856 evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
858 if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
861 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
862 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
866 * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value
868 int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
869 const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
870 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
872 struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
875 if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
876 !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
879 xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
883 xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
884 rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
888 evm_xattr->value = xattr_data;
889 evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data);
890 evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX;
896 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
898 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
899 void __init evm_load_x509(void)
903 rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
905 evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509;
909 static int __init init_evm(void)
912 struct list_head *pos, *q;
916 error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
920 error = evm_init_secfs();
922 pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
928 if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) {
929 list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames)
937 late_initcall(init_evm);