1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
70 #include <linux/compat.h>
74 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
75 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
76 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
77 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
79 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
80 * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate
81 * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
84 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
85 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
87 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
88 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
90 /* number of audit rules */
93 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
96 struct audit_cap_data {
97 kernel_cap_t permitted;
98 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
100 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
101 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
105 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
106 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
107 * pointers at syscall exit time).
109 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
111 struct list_head list; /* audit_context->names_list */
120 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
121 unsigned int fcap_ver;
122 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
123 bool name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
125 * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
126 * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name
127 * should be freed on syscall exit
132 struct audit_aux_data {
133 struct audit_aux_data *next;
137 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
139 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
140 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
142 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
143 struct audit_aux_data d;
146 struct mm_struct *mm;
149 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
150 struct audit_aux_data d;
151 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
152 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
153 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
154 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
155 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
156 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
160 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
161 struct audit_aux_data d;
162 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
163 unsigned int fcap_ver;
164 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
165 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
168 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
169 struct audit_aux_data d;
171 struct audit_cap_data cap;
174 struct audit_tree_refs {
175 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
176 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
179 /* The per-task audit context. */
180 struct audit_context {
181 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
182 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
183 enum audit_state state, current_state;
184 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
185 int major; /* syscall number */
186 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
187 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
188 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
190 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
192 * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
193 * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
194 * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
195 * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced
196 * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
197 * by running the names_list.
199 struct audit_names preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES];
200 int name_count; /* total records in names_list */
201 struct list_head names_list; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */
202 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
204 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
205 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
206 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
207 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
209 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
211 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
212 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
213 unsigned long personality;
219 unsigned int target_sessionid;
221 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
223 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
224 struct list_head killed_trees;
242 unsigned long qbytes;
246 struct mq_attr mqstat;
255 unsigned int msg_prio;
256 struct timespec abs_timeout;
265 struct audit_cap_data cap;
280 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
282 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
283 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
284 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
288 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
295 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
297 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
298 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
300 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
301 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
303 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
304 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
307 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
308 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
309 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
311 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
312 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
314 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
315 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
319 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
321 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
322 case 4: /* socketcall */
323 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
325 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
331 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
333 struct audit_names *n;
334 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
339 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
340 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
341 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
349 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
350 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
351 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
352 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
353 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
354 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
355 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
358 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
359 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
363 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
367 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
369 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
370 int left = ctx->tree_count;
372 p->c[--left] = chunk;
373 ctx->tree_count = left;
382 ctx->tree_count = 30;
388 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
390 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
391 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
397 p->next = ctx->trees;
399 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
400 ctx->tree_count = 31;
405 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
406 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
408 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
409 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
412 /* we started with empty chain */
413 p = ctx->first_trees;
415 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
420 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
422 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
426 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
427 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
431 ctx->tree_count = count;
435 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
437 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
438 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
444 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
446 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
447 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
452 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
453 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
454 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
459 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
460 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
467 static int audit_compare_id(uid_t uid1,
468 struct audit_names *name,
469 unsigned long name_offset,
470 struct audit_field *f,
471 struct audit_context *ctx)
473 struct audit_names *n;
478 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(uid_t) != sizeof(gid_t));
481 addr = (unsigned long)name;
484 uid2 = *(uid_t *)addr;
485 rc = audit_comparator(uid1, f->op, uid2);
491 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
492 addr = (unsigned long)n;
495 uid2 = *(uid_t *)addr;
497 rc = audit_comparator(uid1, f->op, uid2);
505 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
506 const struct cred *cred,
507 struct audit_field *f,
508 struct audit_context *ctx,
509 struct audit_names *name)
512 /* process to file object comparisons */
513 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
514 return audit_compare_id(cred->uid,
515 name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid),
517 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
518 return audit_compare_id(cred->gid,
519 name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid),
521 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
522 return audit_compare_id(cred->euid,
523 name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid),
525 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
526 return audit_compare_id(cred->egid,
527 name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid),
529 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
530 return audit_compare_id(tsk->loginuid,
531 name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid),
533 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
534 return audit_compare_id(cred->suid,
535 name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid),
537 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
538 return audit_compare_id(cred->sgid,
539 name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid),
541 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
542 return audit_compare_id(cred->fsuid,
543 name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid),
545 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
546 return audit_compare_id(cred->fsgid,
547 name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid),
549 /* uid comparisons */
550 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
551 return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
552 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
553 return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
554 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
555 return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
556 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
557 return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
558 /* auid comparisons */
559 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
560 return audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
561 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
562 return audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
563 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
564 return audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
565 /* euid comparisons */
566 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
567 return audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
568 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
569 return audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
570 /* suid comparisons */
571 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
572 return audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
573 /* gid comparisons */
574 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
575 return audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
576 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
577 return audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
578 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
579 return audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
580 /* egid comparisons */
581 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
582 return audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
583 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
584 return audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
585 /* sgid comparison */
586 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
587 return audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
589 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
595 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
596 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
599 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
600 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
601 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
603 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
604 struct audit_krule *rule,
605 struct audit_context *ctx,
606 struct audit_names *name,
607 enum audit_state *state,
610 const struct cred *cred;
614 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
616 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
617 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
618 struct audit_names *n;
623 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
628 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
629 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
633 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
636 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
639 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
642 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
645 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
648 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
651 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
654 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
657 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
661 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
665 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
666 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
669 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
671 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
673 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
678 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
679 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
682 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
683 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
684 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
693 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
694 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
697 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
698 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
699 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
708 result = (name->ino == f->val);
710 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
711 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
720 result = audit_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->val);
722 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
723 if (audit_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->val)) {
732 result = audit_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->val);
734 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
735 if (audit_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->val)) {
744 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
748 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
753 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
755 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
756 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
757 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
760 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
761 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
762 match for now to avoid losing information that
763 may be wanted. An error message will also be
767 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
770 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
779 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
780 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
781 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
784 /* Find files that match */
786 result = security_audit_rule_match(
787 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
790 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
791 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
799 /* Find ipc objects that match */
800 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
802 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
813 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
815 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
816 /* ignore this field for filtering */
820 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
823 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
825 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
826 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
834 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
836 if (rule->filterkey) {
837 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
838 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
840 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
842 switch (rule->action) {
843 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
844 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
849 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
850 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
851 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
853 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
855 struct audit_entry *e;
856 enum audit_state state;
859 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
860 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
862 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
863 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
869 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
872 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
873 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
874 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
875 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
877 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
878 struct audit_context *ctx,
879 struct list_head *list)
881 struct audit_entry *e;
882 enum audit_state state;
884 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
885 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
888 if (!list_empty(list)) {
889 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
890 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
892 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
893 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
894 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
897 ctx->current_state = state;
903 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
907 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
908 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
910 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
911 struct audit_names *n,
912 struct audit_context *ctx) {
914 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
915 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
916 struct audit_entry *e;
917 enum audit_state state;
919 word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
920 bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
922 if (list_empty(list))
925 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
926 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
927 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
928 ctx->current_state = state;
936 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
937 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
938 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
939 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
941 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
943 struct audit_names *n;
945 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
950 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
951 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
957 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
961 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
965 context->return_valid = return_valid;
968 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
969 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
972 * This is actually a test for:
973 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
974 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
976 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
978 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
979 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
980 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
981 context->return_code = -EINTR;
983 context->return_code = return_code;
985 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
986 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
987 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
990 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
994 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
996 struct audit_names *n, *next;
999 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
1000 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
1001 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
1002 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
1004 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
1005 context->name_count, context->put_count,
1006 context->ino_count);
1007 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1008 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1009 n->name, n->name ?: "(null)");
1016 context->put_count = 0;
1017 context->ino_count = 0;
1020 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
1022 if (n->name && n->name_put)
1027 context->name_count = 0;
1028 path_put(&context->pwd);
1029 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
1030 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
1033 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
1035 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1037 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
1038 context->aux = aux->next;
1041 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
1042 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
1047 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
1048 enum audit_state state)
1050 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
1051 context->state = state;
1052 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1055 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
1057 struct audit_context *context;
1059 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
1061 audit_zero_context(context, state);
1062 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
1063 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
1068 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
1071 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
1072 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
1073 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
1076 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
1078 struct audit_context *context;
1079 enum audit_state state;
1082 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
1083 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
1085 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
1086 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1089 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
1091 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
1094 context->filterkey = key;
1096 tsk->audit_context = context;
1097 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
1101 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
1103 struct audit_context *previous;
1107 previous = context->previous;
1108 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
1110 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
1111 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
1112 context->serial, context->major,
1113 context->name_count, count);
1115 audit_free_names(context);
1116 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1117 free_tree_refs(context);
1118 audit_free_aux(context);
1119 kfree(context->filterkey);
1120 kfree(context->sockaddr);
1125 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
1128 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
1135 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
1139 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
1141 if (error != -EINVAL)
1146 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
1147 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1151 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
1155 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
1157 void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
1159 const struct cred *cred;
1160 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
1161 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
1162 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
1168 /* tsk == current */
1169 cred = current_cred();
1171 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1172 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1173 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1176 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1179 audit_log_format(ab,
1180 " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1181 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1182 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u ses=%u tty=%s",
1185 tsk->loginuid, cred->uid, cred->gid,
1186 cred->euid, cred->suid, cred->fsuid,
1187 cred->egid, cred->sgid, cred->fsgid,
1188 tsk->sessionid, tty);
1190 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
1191 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
1192 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
1195 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
1198 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
1200 audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=",
1201 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
1206 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
1208 audit_log_task_context(ab);
1211 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info);
1213 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
1214 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
1215 u32 sid, char *comm)
1217 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1222 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1226 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
1228 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1229 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1232 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1233 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1235 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1236 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1243 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1244 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1245 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1247 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1248 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1249 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1250 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1251 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1253 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1254 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1257 const char __user *p,
1260 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1261 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1262 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1263 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1264 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1265 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1266 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1269 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1270 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1273 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1274 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1275 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1278 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1280 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1284 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1286 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1287 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1290 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1292 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1293 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1298 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1301 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1302 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1305 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1306 * send half as much in each message
1308 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1311 len_left -= to_send;
1313 } while (len_left > 0);
1317 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1320 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1321 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1324 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1325 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1329 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1330 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1332 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1334 room_left -= to_send;
1335 if (room_left < 0) {
1338 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1344 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1345 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1347 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1348 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1349 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1352 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1353 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1354 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1356 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1357 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1362 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1365 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1367 /* actually log it */
1368 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1370 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1371 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1373 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1375 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1378 len_left -= to_send;
1379 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1381 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1383 *len_sent += to_send;
1385 /* include the null we didn't log */
1389 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1390 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1391 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1394 size_t len_sent = 0;
1395 const char __user *p;
1398 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1399 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1401 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1403 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
1406 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1407 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1408 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1409 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1411 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1413 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1417 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1418 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1427 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1431 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1432 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1433 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1437 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1439 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1440 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1443 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1444 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1447 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1448 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1453 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1456 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1458 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1461 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1465 switch (context->type) {
1466 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1467 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1468 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1469 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1470 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1471 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1474 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1476 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1477 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1481 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1482 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1485 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1486 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1489 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1491 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1492 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1493 audit_log_format(ab,
1494 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1495 context->ipc.qbytes,
1496 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1497 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1498 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1503 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1504 audit_log_format(ab,
1505 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1506 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1507 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1508 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1509 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1510 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1511 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1513 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1514 audit_log_format(ab,
1515 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1516 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1517 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1518 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1519 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1520 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1521 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1523 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1524 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1525 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1526 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1528 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1529 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1530 audit_log_format(ab,
1531 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1533 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1534 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1535 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1537 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1538 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1539 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1540 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1541 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1544 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1545 context->mmap.flags);
1551 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1552 int record_num, int *call_panic)
1554 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1555 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1557 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1559 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1562 switch (n->name_len) {
1563 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1564 /* log the full path */
1565 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1566 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1569 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1570 * directory component is the cwd */
1571 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1574 /* log the name's directory component */
1575 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1576 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1580 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1582 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1583 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1584 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
1585 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1598 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1599 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1600 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1603 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1604 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1608 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1613 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1615 int i, call_panic = 0;
1616 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1617 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1618 struct audit_names *n;
1620 /* tsk == current */
1621 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1623 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1625 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1626 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1627 context->arch, context->major);
1628 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1629 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1630 if (context->return_valid)
1631 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1632 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1633 context->return_code);
1635 audit_log_format(ab,
1636 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1641 context->name_count);
1643 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1644 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1647 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1649 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1651 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1653 switch (aux->type) {
1655 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1656 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1657 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1660 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1661 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1662 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1663 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1664 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1665 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1666 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1667 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1668 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1669 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1670 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1671 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1679 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1681 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1682 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1684 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1685 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1690 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1691 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1693 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1694 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1695 context->sockaddr_len);
1700 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1701 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1703 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1704 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1705 axs->target_auid[i],
1707 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1709 axs->target_comm[i]))
1713 if (context->target_pid &&
1714 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1715 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1716 context->target_sessionid,
1717 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1720 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1721 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1723 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1729 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1730 audit_log_name(context, n, i++, &call_panic);
1732 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1733 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1737 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1741 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1742 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1744 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1746 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1748 struct audit_context *context;
1750 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1754 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1755 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1756 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1757 * in the context of the idle thread */
1758 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1759 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1760 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1761 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1762 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1764 audit_free_context(context);
1768 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1769 * @arch: architecture type
1770 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1771 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1772 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1773 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1774 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1776 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1777 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1778 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1779 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1780 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1781 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1784 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1785 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1786 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1788 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1789 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1790 enum audit_state state;
1796 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1797 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1798 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1799 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1800 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1804 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1806 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1807 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1809 if (context->in_syscall) {
1810 struct audit_context *newctx;
1814 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1815 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1816 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1818 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1820 newctx->previous = context;
1822 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1824 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1825 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1826 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1827 * to abandon auditing. */
1828 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1831 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1836 context->arch = arch;
1837 context->major = major;
1838 context->argv[0] = a1;
1839 context->argv[1] = a2;
1840 context->argv[2] = a3;
1841 context->argv[3] = a4;
1843 state = context->state;
1844 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1845 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1847 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1849 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1852 context->serial = 0;
1853 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1854 context->in_syscall = 1;
1855 context->current_state = state;
1860 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1861 * @success: success value of the syscall
1862 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1864 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1865 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1866 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1867 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1868 * free the names stored from getname().
1870 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1872 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1873 struct audit_context *context;
1876 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1878 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1880 context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1884 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1885 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1887 context->in_syscall = 0;
1888 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1890 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1891 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1893 if (context->previous) {
1894 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1895 context->previous = NULL;
1896 audit_free_context(context);
1897 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1899 audit_free_names(context);
1900 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1901 audit_free_aux(context);
1902 context->aux = NULL;
1903 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1904 context->target_pid = 0;
1905 context->target_sid = 0;
1906 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1908 context->fds[0] = -1;
1909 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1910 kfree(context->filterkey);
1911 context->filterkey = NULL;
1913 tsk->audit_context = context;
1917 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1919 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1920 struct audit_context *context;
1921 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1922 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1924 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1926 context = current->audit_context;
1928 count = context->tree_count;
1930 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1934 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1936 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1937 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1938 audit_set_auditable(context);
1939 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1940 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1943 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1947 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1949 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1950 struct audit_context *context;
1951 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1952 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1953 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1957 context = current->audit_context;
1959 count = context->tree_count;
1964 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1966 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1967 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1968 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1969 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1971 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1977 parent = d->d_parent;
1982 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1985 /* just a race with rename */
1986 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1989 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1990 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1991 /* OK, got more space */
1992 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1997 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1998 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1999 audit_set_auditable(context);
2006 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context)
2008 struct audit_names *aname;
2010 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
2011 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
2012 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
2014 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
2017 aname->should_free = true;
2020 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2021 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
2023 context->name_count++;
2025 context->ino_count++;
2031 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
2032 * @name: name to add
2034 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
2035 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
2037 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
2039 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2040 struct audit_names *n;
2042 if (!context->in_syscall) {
2043 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
2044 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
2045 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
2051 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2056 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2059 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
2060 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
2063 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
2064 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
2066 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
2067 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
2068 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
2070 void audit_putname(const char *name)
2072 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2075 if (!context->in_syscall) {
2076 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
2077 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
2078 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
2079 if (context->name_count) {
2080 struct audit_names *n;
2083 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
2084 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
2085 n->name, n->name ?: "(null)");
2092 ++context->put_count;
2093 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
2094 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
2095 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
2098 context->serial, context->major,
2099 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
2100 context->put_count);
2107 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
2109 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
2115 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
2119 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
2120 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
2121 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2122 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2128 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2129 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
2130 const struct inode *inode)
2132 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
2133 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
2134 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
2135 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
2136 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
2137 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
2138 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
2139 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
2143 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2144 * @name: name being audited
2145 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2147 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
2149 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
2151 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2152 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2153 struct audit_names *n;
2155 if (!context->in_syscall)
2158 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2159 if (n->name && (n->name == name))
2163 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname() */
2164 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2168 handle_path(dentry);
2169 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
2173 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2174 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2175 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2177 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2178 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2179 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2180 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2181 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2182 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2183 * unsuccessful attempts.
2185 void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry,
2186 const struct inode *parent)
2188 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2189 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2190 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2191 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
2192 struct audit_names *n;
2195 if (!context->in_syscall)
2201 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2202 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2206 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2207 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2208 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2209 found_parent = n->name;
2214 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2215 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2219 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2220 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2221 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2223 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2225 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2226 found_child = n->name;
2232 if (!found_parent) {
2233 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2236 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
2240 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2244 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2245 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2246 * audit_free_names() */
2248 n->name = found_parent;
2249 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2250 /* don't call __putname() */
2251 n->name_put = false;
2255 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2258 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2261 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2262 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2263 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2264 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2266 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2268 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2269 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2271 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2274 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2275 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2276 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2277 *serial = ctx->serial;
2280 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2285 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2286 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2289 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2290 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2294 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2296 int audit_set_loginuid(uid_t loginuid)
2298 struct task_struct *task = current;
2299 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2300 unsigned int sessionid;
2302 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
2303 if (task->loginuid != -1)
2305 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2306 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
2308 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2310 sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2311 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2312 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2314 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2316 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2317 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2318 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2319 task->pid, task_uid(task),
2320 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2321 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2325 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2326 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2331 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2334 * @attr: queue attributes
2337 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2339 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2342 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2344 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2346 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2347 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2349 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2353 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2354 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2355 * @msg_len: Message length
2356 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2357 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2360 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2361 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2363 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2364 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2367 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2369 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2371 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2372 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2373 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2375 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2379 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2380 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2381 * @notification: Notification event
2385 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2387 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2390 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2392 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2394 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2395 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2399 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2400 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2404 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2406 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2407 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2408 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2409 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2413 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2414 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2417 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2419 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2420 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2421 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2422 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2423 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2424 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2425 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2429 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2430 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2431 * @uid: msgq user id
2432 * @gid: msgq group id
2433 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2435 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2437 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2439 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2441 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2442 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2443 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2444 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2445 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2448 int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2450 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2451 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2453 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2457 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2458 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2460 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2461 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2462 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2468 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2469 * @nargs: number of args
2473 void __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2475 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2477 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2478 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2479 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2483 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2484 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2485 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2488 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2490 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2491 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2492 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2496 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2497 * @len: data length in user space
2498 * @a: data address in kernel space
2500 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2502 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2504 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2506 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2507 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2510 context->sockaddr = p;
2513 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2514 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2518 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2520 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2522 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2523 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2524 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2525 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2526 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2527 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2531 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2532 * @sig: signal value
2533 * @t: task being signaled
2535 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2536 * and uid that is doing that.
2538 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2540 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2541 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2542 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2543 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2545 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2546 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2547 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2548 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2549 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2551 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2552 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2554 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2558 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2559 * in audit_context */
2560 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2561 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2562 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2563 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2564 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2565 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2566 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2570 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2571 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2572 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2576 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2577 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2578 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2580 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2582 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2583 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2584 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2585 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2586 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2587 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2594 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2595 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2596 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2597 * @old: the old credentials
2599 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2600 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2604 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2605 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2607 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2608 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2609 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2610 struct dentry *dentry;
2612 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2616 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2617 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2618 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2620 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2621 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2624 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2625 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2626 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2627 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2629 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2630 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2631 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2633 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2634 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2635 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2640 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2641 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2642 * @new: the new credentials
2643 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2645 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2646 * audit system if applicable
2648 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2649 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2651 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2652 context->capset.pid = pid;
2653 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2654 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2655 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2656 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2659 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2661 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2662 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2663 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2664 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2667 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
2671 unsigned int sessionid;
2673 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2674 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2675 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2677 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2678 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
2679 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2680 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2681 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2682 audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
2683 audit_log_string(ab, reason);
2684 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2687 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2688 * @signr: signal value
2690 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2691 * should record the event for investigation.
2693 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2695 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2700 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2703 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2704 audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr);
2708 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2710 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2712 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2713 audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr);
2714 audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
2715 audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
2716 audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
2717 audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
2721 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2723 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2724 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2726 return &ctx->killed_trees;