1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
65 #include <linux/highmem.h>
66 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
67 #include <linux/inotify.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
72 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
73 * for saving names from getname(). */
74 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
76 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
77 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
79 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
80 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82 /* number of audit rules */
85 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
88 struct audit_cap_data {
89 kernel_cap_t permitted;
90 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
92 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
93 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
97 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
98 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
99 * pointers at syscall exit time).
101 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
104 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
105 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
113 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
114 unsigned int fcap_ver;
117 struct audit_aux_data {
118 struct audit_aux_data *next;
122 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
124 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
125 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
127 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
128 struct audit_aux_data d;
134 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
135 struct audit_aux_data d;
138 unsigned int msg_prio;
139 struct timespec abs_timeout;
142 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
143 struct audit_aux_data d;
145 struct sigevent notification;
148 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
149 struct audit_aux_data d;
151 struct mq_attr mqstat;
154 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
157 unsigned long qbytes;
164 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
165 struct audit_aux_data d;
168 struct mm_struct *mm;
171 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
172 struct audit_aux_data d;
174 unsigned long args[0];
177 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
178 struct audit_aux_data d;
183 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
184 struct audit_aux_data d;
188 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
189 struct audit_aux_data d;
190 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
191 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
192 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
193 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
194 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
195 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
199 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
200 struct audit_aux_data d;
201 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
202 unsigned int fcap_ver;
203 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
204 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
207 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
208 struct audit_aux_data d;
210 struct audit_cap_data cap;
213 struct audit_tree_refs {
214 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
215 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
218 /* The per-task audit context. */
219 struct audit_context {
220 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
221 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
222 enum audit_state state;
223 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
224 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
225 int major; /* syscall number */
226 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
227 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
228 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
229 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
231 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
232 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
234 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
235 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
236 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
238 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
240 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
241 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
242 unsigned long personality;
248 unsigned int target_sessionid;
250 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
252 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
261 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
262 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
264 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
265 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
266 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
270 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
277 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
279 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
280 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
282 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
283 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
285 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
286 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
289 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
290 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
291 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
293 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
294 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
296 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
297 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
301 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
303 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
304 case 4: /* socketcall */
305 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
307 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
313 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
315 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
316 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
321 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
323 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
325 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
331 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
332 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
333 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
334 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
335 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
336 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
337 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
340 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
341 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
343 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
344 int left = ctx->tree_count;
346 p->c[--left] = chunk;
347 ctx->tree_count = left;
356 ctx->tree_count = 30;
362 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
364 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
365 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
371 p->next = ctx->trees;
373 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
374 ctx->tree_count = 31;
379 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
380 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
382 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
383 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
386 /* we started with empty chain */
387 p = ctx->first_trees;
389 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
394 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
396 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
400 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
401 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
405 ctx->tree_count = count;
409 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
411 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
412 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
418 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
420 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
421 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
426 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
427 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
428 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
433 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
434 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
441 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
442 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
444 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
445 struct audit_krule *rule,
446 struct audit_context *ctx,
447 struct audit_names *name,
448 enum audit_state *state)
450 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
451 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
454 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
455 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
460 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
465 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
466 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
470 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
473 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
476 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
479 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
482 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
485 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
488 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
491 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
494 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
498 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
502 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
503 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
506 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
508 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
510 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
515 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
518 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
519 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
528 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
531 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
532 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
541 result = (name->ino == f->val);
543 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
544 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
552 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
553 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
554 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
558 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
563 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
565 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
566 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
567 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
570 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
571 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
572 match for now to avoid losing information that
573 may be wanted. An error message will also be
577 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
580 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
589 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
590 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
591 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
594 /* Find files that match */
596 result = security_audit_rule_match(
597 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
600 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
601 if (security_audit_rule_match(
610 /* Find ipc objects that match */
612 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
613 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
615 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
616 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
617 if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
631 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
633 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
634 /* ignore this field for filtering */
638 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
641 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
650 if (rule->filterkey && ctx)
651 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
652 switch (rule->action) {
653 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
654 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
660 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
661 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
662 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
664 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
666 struct audit_entry *e;
667 enum audit_state state;
670 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
671 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
677 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
680 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
681 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
682 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
683 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
685 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
686 struct audit_context *ctx,
687 struct list_head *list)
689 struct audit_entry *e;
690 enum audit_state state;
692 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
693 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
696 if (!list_empty(list)) {
697 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
698 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
700 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
701 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
702 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
710 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
713 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
714 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
715 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
716 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
718 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
719 struct audit_context *ctx)
722 struct audit_entry *e;
723 enum audit_state state;
725 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
726 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
729 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
730 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
731 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
732 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
733 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
734 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
736 if (list_empty(list))
739 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
740 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
741 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
748 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
751 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
756 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
760 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
762 if (likely(!context))
764 context->return_valid = return_valid;
767 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
768 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
771 * This is actually a test for:
772 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
773 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
775 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
777 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
778 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
779 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
780 context->return_code = -EINTR;
782 context->return_code = return_code;
784 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
785 enum audit_state state;
787 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
788 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
789 context->auditable = 1;
793 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
794 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
795 context->auditable = 1;
801 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
805 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
810 if (context->auditable
811 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
812 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
813 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
814 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
816 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
817 context->name_count, context->put_count,
819 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
820 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
821 context->names[i].name,
822 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
829 context->put_count = 0;
830 context->ino_count = 0;
833 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
834 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
835 __putname(context->names[i].name);
837 context->name_count = 0;
838 path_put(&context->pwd);
839 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
840 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
843 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
845 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
847 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
848 context->aux = aux->next;
851 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
852 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
857 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
858 enum audit_state state)
860 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
861 context->state = state;
864 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
866 struct audit_context *context;
868 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
870 audit_zero_context(context, state);
875 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
878 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
879 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
880 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
883 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
885 struct audit_context *context;
886 enum audit_state state;
888 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
889 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
891 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
892 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
895 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
896 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
900 tsk->audit_context = context;
901 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
905 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
907 struct audit_context *previous;
911 previous = context->previous;
912 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
914 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
915 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
916 context->serial, context->major,
917 context->name_count, count);
919 audit_free_names(context);
920 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
921 free_tree_refs(context);
922 audit_free_aux(context);
923 kfree(context->filterkey);
928 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
931 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
938 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
942 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
944 if (error != -EINVAL)
949 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
950 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
954 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
958 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
960 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
962 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
963 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
964 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
968 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
969 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
970 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
973 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
976 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
978 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
979 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
984 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
986 audit_log_task_context(ab);
989 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
990 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
993 struct audit_buffer *ab;
998 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1002 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
1004 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1005 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1008 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1009 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1011 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1012 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1019 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1020 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1021 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
1023 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1024 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1025 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1026 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1027 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1029 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1030 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1033 const char __user *p,
1036 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1037 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1038 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
1039 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
1040 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1041 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1042 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1045 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1046 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1049 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1050 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1051 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1054 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1056 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1060 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1062 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1063 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1066 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1068 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1069 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1074 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1077 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1078 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1081 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1082 * send half as much in each message
1084 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1087 len_left -= to_send;
1089 } while (len_left > 0);
1093 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1096 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1097 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1100 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1101 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1105 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1106 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1108 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1110 room_left -= to_send;
1111 if (room_left < 0) {
1114 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1120 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1121 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1123 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1124 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
1125 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1128 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1129 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1130 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1132 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1133 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1138 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1141 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1143 /* actually log it */
1144 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1146 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1147 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1149 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1151 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1152 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1155 len_left -= to_send;
1156 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1158 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1160 *len_sent += to_send;
1162 /* include the null we didn't log */
1166 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1167 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1168 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1171 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1172 const char __user *p;
1175 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1176 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1178 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1180 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1183 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1184 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1185 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1186 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1188 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1190 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1194 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1195 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1204 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1208 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1209 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1210 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1214 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1216 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1217 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1220 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1221 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1224 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1225 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1230 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1233 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1235 const struct cred *cred;
1236 int i, call_panic = 0;
1237 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1238 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1241 /* tsk == current */
1242 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1244 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1245 cred = current_cred();
1246 context->uid = cred->uid;
1247 context->gid = cred->gid;
1248 context->euid = cred->euid;
1249 context->suid = cred->suid;
1250 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
1251 context->egid = cred->egid;
1252 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
1253 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
1254 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1256 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1258 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1259 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1260 context->arch, context->major);
1261 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1262 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1263 if (context->return_valid)
1264 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1265 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1266 context->return_code);
1268 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1269 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1270 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1273 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1275 audit_log_format(ab,
1276 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1277 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1278 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1279 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1284 context->name_count,
1290 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1291 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1295 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1296 if (context->filterkey) {
1297 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1298 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1300 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
1303 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1305 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1307 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1309 switch (aux->type) {
1310 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1311 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
1312 audit_log_format(ab,
1313 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1314 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1315 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
1316 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
1317 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
1320 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1321 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
1322 audit_log_format(ab,
1323 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1324 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1325 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
1326 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1329 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1330 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
1331 audit_log_format(ab,
1332 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1334 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
1337 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1338 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
1339 audit_log_format(ab,
1340 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1343 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
1344 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
1348 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1349 audit_log_format(ab,
1350 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1351 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1352 if (axi->osid != 0) {
1355 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1356 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1357 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
1361 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1362 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1367 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
1368 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
1369 audit_log_format(ab,
1370 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1371 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
1374 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1375 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1376 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1379 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1380 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
1381 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
1382 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
1383 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
1386 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
1387 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
1389 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1390 audit_log_n_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
1393 case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
1394 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
1395 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
1398 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1399 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1400 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1401 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1402 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1403 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1404 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1405 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1406 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1407 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1408 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1409 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1412 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1413 struct audit_aux_data_capset *axs = (void *)aux;
1414 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", axs->pid);
1415 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &axs->cap.inheritable);
1416 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &axs->cap.permitted);
1417 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &axs->cap.effective);
1424 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1425 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1427 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1428 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1429 axs->target_auid[i],
1431 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1433 axs->target_comm[i]))
1437 if (context->target_pid &&
1438 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1439 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1440 context->target_sessionid,
1441 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1444 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1445 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1447 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1451 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1452 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1454 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1456 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1458 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1461 switch(n->name_len) {
1462 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1463 /* log the full path */
1464 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1465 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1468 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1469 * directory component is the cwd */
1470 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1473 /* log the name's directory component */
1474 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1475 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1479 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1481 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1482 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1483 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1484 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1497 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1498 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1499 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1502 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1503 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1507 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1512 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1513 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1517 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1521 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1522 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1524 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1526 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1528 struct audit_context *context;
1530 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1531 if (likely(!context))
1534 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1535 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1536 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1537 * in the context of the idle thread */
1538 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1539 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1540 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1542 audit_free_context(context);
1546 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1547 * @tsk: task being audited
1548 * @arch: architecture type
1549 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1550 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1551 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1552 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1553 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1555 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1556 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1557 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1558 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1559 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1560 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1563 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1564 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1565 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1567 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1568 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1569 enum audit_state state;
1571 if (unlikely(!context))
1575 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1576 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1577 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1578 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1579 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1583 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1585 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1586 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1588 if (context->in_syscall) {
1589 struct audit_context *newctx;
1593 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1594 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1595 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1597 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1599 newctx->previous = context;
1601 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1603 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1604 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1605 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1606 * to abandon auditing. */
1607 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1610 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1615 context->arch = arch;
1616 context->major = major;
1617 context->argv[0] = a1;
1618 context->argv[1] = a2;
1619 context->argv[2] = a3;
1620 context->argv[3] = a4;
1622 state = context->state;
1623 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1624 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1625 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1626 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1629 context->serial = 0;
1630 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1631 context->in_syscall = 1;
1632 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1637 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1638 * @tsk: task being audited
1639 * @valid: success/failure flag
1640 * @return_code: syscall return value
1642 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1643 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1644 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1645 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1646 * free the names stored from getname().
1648 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1650 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1651 struct audit_context *context;
1653 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1655 if (likely(!context))
1658 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1659 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1661 context->in_syscall = 0;
1662 context->auditable = 0;
1664 if (context->previous) {
1665 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1666 context->previous = NULL;
1667 audit_free_context(context);
1668 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1670 audit_free_names(context);
1671 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1672 audit_free_aux(context);
1673 context->aux = NULL;
1674 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1675 context->target_pid = 0;
1676 context->target_sid = 0;
1677 kfree(context->filterkey);
1678 context->filterkey = NULL;
1679 tsk->audit_context = context;
1683 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1685 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1686 struct audit_context *context;
1687 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1688 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1690 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1692 context = current->audit_context;
1694 count = context->tree_count;
1696 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1700 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1702 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1703 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1704 audit_set_auditable(context);
1705 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1706 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1709 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1713 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1715 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1716 struct audit_context *context;
1717 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1718 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1719 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1723 context = current->audit_context;
1725 count = context->tree_count;
1730 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1732 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1733 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1734 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1735 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1737 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1743 parent = d->d_parent;
1748 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1751 /* just a race with rename */
1752 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1755 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1756 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1757 /* OK, got more space */
1758 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1763 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1764 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1765 audit_set_auditable(context);
1773 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1774 * @name: name to add
1776 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1777 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1779 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1781 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1783 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1786 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1787 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1788 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1789 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1794 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1795 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1796 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1797 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1798 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1799 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1800 ++context->name_count;
1801 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
1802 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1803 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1804 path_get(¤t->fs->pwd);
1805 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1810 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1811 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1813 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1814 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1815 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1817 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1819 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1822 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1823 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1824 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1825 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1826 if (context->name_count) {
1828 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1829 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1830 context->names[i].name,
1831 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1838 ++context->put_count;
1839 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1840 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1841 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1844 context->serial, context->major,
1845 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1846 context->put_count);
1853 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1854 const struct inode *inode)
1856 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1858 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1859 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
1860 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1861 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1865 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
1868 context->name_count++;
1870 context->ino_count++;
1876 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1878 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1881 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1882 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1889 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1893 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1894 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1895 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1896 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1902 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1903 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1904 const struct inode *inode)
1906 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1907 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1908 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1909 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1910 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1911 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1912 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1913 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1917 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1918 * @name: name being audited
1919 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1921 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1923 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1926 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1927 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1929 if (!context->in_syscall)
1931 if (context->name_count
1932 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1933 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1934 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1935 else if (context->name_count > 1
1936 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1937 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1938 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1940 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1941 * associated name? */
1942 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1944 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1945 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1947 handle_path(dentry);
1948 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
1952 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1953 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1954 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1955 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1957 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1958 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1959 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1960 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1961 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1962 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1963 * unsuccessful attempts.
1965 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
1966 const struct inode *parent)
1969 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1970 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1971 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1974 if (!context->in_syscall)
1979 /* determine matching parent */
1983 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
1984 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
1985 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
1990 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1991 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
1992 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
1993 found_parent = n->name;
1998 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
1999 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2000 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2005 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2006 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2007 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2009 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2011 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2012 found_child = n->name;
2018 if (!found_parent) {
2019 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
2021 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2022 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2023 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
2027 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2029 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2031 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2032 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2033 * audit_free_names() */
2035 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
2036 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2037 /* don't call __putname() */
2038 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
2040 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2044 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
2046 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2049 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2052 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2053 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2054 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2055 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2057 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2059 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2060 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2063 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2064 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2065 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2066 *serial = ctx->serial;
2070 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2071 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2074 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2075 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2076 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2080 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2082 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
2084 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2085 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2087 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2088 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2090 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2092 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2093 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2094 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2095 task->pid, task_uid(task),
2096 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2097 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2101 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2102 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2107 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2110 * @u_attr: queue attributes
2112 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2114 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
2116 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
2117 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2122 if (likely(!context))
2125 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2129 if (u_attr != NULL) {
2130 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
2135 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
2140 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2141 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2142 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2147 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
2148 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2149 * @msg_len: Message length
2150 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2151 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2153 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2155 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2156 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2158 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2159 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2164 if (likely(!context))
2167 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2171 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2172 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2177 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2180 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2181 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
2183 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2184 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2185 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2190 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
2191 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2192 * @msg_len: Message length
2193 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
2194 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2196 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2198 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
2199 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
2200 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
2202 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
2203 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2208 if (likely(!context))
2211 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2215 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
2216 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
2223 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
2224 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
2229 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
2232 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
2234 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2235 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2236 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2241 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2242 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2243 * @u_notification: Notification event
2245 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2248 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
2250 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
2251 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2256 if (likely(!context))
2259 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2263 if (u_notification != NULL) {
2264 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
2269 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
2273 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2274 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2275 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2280 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2281 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2284 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2286 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2288 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
2289 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2294 if (likely(!context))
2297 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2302 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
2304 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2305 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2306 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2311 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2312 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2314 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2316 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2318 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2319 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2321 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2325 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
2326 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
2327 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
2328 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
2329 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
2330 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2331 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2336 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2337 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2338 * @uid: msgq user id
2339 * @gid: msgq group id
2340 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2342 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2344 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2346 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
2347 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2349 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
2353 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
2358 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
2359 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2360 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2364 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2366 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2367 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2369 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2372 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2376 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2377 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2379 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2380 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2381 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2387 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2388 * @nargs: number of args
2391 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2393 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2395 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
2396 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2398 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2401 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
2406 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2408 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2409 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2410 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2415 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2416 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2417 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2419 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2421 int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2423 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2424 struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
2426 if (likely(!context)) {
2430 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2438 ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
2439 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2440 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2445 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2446 * @len: data length in user space
2447 * @a: data address in kernel space
2449 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2451 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2453 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
2454 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2456 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2459 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
2464 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
2466 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
2467 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2468 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2472 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2474 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2476 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2477 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2478 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2479 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2480 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2481 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2485 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2486 * @sig: signal value
2487 * @t: task being signaled
2489 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2490 * and uid that is doing that.
2492 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2494 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2495 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2496 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2497 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2499 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2500 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2501 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2502 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2503 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2505 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2506 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2508 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2512 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2513 * in audit_context */
2514 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2515 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2516 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2517 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2518 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2519 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2520 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2524 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2525 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2526 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2530 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2531 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2532 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2534 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2536 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2537 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2538 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2539 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2540 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2541 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2548 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2549 * @bprm pointer to the bprm being processed
2550 * @caps the caps read from the disk
2552 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2553 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2555 * this can fail and we don't care. See the note in audit.h for
2556 * audit_log_bprm_fcaps() for my explaination....
2560 void __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, kernel_cap_t *pP, kernel_cap_t *pE)
2562 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2563 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2564 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2565 struct dentry *dentry;
2567 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2571 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2572 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2573 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2575 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2576 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2579 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2580 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2581 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2582 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2584 ax->old_pcap.permitted = *pP;
2585 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = current->cred->cap_inheritable;
2586 ax->old_pcap.effective = *pE;
2588 ax->new_pcap.permitted = current->cred->cap_permitted;
2589 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = current->cred->cap_inheritable;
2590 ax->new_pcap.effective = current->cred->cap_effective;
2594 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2595 * @pid target pid of the capset call
2596 * @eff effective cap set
2597 * @inh inheritible cap set
2598 * @perm permited cap set
2600 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2601 * audit system if applicable
2603 int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *eff, kernel_cap_t *inh, kernel_cap_t *perm)
2605 struct audit_aux_data_capset *ax;
2606 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2608 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2611 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2615 ax->d.type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2616 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2617 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2620 ax->cap.effective = *eff;
2621 ax->cap.inheritable = *eff;
2622 ax->cap.permitted = *perm;
2628 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2629 * @signr: signal value
2631 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2632 * should record the event for investigation.
2634 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2636 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2638 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
2640 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2645 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2648 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2649 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2650 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2651 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
2652 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
2657 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
2658 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2660 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2661 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2664 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2665 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2666 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);