1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69 #include <asm/syscall.h>
70 #include <linux/capability.h>
71 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72 #include <linux/compat.h>
73 #include <linux/ctype.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
76 #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
81 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
82 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
83 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
84 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
86 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
87 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
88 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
90 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
91 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
93 /* number of audit rules */
96 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
99 struct audit_aux_data {
100 struct audit_aux_data *next;
104 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
106 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
107 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
109 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
110 struct audit_aux_data d;
111 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
115 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
116 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
120 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
121 struct audit_aux_data d;
122 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
123 unsigned int fcap_ver;
124 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
125 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
128 struct audit_tree_refs {
129 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
130 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
133 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
140 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
142 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
143 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
145 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
146 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
148 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
149 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
152 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
153 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
154 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
156 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
157 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
159 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
160 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
164 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
166 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
167 case 4: /* socketcall */
168 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
170 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
176 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
178 struct audit_names *n;
179 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
184 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
185 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
186 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
194 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
195 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
196 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
197 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
198 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
199 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
200 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
203 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
207 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
211 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
213 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
214 int left = ctx->tree_count;
216 p->c[--left] = chunk;
217 ctx->tree_count = left;
226 ctx->tree_count = 30;
232 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
234 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
235 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
241 p->next = ctx->trees;
243 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
244 ctx->tree_count = 31;
248 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
249 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
251 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
254 /* we started with empty chain */
255 p = ctx->first_trees;
257 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
262 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
264 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
268 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
269 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
273 ctx->tree_count = count;
276 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
278 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
279 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
285 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
287 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
292 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
293 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
294 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
299 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
300 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
306 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
307 struct audit_names *name,
308 struct audit_field *f,
309 struct audit_context *ctx)
311 struct audit_names *n;
315 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
321 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
322 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
330 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
331 struct audit_names *name,
332 struct audit_field *f,
333 struct audit_context *ctx)
335 struct audit_names *n;
339 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
345 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
346 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
354 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
355 const struct cred *cred,
356 struct audit_field *f,
357 struct audit_context *ctx,
358 struct audit_names *name)
361 /* process to file object comparisons */
362 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
363 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
364 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
365 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
366 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
367 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
368 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
369 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
370 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
371 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
372 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
373 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
374 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
375 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
376 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
377 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
379 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
380 /* uid comparisons */
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
382 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
383 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
385 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
387 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
389 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
390 /* auid comparisons */
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
392 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
395 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
400 /* euid comparisons */
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
405 /* suid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
408 /* gid comparisons */
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
410 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
412 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
414 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
415 /* egid comparisons */
416 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
417 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
420 /* sgid comparison */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
424 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
430 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
431 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
434 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
435 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
436 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
438 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
439 struct audit_krule *rule,
440 struct audit_context *ctx,
441 struct audit_names *name,
442 enum audit_state *state,
445 const struct cred *cred;
448 unsigned int sessionid;
450 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
452 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
453 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
454 struct audit_names *n;
460 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
461 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
466 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
467 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
471 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
472 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
476 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
479 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
482 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
485 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
488 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
489 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
491 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
492 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
494 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
498 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
499 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
501 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
502 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
504 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
508 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
511 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
513 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
514 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
515 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
518 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
522 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
526 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
527 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
530 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
532 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
534 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
539 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
540 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
543 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
544 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
545 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
555 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
558 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
559 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
560 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
569 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
571 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
572 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
581 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
583 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
584 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
593 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
595 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
596 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
605 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
609 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
612 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
615 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
616 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
618 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
620 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
623 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
624 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
625 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
628 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
629 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
630 match for now to avoid losing information that
631 may be wanted. An error message will also be
635 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
638 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
646 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
647 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
648 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
651 /* Find files that match */
653 result = security_audit_rule_match(
659 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
660 if (security_audit_rule_match(
670 /* Find ipc objects that match */
671 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
673 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
684 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
686 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
687 /* ignore this field for filtering */
691 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
694 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
696 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
697 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
705 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
707 if (rule->filterkey) {
708 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
709 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
711 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
713 switch (rule->action) {
715 *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
718 *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
724 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
725 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
726 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
728 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
730 struct audit_entry *e;
731 enum audit_state state;
734 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
735 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
737 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
738 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
744 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
747 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
751 if (val > 0xffffffff)
754 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
755 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
758 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
760 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
763 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
764 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
765 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
766 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
768 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
769 struct audit_context *ctx,
770 struct list_head *list)
772 struct audit_entry *e;
773 enum audit_state state;
775 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
776 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
779 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
780 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
781 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
784 ctx->current_state = state;
789 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
793 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
794 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
796 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
797 struct audit_names *n,
798 struct audit_context *ctx) {
799 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
800 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
801 struct audit_entry *e;
802 enum audit_state state;
804 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
805 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
806 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
807 ctx->current_state = state;
814 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
815 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
816 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
817 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
819 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
821 struct audit_names *n;
823 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
828 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
829 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
835 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
837 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
838 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
839 context->proctitle.len = 0;
842 static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
844 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
845 kfree(context->module.name);
846 context->module.name = NULL;
849 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
851 struct audit_names *n, *next;
853 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
860 context->name_count = 0;
861 path_put(&context->pwd);
862 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
863 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
866 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
868 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
870 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
871 context->aux = aux->next;
874 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
875 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
880 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
882 struct audit_context *context;
884 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
887 context->state = state;
888 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
889 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
890 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
895 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
898 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
899 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
900 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
903 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
905 struct audit_context *context;
906 enum audit_state state;
909 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
910 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
912 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
913 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
914 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
918 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
920 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
923 context->filterkey = key;
925 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
926 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
930 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
932 audit_free_module(context);
933 audit_free_names(context);
934 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
935 free_tree_refs(context);
936 audit_free_aux(context);
937 kfree(context->filterkey);
938 kfree(context->sockaddr);
939 audit_proctitle_free(context);
943 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
944 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
947 struct audit_buffer *ab;
952 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
956 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
957 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
958 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
960 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
961 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
964 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
965 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
968 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
969 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
975 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
976 struct audit_buffer **ab)
990 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
992 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
993 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
994 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
997 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
998 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
999 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1000 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1001 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1002 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1004 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1005 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1007 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1012 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1017 require_data = true;
1022 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1023 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1024 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1025 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1026 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1027 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1028 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1030 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1032 /* read more data from userspace */
1034 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1035 if (buf != buf_head) {
1036 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1040 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1041 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1043 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1044 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1045 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1047 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1048 /* buffer is not large enough */
1049 require_data = true;
1050 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1051 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1052 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1053 * consistent record encoding */
1055 len_full = len_full * 2;
1058 require_data = false;
1060 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1062 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1063 if (len_full < len_max)
1064 len_full = (encode ?
1065 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1069 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1071 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1072 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1075 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1077 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1078 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1079 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1081 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1084 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1085 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1090 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1092 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1093 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1095 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1096 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1100 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1101 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1102 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1104 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1105 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1107 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1108 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1110 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1111 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1115 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1116 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1117 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1118 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1119 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1121 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1122 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1123 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1124 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1125 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1126 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1127 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1133 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1134 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1138 require_data = true;
1141 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1143 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1149 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1154 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1155 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1158 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1160 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1163 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1165 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1166 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1169 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1170 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1171 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1172 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1173 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1176 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1178 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1181 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1185 switch (context->type) {
1186 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1187 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1188 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1189 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1190 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1191 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1194 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1196 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1197 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1198 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1203 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1204 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1207 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1208 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1211 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1213 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1214 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1217 audit_log_format(ab,
1218 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1219 context->ipc.qbytes,
1220 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1221 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1222 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1226 audit_log_format(ab,
1227 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1228 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1229 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1230 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1231 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1232 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1233 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1235 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1236 audit_log_format(ab,
1237 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1238 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1239 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1240 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1241 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1242 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1243 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1245 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1246 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1247 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1248 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1250 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1251 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1252 audit_log_format(ab,
1253 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1255 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1256 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1257 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1260 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1261 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1262 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1263 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1264 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1267 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1268 context->mmap.flags);
1271 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1273 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1274 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1275 if (context->module.name) {
1276 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1278 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1285 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1287 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1288 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1291 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1292 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1293 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1298 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1299 * @context: audit_context for the task
1300 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1301 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1302 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1303 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1305 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1306 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1308 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1310 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1314 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1317 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1319 switch (n->name_len) {
1320 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1321 /* log the full path */
1322 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1323 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1326 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1327 * directory component is the cwd
1329 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1332 /* log the name's directory component */
1333 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1334 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1338 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1340 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1341 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1346 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1347 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1354 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1355 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1356 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1360 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1361 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1365 /* log the audit_names record type */
1367 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1368 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1370 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1371 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1373 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1374 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1376 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1377 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1380 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1384 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1388 static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1392 char *msg = "(null)";
1393 int len = strlen(msg);
1394 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1395 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1397 if (!context || context->dummy)
1400 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1402 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1404 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1407 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1408 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1411 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1412 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1417 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1422 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1423 context->proctitle.len = res;
1425 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1426 len = context->proctitle.len;
1428 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1432 static void audit_log_exit(void)
1434 int i, call_panic = 0;
1435 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1436 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1437 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1438 struct audit_names *n;
1440 context->personality = current->personality;
1442 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1444 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1445 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1446 context->arch, context->major);
1447 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1448 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1449 if (context->return_valid)
1450 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1451 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1452 context->return_code);
1454 audit_log_format(ab,
1455 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1460 context->name_count);
1462 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1463 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1466 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1468 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1470 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1472 switch (aux->type) {
1474 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1475 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1476 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1477 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1478 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1479 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1480 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1481 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1482 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1483 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1484 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1485 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1486 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1487 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1488 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1489 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1498 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1500 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1501 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1503 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1504 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1509 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1510 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1512 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1513 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1514 context->sockaddr_len);
1519 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1520 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1522 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1523 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1524 axs->target_auid[i],
1526 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1528 axs->target_comm[i]))
1532 if (context->target_pid &&
1533 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1534 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1535 context->target_sessionid,
1536 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1539 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1540 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1542 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1548 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1551 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1554 audit_log_proctitle();
1556 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1557 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1561 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1565 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1566 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1568 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1570 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1572 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1577 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1578 audit_kill_trees(context);
1580 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1581 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1582 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1583 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1585 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1586 context->return_valid = 0;
1587 context->return_code = 0;
1589 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context,
1590 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1591 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1592 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1596 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1597 audit_free_context(context);
1601 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1602 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1603 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1604 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1605 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1606 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1608 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1609 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1610 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1611 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1612 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1613 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1616 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1617 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1619 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1620 enum audit_state state;
1622 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1625 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1627 state = context->state;
1628 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1631 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1632 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1634 if (auditd_test_task(current))
1638 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
1639 context->major = major;
1640 context->argv[0] = a1;
1641 context->argv[1] = a2;
1642 context->argv[2] = a3;
1643 context->argv[3] = a4;
1644 context->serial = 0;
1645 context->in_syscall = 1;
1646 context->current_state = state;
1648 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
1652 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1653 * @success: success value of the syscall
1654 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1656 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1657 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1658 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1659 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1660 * free the names stored from getname().
1662 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1664 struct audit_context *context;
1666 context = audit_context();
1670 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1671 audit_kill_trees(context);
1673 if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1675 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1677 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1680 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1681 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1682 * arch specific signal handlers
1684 * This is actually a test for:
1685 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1686 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1688 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1690 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1691 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1692 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1693 context->return_code = -EINTR;
1695 context->return_code = return_code;
1697 audit_filter_syscall(current, context,
1698 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1699 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
1700 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1704 context->in_syscall = 0;
1705 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1707 audit_free_module(context);
1708 audit_free_names(context);
1709 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1710 audit_free_aux(context);
1711 context->aux = NULL;
1712 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1713 context->target_pid = 0;
1714 context->target_sid = 0;
1715 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1717 context->fds[0] = -1;
1718 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1719 kfree(context->filterkey);
1720 context->filterkey = NULL;
1724 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1726 struct audit_context *context;
1727 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1728 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1730 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
1732 context = audit_context();
1734 count = context->tree_count;
1736 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1740 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1742 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1743 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1744 audit_set_auditable(context);
1745 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1746 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1749 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1752 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1754 struct audit_context *context;
1755 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1756 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1757 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1761 context = audit_context();
1763 count = context->tree_count;
1768 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1770 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1771 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
1772 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1773 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1775 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1781 parent = d->d_parent;
1786 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1789 /* just a race with rename */
1790 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1793 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1794 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1795 /* OK, got more space */
1796 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1800 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1801 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1802 audit_set_auditable(context);
1808 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1811 struct audit_names *aname;
1813 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1814 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1815 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1817 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1820 aname->should_free = true;
1823 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1825 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1827 context->name_count++;
1832 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1833 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1835 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1836 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1837 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1840 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1842 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1843 struct audit_names *n;
1845 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1848 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1857 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1858 * @name: name to add
1860 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1861 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1863 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1865 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1866 struct audit_names *n;
1868 if (!context->in_syscall)
1871 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1876 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1880 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1881 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1884 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
1885 const struct dentry *dentry)
1887 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1893 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1897 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1898 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1899 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1900 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
1901 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
1902 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1907 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1908 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
1909 const struct dentry *dentry,
1910 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
1912 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1913 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1914 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1915 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1916 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1917 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1918 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1919 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
1920 name->fcap_ver = -1;
1923 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1927 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1928 * @name: name being audited
1929 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1930 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1932 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1935 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1936 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1937 struct audit_names *n;
1938 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1939 struct audit_entry *e;
1940 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
1943 if (!context->in_syscall)
1947 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
1948 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
1949 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
1951 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
1952 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
1954 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
1966 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1967 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1972 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1973 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1976 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1981 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1983 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
1984 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
1985 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
1987 } else if (n->name) {
1988 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
1989 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
1992 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
1995 /* match the correct record type */
1997 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1998 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2001 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2007 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2008 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2018 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2019 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2020 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2023 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2024 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2026 handle_path(dentry);
2027 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2030 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2032 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2036 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2037 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2038 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2039 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2041 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2042 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2043 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2044 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2045 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2046 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2047 * unsuccessful attempts.
2049 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2050 const struct dentry *dentry,
2051 const unsigned char type)
2053 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2054 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2055 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2056 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2057 struct audit_entry *e;
2058 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2061 if (!context->in_syscall)
2065 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2066 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2067 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2069 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2070 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2072 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2083 /* look for a parent entry first */
2084 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2086 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2087 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2090 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2091 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2092 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2093 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2094 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2100 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2101 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2102 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2104 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2107 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2108 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2110 found_parent->name_len :
2112 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2119 if (!found_parent) {
2120 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2121 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2124 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2128 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2132 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2133 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2134 * audit_free_names() */
2136 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2137 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2138 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2143 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2145 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2147 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2150 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2151 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2152 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2153 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2155 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2157 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2158 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2160 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2163 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2164 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2165 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2166 *serial = ctx->serial;
2169 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2175 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2178 * @attr: queue attributes
2181 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2183 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2186 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2188 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2190 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2191 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2193 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2197 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2198 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2199 * @msg_len: Message length
2200 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2201 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2204 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2205 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2207 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2208 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2211 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2213 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2215 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2216 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2217 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2219 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2223 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2224 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2225 * @notification: Notification event
2229 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2231 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2234 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2236 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2238 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2239 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2243 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2244 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2248 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2250 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2251 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2252 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2253 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2257 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2258 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2261 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2263 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2264 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2265 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2266 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2267 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2268 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2269 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2273 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2274 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2275 * @uid: msgq user id
2276 * @gid: msgq group id
2277 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2279 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2281 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2283 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2285 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2286 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2287 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2288 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2289 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2292 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2294 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2296 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2297 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2302 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2303 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2307 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2309 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2311 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2313 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2314 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2315 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2320 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2321 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2322 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2325 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2327 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2328 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2329 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2333 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2334 * @len: data length in user space
2335 * @a: data address in kernel space
2337 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2339 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2341 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2343 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2344 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2347 context->sockaddr = p;
2350 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2351 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2355 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2357 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2359 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2360 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2361 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2362 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2363 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2364 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2368 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2369 * @t: task being signaled
2371 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2372 * and uid that is doing that.
2374 int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2376 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2377 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2378 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2380 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2383 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2384 * in audit_context */
2385 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2386 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2387 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2388 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2389 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2390 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2391 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2395 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2396 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2397 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2401 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2402 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2403 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2405 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2407 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2408 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2409 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2410 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2411 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2412 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2419 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2420 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2421 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2422 * @old: the old credentials
2424 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2425 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2429 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2430 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2432 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2433 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2434 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2436 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2440 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2441 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2442 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2444 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2446 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2447 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2448 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2449 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2450 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2452 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2453 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2454 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2455 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2457 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2458 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2459 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2460 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2465 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2466 * @new: the new credentials
2467 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2469 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2470 * audit system if applicable
2472 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2474 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2475 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2476 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2477 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2478 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2479 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2480 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2483 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2485 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2486 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2487 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2488 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2491 void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2493 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2495 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2496 if (!context->module.name)
2497 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2498 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2501 void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2503 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2504 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2507 void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2509 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
2510 "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
2511 (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
2514 static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
2515 const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
2517 const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
2519 if (val->newval == val->oldval)
2522 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
2523 "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
2526 void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2528 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
2529 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
2530 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
2531 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
2532 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
2533 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
2536 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2540 unsigned int sessionid;
2541 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2543 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2544 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2545 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2547 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2548 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2549 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2550 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2552 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2553 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2554 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2555 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2559 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2560 * @signr: signal value
2562 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2563 * should record the event for investigation.
2565 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2567 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2572 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2575 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2579 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2584 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2585 * @syscall: syscall number
2586 * @signr: signal value
2587 * @code: the seccomp action
2589 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2590 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2591 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2592 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2593 * audit is not in use.
2595 void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2597 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2599 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2603 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2604 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2605 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2609 void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2612 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2617 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2618 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2622 audit_log_format(ab,
2623 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2624 names, old_names, res);
2628 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2630 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2631 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2633 return &ctx->killed_trees;