1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/tty.h>
67 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
68 #include <linux/highmem.h>
69 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
70 #include <linux/capability.h>
71 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72 #include <linux/compat.h>
76 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
77 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
78 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
79 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
81 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
82 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
84 /* number of audit rules */
87 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
90 struct audit_aux_data {
91 struct audit_aux_data *next;
95 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
97 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
98 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
100 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
101 struct audit_aux_data d;
102 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
103 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
104 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
105 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
106 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
107 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
111 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
112 struct audit_aux_data d;
113 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
114 unsigned int fcap_ver;
115 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
116 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
119 struct audit_tree_refs {
120 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
121 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
124 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
126 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
127 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
128 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
132 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
139 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
141 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
142 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
144 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
145 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
147 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
148 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
151 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
152 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
153 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
155 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
156 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
158 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
159 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
163 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
165 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
166 case 4: /* socketcall */
167 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
169 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
175 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
177 struct audit_names *n;
178 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
183 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
184 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
185 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
193 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
194 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
195 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
196 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
197 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
198 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
199 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
202 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
203 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
207 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
211 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
213 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
214 int left = ctx->tree_count;
216 p->c[--left] = chunk;
217 ctx->tree_count = left;
226 ctx->tree_count = 30;
232 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
234 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
235 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
241 p->next = ctx->trees;
243 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
244 ctx->tree_count = 31;
249 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
250 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
252 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
253 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
256 /* we started with empty chain */
257 p = ctx->first_trees;
259 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
264 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
266 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
270 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
271 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
275 ctx->tree_count = count;
279 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
281 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
282 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
288 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
290 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
291 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
296 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
297 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
298 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
303 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
304 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
311 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
312 struct audit_names *name,
313 struct audit_field *f,
314 struct audit_context *ctx)
316 struct audit_names *n;
320 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
326 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
327 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
335 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
336 struct audit_names *name,
337 struct audit_field *f,
338 struct audit_context *ctx)
340 struct audit_names *n;
344 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
350 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
351 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
359 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
360 const struct cred *cred,
361 struct audit_field *f,
362 struct audit_context *ctx,
363 struct audit_names *name)
366 /* process to file object comparisons */
367 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
368 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
369 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
370 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
371 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
372 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
373 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
374 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
375 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
376 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
377 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
378 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
379 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
380 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
382 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
383 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
384 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
385 /* uid comparisons */
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
387 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
389 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
390 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
391 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
392 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
393 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
394 /* auid comparisons */
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
396 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
400 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
401 /* euid comparisons */
402 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
403 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
404 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
405 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
406 /* suid comparisons */
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
408 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
409 /* gid comparisons */
410 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
411 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
412 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
413 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
415 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
416 /* egid comparisons */
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
418 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
419 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
420 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
421 /* sgid comparison */
422 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
423 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
425 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
431 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
432 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
435 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
436 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
437 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
439 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
440 struct audit_krule *rule,
441 struct audit_context *ctx,
442 struct audit_names *name,
443 enum audit_state *state,
446 const struct cred *cred;
450 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
452 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
453 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
454 struct audit_names *n;
459 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
464 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
465 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
469 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
472 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
475 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
478 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
481 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
482 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
484 result = in_group_p(f->gid);
485 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
487 result = !in_group_p(f->gid);
491 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
492 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
494 result = in_egroup_p(f->gid);
495 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
497 result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid);
501 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
504 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
507 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
511 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
515 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
516 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
519 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
521 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
523 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
528 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
529 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
532 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
533 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
534 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
543 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
544 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
547 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
548 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
549 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
558 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
560 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
561 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
570 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
572 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
573 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
582 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
584 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
585 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
594 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
598 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
603 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
605 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
606 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
608 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
609 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
610 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
613 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
614 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
615 match for now to avoid losing information that
616 may be wanted. An error message will also be
620 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
623 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
632 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
633 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
634 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
637 /* Find files that match */
639 result = security_audit_rule_match(
640 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
643 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
644 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
652 /* Find ipc objects that match */
653 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
655 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
666 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
668 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
669 /* ignore this field for filtering */
673 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
676 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
678 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
679 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
687 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
689 if (rule->filterkey) {
690 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
691 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
693 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
695 switch (rule->action) {
696 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
697 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
702 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
703 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
704 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
706 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
708 struct audit_entry *e;
709 enum audit_state state;
712 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
713 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
715 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
716 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
722 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
725 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
726 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
727 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
728 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
730 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
731 struct audit_context *ctx,
732 struct list_head *list)
734 struct audit_entry *e;
735 enum audit_state state;
737 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
738 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
741 if (!list_empty(list)) {
742 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
743 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
745 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
746 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
747 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
750 ctx->current_state = state;
756 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
760 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
761 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
763 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
764 struct audit_names *n,
765 struct audit_context *ctx) {
767 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
768 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
769 struct audit_entry *e;
770 enum audit_state state;
772 word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
773 bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
775 if (list_empty(list))
778 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
779 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
780 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
781 ctx->current_state = state;
789 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
790 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
791 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
792 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
794 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
796 struct audit_names *n;
798 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
803 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
804 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
810 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
814 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
818 context->return_valid = return_valid;
821 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
822 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
825 * This is actually a test for:
826 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
827 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
829 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
831 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
832 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
833 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
834 context->return_code = -EINTR;
836 context->return_code = return_code;
838 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
839 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
840 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
843 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
847 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
849 struct audit_names *n, *next;
852 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
855 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
856 " name_count=%d put_count=%d ino_count=%d"
857 " [NOT freeing]\n", __FILE__, __LINE__,
858 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
859 context->name_count, context->put_count,
861 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
862 pr_err("names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name,
863 n->name->name ?: "(null)");
870 context->put_count = 0;
871 context->ino_count = 0;
874 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
876 if (n->name && n->name_put)
877 final_putname(n->name);
881 context->name_count = 0;
882 path_put(&context->pwd);
883 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
884 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
887 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
889 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
891 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
892 context->aux = aux->next;
895 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
896 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
901 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
903 struct audit_context *context;
905 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
908 context->state = state;
909 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
910 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
911 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
916 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
919 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
920 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
921 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
924 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
926 struct audit_context *context;
927 enum audit_state state;
930 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
931 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
933 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
934 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
935 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
939 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
941 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
944 context->filterkey = key;
946 tsk->audit_context = context;
947 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
951 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
953 audit_free_names(context);
954 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
955 free_tree_refs(context);
956 audit_free_aux(context);
957 kfree(context->filterkey);
958 kfree(context->sockaddr);
962 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
963 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
966 struct audit_buffer *ab;
971 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
975 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
976 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
977 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
979 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
980 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
983 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
984 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
987 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
988 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
995 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
996 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
997 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
999 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1000 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1001 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1002 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1003 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1005 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1006 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1009 const char __user *p,
1012 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1013 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1014 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1015 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1016 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1017 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1018 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1021 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1022 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1025 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1026 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1027 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1030 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1032 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1036 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1038 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1039 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1042 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1044 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1045 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1050 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1053 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1054 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1057 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1058 * send half as much in each message
1060 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1063 len_left -= to_send;
1065 } while (len_left > 0);
1069 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1072 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1073 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1076 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1077 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1081 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1082 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1084 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1086 room_left -= to_send;
1087 if (room_left < 0) {
1090 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1096 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1097 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1099 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1100 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1101 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1104 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1105 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1106 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1108 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1109 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1114 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1117 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1119 /* actually log it */
1120 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1122 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1123 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1125 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1127 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1130 len_left -= to_send;
1131 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1133 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1135 *len_sent += to_send;
1137 /* include the null we didn't log */
1141 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1142 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1145 size_t len_sent = 0;
1146 const char __user *p;
1149 p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1151 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1154 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1155 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1156 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1157 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1159 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1161 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1165 for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) {
1166 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1175 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1177 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1180 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1184 switch (context->type) {
1185 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1186 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1187 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1188 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1189 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1190 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1193 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1195 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1196 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1197 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1202 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1203 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1206 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1207 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1210 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1212 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1213 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1216 audit_log_format(ab,
1217 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1218 context->ipc.qbytes,
1219 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1220 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1221 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1224 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1225 audit_log_format(ab,
1226 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1227 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1228 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1229 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1230 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1231 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1232 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1234 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1235 audit_log_format(ab,
1236 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1237 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1238 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1239 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1240 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1241 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1242 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1244 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1245 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1246 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1247 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1249 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1250 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1251 audit_log_format(ab,
1252 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1254 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1255 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1256 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1258 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1259 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1260 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1261 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1262 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1265 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1266 context->mmap.flags);
1268 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1269 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1275 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1277 int i, call_panic = 0;
1278 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1279 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1280 struct audit_names *n;
1282 /* tsk == current */
1283 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1285 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1287 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1288 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1289 context->arch, context->major);
1290 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1291 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1292 if (context->return_valid)
1293 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1294 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1295 context->return_code);
1297 audit_log_format(ab,
1298 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1303 context->name_count);
1305 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1306 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1309 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1311 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1313 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1315 switch (aux->type) {
1317 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1318 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1319 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1320 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1321 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1322 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1323 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1324 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1325 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1326 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1327 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1328 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1336 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1338 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1339 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1341 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1342 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1347 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1348 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1350 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1351 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1352 context->sockaddr_len);
1357 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1358 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1360 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1361 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1362 axs->target_auid[i],
1364 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1366 axs->target_comm[i]))
1370 if (context->target_pid &&
1371 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1372 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1373 context->target_sessionid,
1374 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1377 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1378 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1380 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1386 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1389 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1392 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1393 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1397 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1401 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1402 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1404 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1406 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1408 struct audit_context *context;
1410 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1414 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1415 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1416 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1417 * in the context of the idle thread */
1418 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1419 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1420 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1421 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1422 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1424 audit_free_context(context);
1428 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1429 * @arch: architecture type
1430 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1431 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1432 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1433 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1434 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1436 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1437 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1438 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1439 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1440 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1441 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1444 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1445 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1446 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1448 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1449 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1450 enum audit_state state;
1455 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1460 context->arch = arch;
1461 context->major = major;
1462 context->argv[0] = a1;
1463 context->argv[1] = a2;
1464 context->argv[2] = a3;
1465 context->argv[3] = a4;
1467 state = context->state;
1468 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1469 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1471 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1473 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1476 context->serial = 0;
1477 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1478 context->in_syscall = 1;
1479 context->current_state = state;
1484 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1485 * @success: success value of the syscall
1486 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1488 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1489 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1490 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1491 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1492 * free the names stored from getname().
1494 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1496 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1497 struct audit_context *context;
1500 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1502 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1504 context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1508 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1509 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1511 context->in_syscall = 0;
1512 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1514 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1515 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1517 audit_free_names(context);
1518 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1519 audit_free_aux(context);
1520 context->aux = NULL;
1521 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1522 context->target_pid = 0;
1523 context->target_sid = 0;
1524 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1526 context->fds[0] = -1;
1527 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1528 kfree(context->filterkey);
1529 context->filterkey = NULL;
1531 tsk->audit_context = context;
1534 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1536 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1537 struct audit_context *context;
1538 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1539 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1541 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1543 context = current->audit_context;
1545 count = context->tree_count;
1547 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1551 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1553 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1554 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1555 audit_set_auditable(context);
1556 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1557 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1560 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1564 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1566 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1567 struct audit_context *context;
1568 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1569 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1570 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1574 context = current->audit_context;
1576 count = context->tree_count;
1581 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1583 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1584 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1585 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1586 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1588 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1594 parent = d->d_parent;
1599 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1602 /* just a race with rename */
1603 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1606 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1607 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1608 /* OK, got more space */
1609 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1613 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1614 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1615 audit_set_auditable(context);
1622 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1625 struct audit_names *aname;
1627 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1628 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1629 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1631 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1634 aname->should_free = true;
1637 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1639 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1641 context->name_count++;
1643 context->ino_count++;
1649 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1650 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1652 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1653 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1654 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1657 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1659 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1660 struct audit_names *n;
1662 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1665 if (n->name->uptr == uptr)
1672 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1673 * @name: name to add
1675 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1676 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1678 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1680 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1681 struct audit_names *n;
1683 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1684 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1685 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1686 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1693 /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1694 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1697 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1702 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1706 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1707 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1710 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1711 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1713 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1714 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1715 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1717 void audit_putname(struct filename *name)
1719 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1722 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1723 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1724 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
1725 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1726 if (context->name_count) {
1727 struct audit_names *n;
1730 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1731 pr_err("name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name,
1732 n->name->name ?: "(null)");
1735 final_putname(name);
1739 ++context->put_count;
1740 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1741 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d putname(%p)"
1742 " name_count=%d put_count=%d\n",
1744 context->serial, context->major,
1745 context->in_syscall, name->name,
1746 context->name_count, context->put_count);
1754 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1755 * @name: name being audited
1756 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1757 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1759 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1762 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1763 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1764 struct audit_names *n;
1765 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1767 if (!context->in_syscall)
1774 /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1775 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1778 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1779 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1784 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1785 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1788 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1793 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1794 /* does the name pointer match? */
1795 if (!n->name || n->name->name != name->name)
1798 /* match the correct record type */
1800 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1801 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1804 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1810 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new
1813 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL);
1818 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1819 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1820 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
1823 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1824 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
1826 handle_path(dentry);
1827 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
1831 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1832 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1833 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1834 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1836 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1837 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1838 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1839 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1840 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1841 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1842 * unsuccessful attempts.
1844 void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
1845 const struct dentry *dentry,
1846 const unsigned char type)
1848 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1849 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1850 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
1851 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1853 if (!context->in_syscall)
1859 /* look for a parent entry first */
1860 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1861 if (!n->name || n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1864 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1865 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
1871 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1872 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1873 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1874 if (!n->name || n->type != type)
1877 /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */
1878 if (found_parent && (n->name != found_parent->name))
1881 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
1882 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
1884 found_parent->name_len :
1891 if (!found_parent) {
1892 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1893 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
1896 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
1900 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
1904 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1905 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1906 * audit_free_names() */
1908 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
1909 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1910 /* don't call __putname() */
1911 found_child->name_put = false;
1915 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
1917 found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1919 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1922 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1923 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1924 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1925 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1927 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1929 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1930 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1932 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
1935 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1936 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1937 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1938 *serial = ctx->serial;
1941 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
1946 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1947 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1949 static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
1951 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
1952 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
1954 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
1955 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
1957 /* it is set, you need permission */
1958 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
1960 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
1961 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
1966 static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
1967 unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
1970 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1971 uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
1976 uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
1977 oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
1978 loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
1980 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1983 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u"
1984 " old-auid=%u new-auid=%u old-ses=%u new-ses=%u"
1987 oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid,
1993 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
1994 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1998 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2000 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
2002 struct task_struct *task = current;
2003 unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1;
2007 oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2008 oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2010 rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
2014 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2015 if (uid_valid(loginuid))
2016 sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2018 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2019 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2021 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
2026 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2029 * @attr: queue attributes
2032 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2034 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2037 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2039 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2041 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2042 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2044 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2048 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2049 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2050 * @msg_len: Message length
2051 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2052 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2055 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2056 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2058 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2059 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2062 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2064 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2066 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2067 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2068 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2070 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2074 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2075 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2076 * @notification: Notification event
2080 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2082 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2085 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2087 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2089 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2090 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2094 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2095 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2099 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2101 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2102 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2103 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2104 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2108 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2109 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2112 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2114 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2115 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2116 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2117 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2118 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2119 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2120 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2124 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2125 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2126 * @uid: msgq user id
2127 * @gid: msgq group id
2128 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2130 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2132 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2134 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2136 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2137 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2138 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2139 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2140 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2143 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2145 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2147 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2148 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2153 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2154 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2158 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2160 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2162 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2164 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2165 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2166 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2171 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2172 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2173 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2176 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2178 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2179 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2180 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2184 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2185 * @len: data length in user space
2186 * @a: data address in kernel space
2188 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2190 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2192 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2194 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2195 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2198 context->sockaddr = p;
2201 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2202 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2206 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2208 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2210 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2211 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2212 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2213 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2214 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2215 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2219 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2220 * @sig: signal value
2221 * @t: task being signaled
2223 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2224 * and uid that is doing that.
2226 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2228 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2229 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2230 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2231 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2233 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2234 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2235 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2236 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
2237 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2239 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2240 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2242 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2246 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2247 * in audit_context */
2248 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2249 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2250 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2251 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2252 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2253 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2254 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2258 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2259 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2260 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2264 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2265 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2266 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2268 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2270 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2271 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2272 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2273 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2274 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2275 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2282 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2283 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2284 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2285 * @old: the old credentials
2287 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2288 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2292 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2293 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2295 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2296 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2297 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2298 struct dentry *dentry;
2300 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2304 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2305 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2306 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2308 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2309 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2312 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2313 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2314 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2315 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2317 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2318 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2319 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2321 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2322 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2323 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2328 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2329 * @new: the new credentials
2330 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2332 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2333 * audit system if applicable
2335 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2337 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2338 context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current);
2339 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2340 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2341 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2342 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2345 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2347 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2348 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2349 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2350 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2353 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2357 unsigned int sessionid;
2358 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
2360 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2361 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2362 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2364 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2365 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2366 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2367 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2369 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2370 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2371 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2373 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2375 audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path);
2376 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2378 audit_log_format(ab, " exe=(null)");
2382 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2383 * @signr: signal value
2385 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2386 * should record the event for investigation.
2388 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2390 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2395 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2398 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2402 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2406 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2408 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2410 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2414 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2415 audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
2416 audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
2417 audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
2418 audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
2422 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2424 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2425 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2427 return &ctx->killed_trees;