1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
33 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
35 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
36 * filesystem information.
38 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
39 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
42 #include <linux/init.h>
43 #include <asm/types.h>
44 #include <asm/atomic.h>
45 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
49 #include <linux/module.h>
50 #include <linux/mount.h>
51 #include <linux/socket.h>
52 #include <linux/audit.h>
53 #include <linux/personality.h>
54 #include <linux/time.h>
55 #include <linux/kthread.h>
56 #include <linux/netlink.h>
57 #include <linux/compiler.h>
58 #include <asm/unistd.h>
59 #include <linux/security.h>
62 1 = put_count checking
63 2 = verbose put_count checking
67 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
68 extern int audit_enabled;
70 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
71 * for saving names from getname(). */
72 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
74 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
75 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
77 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
79 /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
80 a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
81 the syscall filter. */
83 AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
84 * No syscall-specific audit records can
86 AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
87 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
88 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
90 AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
91 * and always fill it in at syscall
92 * entry time. This makes a full
93 * syscall record available if some
94 * other part of the kernel decides it
95 * should be recorded. */
96 AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
97 * always fill it in at syscall entry
98 * time, and always write out the audit
99 * record at syscall exit time. */
102 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
103 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
104 * pointers at syscall exit time).
106 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
119 struct audit_aux_data {
120 struct audit_aux_data *next;
124 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
126 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
127 struct audit_aux_data d;
129 unsigned long qbytes;
136 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
137 struct audit_aux_data d;
139 unsigned long args[0];
142 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
143 struct audit_aux_data d;
148 struct audit_aux_data_path {
149 struct audit_aux_data d;
150 struct dentry *dentry;
151 struct vfsmount *mnt;
154 /* The per-task audit context. */
155 struct audit_context {
156 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
157 enum audit_state state;
158 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
159 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
160 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
161 int major; /* syscall number */
162 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
163 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
164 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
165 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
167 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
169 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
170 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
171 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
173 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
175 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
176 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
177 unsigned long personality;
187 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
188 * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
189 * syscall exit time. */
190 static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
191 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
192 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
193 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
194 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
195 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
196 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
197 #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6
198 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
203 struct list_head list;
205 struct audit_rule rule;
208 extern int audit_pid;
210 /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from
211 * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
212 static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
216 if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
217 && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
218 && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
220 if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
222 if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
226 d->action = s->action;
227 d->field_count = s->field_count;
228 for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
229 d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
230 d->values[i] = s->values[i];
232 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
236 /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
237 * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and
238 * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
239 static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
243 if (a->flags != b->flags)
246 if (a->action != b->action)
249 if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
252 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
253 if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
254 || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
258 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
259 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
265 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
266 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
267 * audit_netlink_sem. */
268 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
269 struct list_head *list)
271 struct audit_entry *entry;
274 /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
275 * addition routine. */
276 list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
277 if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
282 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
283 if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS)
285 if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE )
286 rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL;
287 else if ( (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) == 0 )
288 rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_EQUAL;
289 rule->fields[i] &= (~AUDIT_NEGATE);
292 if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
294 if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
299 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
300 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
301 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
303 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
309 static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
311 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
315 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
316 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
317 * audit_netlink_sem. */
318 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
319 struct list_head *list)
321 struct audit_entry *e;
323 /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
324 * deletion routine. */
325 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
326 if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
327 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
328 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
332 return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
335 static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
339 struct audit_entry *entry;
346 down(&audit_netlink_sem);
348 /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
349 always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
350 for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
351 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
352 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
353 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
355 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
357 up(&audit_netlink_sem);
362 * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type
363 * @type: audit message type
364 * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages
365 * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages
366 * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
367 * @data: payload data
368 * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
370 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
373 struct task_struct *tsk;
380 /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
381 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
382 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
383 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
384 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
386 dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
392 tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
399 listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
400 if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
403 err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
405 audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
406 "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
409 listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
410 if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
413 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
415 audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
416 "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
425 static int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right)
429 return (left == right);
430 case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
431 return (left != right);
432 case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
433 return (left < right);
434 case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
435 return (left <= right);
436 case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
437 return (left > right);
438 case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
439 return (left >= right);
445 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
447 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
448 struct audit_rule *rule,
449 struct audit_context *ctx,
450 enum audit_state *state)
454 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
455 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS;
456 u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
457 u32 value = rule->values[i];
462 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, op, value);
465 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, op, value);
468 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, op, value);
471 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, op, value);
474 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, op, value);
477 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, op, value);
480 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, op, value);
483 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, op, value);
486 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, op, value);
489 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, op, value);
493 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, op, value);
497 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
498 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, op, value);
501 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
503 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
505 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
510 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
511 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) {
520 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
521 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) {
530 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
531 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value) ||
532 audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, op, value)) {
542 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, op, value);
549 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0], op, value);
556 switch (rule->action) {
557 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
558 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
559 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
564 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
565 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
566 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
568 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
570 struct audit_entry *e;
571 enum audit_state state;
574 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
575 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
581 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
584 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
585 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
586 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
587 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
589 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
590 struct audit_context *ctx,
591 struct list_head *list)
593 struct audit_entry *e;
594 enum audit_state state;
596 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
597 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
600 if (!list_empty(list)) {
601 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
602 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
604 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
605 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
606 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
613 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
616 static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
617 struct audit_rule *rule,
618 enum audit_state *state)
622 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
623 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS;
624 u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
625 u32 value = rule->values[i];
630 result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, op, value);
633 result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, op, value);
636 result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, op, value);
639 result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, op, value);
646 switch (rule->action) {
647 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
648 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
649 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
654 int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
656 struct audit_entry *e;
657 enum audit_state state;
661 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
662 if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
663 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
670 return ret; /* Audit by default */
673 int audit_filter_type(int type)
675 struct audit_entry *e;
679 if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE]))
680 goto unlock_and_return;
682 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE],
684 struct audit_rule *rule = &e->rule;
686 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
687 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS;
688 u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
689 u32 value = rule->values[i];
690 if ( field == AUDIT_MSGTYPE ) {
691 result = audit_comparator(type, op, value);
697 goto unlock_and_return;
705 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
706 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
710 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
712 if (likely(!context))
714 context->return_valid = return_valid;
715 context->return_code = return_code;
717 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
718 enum audit_state state;
719 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
720 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
721 context->auditable = 1;
724 context->pid = tsk->pid;
725 context->uid = tsk->uid;
726 context->gid = tsk->gid;
727 context->euid = tsk->euid;
728 context->suid = tsk->suid;
729 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
730 context->egid = tsk->egid;
731 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
732 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
733 context->personality = tsk->personality;
734 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
738 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
743 if (context->auditable
744 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
745 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
746 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
747 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
749 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
750 context->name_count, context->put_count,
752 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
753 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
754 context->names[i].name,
755 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
762 context->put_count = 0;
763 context->ino_count = 0;
766 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
767 char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
768 context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
770 if (context->names[i].name)
771 __putname(context->names[i].name);
773 context->name_count = 0;
777 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
779 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
782 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
784 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
786 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
787 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
788 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
792 if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
793 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
798 context->aux = aux->next;
803 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
804 enum audit_state state)
806 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
808 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
809 context->state = state;
810 context->loginuid = loginuid;
813 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
815 struct audit_context *context;
817 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
819 audit_zero_context(context, state);
824 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
827 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
828 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
829 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
832 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
834 struct audit_context *context;
835 enum audit_state state;
837 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
838 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
840 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
841 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
844 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
845 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
849 /* Preserve login uid */
850 context->loginuid = -1;
851 if (current->audit_context)
852 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
854 tsk->audit_context = context;
855 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
859 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
861 struct audit_context *previous;
865 previous = context->previous;
866 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
868 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
869 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
870 context->serial, context->major,
871 context->name_count, count);
873 audit_free_names(context);
874 audit_free_aux(context);
879 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
882 static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
887 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
894 ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
898 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
902 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
908 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
912 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
914 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
915 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
916 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
918 get_task_comm(name, current);
919 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
920 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
926 * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
927 * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
929 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
932 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
934 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
935 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
936 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
941 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
942 audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
945 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
948 struct audit_buffer *ab;
949 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
951 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
953 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
954 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
955 context->arch, context->major);
956 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
957 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
958 if (context->return_valid)
959 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
960 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
961 context->return_code);
963 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
964 " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
965 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
966 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
976 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
977 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
978 audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
981 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
983 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
985 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
989 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
991 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
992 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
995 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
997 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
998 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
999 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
1000 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
1003 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
1004 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
1006 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1007 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
1010 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
1011 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
1012 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
1019 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
1020 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
1022 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
1026 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1027 unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
1028 unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
1030 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
1032 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1034 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1036 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1037 if (context->names[i].name)
1038 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
1040 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1042 if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
1043 audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
1044 if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
1045 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
1046 if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
1047 audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1048 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1049 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
1050 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
1051 context->names[i].mode,
1052 context->names[i].uid,
1053 context->names[i].gid,
1054 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
1055 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
1056 if (context->names[i].ctx) {
1057 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
1058 context->names[i].ctx);
1066 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1067 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1069 * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
1071 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1073 struct audit_context *context;
1076 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1079 if (likely(!context))
1082 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1083 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1084 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1085 * in the context of the idle thread */
1086 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1087 audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
1089 audit_free_context(context);
1093 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1094 * @tsk: task being audited
1095 * @arch: architecture type
1096 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1097 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1098 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1099 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1100 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1102 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1103 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1104 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1105 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1106 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1107 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1110 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
1111 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1112 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1114 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1115 enum audit_state state;
1120 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1121 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1122 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1123 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1124 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1128 * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
1130 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1131 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1133 if (context->in_syscall) {
1134 struct audit_context *newctx;
1138 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1139 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1140 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1142 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1144 newctx->previous = context;
1146 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1148 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1149 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1150 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1151 * to abandon auditing. */
1152 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1155 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1160 context->arch = arch;
1161 context->major = major;
1162 context->argv[0] = a1;
1163 context->argv[1] = a2;
1164 context->argv[2] = a3;
1165 context->argv[3] = a4;
1167 state = context->state;
1168 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
1169 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1170 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1173 context->serial = 0;
1174 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1175 context->in_syscall = 1;
1176 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1180 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1181 * @tsk: task being audited
1182 * @valid: success/failure flag
1183 * @return_code: syscall return value
1185 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1186 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1187 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1188 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1189 * free the names stored from getname().
1191 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
1193 struct audit_context *context;
1195 get_task_struct(tsk);
1197 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1200 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
1201 * called __put_task_struct. */
1202 if (likely(!context))
1205 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1206 audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
1208 context->in_syscall = 0;
1209 context->auditable = 0;
1211 if (context->previous) {
1212 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1213 context->previous = NULL;
1214 audit_free_context(context);
1215 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1217 audit_free_names(context);
1218 audit_free_aux(context);
1219 tsk->audit_context = context;
1222 put_task_struct(tsk);
1226 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1227 * @name: name to add
1229 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1230 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1232 void audit_getname(const char *name)
1234 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1236 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1239 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1240 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1241 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1242 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1247 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1248 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1249 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1250 ++context->name_count;
1251 if (!context->pwd) {
1252 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1253 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
1254 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
1255 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1260 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1261 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1263 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1264 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1265 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1267 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1269 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1272 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1273 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1274 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1275 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1276 if (context->name_count) {
1278 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1279 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1280 context->names[i].name,
1281 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1288 ++context->put_count;
1289 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1290 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1291 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1294 context->serial, context->major,
1295 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1296 context->put_count);
1303 void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
1305 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1306 const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
1313 len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
1314 if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
1319 ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
1323 len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
1327 kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
1328 context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
1334 audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
1341 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1342 * @name: name being audited
1343 * @inode: inode being audited
1344 * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
1346 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1348 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
1351 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1353 if (!context->in_syscall)
1355 if (context->name_count
1356 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1357 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1358 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1359 else if (context->name_count > 1
1360 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1361 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1362 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1364 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1365 * associated name? */
1366 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1368 idx = context->name_count++;
1369 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1371 ++context->ino_count;
1374 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1375 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1376 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1377 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1378 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1379 audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
1380 if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
1381 (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
1382 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1383 context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
1385 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1386 context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
1391 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1392 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1393 * @inode: inode being audited
1394 * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
1396 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1397 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1398 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1399 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1400 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1401 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1402 * unsuccessful attempts.
1404 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
1408 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1410 if (!context->in_syscall)
1413 /* determine matching parent */
1415 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
1416 if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
1418 const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
1419 int dlen = strlen(dname);
1420 int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
1425 /* disregard trailing slashes */
1426 n = name + nlen - 1;
1427 while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
1430 /* find last path component */
1434 else if (n > name) {
1441 if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
1442 goto update_context;
1445 /* catch-all in case match not found */
1446 idx = context->name_count++;
1447 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1448 context->names[idx].pino = pino;
1450 context->ino_count++;
1455 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1456 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1457 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1458 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1459 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1460 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1461 audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
1466 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1467 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1468 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1469 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1471 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1473 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1474 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1477 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1478 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1479 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1480 *serial = ctx->serial;
1485 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1486 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1487 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1491 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1493 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1495 if (task->audit_context) {
1496 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1498 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1500 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1501 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1502 task->pid, task->uid,
1503 task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
1506 task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
1512 * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
1513 * @ctx: the audit_context
1515 * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
1517 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1519 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1522 static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1524 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1528 if (likely(!context))
1531 len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
1532 if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
1537 ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1541 len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
1549 audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
1555 * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
1556 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
1557 * @uid: msgq user id
1558 * @gid: msgq group id
1559 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
1561 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1563 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1565 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1566 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1568 if (likely(!context))
1571 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1575 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1579 ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
1581 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1582 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1583 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1588 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
1589 * @nargs: number of args
1592 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1594 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1596 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1597 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1599 if (likely(!context))
1602 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1607 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1609 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1610 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1611 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1616 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
1617 * @len: data length in user space
1618 * @a: data address in kernel space
1620 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1622 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1624 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1625 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1627 if (likely(!context))
1630 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1635 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1637 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1638 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1639 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1644 * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
1645 * @dentry: dentry to record
1646 * @mnt: mnt to record
1648 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1650 * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
1652 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1654 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1655 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1657 if (likely(!context))
1660 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1664 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1665 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1667 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1668 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1669 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1674 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
1675 * @sig: signal value
1676 * @t: task being signaled
1678 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
1679 * and uid that is doing that.
1681 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1683 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1684 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1686 if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
1687 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
1688 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1689 audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
1691 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1693 audit_sig_uid = current->uid;