arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

   1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
   2 /*
   3  *  Copyright (C) 1994  Linus Torvalds
   4  *
   5  *  Cyrix stuff, June 1998 by:
   6  *      - Rafael R. Reilova (moved everything from head.S),
   7  *        <rreilova@ececs.uc.edu>
   8  *      - Channing Corn (tests & fixes),
   9  *      - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup).
  10  */
  11 #include <linux/init.h>
  12 #include <linux/utsname.h>
  13 #include <linux/cpu.h>
  14 #include <linux/module.h>
  15 #include <linux/nospec.h>
  16 #include <linux/prctl.h>
  17
  18 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
  19 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
  20 #include <asm/bugs.h>
  21 #include <asm/processor.h>
  22 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
  23 #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
  24 #include <asm/msr.h>
  25 #include <asm/vmx.h>
  26 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
  27 #include <asm/alternative.h>
  28 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
  29 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
  30 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
  31 #include <asm/e820/api.h>
  32 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
  33
  34 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
  35 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
  36 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
  37
  38 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
  39 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
  40 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
  41 static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
  42
  43 /*
  44  * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
  45  * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
  46  */
  47 static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
  48
  49 /*
  50  * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
  51  * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
  52  */
  53 u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
  54 u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
  55
  56 void __init check_bugs(void)
  57 {
  58         identify_boot_cpu();
  59
  60         /*
  61          * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
  62          * core code know.
  63          */
  64         cpu_smt_check_topology_early();
  65
  66         if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
  67                 pr_info("CPU: ");
  68                 print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
  69         }
  70
  71         /*
  72          * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
  73          * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
  74          * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
  75          */
  76         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
  77                 rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
  78
  79         /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
  80         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
  81                 x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
  82
  83         /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
  84         spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
  85
  86         /*
  87          * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
  88          * Bypass vulnerability.
  89          */
  90         ssb_select_mitigation();
  91
  92         l1tf_select_mitigation();
  93
  94 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
  95         /*
  96          * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
  97          *
  98          * - i386 is no longer supported.
  99          * - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be
 100          *   compiled for a i486.
 101          */
 102         if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
 103                 panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");
 104
 105         init_utsname()->machine[1] =
 106                 '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
 107         alternative_instructions();
 108
 109         fpu__init_check_bugs();
 110 #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 111         alternative_instructions();
 112
 113         /*
 114          * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
 115          * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
 116          * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
 117          *
 118          * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
 119          * very little benefit for that case.
 120          */
 121         if (!direct_gbpages)
 122                 set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
 123 #endif
 124 }
 125
 126 /* The kernel command line selection */
 127 enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
 128         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
 129         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
 130         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
 131         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
 132         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
 133         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
 134 };
 135
 136 static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
 137         [SPECTRE_V2_NONE]                       = "Vulnerable",
 138         [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL]          = "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline",
 139         [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD]      = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
 140         [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC]          = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
 141         [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD]              = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
 142         [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED]              = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
 143 };
 144
 145 #undef pr_fmt
 146 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 147
 148 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
 149         SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 150
 151 void
 152 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 153 {
 154         u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 155         struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
 156
 157         /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
 158         if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
 159                 /*
 160                  * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
 161                  * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
 162                  * modifiable bits from the guest value.
 163                  */
 164                 guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
 165                 guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
 166
 167                 /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
 168                 if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
 169                     static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
 170                         hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
 171
 172                 if (hostval != guestval) {
 173                         msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
 174                         wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
 175                 }
 176         }
 177
 178         /*
 179          * If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
 180          * MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
 181          */
 182         if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
 183             !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
 184                 return;
 185
 186         /*
 187          * If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
 188          * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
 189          * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
 190          */
 191         if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
 192                 hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
 193         else
 194                 hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
 195
 196         /* Sanitize the guest value */
 197         guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
 198
 199         if (hostval != guestval) {
 200                 unsigned long tif;
 201
 202                 tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
 203                                  ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
 204
 205                 speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
 206         }
 207 }
 208 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
 209
 210 static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 211 {
 212         u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 213
 214         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
 215                 wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
 216         else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
 217                 wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 218 }
 219
 220 #ifdef RETPOLINE
 221 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
 222
 223 bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
 224 {
 225         if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
 226                 return true;
 227
 228         pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n");
 229         spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
 230         return false;
 231 }
 232
 233 static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
 234 {
 235         return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
 236 }
 237 #else
 238 static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
 239 #endif
 240
 241 static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
 242 {
 243         if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
 244                 pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
 245 }
 246
 247 static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
 248 {
 249         if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
 250                 pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
 251 }
 252
 253 static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
 254 {
 255         return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
 256 }
 257
 258 static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
 259 {
 260         int len = strlen(opt);
 261
 262         return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
 263 }
 264
 265 static const struct {
 266         const char *option;
 267         enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 268         bool secure;
 269 } mitigation_options[] = {
 270         { "off",               SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,              false },
 271         { "on",                SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,             true },
 272         { "retpoline",         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,         false },
 273         { "retpoline,amd",     SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,     false },
 274         { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
 275         { "auto",              SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,              false },
 276 };
 277
 278 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 279 {
 280         char arg[20];
 281         int ret, i;
 282         enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 283
 284         if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
 285                 return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 286         else {
 287                 ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
 288                 if (ret < 0)
 289                         return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 290
 291                 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
 292                         if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
 293                                 continue;
 294                         cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
 295                         break;
 296                 }
 297
 298                 if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
 299                         pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
 300                         return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 301                 }
 302         }
 303
 304         if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
 305              cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
 306              cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
 307             !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
 308                 pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
 309                 return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 310         }
 311
 312         if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD &&
 313             boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON &&
 314             boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
 315                 pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
 316                 return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 317         }
 318
 319         if (mitigation_options[i].secure)
 320                 spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option);
 321         else
 322                 spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option);
 323
 324         return cmd;
 325 }
 326
 327 static bool stibp_needed(void)
 328 {
 329         if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE)
 330                 return false;
 331
 332         if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
 333                 return false;
 334
 335         return true;
 336 }
 337
 338 static void update_stibp_msr(void *info)
 339 {
 340         wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 341 }
 342
 343 void arch_smt_update(void)
 344 {
 345         u64 mask;
 346
 347         if (!stibp_needed())
 348                 return;
 349
 350         mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 351         mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 352         if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
 353                 mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
 354         else
 355                 mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
 356
 357         if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) {
 358                 pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n",
 359                                 cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ?
 360                                 "Enabling" : "Disabling");
 361                 x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
 362                 on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
 363         }
 364         mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 365 }
 366
 367 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 368 {
 369         enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
 370         enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 371
 372         /*
 373          * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
 374          * then nothing to do.
 375          */
 376         if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
 377             (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
 378                 return;
 379
 380         switch (cmd) {
 381         case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
 382                 return;
 383
 384         case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
 385         case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
 386                 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
 387                         mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
 388                         /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
 389                         x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
 390                         wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 391                         goto specv2_set_mode;
 392                 }
 393                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
 394                         goto retpoline_auto;
 395                 break;
 396         case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
 397                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
 398                         goto retpoline_amd;
 399                 break;
 400         case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
 401                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
 402                         goto retpoline_generic;
 403                 break;
 404         case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
 405                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
 406                         goto retpoline_auto;
 407                 break;
 408         }
 409         pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
 410         return;
 411
 412 retpoline_auto:
 413         if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
 414             boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
 415         retpoline_amd:
 416                 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
 417                         pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
 418                         goto retpoline_generic;
 419                 }
 420                 mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
 421                                          SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
 422                 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
 423                 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
 424         } else {
 425         retpoline_generic:
 426                 mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
 427                                          SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
 428                 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
 429         }
 430
 431 specv2_set_mode:
 432         spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
 433         pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 434
 435         /*
 436          * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
 437          * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
 438          * issues:
 439          *
 440          *      - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
 441          *      - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
 442          */
 443         setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
 444         pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
 445
 446         /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
 447         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
 448                 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
 449                 pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
 450         }
 451
 452         /*
 453          * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
 454          * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
 455          * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
 456          * supported.
 457          *
 458          * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
 459          * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
 460          * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
 461          * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
 462          */
 463         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
 464                 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
 465                 pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
 466         }
 467
 468         /* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
 469         arch_smt_update();
 470 }
 471
 472 #undef pr_fmt
 473 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
 474
 475 static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode __ro_after_init = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
 476
 477 /* The kernel command line selection */
 478 enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
 479         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
 480         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
 481         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
 482         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
 483         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
 484 };
 485
 486 static const char *ssb_strings[] = {
 487         [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE]        = "Vulnerable",
 488         [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE]     = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
 489         [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL]       = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
 490         [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP]     = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp",
 491 };
 492
 493 static const struct {
 494         const char *option;
 495         enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 496 } ssb_mitigation_options[] = {
 497         { "auto",       SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO },    /* Platform decides */
 498         { "on",         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON },      /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
 499         { "off",        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE },    /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
 500         { "prctl",      SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL },   /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
 501         { "seccomp",    SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */
 502 };
 503
 504 static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 505 {
 506         enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
 507         char arg[20];
 508         int ret, i;
 509
 510         if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
 511                 return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 512         } else {
 513                 ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
 514                                           arg, sizeof(arg));
 515                 if (ret < 0)
 516                         return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
 517
 518                 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
 519                         if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
 520                                 continue;
 521
 522                         cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
 523                         break;
 524                 }
 525
 526                 if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
 527                         pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
 528                         return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
 529                 }
 530         }
 531
 532         return cmd;
 533 }
 534
 535 static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 536 {
 537         enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
 538         enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 539
 540         if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
 541                 return mode;
 542
 543         cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
 544         if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
 545             (cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
 546              cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
 547                 return mode;
 548
 549         switch (cmd) {
 550         case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
 551         case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
 552                 /*
 553                  * Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
 554                  * enabled.
 555                  */
 556                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
 557                         mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
 558                 else
 559                         mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
 560                 break;
 561         case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
 562                 mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
 563                 break;
 564         case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
 565                 mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
 566                 break;
 567         case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
 568                 break;
 569         }
 570
 571         /*
 572          * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
 573          *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
 574          *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
 575          *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
 576          */
 577         if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
 578                 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
 579                 /*
 580                  * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may
 581                  * use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
 582                  */
 583                 if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
 584                     !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
 585                         x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 586                 } else {
 587                         x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
 588                         x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
 589                         wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 590                 }
 591         }
 592
 593         return mode;
 594 }
 595
 596 static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 597 {
 598         ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();
 599
 600         if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
 601                 pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
 602 }
 603
 604 #undef pr_fmt
 605 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Speculation prctl: " fmt
 606
 607 static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 608 {
 609         bool update;
 610
 611         if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
 612             ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
 613                 return -ENXIO;
 614
 615         switch (ctrl) {
 616         case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
 617                 /* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
 618                 if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
 619                         return -EPERM;
 620                 task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 621                 update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 622                 break;
 623         case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
 624                 task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 625                 update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 626                 break;
 627         case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
 628                 task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 629                 task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
 630                 update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 631                 break;
 632         default:
 633                 return -ERANGE;
 634         }
 635
 636         /*
 637          * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
 638          * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
 639          */
 640         if (task == current && update)
 641                 speculative_store_bypass_update_current();
 642
 643         return 0;
 644 }
 645
 646 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
 647                              unsigned long ctrl)
 648 {
 649         switch (which) {
 650         case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 651                 return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
 652         default:
 653                 return -ENODEV;
 654         }
 655 }
 656
 657 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 658 void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
 659 {
 660         if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
 661                 ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
 662 }
 663 #endif
 664
 665 static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
 666 {
 667         switch (ssb_mode) {
 668         case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
 669                 return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 670         case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP:
 671         case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
 672                 if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
 673                         return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
 674                 if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
 675                         return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 676                 return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
 677         default:
 678                 if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
 679                         return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
 680                 return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
 681         }
 682 }
 683
 684 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
 685 {
 686         switch (which) {
 687         case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 688                 return ssb_prctl_get(task);
 689         default:
 690                 return -ENODEV;
 691         }
 692 }
 693
 694 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 695 {
 696         if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 697                 wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 698
 699         if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
 700                 x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 701 }
 702
 703 #undef pr_fmt
 704 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "L1TF: " fmt
 705
 706 /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
 707 enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
 708 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
 709 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
 710 #endif
 711 enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
 712 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
 713
 714 /*
 715  * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
 716  * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
 717  *
 718  * The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
 719  * non present PTEs. When the installed memory reaches into the top most
 720  * address bit due to memory holes, which has been observed on machines
 721  * which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
 722  * then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
 723  * This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
 724  * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
 725  * instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
 726  * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
 727  */
 728 static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 729 {
 730         if (c->x86 != 6)
 731                 return;
 732
 733         switch (c->x86_model) {
 734         case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
 735         case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
 736         case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
 737         case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
 738         case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE:
 739         case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT:
 740         case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E:
 741         case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE:
 742         case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E:
 743         case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
 744         case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
 745         case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
 746         case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
 747                 if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)
 748                         c->x86_cache_bits = 44;
 749                 break;
 750         }
 751 }
 752
 753 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 754 {
 755         u64 half_pa;
 756
 757         if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 758                 return;
 759
 760         override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 761
 762         switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
 763         case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
 764         case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
 765         case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
 766                 break;
 767         case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
 768         case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
 769                 cpu_smt_disable(false);
 770                 break;
 771         case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
 772                 cpu_smt_disable(true);
 773                 break;
 774         }
 775
 776 #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
 777         pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
 778         return;
 779 #endif
 780
 781         half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
 782         if (e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
 783                 pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
 784                 pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
 785                                 half_pa);
 786                 pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
 787                 pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
 788                 return;
 789         }
 790
 791         setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
 792 }
 793
 794 static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
 795 {
 796         if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 797                 return 0;
 798
 799         if (!str)
 800                 return -EINVAL;
 801
 802         if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
 803                 l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
 804         else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nowarn"))
 805                 l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN;
 806         else if (!strcmp(str, "flush"))
 807                 l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
 808         else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nosmt"))
 809                 l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
 810         else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
 811                 l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL;
 812         else if (!strcmp(str, "full,force"))
 813                 l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE;
 814
 815         return 0;
 816 }
 817 early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
 818
 819 #undef pr_fmt
 820
 821 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 822
 823 #define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
 824
 825 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
 826 static const char *l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
 827         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]                = "auto",
 828         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]               = "vulnerable",
 829         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]                = "conditional cache flushes",
 830         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]              = "cache flushes",
 831         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED]        = "EPT disabled",
 832         [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED]        = "flush not necessary"
 833 };
 834
 835 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 836 {
 837         if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
 838                 return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
 839
 840         if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
 841             (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
 842              cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
 843                 return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
 844                                l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
 845
 846         return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
 847                        l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
 848                        cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 849 }
 850 #else
 851 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 852 {
 853         return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
 854 }
 855 #endif
 856
 857 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 858                                char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 859 {
 860         int ret;
 861
 862         if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
 863                 return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 864
 865         switch (bug) {
 866         case X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN:
 867                 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
 868                         return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
 869
 870                 if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV))
 871                         return sprintf(buf, "Unknown (XEN PV detected, hypervisor mitigation required)\n");
 872
 873                 break;
 874
 875         case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
 876                 return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 877
 878         case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
 879                 ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
 880                                boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
 881                                boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
 882                                (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
 883                                boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
 884                                spectre_v2_module_string());
 885                 return ret;
 886
 887         case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 888                 return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
 889
 890         case X86_BUG_L1TF:
 891                 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
 892                         return l1tf_show_state(buf);
 893                 break;
 894         default:
 895                 break;
 896         }
 897
 898         return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 899 }
 900
 901 ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 902 {
 903         return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 904 }
 905
 906 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 907 {
 908         return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 909 }
 910
 911 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 912 {
 913         return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 914 }
 915
 916 ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 917 {
 918         return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 919 }
 920
 921 ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 922 {
 923         return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
 924 }
 925 #endif