1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
3 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
4 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
6 #include <linux/static_key.h>
7 #include <linux/objtool.h>
8 #include <linux/linkage.h>
10 #include <asm/alternative.h>
11 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
12 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
13 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
14 #include <asm/percpu.h>
15 #include <asm/current.h>
18 * Call depth tracking for Intel SKL CPUs to address the RSB underflow
21 * The tracking does not use a counter. It uses uses arithmetic shift
22 * right on call entry and logical shift left on return.
24 * The depth tracking variable is initialized to 0x8000.... when the call
25 * depth is zero. The arithmetic shift right sign extends the MSB and
26 * saturates after the 12th call. The shift count is 5 for both directions
27 * so the tracking covers 12 nested calls.
30 * 0: 0x8000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
31 * 1: 0xfc00000000000000 0xf000000000000000
33 * 11: 0xfffffffffffffff8 0xfffffffffffffc00
34 * 12: 0xffffffffffffffff 0xffffffffffffffe0
36 * After a return buffer fill the depth is credited 12 calls before the
37 * next stuffing has to take place.
39 * There is a inaccuracy for situations like this:
48 * The shift count might cause this to be off by one in either direction,
49 * but there is still a cushion vs. the RSB depth. The algorithm does not
50 * claim to be perfect and it can be speculated around by the CPU, but it
51 * is considered that it obfuscates the problem enough to make exploitation
52 * extremely difficult.
54 #define RET_DEPTH_SHIFT 5
55 #define RSB_RET_STUFF_LOOPS 16
56 #define RET_DEPTH_INIT 0x8000000000000000ULL
57 #define RET_DEPTH_INIT_FROM_CALL 0xfc00000000000000ULL
58 #define RET_DEPTH_CREDIT 0xffffffffffffffffULL
60 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
61 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS \
62 incq %gs:__x86_call_count;
63 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_RETS \
64 incq %gs:__x86_ret_count;
65 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_STUFFS \
66 incq %gs:__x86_stuffs_count;
67 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW \
68 incq %gs:__x86_ctxsw_count;
70 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS
71 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_RETS
72 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_STUFFS
73 # define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW
76 #if defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS)
78 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
80 #define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH \
81 movq $-1, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth);
83 #define ASM_CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH \
84 movq $-1, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth);
86 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH \
89 movq %rax, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth);
91 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL \
94 movq %rax, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth); \
95 CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS
97 #define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH \
98 sarq $5, %gs:pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth; \
99 CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS
101 #define ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH \
102 sarq $5, PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_call_depth); \
103 CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CALLS
106 #define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH
107 #define ASM_CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH
108 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH
109 #define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH
110 #define ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH
111 #define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL
115 * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
117 * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
118 * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
120 * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
121 * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
122 * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
123 * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
124 * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
126 * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
127 * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
128 * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
131 #define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE 32
132 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
135 * Common helper for __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER and __FILL_ONE_RETURN.
137 #define __FILL_RETURN_SLOT \
138 ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
144 * Stuff the entire RSB.
146 * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
147 * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
148 * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
151 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr) \
156 add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, %_ASM_SP; \
159 /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \
161 ASM_CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH \
162 CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW
165 * i386 doesn't unconditionally have LFENCE, as such it can't
168 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr) \
170 __FILL_RETURN_SLOT; \
172 add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, %_ASM_SP;
176 * Stuff a single RSB slot.
178 * To mitigate Post-Barrier RSB speculation, one CALL instruction must be
179 * forced to retire before letting a RET instruction execute.
181 * On PBRSB-vulnerable CPUs, it is not safe for a RET to be executed
184 #define __FILL_ONE_RETURN \
186 add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP; \
192 * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
193 * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
196 .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
198 .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
204 * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions
205 * vs RETBleed validation.
207 #define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
210 * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should
211 * eventually turn into its own annotation.
213 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END
214 #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
215 (defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
216 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
222 * Equivalent to -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix; emit the 5 byte jmp/call
223 * to the retpoline thunk with a CS prefix when the register requires
224 * a RAX prefix byte to encode. Also see apply_retpolines().
226 .macro __CS_PREFIX reg:req
227 .irp rs,r8,r9,r10,r11,r12,r13,r14,r15
235 * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
236 * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
239 * NOTE: these do not take kCFI into account and are thus not comparable to C
240 * indirect calls, take care when using. The target of these should be an ENDBR
241 * instruction irrespective of kCFI.
243 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
244 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
246 jmp __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
253 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
254 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
256 call __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
263 * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
264 * monstrosity above, manually.
266 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2=ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS)
267 ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
268 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr)), \ftr, \
269 __stringify(nop;nop;__FILL_ONE_RETURN), \ftr2
274 #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
275 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET "call entry_untrain_ret"
277 #define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET ""
281 * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the
282 * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
283 * typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
285 * While retbleed_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
286 * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
288 * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
289 * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
291 .macro __UNTRAIN_RET ibpb_feature, call_depth_insns
292 #if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)
295 CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
296 "call entry_ibpb", \ibpb_feature, \
297 __stringify(\call_depth_insns), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
301 #define UNTRAIN_RET \
302 __UNTRAIN_RET X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB, __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH)
304 #define UNTRAIN_RET_VM \
305 __UNTRAIN_RET X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT, __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH)
307 #define UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL \
308 __UNTRAIN_RET X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB, __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL)
311 .macro CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
312 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
314 __stringify(ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
319 * Macro to execute VERW instruction that mitigate transient data sampling
320 * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW
321 * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF.
323 * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers.
325 .macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
326 ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw _ASM_RIP(mds_verw_sel)), X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
329 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
331 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
333 ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \
337 typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE];
338 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
339 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_array[];
340 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[];
342 #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
343 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
345 static inline void __x86_return_thunk(void) {}
348 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
349 extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
351 static inline void retbleed_return_thunk(void) {}
354 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
355 extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
356 extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
358 static inline void srso_return_thunk(void) {}
359 static inline void srso_alias_return_thunk(void) {}
362 extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
363 extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
364 extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
366 extern void entry_untrain_ret(void);
367 extern void entry_ibpb(void);
369 extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);
371 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
372 extern void call_depth_return_thunk(void);
374 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT \
376 __stringify(INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), \
377 X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH)
379 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
380 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_call_count);
381 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ret_count);
382 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_stuffs_count);
383 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ctxsw_count);
385 #else /* !CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
387 static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
388 #define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT ""
390 #endif /* CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
392 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
395 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
396 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
400 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_ ## reg;
401 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
405 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_ ## reg;
406 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
412 * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
413 * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
415 # define CALL_NOSPEC \
417 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
418 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
419 "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
420 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
422 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
423 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
424 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
426 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
428 #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
430 * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
431 * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
434 # define CALL_NOSPEC \
436 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
437 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
440 "901: call 903f;\n" \
445 "903: lea 4(%%esp), %%esp;\n" \
446 " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \
449 "904: call 901b;\n", \
450 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
452 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
453 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
454 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
456 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
458 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
459 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
460 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
463 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
464 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
466 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE,
469 SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
470 SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
474 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
475 enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
476 SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
477 SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
478 SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED,
479 SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
480 SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
483 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
484 enum ssb_mitigation {
485 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
486 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
487 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
488 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
491 static __always_inline
492 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
494 asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
497 "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
498 [feature] "i" (feature)
502 extern u64 x86_pred_cmd;
504 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
506 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, x86_pred_cmd, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
509 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
510 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
511 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
512 extern void update_spec_ctrl_cond(u64 val);
513 extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
516 * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
517 * before calling into firmware.
519 * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
521 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
524 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \
525 spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \
526 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
527 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, \
528 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW); \
531 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
533 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \
534 spec_ctrl_current(), \
535 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
539 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
540 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
541 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
543 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
545 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
547 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
549 extern u16 mds_verw_sel;
551 #include <asm/segment.h>
554 * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
556 * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
557 * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
558 * instruction is executed.
560 static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
562 static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
565 * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
566 * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
567 * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
568 * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
569 * data segment is the fastest variant.
571 * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
573 asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
577 * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
579 * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
581 static __always_inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
583 if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
584 mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
587 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
589 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */