| 1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| 2 | /* |
| 3 | * linux/kernel/seccomp.c |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * Copyright 2004-2005 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com> |
| 6 | * |
| 7 | * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc. |
| 8 | * Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> |
| 9 | * |
| 10 | * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility. |
| 11 | * |
| 12 | * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls. |
| 13 | * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form |
| 14 | * of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters. |
| 15 | */ |
| 16 | |
| 17 | #include <linux/refcount.h> |
| 18 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
| 19 | #include <linux/compat.h> |
| 20 | #include <linux/coredump.h> |
| 21 | #include <linux/kmemleak.h> |
| 22 | #include <linux/nospec.h> |
| 23 | #include <linux/prctl.h> |
| 24 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
| 25 | #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> |
| 26 | #include <linux/seccomp.h> |
| 27 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
| 28 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
| 29 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
| 30 | |
| 31 | #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER |
| 32 | #include <asm/syscall.h> |
| 33 | #endif |
| 34 | |
| 35 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER |
| 36 | #include <linux/file.h> |
| 37 | #include <linux/filter.h> |
| 38 | #include <linux/pid.h> |
| 39 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
| 40 | #include <linux/security.h> |
| 41 | #include <linux/tracehook.h> |
| 42 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> |
| 43 | #include <linux/anon_inodes.h> |
| 44 | |
| 45 | enum notify_state { |
| 46 | SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT, |
| 47 | SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT, |
| 48 | SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED, |
| 49 | }; |
| 50 | |
| 51 | struct seccomp_knotif { |
| 52 | /* The struct pid of the task whose filter triggered the notification */ |
| 53 | struct task_struct *task; |
| 54 | |
| 55 | /* The "cookie" for this request; this is unique for this filter. */ |
| 56 | u64 id; |
| 57 | |
| 58 | /* |
| 59 | * The seccomp data. This pointer is valid the entire time this |
| 60 | * notification is active, since it comes from __seccomp_filter which |
| 61 | * eclipses the entire lifecycle here. |
| 62 | */ |
| 63 | const struct seccomp_data *data; |
| 64 | |
| 65 | /* |
| 66 | * Notification states. When SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF is returned, a |
| 67 | * struct seccomp_knotif is created and starts out in INIT. Once the |
| 68 | * handler reads the notification off of an FD, it transitions to SENT. |
| 69 | * If a signal is received the state transitions back to INIT and |
| 70 | * another message is sent. When the userspace handler replies, state |
| 71 | * transitions to REPLIED. |
| 72 | */ |
| 73 | enum notify_state state; |
| 74 | |
| 75 | /* The return values, only valid when in SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */ |
| 76 | int error; |
| 77 | long val; |
| 78 | |
| 79 | /* Signals when this has entered SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */ |
| 80 | struct completion ready; |
| 81 | |
| 82 | struct list_head list; |
| 83 | }; |
| 84 | |
| 85 | /** |
| 86 | * struct notification - container for seccomp userspace notifications. Since |
| 87 | * most seccomp filters will not have notification listeners attached and this |
| 88 | * structure is fairly large, we store the notification-specific stuff in a |
| 89 | * separate structure. |
| 90 | * |
| 91 | * @request: A semaphore that users of this notification can wait on for |
| 92 | * changes. Actual reads and writes are still controlled with |
| 93 | * filter->notify_lock. |
| 94 | * @next_id: The id of the next request. |
| 95 | * @notifications: A list of struct seccomp_knotif elements. |
| 96 | * @wqh: A wait queue for poll. |
| 97 | */ |
| 98 | struct notification { |
| 99 | struct semaphore request; |
| 100 | u64 next_id; |
| 101 | struct list_head notifications; |
| 102 | wait_queue_head_t wqh; |
| 103 | }; |
| 104 | |
| 105 | /** |
| 106 | * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs |
| 107 | * |
| 108 | * @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime. |
| 109 | * get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance |
| 110 | * outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this |
| 111 | * is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks. |
| 112 | * @log: true if all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW should be logged |
| 113 | * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter |
| 114 | * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate |
| 115 | * @notif: the struct that holds all notification related information |
| 116 | * @notify_lock: A lock for all notification-related accesses. |
| 117 | * |
| 118 | * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev |
| 119 | * pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting |
| 120 | * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter. |
| 121 | * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which |
| 122 | * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory. This is similar to |
| 123 | * how namespaces work. |
| 124 | * |
| 125 | * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached |
| 126 | * to a task_struct (other than @usage). |
| 127 | */ |
| 128 | struct seccomp_filter { |
| 129 | refcount_t usage; |
| 130 | bool log; |
| 131 | struct seccomp_filter *prev; |
| 132 | struct bpf_prog *prog; |
| 133 | struct notification *notif; |
| 134 | struct mutex notify_lock; |
| 135 | }; |
| 136 | |
| 137 | /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */ |
| 138 | #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter)) |
| 139 | |
| 140 | /* |
| 141 | * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage |
| 142 | * as per the specific architecture. |
| 143 | */ |
| 144 | static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data *sd) |
| 145 | { |
| 146 | struct task_struct *task = current; |
| 147 | struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(task); |
| 148 | unsigned long args[6]; |
| 149 | |
| 150 | sd->nr = syscall_get_nr(task, regs); |
| 151 | sd->arch = syscall_get_arch(); |
| 152 | syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 0, 6, args); |
| 153 | sd->args[0] = args[0]; |
| 154 | sd->args[1] = args[1]; |
| 155 | sd->args[2] = args[2]; |
| 156 | sd->args[3] = args[3]; |
| 157 | sd->args[4] = args[4]; |
| 158 | sd->args[5] = args[5]; |
| 159 | sd->instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(task); |
| 160 | } |
| 161 | |
| 162 | /** |
| 163 | * seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code |
| 164 | * @filter: filter to verify |
| 165 | * @flen: length of filter |
| 166 | * |
| 167 | * Takes a previously checked filter (by bpf_check_classic) and |
| 168 | * redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data |
| 169 | * and related data through seccomp_bpf_load. It also |
| 170 | * enforces length and alignment checking of those loads. |
| 171 | * |
| 172 | * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not. |
| 173 | */ |
| 174 | static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) |
| 175 | { |
| 176 | int pc; |
| 177 | for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) { |
| 178 | struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc]; |
| 179 | u16 code = ftest->code; |
| 180 | u32 k = ftest->k; |
| 181 | |
| 182 | switch (code) { |
| 183 | case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS: |
| 184 | ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_ABS; |
| 185 | /* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */ |
| 186 | if (k >= sizeof(struct seccomp_data) || k & 3) |
| 187 | return -EINVAL; |
| 188 | continue; |
| 189 | case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_LEN: |
| 190 | ftest->code = BPF_LD | BPF_IMM; |
| 191 | ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data); |
| 192 | continue; |
| 193 | case BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_LEN: |
| 194 | ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM; |
| 195 | ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data); |
| 196 | continue; |
| 197 | /* Explicitly include allowed calls. */ |
| 198 | case BPF_RET | BPF_K: |
| 199 | case BPF_RET | BPF_A: |
| 200 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_K: |
| 201 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_X: |
| 202 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_K: |
| 203 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_X: |
| 204 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_K: |
| 205 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_X: |
| 206 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K: |
| 207 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X: |
| 208 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K: |
| 209 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_X: |
| 210 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_K: |
| 211 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_X: |
| 212 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K: |
| 213 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_X: |
| 214 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_K: |
| 215 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_X: |
| 216 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_K: |
| 217 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_X: |
| 218 | case BPF_ALU | BPF_NEG: |
| 219 | case BPF_LD | BPF_IMM: |
| 220 | case BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM: |
| 221 | case BPF_MISC | BPF_TAX: |
| 222 | case BPF_MISC | BPF_TXA: |
| 223 | case BPF_LD | BPF_MEM: |
| 224 | case BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM: |
| 225 | case BPF_ST: |
| 226 | case BPF_STX: |
| 227 | case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA: |
| 228 | case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K: |
| 229 | case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_X: |
| 230 | case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K: |
| 231 | case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_X: |
| 232 | case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K: |
| 233 | case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_X: |
| 234 | case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K: |
| 235 | case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_X: |
| 236 | continue; |
| 237 | default: |
| 238 | return -EINVAL; |
| 239 | } |
| 240 | } |
| 241 | return 0; |
| 242 | } |
| 243 | |
| 244 | /** |
| 245 | * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd |
| 246 | * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters |
| 247 | * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value, |
| 248 | * unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will |
| 249 | * be unchanged. |
| 250 | * |
| 251 | * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes. |
| 252 | */ |
| 253 | #define ACTION_ONLY(ret) ((s32)((ret) & (SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL))) |
| 254 | static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd, |
| 255 | struct seccomp_filter **match) |
| 256 | { |
| 257 | u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; |
| 258 | /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */ |
| 259 | struct seccomp_filter *f = |
| 260 | READ_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter); |
| 261 | |
| 262 | /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */ |
| 263 | if (WARN_ON(f == NULL)) |
| 264 | return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS; |
| 265 | |
| 266 | /* |
| 267 | * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return |
| 268 | * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA). |
| 269 | */ |
| 270 | preempt_disable(); |
| 271 | for (; f; f = f->prev) { |
| 272 | u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, sd); |
| 273 | |
| 274 | if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret) < ACTION_ONLY(ret)) { |
| 275 | ret = cur_ret; |
| 276 | *match = f; |
| 277 | } |
| 278 | } |
| 279 | preempt_enable(); |
| 280 | return ret; |
| 281 | } |
| 282 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ |
| 283 | |
| 284 | static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode) |
| 285 | { |
| 286 | assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 287 | |
| 288 | if (current->seccomp.mode && current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode) |
| 289 | return false; |
| 290 | |
| 291 | return true; |
| 292 | } |
| 293 | |
| 294 | void __weak arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) { } |
| 295 | |
| 296 | static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task, |
| 297 | unsigned long seccomp_mode, |
| 298 | unsigned long flags) |
| 299 | { |
| 300 | assert_spin_locked(&task->sighand->siglock); |
| 301 | |
| 302 | task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode; |
| 303 | /* |
| 304 | * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and |
| 305 | * filter) is set. |
| 306 | */ |
| 307 | smp_mb__before_atomic(); |
| 308 | /* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */ |
| 309 | if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW) == 0) |
| 310 | arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(task); |
| 311 | set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP); |
| 312 | } |
| 313 | |
| 314 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER |
| 315 | /* Returns 1 if the parent is an ancestor of the child. */ |
| 316 | static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter *parent, |
| 317 | struct seccomp_filter *child) |
| 318 | { |
| 319 | /* NULL is the root ancestor. */ |
| 320 | if (parent == NULL) |
| 321 | return 1; |
| 322 | for (; child; child = child->prev) |
| 323 | if (child == parent) |
| 324 | return 1; |
| 325 | return 0; |
| 326 | } |
| 327 | |
| 328 | /** |
| 329 | * seccomp_can_sync_threads: checks if all threads can be synchronized |
| 330 | * |
| 331 | * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held. |
| 332 | * |
| 333 | * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or the pid of a thread which was |
| 334 | * either not in the correct seccomp mode or it did not have an ancestral |
| 335 | * seccomp filter. |
| 336 | */ |
| 337 | static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void) |
| 338 | { |
| 339 | struct task_struct *thread, *caller; |
| 340 | |
| 341 | BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex)); |
| 342 | assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 343 | |
| 344 | /* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */ |
| 345 | caller = current; |
| 346 | for_each_thread(caller, thread) { |
| 347 | pid_t failed; |
| 348 | |
| 349 | /* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */ |
| 350 | if (thread == caller) |
| 351 | continue; |
| 352 | |
| 353 | if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED || |
| 354 | (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER && |
| 355 | is_ancestor(thread->seccomp.filter, |
| 356 | caller->seccomp.filter))) |
| 357 | continue; |
| 358 | |
| 359 | /* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */ |
| 360 | failed = task_pid_vnr(thread); |
| 361 | /* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */ |
| 362 | if (WARN_ON(failed == 0)) |
| 363 | failed = -ESRCH; |
| 364 | return failed; |
| 365 | } |
| 366 | |
| 367 | return 0; |
| 368 | } |
| 369 | |
| 370 | /** |
| 371 | * seccomp_sync_threads: sets all threads to use current's filter |
| 372 | * |
| 373 | * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held, and for |
| 374 | * seccomp_can_sync_threads() to have returned success already |
| 375 | * without dropping the locks. |
| 376 | * |
| 377 | */ |
| 378 | static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags) |
| 379 | { |
| 380 | struct task_struct *thread, *caller; |
| 381 | |
| 382 | BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex)); |
| 383 | assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 384 | |
| 385 | /* Synchronize all threads. */ |
| 386 | caller = current; |
| 387 | for_each_thread(caller, thread) { |
| 388 | /* Skip current, since it needs no changes. */ |
| 389 | if (thread == caller) |
| 390 | continue; |
| 391 | |
| 392 | /* Get a task reference for the new leaf node. */ |
| 393 | get_seccomp_filter(caller); |
| 394 | /* |
| 395 | * Drop the task reference to the shared ancestor since |
| 396 | * current's path will hold a reference. (This also |
| 397 | * allows a put before the assignment.) |
| 398 | */ |
| 399 | put_seccomp_filter(thread); |
| 400 | smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter, |
| 401 | caller->seccomp.filter); |
| 402 | |
| 403 | /* |
| 404 | * Don't let an unprivileged task work around |
| 405 | * the no_new_privs restriction by creating |
| 406 | * a thread that sets it up, enters seccomp, |
| 407 | * then dies. |
| 408 | */ |
| 409 | if (task_no_new_privs(caller)) |
| 410 | task_set_no_new_privs(thread); |
| 411 | |
| 412 | /* |
| 413 | * Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed. |
| 414 | * As threads are considered to be trust-realm |
| 415 | * equivalent (see ptrace_may_access), it is safe to |
| 416 | * allow one thread to transition the other. |
| 417 | */ |
| 418 | if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) |
| 419 | seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, |
| 420 | flags); |
| 421 | } |
| 422 | } |
| 423 | |
| 424 | /** |
| 425 | * seccomp_prepare_filter: Prepares a seccomp filter for use. |
| 426 | * @fprog: BPF program to install |
| 427 | * |
| 428 | * Returns filter on success or an ERR_PTR on failure. |
| 429 | */ |
| 430 | static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) |
| 431 | { |
| 432 | struct seccomp_filter *sfilter; |
| 433 | int ret; |
| 434 | const bool save_orig = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE); |
| 435 | |
| 436 | if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS) |
| 437 | return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
| 438 | |
| 439 | BUG_ON(INT_MAX / fprog->len < sizeof(struct sock_filter)); |
| 440 | |
| 441 | /* |
| 442 | * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has |
| 443 | * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs. |
| 444 | * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the |
| 445 | * behavior of privileged children. |
| 446 | */ |
| 447 | if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && |
| 448 | security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), |
| 449 | CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0) |
| 450 | return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); |
| 451 | |
| 452 | /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */ |
| 453 | sfilter = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfilter), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
| 454 | if (!sfilter) |
| 455 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
| 456 | |
| 457 | mutex_init(&sfilter->notify_lock); |
| 458 | ret = bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter->prog, fprog, |
| 459 | seccomp_check_filter, save_orig); |
| 460 | if (ret < 0) { |
| 461 | kfree(sfilter); |
| 462 | return ERR_PTR(ret); |
| 463 | } |
| 464 | |
| 465 | refcount_set(&sfilter->usage, 1); |
| 466 | |
| 467 | return sfilter; |
| 468 | } |
| 469 | |
| 470 | /** |
| 471 | * seccomp_prepare_user_filter - prepares a user-supplied sock_fprog |
| 472 | * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog. |
| 473 | * |
| 474 | * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise. |
| 475 | */ |
| 476 | static struct seccomp_filter * |
| 477 | seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter) |
| 478 | { |
| 479 | struct sock_fprog fprog; |
| 480 | struct seccomp_filter *filter = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); |
| 481 | |
| 482 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
| 483 | if (in_compat_syscall()) { |
| 484 | struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32; |
| 485 | if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32))) |
| 486 | goto out; |
| 487 | fprog.len = fprog32.len; |
| 488 | fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter); |
| 489 | } else /* falls through to the if below. */ |
| 490 | #endif |
| 491 | if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog))) |
| 492 | goto out; |
| 493 | filter = seccomp_prepare_filter(&fprog); |
| 494 | out: |
| 495 | return filter; |
| 496 | } |
| 497 | |
| 498 | /** |
| 499 | * seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter |
| 500 | * @flags: flags to change filter behavior |
| 501 | * @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process |
| 502 | * |
| 503 | * Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock. |
| 504 | * |
| 505 | * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error. |
| 506 | */ |
| 507 | static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags, |
| 508 | struct seccomp_filter *filter) |
| 509 | { |
| 510 | unsigned long total_insns; |
| 511 | struct seccomp_filter *walker; |
| 512 | |
| 513 | assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 514 | |
| 515 | /* Validate resulting filter length. */ |
| 516 | total_insns = filter->prog->len; |
| 517 | for (walker = current->seccomp.filter; walker; walker = walker->prev) |
| 518 | total_insns += walker->prog->len + 4; /* 4 instr penalty */ |
| 519 | if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH) |
| 520 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 521 | |
| 522 | /* If thread sync has been requested, check that it is possible. */ |
| 523 | if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) { |
| 524 | int ret; |
| 525 | |
| 526 | ret = seccomp_can_sync_threads(); |
| 527 | if (ret) |
| 528 | return ret; |
| 529 | } |
| 530 | |
| 531 | /* Set log flag, if present. */ |
| 532 | if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG) |
| 533 | filter->log = true; |
| 534 | |
| 535 | /* |
| 536 | * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its |
| 537 | * task reference. |
| 538 | */ |
| 539 | filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter; |
| 540 | current->seccomp.filter = filter; |
| 541 | |
| 542 | /* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */ |
| 543 | if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) |
| 544 | seccomp_sync_threads(flags); |
| 545 | |
| 546 | return 0; |
| 547 | } |
| 548 | |
| 549 | static void __get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter) |
| 550 | { |
| 551 | refcount_inc(&filter->usage); |
| 552 | } |
| 553 | |
| 554 | /* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */ |
| 555 | void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) |
| 556 | { |
| 557 | struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter; |
| 558 | if (!orig) |
| 559 | return; |
| 560 | __get_seccomp_filter(orig); |
| 561 | } |
| 562 | |
| 563 | static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter) |
| 564 | { |
| 565 | if (filter) { |
| 566 | bpf_prog_destroy(filter->prog); |
| 567 | kfree(filter); |
| 568 | } |
| 569 | } |
| 570 | |
| 571 | static void __put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *orig) |
| 572 | { |
| 573 | /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */ |
| 574 | while (orig && refcount_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) { |
| 575 | struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig; |
| 576 | orig = orig->prev; |
| 577 | seccomp_filter_free(freeme); |
| 578 | } |
| 579 | } |
| 580 | |
| 581 | /* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */ |
| 582 | void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) |
| 583 | { |
| 584 | __put_seccomp_filter(tsk->seccomp.filter); |
| 585 | } |
| 586 | |
| 587 | static void seccomp_init_siginfo(kernel_siginfo_t *info, int syscall, int reason) |
| 588 | { |
| 589 | clear_siginfo(info); |
| 590 | info->si_signo = SIGSYS; |
| 591 | info->si_code = SYS_SECCOMP; |
| 592 | info->si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current); |
| 593 | info->si_errno = reason; |
| 594 | info->si_arch = syscall_get_arch(); |
| 595 | info->si_syscall = syscall; |
| 596 | } |
| 597 | |
| 598 | /** |
| 599 | * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation |
| 600 | * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland |
| 601 | * @reason: filter-supplied reason code to send to userland (via si_errno) |
| 602 | * |
| 603 | * Forces a SIGSYS with a code of SYS_SECCOMP and related sigsys info. |
| 604 | */ |
| 605 | static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason) |
| 606 | { |
| 607 | struct kernel_siginfo info; |
| 608 | seccomp_init_siginfo(&info, syscall, reason); |
| 609 | force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current); |
| 610 | } |
| 611 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ |
| 612 | |
| 613 | /* For use with seccomp_actions_logged */ |
| 614 | #define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS (1 << 0) |
| 615 | #define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD (1 << 1) |
| 616 | #define SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP (1 << 2) |
| 617 | #define SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO (1 << 3) |
| 618 | #define SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE (1 << 4) |
| 619 | #define SECCOMP_LOG_LOG (1 << 5) |
| 620 | #define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW (1 << 6) |
| 621 | #define SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF (1 << 7) |
| 622 | |
| 623 | static u32 seccomp_actions_logged = SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS | |
| 624 | SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD | |
| 625 | SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP | |
| 626 | SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO | |
| 627 | SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF | |
| 628 | SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE | |
| 629 | SECCOMP_LOG_LOG; |
| 630 | |
| 631 | static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action, |
| 632 | bool requested) |
| 633 | { |
| 634 | bool log = false; |
| 635 | |
| 636 | switch (action) { |
| 637 | case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: |
| 638 | break; |
| 639 | case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: |
| 640 | log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP; |
| 641 | break; |
| 642 | case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: |
| 643 | log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO; |
| 644 | break; |
| 645 | case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: |
| 646 | log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE; |
| 647 | break; |
| 648 | case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF: |
| 649 | log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF; |
| 650 | break; |
| 651 | case SECCOMP_RET_LOG: |
| 652 | log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_LOG; |
| 653 | break; |
| 654 | case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD: |
| 655 | log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD; |
| 656 | break; |
| 657 | case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS: |
| 658 | default: |
| 659 | log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS; |
| 660 | } |
| 661 | |
| 662 | /* |
| 663 | * Emit an audit message when the action is RET_KILL_*, RET_LOG, or the |
| 664 | * FILTER_FLAG_LOG bit was set. The admin has the ability to silence |
| 665 | * any action from being logged by removing the action name from the |
| 666 | * seccomp_actions_logged sysctl. |
| 667 | */ |
| 668 | if (!log) |
| 669 | return; |
| 670 | |
| 671 | audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action); |
| 672 | } |
| 673 | |
| 674 | /* |
| 675 | * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn. |
| 676 | * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit |
| 677 | * to limit the stack allocations too. |
| 678 | */ |
| 679 | static const int mode1_syscalls[] = { |
| 680 | __NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn, |
| 681 | 0, /* null terminated */ |
| 682 | }; |
| 683 | |
| 684 | static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) |
| 685 | { |
| 686 | const int *syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls; |
| 687 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
| 688 | if (in_compat_syscall()) |
| 689 | syscall_whitelist = get_compat_mode1_syscalls(); |
| 690 | #endif |
| 691 | do { |
| 692 | if (*syscall_whitelist == this_syscall) |
| 693 | return; |
| 694 | } while (*++syscall_whitelist); |
| 695 | |
| 696 | #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG |
| 697 | dump_stack(); |
| 698 | #endif |
| 699 | seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD, true); |
| 700 | do_exit(SIGKILL); |
| 701 | } |
| 702 | |
| 703 | #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER |
| 704 | void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) |
| 705 | { |
| 706 | int mode = current->seccomp.mode; |
| 707 | |
| 708 | if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) && |
| 709 | unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) |
| 710 | return; |
| 711 | |
| 712 | if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) |
| 713 | return; |
| 714 | else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT) |
| 715 | __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); |
| 716 | else |
| 717 | BUG(); |
| 718 | } |
| 719 | #else |
| 720 | |
| 721 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER |
| 722 | static u64 seccomp_next_notify_id(struct seccomp_filter *filter) |
| 723 | { |
| 724 | /* |
| 725 | * Note: overflow is ok here, the id just needs to be unique per |
| 726 | * filter. |
| 727 | */ |
| 728 | lockdep_assert_held(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 729 | return filter->notif->next_id++; |
| 730 | } |
| 731 | |
| 732 | static void seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall, |
| 733 | struct seccomp_filter *match, |
| 734 | const struct seccomp_data *sd) |
| 735 | { |
| 736 | int err; |
| 737 | long ret = 0; |
| 738 | struct seccomp_knotif n = {}; |
| 739 | |
| 740 | mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock); |
| 741 | err = -ENOSYS; |
| 742 | if (!match->notif) |
| 743 | goto out; |
| 744 | |
| 745 | n.task = current; |
| 746 | n.state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT; |
| 747 | n.data = sd; |
| 748 | n.id = seccomp_next_notify_id(match); |
| 749 | init_completion(&n.ready); |
| 750 | list_add(&n.list, &match->notif->notifications); |
| 751 | |
| 752 | up(&match->notif->request); |
| 753 | wake_up_poll(&match->notif->wqh, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM); |
| 754 | mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock); |
| 755 | |
| 756 | /* |
| 757 | * This is where we wait for a reply from userspace. |
| 758 | */ |
| 759 | err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready); |
| 760 | mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock); |
| 761 | if (err == 0) { |
| 762 | ret = n.val; |
| 763 | err = n.error; |
| 764 | } |
| 765 | |
| 766 | /* |
| 767 | * Note that it's possible the listener died in between the time when |
| 768 | * we were notified of a respons (or a signal) and when we were able to |
| 769 | * re-acquire the lock, so only delete from the list if the |
| 770 | * notification actually exists. |
| 771 | * |
| 772 | * Also note that this test is only valid because there's no way to |
| 773 | * *reattach* to a notifier right now. If one is added, we'll need to |
| 774 | * keep track of the notif itself and make sure they match here. |
| 775 | */ |
| 776 | if (match->notif) |
| 777 | list_del(&n.list); |
| 778 | out: |
| 779 | mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock); |
| 780 | syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current), |
| 781 | err, ret); |
| 782 | } |
| 783 | |
| 784 | static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, |
| 785 | const bool recheck_after_trace) |
| 786 | { |
| 787 | u32 filter_ret, action; |
| 788 | struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL; |
| 789 | int data; |
| 790 | struct seccomp_data sd_local; |
| 791 | |
| 792 | /* |
| 793 | * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have |
| 794 | * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen. |
| 795 | */ |
| 796 | rmb(); |
| 797 | |
| 798 | if (!sd) { |
| 799 | populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local); |
| 800 | sd = &sd_local; |
| 801 | } |
| 802 | |
| 803 | filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match); |
| 804 | data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; |
| 805 | action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL; |
| 806 | |
| 807 | switch (action) { |
| 808 | case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: |
| 809 | /* Set low-order bits as an errno, capped at MAX_ERRNO. */ |
| 810 | if (data > MAX_ERRNO) |
| 811 | data = MAX_ERRNO; |
| 812 | syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current), |
| 813 | -data, 0); |
| 814 | goto skip; |
| 815 | |
| 816 | case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: |
| 817 | /* Show the handler the original registers. */ |
| 818 | syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current)); |
| 819 | /* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */ |
| 820 | seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data); |
| 821 | goto skip; |
| 822 | |
| 823 | case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: |
| 824 | /* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */ |
| 825 | if (recheck_after_trace) |
| 826 | return 0; |
| 827 | |
| 828 | /* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */ |
| 829 | if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) { |
| 830 | syscall_set_return_value(current, |
| 831 | task_pt_regs(current), |
| 832 | -ENOSYS, 0); |
| 833 | goto skip; |
| 834 | } |
| 835 | |
| 836 | /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */ |
| 837 | ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data); |
| 838 | /* |
| 839 | * The delivery of a fatal signal during event |
| 840 | * notification may silently skip tracer notification, |
| 841 | * which could leave us with a potentially unmodified |
| 842 | * syscall that the tracer would have liked to have |
| 843 | * changed. Since the process is about to die, we just |
| 844 | * force the syscall to be skipped and let the signal |
| 845 | * kill the process and correctly handle any tracer exit |
| 846 | * notifications. |
| 847 | */ |
| 848 | if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) |
| 849 | goto skip; |
| 850 | /* Check if the tracer forced the syscall to be skipped. */ |
| 851 | this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current)); |
| 852 | if (this_syscall < 0) |
| 853 | goto skip; |
| 854 | |
| 855 | /* |
| 856 | * Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This |
| 857 | * intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force |
| 858 | * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since |
| 859 | * a skip would have already been reported. |
| 860 | */ |
| 861 | if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true)) |
| 862 | return -1; |
| 863 | |
| 864 | return 0; |
| 865 | |
| 866 | case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF: |
| 867 | seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, sd); |
| 868 | goto skip; |
| 869 | |
| 870 | case SECCOMP_RET_LOG: |
| 871 | seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true); |
| 872 | return 0; |
| 873 | |
| 874 | case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: |
| 875 | /* |
| 876 | * Note that the "match" filter will always be NULL for |
| 877 | * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting |
| 878 | * state in seccomp_run_filters(). |
| 879 | */ |
| 880 | return 0; |
| 881 | |
| 882 | case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD: |
| 883 | case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS: |
| 884 | default: |
| 885 | seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action, true); |
| 886 | /* Dump core only if this is the last remaining thread. */ |
| 887 | if (action == SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS || |
| 888 | get_nr_threads(current) == 1) { |
| 889 | kernel_siginfo_t info; |
| 890 | |
| 891 | /* Show the original registers in the dump. */ |
| 892 | syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current)); |
| 893 | /* Trigger a manual coredump since do_exit skips it. */ |
| 894 | seccomp_init_siginfo(&info, this_syscall, data); |
| 895 | do_coredump(&info); |
| 896 | } |
| 897 | if (action == SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS) |
| 898 | do_group_exit(SIGSYS); |
| 899 | else |
| 900 | do_exit(SIGSYS); |
| 901 | } |
| 902 | |
| 903 | unreachable(); |
| 904 | |
| 905 | skip: |
| 906 | seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, match ? match->log : false); |
| 907 | return -1; |
| 908 | } |
| 909 | #else |
| 910 | static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, |
| 911 | const bool recheck_after_trace) |
| 912 | { |
| 913 | BUG(); |
| 914 | } |
| 915 | #endif |
| 916 | |
| 917 | int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) |
| 918 | { |
| 919 | int mode = current->seccomp.mode; |
| 920 | int this_syscall; |
| 921 | |
| 922 | if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) && |
| 923 | unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) |
| 924 | return 0; |
| 925 | |
| 926 | this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr : |
| 927 | syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current)); |
| 928 | |
| 929 | switch (mode) { |
| 930 | case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: |
| 931 | __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */ |
| 932 | return 0; |
| 933 | case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: |
| 934 | return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, sd, false); |
| 935 | default: |
| 936 | BUG(); |
| 937 | } |
| 938 | } |
| 939 | #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */ |
| 940 | |
| 941 | long prctl_get_seccomp(void) |
| 942 | { |
| 943 | return current->seccomp.mode; |
| 944 | } |
| 945 | |
| 946 | /** |
| 947 | * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp |
| 948 | * |
| 949 | * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed. |
| 950 | * |
| 951 | * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. |
| 952 | */ |
| 953 | static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void) |
| 954 | { |
| 955 | const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT; |
| 956 | long ret = -EINVAL; |
| 957 | |
| 958 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 959 | |
| 960 | if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode)) |
| 961 | goto out; |
| 962 | |
| 963 | #ifdef TIF_NOTSC |
| 964 | disable_TSC(); |
| 965 | #endif |
| 966 | seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, 0); |
| 967 | ret = 0; |
| 968 | |
| 969 | out: |
| 970 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 971 | |
| 972 | return ret; |
| 973 | } |
| 974 | |
| 975 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER |
| 976 | static int seccomp_notify_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) |
| 977 | { |
| 978 | struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data; |
| 979 | struct seccomp_knotif *knotif; |
| 980 | |
| 981 | if (!filter) |
| 982 | return 0; |
| 983 | |
| 984 | mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 985 | |
| 986 | /* |
| 987 | * If this file is being closed because e.g. the task who owned it |
| 988 | * died, let's wake everyone up who was waiting on us. |
| 989 | */ |
| 990 | list_for_each_entry(knotif, &filter->notif->notifications, list) { |
| 991 | if (knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) |
| 992 | continue; |
| 993 | |
| 994 | knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED; |
| 995 | knotif->error = -ENOSYS; |
| 996 | knotif->val = 0; |
| 997 | |
| 998 | complete(&knotif->ready); |
| 999 | } |
| 1000 | |
| 1001 | kfree(filter->notif); |
| 1002 | filter->notif = NULL; |
| 1003 | mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1004 | __put_seccomp_filter(filter); |
| 1005 | return 0; |
| 1006 | } |
| 1007 | |
| 1008 | static long seccomp_notify_recv(struct seccomp_filter *filter, |
| 1009 | void __user *buf) |
| 1010 | { |
| 1011 | struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur; |
| 1012 | struct seccomp_notif unotif; |
| 1013 | ssize_t ret; |
| 1014 | |
| 1015 | memset(&unotif, 0, sizeof(unotif)); |
| 1016 | |
| 1017 | ret = down_interruptible(&filter->notif->request); |
| 1018 | if (ret < 0) |
| 1019 | return ret; |
| 1020 | |
| 1021 | mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1022 | list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) { |
| 1023 | if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT) { |
| 1024 | knotif = cur; |
| 1025 | break; |
| 1026 | } |
| 1027 | } |
| 1028 | |
| 1029 | /* |
| 1030 | * If we didn't find a notification, it could be that the task was |
| 1031 | * interrupted by a fatal signal between the time we were woken and |
| 1032 | * when we were able to acquire the rw lock. |
| 1033 | */ |
| 1034 | if (!knotif) { |
| 1035 | ret = -ENOENT; |
| 1036 | goto out; |
| 1037 | } |
| 1038 | |
| 1039 | unotif.id = knotif->id; |
| 1040 | unotif.pid = task_pid_vnr(knotif->task); |
| 1041 | unotif.data = *(knotif->data); |
| 1042 | |
| 1043 | knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT; |
| 1044 | wake_up_poll(&filter->notif->wqh, EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM); |
| 1045 | ret = 0; |
| 1046 | out: |
| 1047 | mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1048 | |
| 1049 | if (ret == 0 && copy_to_user(buf, &unotif, sizeof(unotif))) { |
| 1050 | ret = -EFAULT; |
| 1051 | |
| 1052 | /* |
| 1053 | * Userspace screwed up. To make sure that we keep this |
| 1054 | * notification alive, let's reset it back to INIT. It |
| 1055 | * may have died when we released the lock, so we need to make |
| 1056 | * sure it's still around. |
| 1057 | */ |
| 1058 | knotif = NULL; |
| 1059 | mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1060 | list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) { |
| 1061 | if (cur->id == unotif.id) { |
| 1062 | knotif = cur; |
| 1063 | break; |
| 1064 | } |
| 1065 | } |
| 1066 | |
| 1067 | if (knotif) { |
| 1068 | knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT; |
| 1069 | up(&filter->notif->request); |
| 1070 | } |
| 1071 | mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1072 | } |
| 1073 | |
| 1074 | return ret; |
| 1075 | } |
| 1076 | |
| 1077 | static long seccomp_notify_send(struct seccomp_filter *filter, |
| 1078 | void __user *buf) |
| 1079 | { |
| 1080 | struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {}; |
| 1081 | struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur; |
| 1082 | long ret; |
| 1083 | |
| 1084 | if (copy_from_user(&resp, buf, sizeof(resp))) |
| 1085 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1086 | |
| 1087 | if (resp.flags) |
| 1088 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1089 | |
| 1090 | ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1091 | if (ret < 0) |
| 1092 | return ret; |
| 1093 | |
| 1094 | list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) { |
| 1095 | if (cur->id == resp.id) { |
| 1096 | knotif = cur; |
| 1097 | break; |
| 1098 | } |
| 1099 | } |
| 1100 | |
| 1101 | if (!knotif) { |
| 1102 | ret = -ENOENT; |
| 1103 | goto out; |
| 1104 | } |
| 1105 | |
| 1106 | /* Allow exactly one reply. */ |
| 1107 | if (knotif->state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) { |
| 1108 | ret = -EINPROGRESS; |
| 1109 | goto out; |
| 1110 | } |
| 1111 | |
| 1112 | ret = 0; |
| 1113 | knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED; |
| 1114 | knotif->error = resp.error; |
| 1115 | knotif->val = resp.val; |
| 1116 | complete(&knotif->ready); |
| 1117 | out: |
| 1118 | mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1119 | return ret; |
| 1120 | } |
| 1121 | |
| 1122 | static long seccomp_notify_id_valid(struct seccomp_filter *filter, |
| 1123 | void __user *buf) |
| 1124 | { |
| 1125 | struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL; |
| 1126 | u64 id; |
| 1127 | long ret; |
| 1128 | |
| 1129 | if (copy_from_user(&id, buf, sizeof(id))) |
| 1130 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1131 | |
| 1132 | ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1133 | if (ret < 0) |
| 1134 | return ret; |
| 1135 | |
| 1136 | ret = -ENOENT; |
| 1137 | list_for_each_entry(knotif, &filter->notif->notifications, list) { |
| 1138 | if (knotif->id == id) { |
| 1139 | if (knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) |
| 1140 | ret = 0; |
| 1141 | goto out; |
| 1142 | } |
| 1143 | } |
| 1144 | |
| 1145 | out: |
| 1146 | mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1147 | return ret; |
| 1148 | } |
| 1149 | |
| 1150 | static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, |
| 1151 | unsigned long arg) |
| 1152 | { |
| 1153 | struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data; |
| 1154 | void __user *buf = (void __user *)arg; |
| 1155 | |
| 1156 | switch (cmd) { |
| 1157 | case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV: |
| 1158 | return seccomp_notify_recv(filter, buf); |
| 1159 | case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND: |
| 1160 | return seccomp_notify_send(filter, buf); |
| 1161 | case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID: |
| 1162 | return seccomp_notify_id_valid(filter, buf); |
| 1163 | default: |
| 1164 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1165 | } |
| 1166 | } |
| 1167 | |
| 1168 | static __poll_t seccomp_notify_poll(struct file *file, |
| 1169 | struct poll_table_struct *poll_tab) |
| 1170 | { |
| 1171 | struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data; |
| 1172 | __poll_t ret = 0; |
| 1173 | struct seccomp_knotif *cur; |
| 1174 | |
| 1175 | poll_wait(file, &filter->notif->wqh, poll_tab); |
| 1176 | |
| 1177 | if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock) < 0) |
| 1178 | return EPOLLERR; |
| 1179 | |
| 1180 | list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) { |
| 1181 | if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT) |
| 1182 | ret |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; |
| 1183 | if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) |
| 1184 | ret |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM; |
| 1185 | if ((ret & EPOLLIN) && (ret & EPOLLOUT)) |
| 1186 | break; |
| 1187 | } |
| 1188 | |
| 1189 | mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); |
| 1190 | |
| 1191 | return ret; |
| 1192 | } |
| 1193 | |
| 1194 | static const struct file_operations seccomp_notify_ops = { |
| 1195 | .poll = seccomp_notify_poll, |
| 1196 | .release = seccomp_notify_release, |
| 1197 | .unlocked_ioctl = seccomp_notify_ioctl, |
| 1198 | }; |
| 1199 | |
| 1200 | static struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter) |
| 1201 | { |
| 1202 | struct file *ret = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY); |
| 1203 | struct seccomp_filter *cur; |
| 1204 | |
| 1205 | for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) { |
| 1206 | if (cur->notif) |
| 1207 | goto out; |
| 1208 | } |
| 1209 | |
| 1210 | ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
| 1211 | filter->notif = kzalloc(sizeof(*(filter->notif)), GFP_KERNEL); |
| 1212 | if (!filter->notif) |
| 1213 | goto out; |
| 1214 | |
| 1215 | sema_init(&filter->notif->request, 0); |
| 1216 | filter->notif->next_id = get_random_u64(); |
| 1217 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&filter->notif->notifications); |
| 1218 | init_waitqueue_head(&filter->notif->wqh); |
| 1219 | |
| 1220 | ret = anon_inode_getfile("seccomp notify", &seccomp_notify_ops, |
| 1221 | filter, O_RDWR); |
| 1222 | if (IS_ERR(ret)) |
| 1223 | goto out_notif; |
| 1224 | |
| 1225 | /* The file has a reference to it now */ |
| 1226 | __get_seccomp_filter(filter); |
| 1227 | |
| 1228 | out_notif: |
| 1229 | if (IS_ERR(ret)) |
| 1230 | kfree(filter->notif); |
| 1231 | out: |
| 1232 | return ret; |
| 1233 | } |
| 1234 | |
| 1235 | /** |
| 1236 | * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter |
| 1237 | * @flags: flags to change filter behavior |
| 1238 | * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter |
| 1239 | * |
| 1240 | * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters. |
| 1241 | * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) |
| 1242 | * for each system call the task makes. |
| 1243 | * |
| 1244 | * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed. |
| 1245 | * |
| 1246 | * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. |
| 1247 | */ |
| 1248 | static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, |
| 1249 | const char __user *filter) |
| 1250 | { |
| 1251 | const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER; |
| 1252 | struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL; |
| 1253 | long ret = -EINVAL; |
| 1254 | int listener = -1; |
| 1255 | struct file *listener_f = NULL; |
| 1256 | |
| 1257 | /* Validate flags. */ |
| 1258 | if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK) |
| 1259 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1260 | |
| 1261 | /* Prepare the new filter before holding any locks. */ |
| 1262 | prepared = seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter); |
| 1263 | if (IS_ERR(prepared)) |
| 1264 | return PTR_ERR(prepared); |
| 1265 | |
| 1266 | if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) { |
| 1267 | listener = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC); |
| 1268 | if (listener < 0) { |
| 1269 | ret = listener; |
| 1270 | goto out_free; |
| 1271 | } |
| 1272 | |
| 1273 | listener_f = init_listener(prepared); |
| 1274 | if (IS_ERR(listener_f)) { |
| 1275 | put_unused_fd(listener); |
| 1276 | ret = PTR_ERR(listener_f); |
| 1277 | goto out_free; |
| 1278 | } |
| 1279 | } |
| 1280 | |
| 1281 | /* |
| 1282 | * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC |
| 1283 | * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec. |
| 1284 | */ |
| 1285 | if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC && |
| 1286 | mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) |
| 1287 | goto out_put_fd; |
| 1288 | |
| 1289 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 1290 | |
| 1291 | if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode)) |
| 1292 | goto out; |
| 1293 | |
| 1294 | ret = seccomp_attach_filter(flags, prepared); |
| 1295 | if (ret) |
| 1296 | goto out; |
| 1297 | /* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */ |
| 1298 | prepared = NULL; |
| 1299 | |
| 1300 | seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, flags); |
| 1301 | out: |
| 1302 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 1303 | if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) |
| 1304 | mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); |
| 1305 | out_put_fd: |
| 1306 | if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) { |
| 1307 | if (ret < 0) { |
| 1308 | listener_f->private_data = NULL; |
| 1309 | fput(listener_f); |
| 1310 | put_unused_fd(listener); |
| 1311 | } else { |
| 1312 | fd_install(listener, listener_f); |
| 1313 | ret = listener; |
| 1314 | } |
| 1315 | } |
| 1316 | out_free: |
| 1317 | seccomp_filter_free(prepared); |
| 1318 | return ret; |
| 1319 | } |
| 1320 | #else |
| 1321 | static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, |
| 1322 | const char __user *filter) |
| 1323 | { |
| 1324 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1325 | } |
| 1326 | #endif |
| 1327 | |
| 1328 | static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction) |
| 1329 | { |
| 1330 | u32 action; |
| 1331 | |
| 1332 | if (copy_from_user(&action, uaction, sizeof(action))) |
| 1333 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1334 | |
| 1335 | switch (action) { |
| 1336 | case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS: |
| 1337 | case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD: |
| 1338 | case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: |
| 1339 | case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: |
| 1340 | case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF: |
| 1341 | case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: |
| 1342 | case SECCOMP_RET_LOG: |
| 1343 | case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: |
| 1344 | break; |
| 1345 | default: |
| 1346 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 1347 | } |
| 1348 | |
| 1349 | return 0; |
| 1350 | } |
| 1351 | |
| 1352 | static long seccomp_get_notif_sizes(void __user *usizes) |
| 1353 | { |
| 1354 | struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes = { |
| 1355 | .seccomp_notif = sizeof(struct seccomp_notif), |
| 1356 | .seccomp_notif_resp = sizeof(struct seccomp_notif_resp), |
| 1357 | .seccomp_data = sizeof(struct seccomp_data), |
| 1358 | }; |
| 1359 | |
| 1360 | if (copy_to_user(usizes, &sizes, sizeof(sizes))) |
| 1361 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1362 | |
| 1363 | return 0; |
| 1364 | } |
| 1365 | |
| 1366 | /* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */ |
| 1367 | static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, |
| 1368 | void __user *uargs) |
| 1369 | { |
| 1370 | switch (op) { |
| 1371 | case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT: |
| 1372 | if (flags != 0 || uargs != NULL) |
| 1373 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1374 | return seccomp_set_mode_strict(); |
| 1375 | case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER: |
| 1376 | return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs); |
| 1377 | case SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL: |
| 1378 | if (flags != 0) |
| 1379 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1380 | |
| 1381 | return seccomp_get_action_avail(uargs); |
| 1382 | case SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES: |
| 1383 | if (flags != 0) |
| 1384 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1385 | |
| 1386 | return seccomp_get_notif_sizes(uargs); |
| 1387 | default: |
| 1388 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1389 | } |
| 1390 | } |
| 1391 | |
| 1392 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags, |
| 1393 | void __user *, uargs) |
| 1394 | { |
| 1395 | return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs); |
| 1396 | } |
| 1397 | |
| 1398 | /** |
| 1399 | * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode |
| 1400 | * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use |
| 1401 | * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER |
| 1402 | * |
| 1403 | * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. |
| 1404 | */ |
| 1405 | long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, void __user *filter) |
| 1406 | { |
| 1407 | unsigned int op; |
| 1408 | void __user *uargs; |
| 1409 | |
| 1410 | switch (seccomp_mode) { |
| 1411 | case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: |
| 1412 | op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT; |
| 1413 | /* |
| 1414 | * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter, |
| 1415 | * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal |
| 1416 | * check in do_seccomp(). |
| 1417 | */ |
| 1418 | uargs = NULL; |
| 1419 | break; |
| 1420 | case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: |
| 1421 | op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER; |
| 1422 | uargs = filter; |
| 1423 | break; |
| 1424 | default: |
| 1425 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1426 | } |
| 1427 | |
| 1428 | /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */ |
| 1429 | return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs); |
| 1430 | } |
| 1431 | |
| 1432 | #if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) |
| 1433 | static struct seccomp_filter *get_nth_filter(struct task_struct *task, |
| 1434 | unsigned long filter_off) |
| 1435 | { |
| 1436 | struct seccomp_filter *orig, *filter; |
| 1437 | unsigned long count; |
| 1438 | |
| 1439 | /* |
| 1440 | * Note: this is only correct because the caller should be the (ptrace) |
| 1441 | * tracer of the task, otherwise lock_task_sighand is needed. |
| 1442 | */ |
| 1443 | spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); |
| 1444 | |
| 1445 | if (task->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) { |
| 1446 | spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); |
| 1447 | return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
| 1448 | } |
| 1449 | |
| 1450 | orig = task->seccomp.filter; |
| 1451 | __get_seccomp_filter(orig); |
| 1452 | spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); |
| 1453 | |
| 1454 | count = 0; |
| 1455 | for (filter = orig; filter; filter = filter->prev) |
| 1456 | count++; |
| 1457 | |
| 1458 | if (filter_off >= count) { |
| 1459 | filter = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); |
| 1460 | goto out; |
| 1461 | } |
| 1462 | |
| 1463 | count -= filter_off; |
| 1464 | for (filter = orig; filter && count > 1; filter = filter->prev) |
| 1465 | count--; |
| 1466 | |
| 1467 | if (WARN_ON(count != 1 || !filter)) { |
| 1468 | filter = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); |
| 1469 | goto out; |
| 1470 | } |
| 1471 | |
| 1472 | __get_seccomp_filter(filter); |
| 1473 | |
| 1474 | out: |
| 1475 | __put_seccomp_filter(orig); |
| 1476 | return filter; |
| 1477 | } |
| 1478 | |
| 1479 | long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off, |
| 1480 | void __user *data) |
| 1481 | { |
| 1482 | struct seccomp_filter *filter; |
| 1483 | struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog; |
| 1484 | long ret; |
| 1485 | |
| 1486 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || |
| 1487 | current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) { |
| 1488 | return -EACCES; |
| 1489 | } |
| 1490 | |
| 1491 | filter = get_nth_filter(task, filter_off); |
| 1492 | if (IS_ERR(filter)) |
| 1493 | return PTR_ERR(filter); |
| 1494 | |
| 1495 | fprog = filter->prog->orig_prog; |
| 1496 | if (!fprog) { |
| 1497 | /* This must be a new non-cBPF filter, since we save |
| 1498 | * every cBPF filter's orig_prog above when |
| 1499 | * CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is enabled. |
| 1500 | */ |
| 1501 | ret = -EMEDIUMTYPE; |
| 1502 | goto out; |
| 1503 | } |
| 1504 | |
| 1505 | ret = fprog->len; |
| 1506 | if (!data) |
| 1507 | goto out; |
| 1508 | |
| 1509 | if (copy_to_user(data, fprog->filter, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog))) |
| 1510 | ret = -EFAULT; |
| 1511 | |
| 1512 | out: |
| 1513 | __put_seccomp_filter(filter); |
| 1514 | return ret; |
| 1515 | } |
| 1516 | |
| 1517 | long seccomp_get_metadata(struct task_struct *task, |
| 1518 | unsigned long size, void __user *data) |
| 1519 | { |
| 1520 | long ret; |
| 1521 | struct seccomp_filter *filter; |
| 1522 | struct seccomp_metadata kmd = {}; |
| 1523 | |
| 1524 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || |
| 1525 | current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) { |
| 1526 | return -EACCES; |
| 1527 | } |
| 1528 | |
| 1529 | size = min_t(unsigned long, size, sizeof(kmd)); |
| 1530 | |
| 1531 | if (size < sizeof(kmd.filter_off)) |
| 1532 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1533 | |
| 1534 | if (copy_from_user(&kmd.filter_off, data, sizeof(kmd.filter_off))) |
| 1535 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1536 | |
| 1537 | filter = get_nth_filter(task, kmd.filter_off); |
| 1538 | if (IS_ERR(filter)) |
| 1539 | return PTR_ERR(filter); |
| 1540 | |
| 1541 | if (filter->log) |
| 1542 | kmd.flags |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG; |
| 1543 | |
| 1544 | ret = size; |
| 1545 | if (copy_to_user(data, &kmd, size)) |
| 1546 | ret = -EFAULT; |
| 1547 | |
| 1548 | __put_seccomp_filter(filter); |
| 1549 | return ret; |
| 1550 | } |
| 1551 | #endif |
| 1552 | |
| 1553 | #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL |
| 1554 | |
| 1555 | /* Human readable action names for friendly sysctl interaction */ |
| 1556 | #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME "kill_process" |
| 1557 | #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME "kill_thread" |
| 1558 | #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap" |
| 1559 | #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno" |
| 1560 | #define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME "user_notif" |
| 1561 | #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace" |
| 1562 | #define SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME "log" |
| 1563 | #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow" |
| 1564 | |
| 1565 | static const char seccomp_actions_avail[] = |
| 1566 | SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME " " |
| 1567 | SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME " " |
| 1568 | SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " " |
| 1569 | SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " " |
| 1570 | SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME " " |
| 1571 | SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME " " |
| 1572 | SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME " " |
| 1573 | SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME; |
| 1574 | |
| 1575 | struct seccomp_log_name { |
| 1576 | u32 log; |
| 1577 | const char *name; |
| 1578 | }; |
| 1579 | |
| 1580 | static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = { |
| 1581 | { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME }, |
| 1582 | { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME }, |
| 1583 | { SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME }, |
| 1584 | { SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME }, |
| 1585 | { SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME }, |
| 1586 | { SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME }, |
| 1587 | { SECCOMP_LOG_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME }, |
| 1588 | { SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME }, |
| 1589 | { } |
| 1590 | }; |
| 1591 | |
| 1592 | static bool seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(char *names, size_t size, |
| 1593 | u32 actions_logged, |
| 1594 | const char *sep) |
| 1595 | { |
| 1596 | const struct seccomp_log_name *cur; |
| 1597 | bool append_sep = false; |
| 1598 | |
| 1599 | for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name && size; cur++) { |
| 1600 | ssize_t ret; |
| 1601 | |
| 1602 | if (!(actions_logged & cur->log)) |
| 1603 | continue; |
| 1604 | |
| 1605 | if (append_sep) { |
| 1606 | ret = strscpy(names, sep, size); |
| 1607 | if (ret < 0) |
| 1608 | return false; |
| 1609 | |
| 1610 | names += ret; |
| 1611 | size -= ret; |
| 1612 | } else |
| 1613 | append_sep = true; |
| 1614 | |
| 1615 | ret = strscpy(names, cur->name, size); |
| 1616 | if (ret < 0) |
| 1617 | return false; |
| 1618 | |
| 1619 | names += ret; |
| 1620 | size -= ret; |
| 1621 | } |
| 1622 | |
| 1623 | return true; |
| 1624 | } |
| 1625 | |
| 1626 | static bool seccomp_action_logged_from_name(u32 *action_logged, |
| 1627 | const char *name) |
| 1628 | { |
| 1629 | const struct seccomp_log_name *cur; |
| 1630 | |
| 1631 | for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name; cur++) { |
| 1632 | if (!strcmp(cur->name, name)) { |
| 1633 | *action_logged = cur->log; |
| 1634 | return true; |
| 1635 | } |
| 1636 | } |
| 1637 | |
| 1638 | return false; |
| 1639 | } |
| 1640 | |
| 1641 | static bool seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(u32 *actions_logged, char *names) |
| 1642 | { |
| 1643 | char *name; |
| 1644 | |
| 1645 | *actions_logged = 0; |
| 1646 | while ((name = strsep(&names, " ")) && *name) { |
| 1647 | u32 action_logged = 0; |
| 1648 | |
| 1649 | if (!seccomp_action_logged_from_name(&action_logged, name)) |
| 1650 | return false; |
| 1651 | |
| 1652 | *actions_logged |= action_logged; |
| 1653 | } |
| 1654 | |
| 1655 | return true; |
| 1656 | } |
| 1657 | |
| 1658 | static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, |
| 1659 | size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
| 1660 | { |
| 1661 | char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; |
| 1662 | struct ctl_table table; |
| 1663 | |
| 1664 | memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); |
| 1665 | |
| 1666 | if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), |
| 1667 | seccomp_actions_logged, " ")) |
| 1668 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1669 | |
| 1670 | table = *ro_table; |
| 1671 | table.data = names; |
| 1672 | table.maxlen = sizeof(names); |
| 1673 | return proc_dostring(&table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
| 1674 | } |
| 1675 | |
| 1676 | static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, |
| 1677 | size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos, u32 *actions_logged) |
| 1678 | { |
| 1679 | char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; |
| 1680 | struct ctl_table table; |
| 1681 | int ret; |
| 1682 | |
| 1683 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
| 1684 | return -EPERM; |
| 1685 | |
| 1686 | memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); |
| 1687 | |
| 1688 | table = *ro_table; |
| 1689 | table.data = names; |
| 1690 | table.maxlen = sizeof(names); |
| 1691 | ret = proc_dostring(&table, 1, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
| 1692 | if (ret) |
| 1693 | return ret; |
| 1694 | |
| 1695 | if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(actions_logged, table.data)) |
| 1696 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1697 | |
| 1698 | if (*actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) |
| 1699 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1700 | |
| 1701 | seccomp_actions_logged = *actions_logged; |
| 1702 | return 0; |
| 1703 | } |
| 1704 | |
| 1705 | static void audit_actions_logged(u32 actions_logged, u32 old_actions_logged, |
| 1706 | int ret) |
| 1707 | { |
| 1708 | char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; |
| 1709 | char old_names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; |
| 1710 | const char *new = names; |
| 1711 | const char *old = old_names; |
| 1712 | |
| 1713 | if (!audit_enabled) |
| 1714 | return; |
| 1715 | |
| 1716 | memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); |
| 1717 | memset(old_names, 0, sizeof(old_names)); |
| 1718 | |
| 1719 | if (ret) |
| 1720 | new = "?"; |
| 1721 | else if (!actions_logged) |
| 1722 | new = "(none)"; |
| 1723 | else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), |
| 1724 | actions_logged, ",")) |
| 1725 | new = "?"; |
| 1726 | |
| 1727 | if (!old_actions_logged) |
| 1728 | old = "(none)"; |
| 1729 | else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(old_names, |
| 1730 | sizeof(old_names), |
| 1731 | old_actions_logged, ",")) |
| 1732 | old = "?"; |
| 1733 | |
| 1734 | return audit_seccomp_actions_logged(new, old, !ret); |
| 1735 | } |
| 1736 | |
| 1737 | static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int write, |
| 1738 | void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, |
| 1739 | loff_t *ppos) |
| 1740 | { |
| 1741 | int ret; |
| 1742 | |
| 1743 | if (write) { |
| 1744 | u32 actions_logged = 0; |
| 1745 | u32 old_actions_logged = seccomp_actions_logged; |
| 1746 | |
| 1747 | ret = write_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos, |
| 1748 | &actions_logged); |
| 1749 | audit_actions_logged(actions_logged, old_actions_logged, ret); |
| 1750 | } else |
| 1751 | ret = read_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
| 1752 | |
| 1753 | return ret; |
| 1754 | } |
| 1755 | |
| 1756 | static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = { |
| 1757 | { .procname = "kernel", }, |
| 1758 | { .procname = "seccomp", }, |
| 1759 | { } |
| 1760 | }; |
| 1761 | |
| 1762 | static struct ctl_table seccomp_sysctl_table[] = { |
| 1763 | { |
| 1764 | .procname = "actions_avail", |
| 1765 | .data = (void *) &seccomp_actions_avail, |
| 1766 | .maxlen = sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail), |
| 1767 | .mode = 0444, |
| 1768 | .proc_handler = proc_dostring, |
| 1769 | }, |
| 1770 | { |
| 1771 | .procname = "actions_logged", |
| 1772 | .mode = 0644, |
| 1773 | .proc_handler = seccomp_actions_logged_handler, |
| 1774 | }, |
| 1775 | { } |
| 1776 | }; |
| 1777 | |
| 1778 | static int __init seccomp_sysctl_init(void) |
| 1779 | { |
| 1780 | struct ctl_table_header *hdr; |
| 1781 | |
| 1782 | hdr = register_sysctl_paths(seccomp_sysctl_path, seccomp_sysctl_table); |
| 1783 | if (!hdr) |
| 1784 | pr_warn("seccomp: sysctl registration failed\n"); |
| 1785 | else |
| 1786 | kmemleak_not_leak(hdr); |
| 1787 | |
| 1788 | return 0; |
| 1789 | } |
| 1790 | |
| 1791 | device_initcall(seccomp_sysctl_init) |
| 1792 | |
| 1793 | #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ |