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audit: re-structure audit field valid checks
[linux-block.git] / kernel / auditfilter.c
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1/* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events
2 *
3 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
4 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
5 * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
6 *
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
11 *
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 *
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
20 */
21
22#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
23
24#include <linux/kernel.h>
25#include <linux/audit.h>
26#include <linux/kthread.h>
27#include <linux/mutex.h>
28#include <linux/fs.h>
29#include <linux/namei.h>
30#include <linux/netlink.h>
31#include <linux/sched.h>
32#include <linux/slab.h>
33#include <linux/security.h>
34#include <net/net_namespace.h>
35#include <net/sock.h>
36#include "audit.h"
37
38/*
39 * Locking model:
40 *
41 * audit_filter_mutex:
42 * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
43 * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
44 * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
45 * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
46 * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
47 * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
48 * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
49 */
50
51/* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */
52struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
53 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
54 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
55 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
56 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
57 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
58 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
59 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[6]),
60#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 7
61#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
62#endif
63};
64static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
65 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]),
66 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]),
67 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]),
68 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]),
69 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]),
70 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]),
71 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[6]),
72};
73
74DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
75
76static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
77{
78 switch (f->type) {
79 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
80 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
81 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
82 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
83 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
84 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
85 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
86 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
87 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
88 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
89 kfree(f->lsm_str);
90 security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
91 }
92}
93
94static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
95{
96 int i;
97 struct audit_krule *erule = &e->rule;
98
99 /* some rules don't have associated watches */
100 if (erule->watch)
101 audit_put_watch(erule->watch);
102 if (erule->fields)
103 for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++)
104 audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]);
105 kfree(erule->fields);
106 kfree(erule->filterkey);
107 kfree(e);
108}
109
110void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
111{
112 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
113 audit_free_rule(e);
114}
115
116/* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
117static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
118{
119 struct audit_entry *entry;
120 struct audit_field *fields;
121
122 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
123 if (unlikely(!entry))
124 return NULL;
125
126 fields = kcalloc(field_count, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
127 if (unlikely(!fields)) {
128 kfree(entry);
129 return NULL;
130 }
131 entry->rule.fields = fields;
132
133 return entry;
134}
135
136/* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
137 * buffer. */
138char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
139{
140 char *str;
141
142 if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain))
143 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
144
145 /* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX
146 * defines the longest valid length.
147 */
148 if (len > PATH_MAX)
149 return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
150
151 str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
152 if (unlikely(!str))
153 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
154
155 memcpy(str, *bufp, len);
156 str[len] = 0;
157 *bufp += len;
158 *remain -= len;
159
160 return str;
161}
162
163/* Translate an inode field to kernel representation. */
164static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
165 struct audit_field *f)
166{
167 if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
168 krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree ||
169 (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
170 return -EINVAL;
171
172 krule->inode_f = f;
173 return 0;
174}
175
176static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES];
177
178int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list)
179{
180 __u32 *p = kcalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE, sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL);
181 if (!p)
182 return -ENOMEM;
183 while (*list != ~0U) {
184 unsigned n = *list++;
185 if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) {
186 kfree(p);
187 return -EINVAL;
188 }
189 p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n);
190 }
191 if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) {
192 kfree(p);
193 return -EINVAL;
194 }
195 classes[class] = p;
196 return 0;
197}
198
199int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall)
200{
201 if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32))
202 return 0;
203 if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class]))
204 return 0;
205 return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall);
206}
207
208#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
209static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask)
210{
211 int i;
212
213 if (classes[class]) {
214 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
215 if (mask[i] & classes[class][i])
216 return 0;
217 }
218 return 1;
219}
220
221static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry)
222{
223 struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f;
224
225 if (!arch) {
226 /* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch
227 * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */
228 return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
229 entry->rule.mask) &&
230 audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
231 entry->rule.mask));
232 }
233
234 switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) {
235 case 0: /* native */
236 return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
237 entry->rule.mask));
238 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
239 return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
240 entry->rule.mask));
241 default:
242 return 1;
243 }
244}
245#endif
246
247/* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
248static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *rule)
249{
250 unsigned listnr;
251 struct audit_entry *entry;
252 int i, err;
253
254 err = -EINVAL;
255 listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
256 switch(listnr) {
257 default:
258 goto exit_err;
259#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
260 case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY:
261 pr_err("AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY is deprecated\n");
262 goto exit_err;
263 case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT:
264 case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:
265#endif
266 case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
267 case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE:
268 case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
269 ;
270 }
271 if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) {
272 pr_err("AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n");
273 goto exit_err;
274 }
275 if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
276 goto exit_err;
277 if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
278 goto exit_err;
279
280 err = -ENOMEM;
281 entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
282 if (!entry)
283 goto exit_err;
284
285 entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
286 entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
287 entry->rule.action = rule->action;
288 entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
289
290 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
291 entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
292
293 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) {
294 int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1;
295 __u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)];
296 __u32 *class;
297
298 if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit)))
299 continue;
300 *p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit);
301 class = classes[i];
302 if (class) {
303 int j;
304 for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++)
305 entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j];
306 }
307 }
308
309 return entry;
310
311exit_err:
312 return ERR_PTR(err);
313}
314
315static u32 audit_ops[] =
316{
317 [Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL,
318 [Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL,
319 [Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK,
320 [Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST,
321 [Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN,
322 [Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN,
323 [Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
324 [Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
325};
326
327static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
328{
329 u32 n;
330 for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++)
331 ;
332 return n;
333}
334
335/* check if an audit field is valid */
336static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
337{
338 switch (f->type) {
339 case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
340 if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE &&
341 entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER)
342 return -EINVAL;
343 break;
344 case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
345 if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_FS)
346 return -EINVAL;
347 break;
348 }
349
350 switch (entry->rule.listnr) {
351 case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
352 switch(f->type) {
353 case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
354 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
355 break;
356 default:
357 return -EINVAL;
358 }
359 }
360
361 /* Check for valid field type and op */
362 switch (f->type) {
363 case AUDIT_ARG0:
364 case AUDIT_ARG1:
365 case AUDIT_ARG2:
366 case AUDIT_ARG3:
367 case AUDIT_PERS: /* <uapi/linux/personality.h> */
368 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
369 /* all ops are valid */
370 break;
371 case AUDIT_UID:
372 case AUDIT_EUID:
373 case AUDIT_SUID:
374 case AUDIT_FSUID:
375 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
376 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
377 case AUDIT_GID:
378 case AUDIT_EGID:
379 case AUDIT_SGID:
380 case AUDIT_FSGID:
381 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
382 case AUDIT_PID:
383 case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
384 case AUDIT_PPID:
385 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
386 case AUDIT_EXIT:
387 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
388 case AUDIT_INODE:
389 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
390 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
391 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
392 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
393 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
394 /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
395 if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
396 return -EINVAL;
397 break;
398 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
399 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
400 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
401 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
402 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
403 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
404 case AUDIT_WATCH:
405 case AUDIT_DIR:
406 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
407 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
408 case AUDIT_ARCH:
409 case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
410 case AUDIT_PERM:
411 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
412 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
413 case AUDIT_EXE:
414 /* only equal and not equal valid ops */
415 if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
416 return -EINVAL;
417 break;
418 default:
419 /* field not recognized */
420 return -EINVAL;
421 }
422
423 /* Check for select valid field values */
424 switch (f->type) {
425 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
426 if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
427 return -EINVAL;
428 break;
429 case AUDIT_PERM:
430 if (f->val & ~15)
431 return -EINVAL;
432 break;
433 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
434 if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
435 return -EINVAL;
436 break;
437 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
438 if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
439 return -EINVAL;
440 break;
441 default:
442 break;
443 }
444
445 return 0;
446}
447
448/* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule representation. */
449static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
450 size_t datasz)
451{
452 int err = 0;
453 struct audit_entry *entry;
454 void *bufp;
455 size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
456 int i;
457 char *str;
458 struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
459
460 entry = audit_to_entry_common(data);
461 if (IS_ERR(entry))
462 goto exit_nofree;
463
464 bufp = data->buf;
465 for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
466 struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
467
468 err = -EINVAL;
469
470 f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]);
471 if (f->op == Audit_bad)
472 goto exit_free;
473
474 f->type = data->fields[i];
475 f->val = data->values[i];
476
477 /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
478 if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
479 f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
480 f->val = 0;
481 entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY;
482 }
483
484 err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
485 if (err)
486 goto exit_free;
487
488 err = -EINVAL;
489 switch (f->type) {
490 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
491 case AUDIT_UID:
492 case AUDIT_EUID:
493 case AUDIT_SUID:
494 case AUDIT_FSUID:
495 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
496 f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
497 if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
498 goto exit_free;
499 break;
500 case AUDIT_GID:
501 case AUDIT_EGID:
502 case AUDIT_SGID:
503 case AUDIT_FSGID:
504 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
505 f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
506 if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
507 goto exit_free;
508 break;
509 case AUDIT_ARCH:
510 entry->rule.arch_f = f;
511 break;
512 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
513 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
514 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
515 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
516 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
517 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
518 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
519 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
520 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
521 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
522 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
523 if (IS_ERR(str))
524 goto exit_free;
525 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
526
527 err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
528 (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
529 /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
530 * become valid after a policy reload. */
531 if (err == -EINVAL) {
532 pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
533 str);
534 err = 0;
535 }
536 if (err) {
537 kfree(str);
538 goto exit_free;
539 } else
540 f->lsm_str = str;
541 break;
542 case AUDIT_WATCH:
543 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
544 if (IS_ERR(str))
545 goto exit_free;
546 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
547
548 err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op);
549 if (err) {
550 kfree(str);
551 goto exit_free;
552 }
553 break;
554 case AUDIT_DIR:
555 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
556 if (IS_ERR(str))
557 goto exit_free;
558 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
559
560 err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
561 kfree(str);
562 if (err)
563 goto exit_free;
564 break;
565 case AUDIT_INODE:
566 err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
567 if (err)
568 goto exit_free;
569 break;
570 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
571 if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
572 goto exit_free;
573 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
574 if (IS_ERR(str))
575 goto exit_free;
576 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
577 entry->rule.filterkey = str;
578 break;
579 case AUDIT_EXE:
580 if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
581 goto exit_free;
582 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
583 if (IS_ERR(str)) {
584 err = PTR_ERR(str);
585 goto exit_free;
586 }
587 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
588
589 audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val);
590 if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
591 kfree(str);
592 err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
593 goto exit_free;
594 }
595 entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;
596 break;
597 }
598 }
599
600 if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
601 entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
602
603exit_nofree:
604 return entry;
605
606exit_free:
607 if (entry->rule.tree)
608 audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); /* that's the temporary one */
609 if (entry->rule.exe)
610 audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); /* that's the template one */
611 audit_free_rule(entry);
612 return ERR_PTR(err);
613}
614
615/* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
616static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
617{
618 size_t len = strlen(str);
619
620 memcpy(*bufp, str, len);
621 *bufp += len;
622
623 return len;
624}
625
626/* Translate kernel rule representation to struct audit_rule_data. */
627static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
628{
629 struct audit_rule_data *data;
630 void *bufp;
631 int i;
632
633 data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
634 if (unlikely(!data))
635 return NULL;
636 memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
637
638 data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
639 data->action = krule->action;
640 data->field_count = krule->field_count;
641 bufp = data->buf;
642 for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
643 struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i];
644
645 data->fields[i] = f->type;
646 data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op];
647 switch(f->type) {
648 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
649 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
650 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
651 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
652 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
653 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
654 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
655 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
656 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
657 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
658 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
659 audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
660 break;
661 case AUDIT_WATCH:
662 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
663 audit_pack_string(&bufp,
664 audit_watch_path(krule->watch));
665 break;
666 case AUDIT_DIR:
667 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
668 audit_pack_string(&bufp,
669 audit_tree_path(krule->tree));
670 break;
671 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
672 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
673 audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
674 break;
675 case AUDIT_EXE:
676 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
677 audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe));
678 break;
679 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
680 if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
681 data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
682 data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
683 break;
684 }
685 /* fall through - if set */
686 default:
687 data->values[i] = f->val;
688 }
689 }
690 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
691
692 return data;
693}
694
695/* Compare two rules in kernel format. Considered success if rules
696 * don't match. */
697static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
698{
699 int i;
700
701 if (a->flags != b->flags ||
702 a->pflags != b->pflags ||
703 a->listnr != b->listnr ||
704 a->action != b->action ||
705 a->field_count != b->field_count)
706 return 1;
707
708 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
709 if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type ||
710 a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op)
711 return 1;
712
713 switch(a->fields[i].type) {
714 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
715 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
716 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
717 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
718 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
719 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
720 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
721 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
722 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
723 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
724 if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
725 return 1;
726 break;
727 case AUDIT_WATCH:
728 if (strcmp(audit_watch_path(a->watch),
729 audit_watch_path(b->watch)))
730 return 1;
731 break;
732 case AUDIT_DIR:
733 if (strcmp(audit_tree_path(a->tree),
734 audit_tree_path(b->tree)))
735 return 1;
736 break;
737 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
738 /* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
739 if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
740 return 1;
741 break;
742 case AUDIT_EXE:
743 /* both paths exist based on above type compare */
744 if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe),
745 audit_mark_path(b->exe)))
746 return 1;
747 break;
748 case AUDIT_UID:
749 case AUDIT_EUID:
750 case AUDIT_SUID:
751 case AUDIT_FSUID:
752 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
753 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
754 if (!uid_eq(a->fields[i].uid, b->fields[i].uid))
755 return 1;
756 break;
757 case AUDIT_GID:
758 case AUDIT_EGID:
759 case AUDIT_SGID:
760 case AUDIT_FSGID:
761 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
762 if (!gid_eq(a->fields[i].gid, b->fields[i].gid))
763 return 1;
764 break;
765 default:
766 if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
767 return 1;
768 }
769 }
770
771 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
772 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
773 return 1;
774
775 return 0;
776}
777
778/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
779 * re-initialized. */
780static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
781 struct audit_field *sf)
782{
783 int ret = 0;
784 char *lsm_str;
785
786 /* our own copy of lsm_str */
787 lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
788 if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
789 return -ENOMEM;
790 df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
791
792 /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
793 ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
794 (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
795 /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
796 * become valid after a policy reload. */
797 if (ret == -EINVAL) {
798 pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
799 df->lsm_str);
800 ret = 0;
801 }
802
803 return ret;
804}
805
806/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
807 * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
808 * will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
809 * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
810 * The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
811 * the initial copy. */
812struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
813{
814 u32 fcount = old->field_count;
815 struct audit_entry *entry;
816 struct audit_krule *new;
817 char *fk;
818 int i, err = 0;
819
820 entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
821 if (unlikely(!entry))
822 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
823
824 new = &entry->rule;
825 new->flags = old->flags;
826 new->pflags = old->pflags;
827 new->listnr = old->listnr;
828 new->action = old->action;
829 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
830 new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
831 new->prio = old->prio;
832 new->buflen = old->buflen;
833 new->inode_f = old->inode_f;
834 new->field_count = old->field_count;
835
836 /*
837 * note that we are OK with not refcounting here; audit_match_tree()
838 * never dereferences tree and we can't get false positives there
839 * since we'd have to have rule gone from the list *and* removed
840 * before the chunks found by lookup had been allocated, i.e. before
841 * the beginning of list scan.
842 */
843 new->tree = old->tree;
844 memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
845
846 /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
847 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
848 for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
849 switch (new->fields[i].type) {
850 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
851 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
852 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
853 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
854 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
855 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
856 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
857 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
858 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
859 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
860 err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
861 &old->fields[i]);
862 break;
863 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
864 fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
865 if (unlikely(!fk))
866 err = -ENOMEM;
867 else
868 new->filterkey = fk;
869 break;
870 case AUDIT_EXE:
871 err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old);
872 break;
873 }
874 if (err) {
875 if (new->exe)
876 audit_remove_mark(new->exe);
877 audit_free_rule(entry);
878 return ERR_PTR(err);
879 }
880 }
881
882 if (old->watch) {
883 audit_get_watch(old->watch);
884 new->watch = old->watch;
885 }
886
887 return entry;
888}
889
890/* Find an existing audit rule.
891 * Caller must hold audit_filter_mutex to prevent stale rule data. */
892static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
893 struct list_head **p)
894{
895 struct audit_entry *e, *found = NULL;
896 struct list_head *list;
897 int h;
898
899 if (entry->rule.inode_f) {
900 h = audit_hash_ino(entry->rule.inode_f->val);
901 *p = list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
902 } else if (entry->rule.watch) {
903 /* we don't know the inode number, so must walk entire hash */
904 for (h = 0; h < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; h++) {
905 list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
906 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
907 if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
908 found = e;
909 goto out;
910 }
911 }
912 goto out;
913 } else {
914 *p = list = &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr];
915 }
916
917 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
918 if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
919 found = e;
920 goto out;
921 }
922
923out:
924 return found;
925}
926
927static u64 prio_low = ~0ULL/2;
928static u64 prio_high = ~0ULL/2 - 1;
929
930/* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. */
931static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
932{
933 struct audit_entry *e;
934 struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
935 struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
936 struct list_head *list;
937 int err = 0;
938#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
939 int dont_count = 0;
940
941 /* If any of these, don't count towards total */
942 switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
943 case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
944 case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE:
945 case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
946 dont_count = 1;
947 }
948#endif
949
950 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
951 e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
952 if (e) {
953 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
954 err = -EEXIST;
955 /* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */
956 if (tree)
957 audit_put_tree(tree);
958 return err;
959 }
960
961 if (watch) {
962 /* audit_filter_mutex is dropped and re-taken during this call */
963 err = audit_add_watch(&entry->rule, &list);
964 if (err) {
965 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
966 /*
967 * normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it
968 * on failure
969 */
970 if (tree)
971 audit_put_tree(tree);
972 return err;
973 }
974 }
975 if (tree) {
976 err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule);
977 if (err) {
978 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
979 return err;
980 }
981 }
982
983 entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL;
984 if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) {
985 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND)
986 entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high;
987 else
988 entry->rule.prio = --prio_low;
989 }
990
991 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
992 list_add(&entry->rule.list,
993 &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
994 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
995 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
996 } else {
997 list_add_tail(&entry->rule.list,
998 &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
999 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
1000 }
1001#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
1002 if (!dont_count)
1003 audit_n_rules++;
1004
1005 if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
1006 audit_signals++;
1007#endif
1008 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1009
1010 return err;
1011}
1012
1013/* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */
1014int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
1015{
1016 struct audit_entry *e;
1017 struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
1018 struct list_head *list;
1019 int ret = 0;
1020#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
1021 int dont_count = 0;
1022
1023 /* If any of these, don't count towards total */
1024 switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
1025 case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
1026 case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE:
1027 case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
1028 dont_count = 1;
1029 }
1030#endif
1031
1032 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1033 e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
1034 if (!e) {
1035 ret = -ENOENT;
1036 goto out;
1037 }
1038
1039 if (e->rule.watch)
1040 audit_remove_watch_rule(&e->rule);
1041
1042 if (e->rule.tree)
1043 audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
1044
1045 if (e->rule.exe)
1046 audit_remove_mark_rule(&e->rule);
1047
1048#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
1049 if (!dont_count)
1050 audit_n_rules--;
1051
1052 if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
1053 audit_signals--;
1054#endif
1055
1056 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
1057 list_del(&e->rule.list);
1058 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
1059
1060out:
1061 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1062
1063 if (tree)
1064 audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */
1065
1066 return ret;
1067}
1068
1069/* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
1070static void audit_list_rules(int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
1071{
1072 struct sk_buff *skb;
1073 struct audit_krule *r;
1074 int i;
1075
1076 /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
1077 * iterator to sync with list writers. */
1078 for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1079 list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1080 struct audit_rule_data *data;
1081
1082 data = audit_krule_to_data(r);
1083 if (unlikely(!data))
1084 break;
1085 skb = audit_make_reply(seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1,
1086 data,
1087 sizeof(*data) + data->buflen);
1088 if (skb)
1089 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1090 kfree(data);
1091 }
1092 }
1093 skb = audit_make_reply(seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
1094 if (skb)
1095 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1096}
1097
1098/* Log rule additions and removals */
1099static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
1100{
1101 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1102
1103 if (!audit_enabled)
1104 return;
1105
1106 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
1107 if (!ab)
1108 return;
1109 audit_log_session_info(ab);
1110 audit_log_task_context(ab);
1111 audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", action);
1112 audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
1113 audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
1114 audit_log_end(ab);
1115}
1116
1117/**
1118 * audit_rule_change - apply all rules to the specified message type
1119 * @type: audit message type
1120 * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
1121 * @data: payload data
1122 * @datasz: size of payload data
1123 */
1124int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz)
1125{
1126 int err = 0;
1127 struct audit_entry *entry;
1128
1129 switch (type) {
1130 case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
1131 entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
1132 if (IS_ERR(entry))
1133 return PTR_ERR(entry);
1134 err = audit_add_rule(entry);
1135 audit_log_rule_change("add_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
1136 break;
1137 case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
1138 entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
1139 if (IS_ERR(entry))
1140 return PTR_ERR(entry);
1141 err = audit_del_rule(entry);
1142 audit_log_rule_change("remove_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
1143 break;
1144 default:
1145 WARN_ON(1);
1146 return -EINVAL;
1147 }
1148
1149 if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) {
1150 if (entry->rule.exe)
1151 audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
1152 audit_free_rule(entry);
1153 }
1154
1155 return err;
1156}
1157
1158/**
1159 * audit_list_rules_send - list the audit rules
1160 * @request_skb: skb of request we are replying to (used to target the reply)
1161 * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
1162 */
1163int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq)
1164{
1165 u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid;
1166 struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk);
1167 struct task_struct *tsk;
1168 struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
1169 int err = 0;
1170
1171 /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
1172 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
1173 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
1174 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
1175 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
1176
1177 dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL);
1178 if (!dest)
1179 return -ENOMEM;
1180 dest->net = get_net(net);
1181 dest->portid = portid;
1182 skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
1183
1184 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1185 audit_list_rules(seq, &dest->q);
1186 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1187
1188 tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
1189 if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
1190 skb_queue_purge(&dest->q);
1191 kfree(dest);
1192 err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
1193 }
1194
1195 return err;
1196}
1197
1198int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
1199{
1200 switch (op) {
1201 case Audit_equal:
1202 return (left == right);
1203 case Audit_not_equal:
1204 return (left != right);
1205 case Audit_lt:
1206 return (left < right);
1207 case Audit_le:
1208 return (left <= right);
1209 case Audit_gt:
1210 return (left > right);
1211 case Audit_ge:
1212 return (left >= right);
1213 case Audit_bitmask:
1214 return (left & right);
1215 case Audit_bittest:
1216 return ((left & right) == right);
1217 default:
1218 BUG();
1219 return 0;
1220 }
1221}
1222
1223int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right)
1224{
1225 switch (op) {
1226 case Audit_equal:
1227 return uid_eq(left, right);
1228 case Audit_not_equal:
1229 return !uid_eq(left, right);
1230 case Audit_lt:
1231 return uid_lt(left, right);
1232 case Audit_le:
1233 return uid_lte(left, right);
1234 case Audit_gt:
1235 return uid_gt(left, right);
1236 case Audit_ge:
1237 return uid_gte(left, right);
1238 case Audit_bitmask:
1239 case Audit_bittest:
1240 default:
1241 BUG();
1242 return 0;
1243 }
1244}
1245
1246int audit_gid_comparator(kgid_t left, u32 op, kgid_t right)
1247{
1248 switch (op) {
1249 case Audit_equal:
1250 return gid_eq(left, right);
1251 case Audit_not_equal:
1252 return !gid_eq(left, right);
1253 case Audit_lt:
1254 return gid_lt(left, right);
1255 case Audit_le:
1256 return gid_lte(left, right);
1257 case Audit_gt:
1258 return gid_gt(left, right);
1259 case Audit_ge:
1260 return gid_gte(left, right);
1261 case Audit_bitmask:
1262 case Audit_bittest:
1263 default:
1264 BUG();
1265 return 0;
1266 }
1267}
1268
1269/**
1270 * parent_len - find the length of the parent portion of a pathname
1271 * @path: pathname of which to determine length
1272 */
1273int parent_len(const char *path)
1274{
1275 int plen;
1276 const char *p;
1277
1278 plen = strlen(path);
1279
1280 if (plen == 0)
1281 return plen;
1282
1283 /* disregard trailing slashes */
1284 p = path + plen - 1;
1285 while ((*p == '/') && (p > path))
1286 p--;
1287
1288 /* walk backward until we find the next slash or hit beginning */
1289 while ((*p != '/') && (p > path))
1290 p--;
1291
1292 /* did we find a slash? Then increment to include it in path */
1293 if (*p == '/')
1294 p++;
1295
1296 return p - path;
1297}
1298
1299/**
1300 * audit_compare_dname_path - compare given dentry name with last component in
1301 * given path. Return of 0 indicates a match.
1302 * @dname: dentry name that we're comparing
1303 * @path: full pathname that we're comparing
1304 * @parentlen: length of the parent if known. Passing in AUDIT_NAME_FULL
1305 * here indicates that we must compute this value.
1306 */
1307int audit_compare_dname_path(const struct qstr *dname, const char *path, int parentlen)
1308{
1309 int dlen, pathlen;
1310 const char *p;
1311
1312 dlen = dname->len;
1313 pathlen = strlen(path);
1314 if (pathlen < dlen)
1315 return 1;
1316
1317 parentlen = parentlen == AUDIT_NAME_FULL ? parent_len(path) : parentlen;
1318 if (pathlen - parentlen != dlen)
1319 return 1;
1320
1321 p = path + parentlen;
1322
1323 return strncmp(p, dname->name, dlen);
1324}
1325
1326int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
1327{
1328 struct audit_entry *e;
1329 int ret = 1; /* Audit by default */
1330
1331 rcu_read_lock();
1332 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[listtype], list) {
1333 int i, result = 0;
1334
1335 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
1336 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
1337 pid_t pid;
1338 u32 sid;
1339
1340 switch (f->type) {
1341 case AUDIT_PID:
1342 pid = task_pid_nr(current);
1343 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
1344 break;
1345 case AUDIT_UID:
1346 result = audit_uid_comparator(current_uid(), f->op, f->uid);
1347 break;
1348 case AUDIT_GID:
1349 result = audit_gid_comparator(current_gid(), f->op, f->gid);
1350 break;
1351 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
1352 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current),
1353 f->op, f->uid);
1354 break;
1355 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
1356 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current),
1357 f->op, f->val);
1358 break;
1359 case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
1360 result = audit_comparator(msgtype, f->op, f->val);
1361 break;
1362 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
1363 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
1364 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
1365 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
1366 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
1367 if (f->lsm_rule) {
1368 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
1369 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
1370 f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
1371 }
1372 break;
1373 case AUDIT_EXE:
1374 result = audit_exe_compare(current, e->rule.exe);
1375 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
1376 result = !result;
1377 break;
1378 default:
1379 goto unlock_and_return;
1380 }
1381 if (result < 0) /* error */
1382 goto unlock_and_return;
1383 if (!result)
1384 break;
1385 }
1386 if (result > 0) {
1387 if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER || listtype == AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE)
1388 ret = 0;
1389 break;
1390 }
1391 }
1392unlock_and_return:
1393 rcu_read_unlock();
1394 return ret;
1395}
1396
1397static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
1398{
1399 struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
1400 struct audit_entry *nentry;
1401 int err = 0;
1402
1403 if (!security_audit_rule_known(r))
1404 return 0;
1405
1406 nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r);
1407 if (entry->rule.exe)
1408 audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
1409 if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
1410 /* save the first error encountered for the
1411 * return value */
1412 err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
1413 audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
1414 if (r->watch)
1415 list_del(&r->rlist);
1416 list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
1417 list_del(&r->list);
1418 } else {
1419 if (r->watch || r->tree)
1420 list_replace_init(&r->rlist, &nentry->rule.rlist);
1421 list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
1422 list_replace(&r->list, &nentry->rule.list);
1423 }
1424 call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
1425
1426 return err;
1427}
1428
1429/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
1430 * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
1431 * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
1432 * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
1433 * updated rule. */
1434int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
1435{
1436 struct audit_krule *r, *n;
1437 int i, err = 0;
1438
1439 /* audit_filter_mutex synchronizes the writers */
1440 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1441
1442 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1443 list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1444 int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
1445 if (!err)
1446 err = res;
1447 }
1448 }
1449 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1450
1451 return err;
1452}
Linux 6.x block layer and io_uring tree(s)