| 1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
| 2 | #define pr_fmt(fmt) "efi: " fmt |
| 3 | |
| 4 | #include <linux/init.h> |
| 5 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| 6 | #include <linux/string.h> |
| 7 | #include <linux/time.h> |
| 8 | #include <linux/types.h> |
| 9 | #include <linux/efi.h> |
| 10 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
| 11 | #include <linux/memblock.h> |
| 12 | #include <linux/acpi.h> |
| 13 | #include <linux/dmi.h> |
| 14 | |
| 15 | #include <asm/e820/api.h> |
| 16 | #include <asm/efi.h> |
| 17 | #include <asm/uv/uv.h> |
| 18 | #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> |
| 19 | #include <asm/reboot.h> |
| 20 | |
| 21 | #define EFI_MIN_RESERVE 5120 |
| 22 | |
| 23 | #define EFI_DUMMY_GUID \ |
| 24 | EFI_GUID(0x4424ac57, 0xbe4b, 0x47dd, 0x9e, 0x97, 0xed, 0x50, 0xf0, 0x9f, 0x92, 0xa9) |
| 25 | |
| 26 | #define QUARK_CSH_SIGNATURE 0x5f435348 /* _CSH */ |
| 27 | #define QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE 0x400 |
| 28 | |
| 29 | /* |
| 30 | * Header prepended to the standard EFI capsule on Quark systems the are based |
| 31 | * on Intel firmware BSP. |
| 32 | * @csh_signature: Unique identifier to sanity check signed module |
| 33 | * presence ("_CSH"). |
| 34 | * @version: Current version of CSH used. Should be one for Quark A0. |
| 35 | * @modulesize: Size of the entire module including the module header |
| 36 | * and payload. |
| 37 | * @security_version_number_index: Index of SVN to use for validation of signed |
| 38 | * module. |
| 39 | * @security_version_number: Used to prevent against roll back of modules. |
| 40 | * @rsvd_module_id: Currently unused for Clanton (Quark). |
| 41 | * @rsvd_module_vendor: Vendor Identifier. For Intel products value is |
| 42 | * 0x00008086. |
| 43 | * @rsvd_date: BCD representation of build date as yyyymmdd, where |
| 44 | * yyyy=4 digit year, mm=1-12, dd=1-31. |
| 45 | * @headersize: Total length of the header including including any |
| 46 | * padding optionally added by the signing tool. |
| 47 | * @hash_algo: What Hash is used in the module signing. |
| 48 | * @cryp_algo: What Crypto is used in the module signing. |
| 49 | * @keysize: Total length of the key data including including any |
| 50 | * padding optionally added by the signing tool. |
| 51 | * @signaturesize: Total length of the signature including including any |
| 52 | * padding optionally added by the signing tool. |
| 53 | * @rsvd_next_header: 32-bit pointer to the next Secure Boot Module in the |
| 54 | * chain, if there is a next header. |
| 55 | * @rsvd: Reserved, padding structure to required size. |
| 56 | * |
| 57 | * See also QuartSecurityHeader_t in |
| 58 | * Quark_EDKII_v1.2.1.1/QuarkPlatformPkg/Include/QuarkBootRom.h |
| 59 | * from https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/23197/Intel-Quark-SoC-X1000-Board-Support-Package-BSP |
| 60 | */ |
| 61 | struct quark_security_header { |
| 62 | u32 csh_signature; |
| 63 | u32 version; |
| 64 | u32 modulesize; |
| 65 | u32 security_version_number_index; |
| 66 | u32 security_version_number; |
| 67 | u32 rsvd_module_id; |
| 68 | u32 rsvd_module_vendor; |
| 69 | u32 rsvd_date; |
| 70 | u32 headersize; |
| 71 | u32 hash_algo; |
| 72 | u32 cryp_algo; |
| 73 | u32 keysize; |
| 74 | u32 signaturesize; |
| 75 | u32 rsvd_next_header; |
| 76 | u32 rsvd[2]; |
| 77 | }; |
| 78 | |
| 79 | static const efi_char16_t efi_dummy_name[] = L"DUMMY"; |
| 80 | |
| 81 | static bool efi_no_storage_paranoia; |
| 82 | |
| 83 | /* |
| 84 | * Some firmware implementations refuse to boot if there's insufficient |
| 85 | * space in the variable store. The implementation of garbage collection |
| 86 | * in some FW versions causes stale (deleted) variables to take up space |
| 87 | * longer than intended and space is only freed once the store becomes |
| 88 | * almost completely full. |
| 89 | * |
| 90 | * Enabling this option disables the space checks in |
| 91 | * efi_query_variable_store() and forces garbage collection. |
| 92 | * |
| 93 | * Only enable this option if deleting EFI variables does not free up |
| 94 | * space in your variable store, e.g. if despite deleting variables |
| 95 | * you're unable to create new ones. |
| 96 | */ |
| 97 | static int __init setup_storage_paranoia(char *arg) |
| 98 | { |
| 99 | efi_no_storage_paranoia = true; |
| 100 | return 0; |
| 101 | } |
| 102 | early_param("efi_no_storage_paranoia", setup_storage_paranoia); |
| 103 | |
| 104 | /* |
| 105 | * Deleting the dummy variable which kicks off garbage collection |
| 106 | */ |
| 107 | void efi_delete_dummy_variable(void) |
| 108 | { |
| 109 | efi.set_variable_nonblocking((efi_char16_t *)efi_dummy_name, |
| 110 | &EFI_DUMMY_GUID, |
| 111 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | |
| 112 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | |
| 113 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, 0, NULL); |
| 114 | } |
| 115 | |
| 116 | /* |
| 117 | * In the nonblocking case we do not attempt to perform garbage |
| 118 | * collection if we do not have enough free space. Rather, we do the |
| 119 | * bare minimum check and give up immediately if the available space |
| 120 | * is below EFI_MIN_RESERVE. |
| 121 | * |
| 122 | * This function is intended to be small and simple because it is |
| 123 | * invoked from crash handler paths. |
| 124 | */ |
| 125 | static efi_status_t |
| 126 | query_variable_store_nonblocking(u32 attributes, unsigned long size) |
| 127 | { |
| 128 | efi_status_t status; |
| 129 | u64 storage_size, remaining_size, max_size; |
| 130 | |
| 131 | status = efi.query_variable_info_nonblocking(attributes, &storage_size, |
| 132 | &remaining_size, |
| 133 | &max_size); |
| 134 | if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) |
| 135 | return status; |
| 136 | |
| 137 | if (remaining_size - size < EFI_MIN_RESERVE) |
| 138 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
| 139 | |
| 140 | return EFI_SUCCESS; |
| 141 | } |
| 142 | |
| 143 | /* |
| 144 | * Some firmware implementations refuse to boot if there's insufficient space |
| 145 | * in the variable store. Ensure that we never use more than a safe limit. |
| 146 | * |
| 147 | * Return EFI_SUCCESS if it is safe to write 'size' bytes to the variable |
| 148 | * store. |
| 149 | */ |
| 150 | efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store(u32 attributes, unsigned long size, |
| 151 | bool nonblocking) |
| 152 | { |
| 153 | efi_status_t status; |
| 154 | u64 storage_size, remaining_size, max_size; |
| 155 | |
| 156 | if (!(attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)) |
| 157 | return 0; |
| 158 | |
| 159 | if (nonblocking) |
| 160 | return query_variable_store_nonblocking(attributes, size); |
| 161 | |
| 162 | status = efi.query_variable_info(attributes, &storage_size, |
| 163 | &remaining_size, &max_size); |
| 164 | if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) |
| 165 | return status; |
| 166 | |
| 167 | /* |
| 168 | * We account for that by refusing the write if permitting it would |
| 169 | * reduce the available space to under 5KB. This figure was provided by |
| 170 | * Samsung, so should be safe. |
| 171 | */ |
| 172 | if ((remaining_size - size < EFI_MIN_RESERVE) && |
| 173 | !efi_no_storage_paranoia) { |
| 174 | |
| 175 | /* |
| 176 | * Triggering garbage collection may require that the firmware |
| 177 | * generate a real EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES error. We can force |
| 178 | * that by attempting to use more space than is available. |
| 179 | */ |
| 180 | unsigned long dummy_size = remaining_size + 1024; |
| 181 | void *dummy = kzalloc(dummy_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
| 182 | |
| 183 | if (!dummy) |
| 184 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
| 185 | |
| 186 | status = efi.set_variable((efi_char16_t *)efi_dummy_name, |
| 187 | &EFI_DUMMY_GUID, |
| 188 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | |
| 189 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | |
| 190 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, |
| 191 | dummy_size, dummy); |
| 192 | |
| 193 | if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) { |
| 194 | /* |
| 195 | * This should have failed, so if it didn't make sure |
| 196 | * that we delete it... |
| 197 | */ |
| 198 | efi_delete_dummy_variable(); |
| 199 | } |
| 200 | |
| 201 | kfree(dummy); |
| 202 | |
| 203 | /* |
| 204 | * The runtime code may now have triggered a garbage collection |
| 205 | * run, so check the variable info again |
| 206 | */ |
| 207 | status = efi.query_variable_info(attributes, &storage_size, |
| 208 | &remaining_size, &max_size); |
| 209 | |
| 210 | if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) |
| 211 | return status; |
| 212 | |
| 213 | /* |
| 214 | * There still isn't enough room, so return an error |
| 215 | */ |
| 216 | if (remaining_size - size < EFI_MIN_RESERVE) |
| 217 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
| 218 | } |
| 219 | |
| 220 | return EFI_SUCCESS; |
| 221 | } |
| 222 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efi_query_variable_store); |
| 223 | |
| 224 | /* |
| 225 | * The UEFI specification makes it clear that the operating system is |
| 226 | * free to do whatever it wants with boot services code after |
| 227 | * ExitBootServices() has been called. Ignoring this recommendation a |
| 228 | * significant bunch of EFI implementations continue calling into boot |
| 229 | * services code (SetVirtualAddressMap). In order to work around such |
| 230 | * buggy implementations we reserve boot services region during EFI |
| 231 | * init and make sure it stays executable. Then, after |
| 232 | * SetVirtualAddressMap(), it is discarded. |
| 233 | * |
| 234 | * However, some boot services regions contain data that is required |
| 235 | * by drivers, so we need to track which memory ranges can never be |
| 236 | * freed. This is done by tagging those regions with the |
| 237 | * EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute. |
| 238 | * |
| 239 | * Any driver that wants to mark a region as reserved must use |
| 240 | * efi_mem_reserve() which will insert a new EFI memory descriptor |
| 241 | * into efi.memmap (splitting existing regions if necessary) and tag |
| 242 | * it with EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME. |
| 243 | */ |
| 244 | void __init efi_arch_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size) |
| 245 | { |
| 246 | phys_addr_t new_phys, new_size; |
| 247 | struct efi_mem_range mr; |
| 248 | efi_memory_desc_t md; |
| 249 | int num_entries; |
| 250 | void *new; |
| 251 | |
| 252 | if (efi_mem_desc_lookup(addr, &md) || |
| 253 | md.type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) { |
| 254 | pr_err("Failed to lookup EFI memory descriptor for %pa\n", &addr); |
| 255 | return; |
| 256 | } |
| 257 | |
| 258 | if (addr + size > md.phys_addr + (md.num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)) { |
| 259 | pr_err("Region spans EFI memory descriptors, %pa\n", &addr); |
| 260 | return; |
| 261 | } |
| 262 | |
| 263 | /* No need to reserve regions that will never be freed. */ |
| 264 | if (md.attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) |
| 265 | return; |
| 266 | |
| 267 | size += addr % EFI_PAGE_SIZE; |
| 268 | size = round_up(size, EFI_PAGE_SIZE); |
| 269 | addr = round_down(addr, EFI_PAGE_SIZE); |
| 270 | |
| 271 | mr.range.start = addr; |
| 272 | mr.range.end = addr + size - 1; |
| 273 | mr.attribute = md.attribute | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME; |
| 274 | |
| 275 | num_entries = efi_memmap_split_count(&md, &mr.range); |
| 276 | num_entries += efi.memmap.nr_map; |
| 277 | |
| 278 | new_size = efi.memmap.desc_size * num_entries; |
| 279 | |
| 280 | new_phys = efi_memmap_alloc(num_entries); |
| 281 | if (!new_phys) { |
| 282 | pr_err("Could not allocate boot services memmap\n"); |
| 283 | return; |
| 284 | } |
| 285 | |
| 286 | new = early_memremap(new_phys, new_size); |
| 287 | if (!new) { |
| 288 | pr_err("Failed to map new boot services memmap\n"); |
| 289 | return; |
| 290 | } |
| 291 | |
| 292 | efi_memmap_insert(&efi.memmap, new, &mr); |
| 293 | early_memunmap(new, new_size); |
| 294 | |
| 295 | efi_memmap_install(new_phys, num_entries); |
| 296 | } |
| 297 | |
| 298 | /* |
| 299 | * Helper function for efi_reserve_boot_services() to figure out if we |
| 300 | * can free regions in efi_free_boot_services(). |
| 301 | * |
| 302 | * Use this function to ensure we do not free regions owned by somebody |
| 303 | * else. We must only reserve (and then free) regions: |
| 304 | * |
| 305 | * - Not within any part of the kernel |
| 306 | * - Not the BIOS reserved area (E820_TYPE_RESERVED, E820_TYPE_NVS, etc) |
| 307 | */ |
| 308 | static __init bool can_free_region(u64 start, u64 size) |
| 309 | { |
| 310 | if (start + size > __pa_symbol(_text) && start <= __pa_symbol(_end)) |
| 311 | return false; |
| 312 | |
| 313 | if (!e820__mapped_all(start, start+size, E820_TYPE_RAM)) |
| 314 | return false; |
| 315 | |
| 316 | return true; |
| 317 | } |
| 318 | |
| 319 | void __init efi_reserve_boot_services(void) |
| 320 | { |
| 321 | efi_memory_desc_t *md; |
| 322 | |
| 323 | for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) { |
| 324 | u64 start = md->phys_addr; |
| 325 | u64 size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT; |
| 326 | bool already_reserved; |
| 327 | |
| 328 | if (md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE && |
| 329 | md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) |
| 330 | continue; |
| 331 | |
| 332 | already_reserved = memblock_is_region_reserved(start, size); |
| 333 | |
| 334 | /* |
| 335 | * Because the following memblock_reserve() is paired |
| 336 | * with memblock_free_late() for this region in |
| 337 | * efi_free_boot_services(), we must be extremely |
| 338 | * careful not to reserve, and subsequently free, |
| 339 | * critical regions of memory (like the kernel image) or |
| 340 | * those regions that somebody else has already |
| 341 | * reserved. |
| 342 | * |
| 343 | * A good example of a critical region that must not be |
| 344 | * freed is page zero (first 4Kb of memory), which may |
| 345 | * contain boot services code/data but is marked |
| 346 | * E820_TYPE_RESERVED by trim_bios_range(). |
| 347 | */ |
| 348 | if (!already_reserved) { |
| 349 | memblock_reserve(start, size); |
| 350 | |
| 351 | /* |
| 352 | * If we are the first to reserve the region, no |
| 353 | * one else cares about it. We own it and can |
| 354 | * free it later. |
| 355 | */ |
| 356 | if (can_free_region(start, size)) |
| 357 | continue; |
| 358 | } |
| 359 | |
| 360 | /* |
| 361 | * We don't own the region. We must not free it. |
| 362 | * |
| 363 | * Setting this bit for a boot services region really |
| 364 | * doesn't make sense as far as the firmware is |
| 365 | * concerned, but it does provide us with a way to tag |
| 366 | * those regions that must not be paired with |
| 367 | * memblock_free_late(). |
| 368 | */ |
| 369 | md->attribute |= EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME; |
| 370 | } |
| 371 | } |
| 372 | |
| 373 | /* |
| 374 | * Apart from having VA mappings for EFI boot services code/data regions, |
| 375 | * (duplicate) 1:1 mappings were also created as a quirk for buggy firmware. So, |
| 376 | * unmap both 1:1 and VA mappings. |
| 377 | */ |
| 378 | static void __init efi_unmap_pages(efi_memory_desc_t *md) |
| 379 | { |
| 380 | pgd_t *pgd = efi_mm.pgd; |
| 381 | u64 pa = md->phys_addr; |
| 382 | u64 va = md->virt_addr; |
| 383 | |
| 384 | /* |
| 385 | * To Do: Remove this check after adding functionality to unmap EFI boot |
| 386 | * services code/data regions from direct mapping area because |
| 387 | * "efi=old_map" maps EFI regions in swapper_pg_dir. |
| 388 | */ |
| 389 | if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) |
| 390 | return; |
| 391 | |
| 392 | /* |
| 393 | * EFI mixed mode has all RAM mapped to access arguments while making |
| 394 | * EFI runtime calls, hence don't unmap EFI boot services code/data |
| 395 | * regions. |
| 396 | */ |
| 397 | if (!efi_is_native()) |
| 398 | return; |
| 399 | |
| 400 | if (kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pa, md->num_pages)) |
| 401 | pr_err("Failed to unmap 1:1 mapping for 0x%llx\n", pa); |
| 402 | |
| 403 | if (kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd, va, md->num_pages)) |
| 404 | pr_err("Failed to unmap VA mapping for 0x%llx\n", va); |
| 405 | } |
| 406 | |
| 407 | void __init efi_free_boot_services(void) |
| 408 | { |
| 409 | phys_addr_t new_phys, new_size; |
| 410 | efi_memory_desc_t *md; |
| 411 | int num_entries = 0; |
| 412 | void *new, *new_md; |
| 413 | |
| 414 | for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) { |
| 415 | unsigned long long start = md->phys_addr; |
| 416 | unsigned long long size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT; |
| 417 | size_t rm_size; |
| 418 | |
| 419 | if (md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE && |
| 420 | md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) { |
| 421 | num_entries++; |
| 422 | continue; |
| 423 | } |
| 424 | |
| 425 | /* Do not free, someone else owns it: */ |
| 426 | if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) { |
| 427 | num_entries++; |
| 428 | continue; |
| 429 | } |
| 430 | |
| 431 | /* |
| 432 | * Before calling set_virtual_address_map(), EFI boot services |
| 433 | * code/data regions were mapped as a quirk for buggy firmware. |
| 434 | * Unmap them from efi_pgd before freeing them up. |
| 435 | */ |
| 436 | efi_unmap_pages(md); |
| 437 | |
| 438 | /* |
| 439 | * Nasty quirk: if all sub-1MB memory is used for boot |
| 440 | * services, we can get here without having allocated the |
| 441 | * real mode trampoline. It's too late to hand boot services |
| 442 | * memory back to the memblock allocator, so instead |
| 443 | * try to manually allocate the trampoline if needed. |
| 444 | * |
| 445 | * I've seen this on a Dell XPS 13 9350 with firmware |
| 446 | * 1.4.4 with SGX enabled booting Linux via Fedora 24's |
| 447 | * grub2-efi on a hard disk. (And no, I don't know why |
| 448 | * this happened, but Linux should still try to boot rather |
| 449 | * panicing early.) |
| 450 | */ |
| 451 | rm_size = real_mode_size_needed(); |
| 452 | if (rm_size && (start + rm_size) < (1<<20) && size >= rm_size) { |
| 453 | set_real_mode_mem(start); |
| 454 | start += rm_size; |
| 455 | size -= rm_size; |
| 456 | } |
| 457 | |
| 458 | memblock_free_late(start, size); |
| 459 | } |
| 460 | |
| 461 | if (!num_entries) |
| 462 | return; |
| 463 | |
| 464 | new_size = efi.memmap.desc_size * num_entries; |
| 465 | new_phys = efi_memmap_alloc(num_entries); |
| 466 | if (!new_phys) { |
| 467 | pr_err("Failed to allocate new EFI memmap\n"); |
| 468 | return; |
| 469 | } |
| 470 | |
| 471 | new = memremap(new_phys, new_size, MEMREMAP_WB); |
| 472 | if (!new) { |
| 473 | pr_err("Failed to map new EFI memmap\n"); |
| 474 | return; |
| 475 | } |
| 476 | |
| 477 | /* |
| 478 | * Build a new EFI memmap that excludes any boot services |
| 479 | * regions that are not tagged EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME, since those |
| 480 | * regions have now been freed. |
| 481 | */ |
| 482 | new_md = new; |
| 483 | for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) { |
| 484 | if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) && |
| 485 | (md->type == EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE || |
| 486 | md->type == EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA)) |
| 487 | continue; |
| 488 | |
| 489 | memcpy(new_md, md, efi.memmap.desc_size); |
| 490 | new_md += efi.memmap.desc_size; |
| 491 | } |
| 492 | |
| 493 | memunmap(new); |
| 494 | |
| 495 | if (efi_memmap_install(new_phys, num_entries)) { |
| 496 | pr_err("Could not install new EFI memmap\n"); |
| 497 | return; |
| 498 | } |
| 499 | } |
| 500 | |
| 501 | /* |
| 502 | * A number of config table entries get remapped to virtual addresses |
| 503 | * after entering EFI virtual mode. However, the kexec kernel requires |
| 504 | * their physical addresses therefore we pass them via setup_data and |
| 505 | * correct those entries to their respective physical addresses here. |
| 506 | * |
| 507 | * Currently only handles smbios which is necessary for some firmware |
| 508 | * implementation. |
| 509 | */ |
| 510 | int __init efi_reuse_config(u64 tables, int nr_tables) |
| 511 | { |
| 512 | int i, sz, ret = 0; |
| 513 | void *p, *tablep; |
| 514 | struct efi_setup_data *data; |
| 515 | |
| 516 | if (nr_tables == 0) |
| 517 | return 0; |
| 518 | |
| 519 | if (!efi_setup) |
| 520 | return 0; |
| 521 | |
| 522 | if (!efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT)) |
| 523 | return 0; |
| 524 | |
| 525 | data = early_memremap(efi_setup, sizeof(*data)); |
| 526 | if (!data) { |
| 527 | ret = -ENOMEM; |
| 528 | goto out; |
| 529 | } |
| 530 | |
| 531 | if (!data->smbios) |
| 532 | goto out_memremap; |
| 533 | |
| 534 | sz = sizeof(efi_config_table_64_t); |
| 535 | |
| 536 | p = tablep = early_memremap(tables, nr_tables * sz); |
| 537 | if (!p) { |
| 538 | pr_err("Could not map Configuration table!\n"); |
| 539 | ret = -ENOMEM; |
| 540 | goto out_memremap; |
| 541 | } |
| 542 | |
| 543 | for (i = 0; i < efi.systab->nr_tables; i++) { |
| 544 | efi_guid_t guid; |
| 545 | |
| 546 | guid = ((efi_config_table_64_t *)p)->guid; |
| 547 | |
| 548 | if (!efi_guidcmp(guid, SMBIOS_TABLE_GUID)) |
| 549 | ((efi_config_table_64_t *)p)->table = data->smbios; |
| 550 | p += sz; |
| 551 | } |
| 552 | early_memunmap(tablep, nr_tables * sz); |
| 553 | |
| 554 | out_memremap: |
| 555 | early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data)); |
| 556 | out: |
| 557 | return ret; |
| 558 | } |
| 559 | |
| 560 | static const struct dmi_system_id sgi_uv1_dmi[] = { |
| 561 | { NULL, "SGI UV1", |
| 562 | { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Stoutland Platform"), |
| 563 | DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "1.0"), |
| 564 | DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VENDOR, "SGI.COM"), |
| 565 | } |
| 566 | }, |
| 567 | { } /* NULL entry stops DMI scanning */ |
| 568 | }; |
| 569 | |
| 570 | void __init efi_apply_memmap_quirks(void) |
| 571 | { |
| 572 | /* |
| 573 | * Once setup is done earlier, unmap the EFI memory map on mismatched |
| 574 | * firmware/kernel architectures since there is no support for runtime |
| 575 | * services. |
| 576 | */ |
| 577 | if (!efi_runtime_supported()) { |
| 578 | pr_info("Setup done, disabling due to 32/64-bit mismatch\n"); |
| 579 | efi_memmap_unmap(); |
| 580 | } |
| 581 | |
| 582 | /* UV2+ BIOS has a fix for this issue. UV1 still needs the quirk. */ |
| 583 | if (dmi_check_system(sgi_uv1_dmi)) |
| 584 | set_bit(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP, &efi.flags); |
| 585 | } |
| 586 | |
| 587 | /* |
| 588 | * For most modern platforms the preferred method of powering off is via |
| 589 | * ACPI. However, there are some that are known to require the use of |
| 590 | * EFI runtime services and for which ACPI does not work at all. |
| 591 | * |
| 592 | * Using EFI is a last resort, to be used only if no other option |
| 593 | * exists. |
| 594 | */ |
| 595 | bool efi_reboot_required(void) |
| 596 | { |
| 597 | if (!acpi_gbl_reduced_hardware) |
| 598 | return false; |
| 599 | |
| 600 | efi_reboot_quirk_mode = EFI_RESET_WARM; |
| 601 | return true; |
| 602 | } |
| 603 | |
| 604 | bool efi_poweroff_required(void) |
| 605 | { |
| 606 | return acpi_gbl_reduced_hardware || acpi_no_s5; |
| 607 | } |
| 608 | |
| 609 | #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_QUIRK_QUARK_CSH |
| 610 | |
| 611 | static int qrk_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info, void **pkbuff, |
| 612 | size_t hdr_bytes) |
| 613 | { |
| 614 | struct quark_security_header *csh = *pkbuff; |
| 615 | |
| 616 | /* Only process data block that is larger than the security header */ |
| 617 | if (hdr_bytes < sizeof(struct quark_security_header)) |
| 618 | return 0; |
| 619 | |
| 620 | if (csh->csh_signature != QUARK_CSH_SIGNATURE || |
| 621 | csh->headersize != QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE) |
| 622 | return 1; |
| 623 | |
| 624 | /* Only process data block if EFI header is included */ |
| 625 | if (hdr_bytes < QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE + |
| 626 | sizeof(efi_capsule_header_t)) |
| 627 | return 0; |
| 628 | |
| 629 | pr_debug("Quark security header detected\n"); |
| 630 | |
| 631 | if (csh->rsvd_next_header != 0) { |
| 632 | pr_err("multiple Quark security headers not supported\n"); |
| 633 | return -EINVAL; |
| 634 | } |
| 635 | |
| 636 | *pkbuff += csh->headersize; |
| 637 | cap_info->total_size = csh->headersize; |
| 638 | |
| 639 | /* |
| 640 | * Update the first page pointer to skip over the CSH header. |
| 641 | */ |
| 642 | cap_info->phys[0] += csh->headersize; |
| 643 | |
| 644 | /* |
| 645 | * cap_info->capsule should point at a virtual mapping of the entire |
| 646 | * capsule, starting at the capsule header. Our image has the Quark |
| 647 | * security header prepended, so we cannot rely on the default vmap() |
| 648 | * mapping created by the generic capsule code. |
| 649 | * Given that the Quark firmware does not appear to care about the |
| 650 | * virtual mapping, let's just point cap_info->capsule at our copy |
| 651 | * of the capsule header. |
| 652 | */ |
| 653 | cap_info->capsule = &cap_info->header; |
| 654 | |
| 655 | return 1; |
| 656 | } |
| 657 | |
| 658 | #define ICPU(family, model, quirk_handler) \ |
| 659 | { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, family, model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, \ |
| 660 | (unsigned long)&quirk_handler } |
| 661 | |
| 662 | static const struct x86_cpu_id efi_capsule_quirk_ids[] = { |
| 663 | ICPU(5, 9, qrk_capsule_setup_info), /* Intel Quark X1000 */ |
| 664 | { } |
| 665 | }; |
| 666 | |
| 667 | int efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info, void *kbuff, |
| 668 | size_t hdr_bytes) |
| 669 | { |
| 670 | int (*quirk_handler)(struct capsule_info *, void **, size_t); |
| 671 | const struct x86_cpu_id *id; |
| 672 | int ret; |
| 673 | |
| 674 | if (hdr_bytes < sizeof(efi_capsule_header_t)) |
| 675 | return 0; |
| 676 | |
| 677 | cap_info->total_size = 0; |
| 678 | |
| 679 | id = x86_match_cpu(efi_capsule_quirk_ids); |
| 680 | if (id) { |
| 681 | /* |
| 682 | * The quirk handler is supposed to return |
| 683 | * - a value > 0 if the setup should continue, after advancing |
| 684 | * kbuff as needed |
| 685 | * - 0 if not enough hdr_bytes are available yet |
| 686 | * - a negative error code otherwise |
| 687 | */ |
| 688 | quirk_handler = (typeof(quirk_handler))id->driver_data; |
| 689 | ret = quirk_handler(cap_info, &kbuff, hdr_bytes); |
| 690 | if (ret <= 0) |
| 691 | return ret; |
| 692 | } |
| 693 | |
| 694 | memcpy(&cap_info->header, kbuff, sizeof(cap_info->header)); |
| 695 | |
| 696 | cap_info->total_size += cap_info->header.imagesize; |
| 697 | |
| 698 | return __efi_capsule_setup_info(cap_info); |
| 699 | } |
| 700 | |
| 701 | #endif |
| 702 | |
| 703 | /* |
| 704 | * If any access by any efi runtime service causes a page fault, then, |
| 705 | * 1. If it's efi_reset_system(), reboot through BIOS. |
| 706 | * 2. If any other efi runtime service, then |
| 707 | * a. Return error status to the efi caller process. |
| 708 | * b. Disable EFI Runtime Services forever and |
| 709 | * c. Freeze efi_rts_wq and schedule new process. |
| 710 | * |
| 711 | * @return: Returns, if the page fault is not handled. This function |
| 712 | * will never return if the page fault is handled successfully. |
| 713 | */ |
| 714 | void efi_recover_from_page_fault(unsigned long phys_addr) |
| 715 | { |
| 716 | if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) |
| 717 | return; |
| 718 | |
| 719 | /* |
| 720 | * Make sure that an efi runtime service caused the page fault. |
| 721 | * "efi_mm" cannot be used to check if the page fault had occurred |
| 722 | * in the firmware context because efi=old_map doesn't use efi_pgd. |
| 723 | */ |
| 724 | if (efi_rts_work.efi_rts_id == EFI_NONE) |
| 725 | return; |
| 726 | |
| 727 | /* |
| 728 | * Address range 0x0000 - 0x0fff is always mapped in the efi_pgd, so |
| 729 | * page faulting on these addresses isn't expected. |
| 730 | */ |
| 731 | if (phys_addr <= 0x0fff) |
| 732 | return; |
| 733 | |
| 734 | /* |
| 735 | * Print stack trace as it might be useful to know which EFI Runtime |
| 736 | * Service is buggy. |
| 737 | */ |
| 738 | WARN(1, FW_BUG "Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0x%lx\n", |
| 739 | phys_addr); |
| 740 | |
| 741 | /* |
| 742 | * Buggy efi_reset_system() is handled differently from other EFI |
| 743 | * Runtime Services as it doesn't use efi_rts_wq. Although, |
| 744 | * native_machine_emergency_restart() says that machine_real_restart() |
| 745 | * could fail, it's better not to compilcate this fault handler |
| 746 | * because this case occurs *very* rarely and hence could be improved |
| 747 | * on a need by basis. |
| 748 | */ |
| 749 | if (efi_rts_work.efi_rts_id == EFI_RESET_SYSTEM) { |
| 750 | pr_info("efi_reset_system() buggy! Reboot through BIOS\n"); |
| 751 | machine_real_restart(MRR_BIOS); |
| 752 | return; |
| 753 | } |
| 754 | |
| 755 | /* |
| 756 | * Before calling EFI Runtime Service, the kernel has switched the |
| 757 | * calling process to efi_mm. Hence, switch back to task_mm. |
| 758 | */ |
| 759 | arch_efi_call_virt_teardown(); |
| 760 | |
| 761 | /* Signal error status to the efi caller process */ |
| 762 | efi_rts_work.status = EFI_ABORTED; |
| 763 | complete(&efi_rts_work.efi_rts_comp); |
| 764 | |
| 765 | clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags); |
| 766 | pr_info("Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services\n"); |
| 767 | |
| 768 | /* |
| 769 | * Call schedule() in an infinite loop, so that any spurious wake ups |
| 770 | * will never run efi_rts_wq again. |
| 771 | */ |
| 772 | for (;;) { |
| 773 | set_current_state(TASK_IDLE); |
| 774 | schedule(); |
| 775 | } |
| 776 | |
| 777 | return; |
| 778 | } |