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[linux-2.6-block.git] / security / smack / smack_lsm.c
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e114e473
CS		 1/*
2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
5 *
5c6d1125 6 * Authors:
e114e473 7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
5c6d1125 8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
e114e473
CS		 9 *
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
07feee8f
PM		 11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
5c6d1125 13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
e114e473
CS		 14 *
15 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
16 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
17 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
18 */
19
20#include <linux/xattr.h>
21#include <linux/pagemap.h>
22#include <linux/mount.h>
23#include <linux/stat.h>
e114e473
CS		 24#include <linux/kd.h>
25#include <asm/ioctls.h>
07feee8f 26#include <linux/ip.h>
e114e473
CS		 27#include <linux/tcp.h>
28#include <linux/udp.h>
5a0e3ad6 29#include <linux/slab.h>
e114e473
CS		 30#include <linux/mutex.h>
31#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
32#include <net/netlabel.h>
33#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
d20bdda6 34#include <linux/audit.h>
1fd7317d 35#include <linux/magic.h>
e114e473
CS		 36#include "smack.h"
37
c69e8d9c
DH		 38#define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
39
5c6d1125
JS		 40#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
41#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
42
e114e473
CS		 43/**
44 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
45 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
46 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
47 *
48 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
49 * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
50 */
676dac4b 51static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
e114e473
CS		 52{
53 int rc;
54 char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
55
56 if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
57 return NULL;
58
676dac4b 59 rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
e114e473
CS		 60 if (rc < 0)
61 return NULL;
62
63 return smk_import(in, rc);
64}
65
66/**
67 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
68 * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
69 *
70 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
71 */
72struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
73{
74 struct inode_smack *isp;
75
76 isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
77 if (isp == NULL)
78 return NULL;
79
80 isp->smk_inode = smack;
81 isp->smk_flags = 0;
82 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
83
84 return isp;
85}
86
87/*
88 * LSM hooks.
89 * We he, that is fun!
90 */
91
92/**
9e48858f 93 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
e114e473 94 * @ctp: child task pointer
251a2a95 95 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
e114e473
CS		 96 *
97 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
98 *
99 * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
100 */
9e48858f 101static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
e114e473
CS		 102{
103 int rc;
ecfcc53f
EB		 104 struct smk_audit_info ad;
105 char *sp, *tsp;
e114e473 106
9e48858f 107 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
e114e473
CS		 108 if (rc != 0)
109 return rc;
110
676dac4b
CS		 111 sp = smk_of_current();
112 tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
ecfcc53f
EB		 113 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
114 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
115
116 /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
117 rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
5cd9c58f 118 if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
ecfcc53f
EB		 119 rc = 0;
120
121 smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
5cd9c58f
DH		 122 return rc;
123}
124
125/**
126 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
127 * @ptp: parent task pointer
128 *
129 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
130 *
131 * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
132 */
133static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
134{
135 int rc;
ecfcc53f
EB		 136 struct smk_audit_info ad;
137 char *sp, *tsp;
5cd9c58f
DH		 138
139 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
140 if (rc != 0)
141 return rc;
e114e473 142
ecfcc53f
EB		 143 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
144 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
145
676dac4b
CS		 146 sp = smk_of_current();
147 tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
ecfcc53f
EB		 148 /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
149 rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
5cd9c58f 150 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
ecfcc53f
EB		 151 rc = 0;
152
153 smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 154 return rc;
155}
156
157/**
158 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
159 * @type: message type
160 *
161 * Require that the task has the floor label
162 *
163 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
164 */
12b3052c 165static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
e114e473 166{
12b3052c 167 int rc = 0;
676dac4b 168 char *sp = smk_of_current();
e114e473 169
e114e473
CS		 170 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
171 return 0;
172
173 if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
174 rc = -EACCES;
175
176 return rc;
177}
178
179
180/*
181 * Superblock Hooks.
182 */
183
184/**
185 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
186 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
187 *
188 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
189 */
190static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
191{
192 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
193
194 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
195
196 if (sbsp == NULL)
197 return -ENOMEM;
198
199 sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
200 sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
201 sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
202 sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
203 sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
204 spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
205
206 sb->s_security = sbsp;
207
208 return 0;
209}
210
211/**
212 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
213 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
214 *
215 */
216static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
217{
218 kfree(sb->s_security);
219 sb->s_security = NULL;
220}
221
222/**
223 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
e114e473 224 * @orig: where to start
251a2a95 225 * @smackopts: mount options string
e114e473
CS		 226 *
227 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
228 *
229 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
230 * options list.
231 */
e0007529 232static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
e114e473
CS		 233{
234 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
235
e114e473
CS		 236 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
237 if (otheropts == NULL)
238 return -ENOMEM;
239
240 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
241 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
242 dp = smackopts;
243 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
244 dp = smackopts;
245 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
246 dp = smackopts;
247 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
248 dp = smackopts;
249 else
250 dp = otheropts;
251
252 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
253 if (commap != NULL)
254 *commap = '\0';
255
256 if (*dp != '\0')
257 strcat(dp, ",");
258 strcat(dp, cp);
259 }
260
261 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
262 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
263
264 return 0;
265}
266
267/**
268 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
269 * @sb: the file system superblock
12204e24 270 * @flags: the mount flags
e114e473
CS		 271 * @data: the smack mount options
272 *
273 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
274 */
12204e24 275static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
e114e473
CS		 276{
277 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
278 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
279 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
280 struct inode_smack *isp;
281 char *op;
282 char *commap;
283 char *nsp;
284
285 spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
286 if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
287 spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
288 return 0;
289 }
290 sp->smk_initialized = 1;
291 spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
292
293 for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
294 commap = strchr(op, ',');
295 if (commap != NULL)
296 *commap++ = '\0';
297
298 if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
299 op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
300 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
301 if (nsp != NULL)
302 sp->smk_hat = nsp;
303 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
304 op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
305 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
306 if (nsp != NULL)
307 sp->smk_floor = nsp;
308 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
309 strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
310 op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
311 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
312 if (nsp != NULL)
313 sp->smk_default = nsp;
314 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
315 op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
316 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
317 if (nsp != NULL)
318 sp->smk_root = nsp;
319 }
320 }
321
322 /*
323 * Initialize the root inode.
324 */
325 isp = inode->i_security;
326 if (isp == NULL)
327 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
328 else
329 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
330
331 return 0;
332}
333
334/**
335 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
336 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
337 *
338 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
339 * and error code otherwise
340 */
341static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
342{
343 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
ecfcc53f
EB		 344 int rc;
345 struct smk_audit_info ad;
346
347 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
348 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
e114e473 349
ecfcc53f
EB		 350 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
351 return rc;
e114e473
CS		 352}
353
354/**
355 * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
356 * @dev_name: unused
251a2a95 357 * @path: mount point
e114e473
CS		 358 * @type: unused
359 * @flags: unused
360 * @data: unused
361 *
362 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
363 * being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
364 */
b5266eb4 365static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
e114e473
CS		 366 char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
367{
b5266eb4 368 struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
ecfcc53f 369 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473 370
ecfcc53f
EB		 371 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
372 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
373
374 return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 375}
376
377/**
378 * smack_sb_umount - Smack check for unmounting
379 * @mnt: file system to unmount
380 * @flags: unused
381 *
382 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
383 * being unmounted, an error code otherwise.
384 */
385static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
386{
387 struct superblock_smack *sbp;
ecfcc53f 388 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473 389
ecfcc53f 390 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
de27a5bf 391 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, mnt->mnt_root);
ecfcc53f 392 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
e114e473 393
ecfcc53f
EB		 394 sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
395 return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 396}
397
676dac4b
CS		 398/*
399 * BPRM hooks
400 */
401
402static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
403{
404 struct task_smack *tsp = bprm->cred->security;
405 struct inode_smack *isp;
406 struct dentry *dp;
407 int rc;
408
409 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
410 if (rc != 0)
411 return rc;
412
413 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
414 return 0;
415
416 if (bprm->file == NULL || bprm->file->f_dentry == NULL)
417 return 0;
418
419 dp = bprm->file->f_dentry;
420
421 if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
422 return 0;
423
424 isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
425
426 if (isp->smk_task != NULL)
427 tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
428
429 return 0;
430}
431
e114e473
CS		 432/*
433 * Inode hooks
434 */
435
436/**
437 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
251a2a95 438 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
e114e473
CS		 439 *
440 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
441 */
442static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
443{
676dac4b 444 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current());
e114e473
CS		 445 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
446 return -ENOMEM;
447 return 0;
448}
449
450/**
451 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
251a2a95 452 * @inode: the inode with a blob
e114e473
CS		 453 *
454 * Clears the blob pointer in inode
455 */
456static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
457{
458 kfree(inode->i_security);
459 inode->i_security = NULL;
460}
461
462/**
463 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
464 * @inode: the inode
465 * @dir: unused
466 * @name: where to put the attribute name
467 * @value: where to put the attribute value
468 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
469 *
470 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
471 */
472static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
473 char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
474{
475 char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
5c6d1125
JS		 476 char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
477 u32 may;
e114e473
CS		 478
479 if (name) {
480 *name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
481 if (*name == NULL)
482 return -ENOMEM;
483 }
484
485 if (value) {
5c6d1125
JS		 486 may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp);
487
488 /*
489 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
490 * the directory requests transmutation then
491 * by all means transmute.
492 */
493 if (((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
494 isp = dsp;
495
e114e473
CS		 496 *value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
497 if (*value == NULL)
498 return -ENOMEM;
499 }
500
501 if (len)
502 *len = strlen(isp) + 1;
503
504 return 0;
505}
506
507/**
508 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
509 * @old_dentry: the existing object
510 * @dir: unused
511 * @new_dentry: the new object
512 *
513 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
514 */
515static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
516 struct dentry *new_dentry)
517{
e114e473 518 char *isp;
ecfcc53f
EB		 519 struct smk_audit_info ad;
520 int rc;
521
522 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
523 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
e114e473
CS		 524
525 isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
ecfcc53f 526 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 527
528 if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
529 isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
ecfcc53f
EB		 530 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
531 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 532 }
533
534 return rc;
535}
536
537/**
538 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
539 * @dir: containing directory object
540 * @dentry: file to unlink
541 *
542 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
543 * and the object, error code otherwise
544 */
545static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
546{
547 struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
ecfcc53f 548 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473
CS		 549 int rc;
550
ecfcc53f
EB		 551 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
552 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
553
e114e473
CS		 554 /*
555 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
556 */
ecfcc53f
EB		 557 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
558 if (rc == 0) {
e114e473
CS		 559 /*
560 * You also need write access to the containing directory
561 */
ecfcc53f
EB		 562 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
563 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
564 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
565 }
e114e473
CS		 566 return rc;
567}
568
569/**
570 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
571 * @dir: containing directory object
572 * @dentry: directory to unlink
573 *
574 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
575 * and the directory, error code otherwise
576 */
577static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
578{
ecfcc53f 579 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473
CS		 580 int rc;
581
ecfcc53f
EB		 582 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
583 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
584
e114e473
CS		 585 /*
586 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
587 */
ecfcc53f
EB		 588 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
589 if (rc == 0) {
e114e473
CS		 590 /*
591 * You also need write access to the containing directory
592 */
ecfcc53f
EB		 593 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
594 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
595 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
596 }
e114e473
CS		 597
598 return rc;
599}
600
601/**
602 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
603 * @old_inode: the old directory
604 * @old_dentry: unused
605 * @new_inode: the new directory
606 * @new_dentry: unused
607 *
608 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
609 * new directories.
610 *
611 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
612 */
613static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
614 struct dentry *old_dentry,
615 struct inode *new_inode,
616 struct dentry *new_dentry)
617{
618 int rc;
619 char *isp;
ecfcc53f
EB		 620 struct smk_audit_info ad;
621
622 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
623 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
e114e473
CS		 624
625 isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
ecfcc53f 626 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 627
628 if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
629 isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
ecfcc53f
EB		 630 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
631 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
e114e473 632 }
e114e473
CS		 633 return rc;
634}
635
636/**
637 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
638 * @inode: the inode in question
639 * @mask: the access requested
e114e473
CS		 640 *
641 * This is the important Smack hook.
642 *
643 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
644 */
b77b0646 645static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
e114e473 646{
ecfcc53f 647 struct smk_audit_info ad;
d09ca739
EP		 648
649 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
e114e473
CS		 650 /*
651 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
652 */
653 if (mask == 0)
654 return 0;
ecfcc53f
EB		 655 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
656 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
657 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 658}
659
660/**
661 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
662 * @dentry: the object
663 * @iattr: for the force flag
664 *
665 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
666 */
667static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
668{
ecfcc53f 669 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473
CS		 670 /*
671 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
672 */
673 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
674 return 0;
ecfcc53f
EB		 675 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
676 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
e114e473 677
ecfcc53f 678 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 679}
680
681/**
682 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
683 * @mnt: unused
684 * @dentry: the object
685 *
686 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
687 */
688static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
689{
ecfcc53f
EB		 690 struct smk_audit_info ad;
691
692 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
693 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
694 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
695 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 696}
697
698/**
699 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
700 * @dentry: the object
701 * @name: name of the attribute
702 * @value: unused
703 * @size: unused
704 * @flags: unused
705 *
706 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
707 *
708 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
709 */
8f0cfa52
DH		 710static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
711 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
e114e473 712{
ecfcc53f 713 struct smk_audit_info ad;
bcdca225 714 int rc = 0;
e114e473 715
bcdca225
CS		 716 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
717 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
676dac4b
CS		 718 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
719 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
bcdca225
CS		 720 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
721 rc = -EPERM;
defc433b
EB		 722 /*
723 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
724 * post_setxattr
725 */
726 if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
727 smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
4303154e 728 rc = -EINVAL;
5c6d1125
JS		 729 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
730 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
731 rc = -EPERM;
732 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
733 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
734 rc = -EINVAL;
bcdca225
CS		 735 } else
736 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
737
ecfcc53f
EB		 738 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
739 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
740
bcdca225 741 if (rc == 0)
ecfcc53f 742 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
bcdca225
CS		 743
744 return rc;
e114e473
CS		 745}
746
747/**
748 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
749 * @dentry: object
750 * @name: attribute name
751 * @value: attribute value
752 * @size: attribute size
753 * @flags: unused
754 *
755 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
756 * in the master label list.
757 */
8f0cfa52
DH		 758static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
759 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
e114e473 760{
e114e473 761 char *nsp;
5c6d1125 762 struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
676dac4b
CS		 763
764 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
5c6d1125 765 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
676dac4b
CS		 766 if (nsp != NULL)
767 isp->smk_inode = nsp;
768 else
769 isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
5c6d1125
JS		 770 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
771 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
676dac4b
CS		 772 if (nsp != NULL)
773 isp->smk_task = nsp;
774 else
775 isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
5c6d1125
JS		 776 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
777 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
e114e473
CS		 778
779 return;
780}
781
782/*
783 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
784 * @dentry: the object
785 * @name: unused
786 *
787 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
788 */
8f0cfa52 789static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
e114e473 790{
ecfcc53f
EB		 791 struct smk_audit_info ad;
792
793 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
794 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
795
796 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 797}
798
799/*
800 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
801 * @dentry: the object
802 * @name: name of the attribute
803 *
804 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
805 *
806 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
807 */
8f0cfa52 808static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
e114e473 809{
676dac4b 810 struct inode_smack *isp;
ecfcc53f 811 struct smk_audit_info ad;
bcdca225 812 int rc = 0;
e114e473 813
bcdca225
CS		 814 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
815 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
676dac4b 816 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
5c6d1125
JS		 817 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
818 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
bcdca225
CS		 819 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
820 rc = -EPERM;
821 } else
822 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
823
ecfcc53f
EB		 824 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
825 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
bcdca225 826 if (rc == 0)
ecfcc53f 827 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
bcdca225 828
676dac4b
CS		 829 if (rc == 0) {
830 isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
831 isp->smk_task = NULL;
832 }
833
bcdca225 834 return rc;
e114e473
CS		 835}
836
837/**
838 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
839 * @inode: the object
840 * @name: attribute name
841 * @buffer: where to put the result
251a2a95 842 * @alloc: unused
e114e473
CS		 843 *
844 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
845 */
846static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
847 const char *name, void **buffer,
848 bool alloc)
849{
850 struct socket_smack *ssp;
851 struct socket *sock;
852 struct super_block *sbp;
853 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
854 char *isp;
855 int ilen;
856 int rc = 0;
857
858 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
859 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
860 ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
861 *buffer = isp;
862 return ilen;
863 }
864
865 /*
866 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
867 */
868 sbp = ip->i_sb;
869 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
870 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
871
872 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
2e1d146a 873 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
e114e473
CS		 874 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
875
876 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
877
878 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
879 isp = ssp->smk_in;
880 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
881 isp = ssp->smk_out;
882 else
883 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
884
885 ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
886 if (rc == 0) {
887 *buffer = isp;
888 rc = ilen;
889 }
890
891 return rc;
892}
893
894
895/**
896 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
897 * @inode: the object
898 * @buffer: where they go
899 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
900 *
901 * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
902 */
903static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
904 size_t buffer_size)
905{
906 int len = strlen(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
907
908 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size) {
909 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
910 return len;
911 }
912 return -EINVAL;
913}
914
d20bdda6
AD		 915/**
916 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
917 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
918 * @secid: where result will be saved
919 */
920static void smack_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
921{
922 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
923
924 *secid = smack_to_secid(isp->smk_inode);
925}
926
e114e473
CS		 927/*
928 * File Hooks
929 */
930
931/**
932 * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
933 * @file: unused
934 * @mask: unused
935 *
936 * Returns 0
937 *
938 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
939 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
940 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
941 *
942 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
943 * label changing that SELinux does.
944 */
945static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
946{
947 return 0;
948}
949
950/**
951 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
952 * @file: the object
953 *
954 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
955 * label list, so no allocation is done.
956 *
957 * Returns 0
958 */
959static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
960{
676dac4b 961 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
e114e473
CS		 962 return 0;
963}
964
965/**
966 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
967 * @file: the object
968 *
969 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
970 * label list, so no memory is freed.
971 */
972static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
973{
974 file->f_security = NULL;
975}
976
977/**
978 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
979 * @file: the object
980 * @cmd: what to do
981 * @arg: unused
982 *
983 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
984 *
985 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
986 */
987static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
988 unsigned long arg)
989{
990 int rc = 0;
ecfcc53f
EB		 991 struct smk_audit_info ad;
992
993 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
994 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
e114e473
CS		 995
996 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
ecfcc53f 997 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 998
999 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
ecfcc53f 1000 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1001
1002 return rc;
1003}
1004
1005/**
1006 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1007 * @file: the object
251a2a95 1008 * @cmd: unused
e114e473
CS		 1009 *
1010 * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
1011 */
1012static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1013{
ecfcc53f
EB		 1014 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1015
1016 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
1017 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, file->f_path.dentry);
1018 return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1019}
1020
1021/**
1022 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1023 * @file: the object
1024 * @cmd: what action to check
1025 * @arg: unused
1026 *
1027 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1028 */
1029static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1030 unsigned long arg)
1031{
ecfcc53f 1032 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473
CS		 1033 int rc;
1034
ecfcc53f
EB		 1035 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
1036 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1037
e114e473
CS		 1038 switch (cmd) {
1039 case F_DUPFD:
1040 case F_GETFD:
1041 case F_GETFL:
1042 case F_GETLK:
1043 case F_GETOWN:
1044 case F_GETSIG:
ecfcc53f 1045 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1046 break;
1047 case F_SETFD:
1048 case F_SETFL:
1049 case F_SETLK:
1050 case F_SETLKW:
1051 case F_SETOWN:
1052 case F_SETSIG:
ecfcc53f 1053 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1054 break;
1055 default:
ecfcc53f 1056 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1057 }
1058
1059 return rc;
1060}
1061
1062/**
1063 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1064 * @file: object in question
1065 *
1066 * Returns 0
1067 * Further research may be required on this one.
1068 */
1069static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1070{
676dac4b 1071 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
e114e473
CS		 1072 return 0;
1073}
1074
1075/**
1076 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1077 * @tsk: The target task
1078 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1079 * @signum: unused
1080 *
1081 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1082 *
1083 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1084 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1085 */
1086static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1087 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1088{
1089 struct file *file;
1090 int rc;
676dac4b 1091 char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
ecfcc53f 1092 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473
CS		 1093
1094 /*
1095 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1096 */
1097 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
ecfcc53f
EB		 1098 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1099 rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
5cd9c58f 1100 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
ecfcc53f
EB		 1101 rc = 0;
1102
1103 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1104 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1105 smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1106 return rc;
1107}
1108
1109/**
1110 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1111 * @file: the object
1112 *
1113 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1114 */
1115static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1116{
1117 int may = 0;
ecfcc53f 1118 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473 1119
ecfcc53f
EB		 1120 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1121 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
e114e473
CS		 1122 /*
1123 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1124 */
1125 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1126 may = MAY_READ;
1127 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1128 may |= MAY_WRITE;
1129
ecfcc53f 1130 return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1131}
1132
1133/*
1134 * Task hooks
1135 */
1136
ee18d64c
DH		 1137/**
1138 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1139 * @new: the new credentials
1140 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1141 *
1142 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1143 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1144 * complete without error.
1145 */
1146static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1147{
676dac4b
CS		 1148 cred->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
1149 if (cred->security == NULL)
1150 return -ENOMEM;
ee18d64c
DH		 1151 return 0;
1152}
1153
1154
e114e473 1155/**
f1752eec
DH		 1156 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1157 * @cred: the credentials in question
e114e473
CS		 1158 *
1159 * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
1160 * points to an immutable list. The blobs never go away.
1161 * There is no leak here.
1162 */
f1752eec 1163static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
e114e473 1164{
676dac4b 1165 kfree(cred->security);
e114e473
CS		 1166}
1167
d84f4f99
DH		 1168/**
1169 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
1170 * @new: the new credentials
1171 * @old: the original credentials
1172 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1173 *
1174 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
1175 */
1176static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1177 gfp_t gfp)
1178{
676dac4b
CS		 1179 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1180 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
1181
1182 new_tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
1183 if (new_tsp == NULL)
1184 return -ENOMEM;
1185
1186 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
1187 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
1188 new->security = new_tsp;
d84f4f99
DH		 1189 return 0;
1190}
1191
ee18d64c
DH		 1192/**
1193 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
1194 * @new: the new credentials
1195 * @old: the original credentials
1196 *
1197 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
1198 */
1199static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
1200{
676dac4b
CS		 1201 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1202 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
1203
1204 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
1205 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
ee18d64c
DH		 1206}
1207
3a3b7ce9
DH		 1208/**
1209 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
251a2a95
RD		 1210 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
1211 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
3a3b7ce9
DH		 1212 *
1213 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
1214 */
1215static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
1216{
676dac4b 1217 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
3a3b7ce9
DH		 1218 char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
1219
1220 if (smack == NULL)
1221 return -EINVAL;
1222
676dac4b 1223 new_tsp->smk_task = smack;
3a3b7ce9
DH		 1224 return 0;
1225}
1226
1227/**
1228 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
251a2a95
RD		 1229 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
1230 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
3a3b7ce9
DH		 1231 *
1232 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
1233 * as the objective context of the specified inode
1234 */
1235static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
1236 struct inode *inode)
1237{
1238 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
676dac4b 1239 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
3a3b7ce9 1240
676dac4b
CS		 1241 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
1242 tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
3a3b7ce9
DH		 1243 return 0;
1244}
1245
ecfcc53f
EB		 1246/**
1247 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
1248 * @p: the task object
1249 * @access : the access requested
1250 *
1251 * Return 0 if access is permitted
1252 */
1253static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access)
1254{
1255 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1256
1257 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1258 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
676dac4b 1259 return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad);
ecfcc53f
EB		 1260}
1261
e114e473
CS		 1262/**
1263 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
1264 * @p: the task object
1265 * @pgid: unused
1266 *
1267 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1268 */
1269static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
1270{
ecfcc53f 1271 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
e114e473
CS		 1272}
1273
1274/**
1275 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
1276 * @p: the object task
1277 *
1278 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
1279 */
1280static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
1281{
ecfcc53f 1282 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
e114e473
CS		 1283}
1284
1285/**
1286 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
1287 * @p: the object task
1288 *
1289 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
1290 */
1291static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
1292{
ecfcc53f 1293 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
e114e473
CS		 1294}
1295
1296/**
1297 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
1298 * @p: the object task
1299 * @secid: where to put the result
1300 *
1301 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
1302 */
1303static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
1304{
676dac4b 1305 *secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p)));
e114e473
CS		 1306}
1307
1308/**
1309 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
1310 * @p: the task object
1311 * @nice: unused
1312 *
1313 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1314 */
1315static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
1316{
bcdca225
CS		 1317 int rc;
1318
1319 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
1320 if (rc == 0)
ecfcc53f 1321 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
bcdca225 1322 return rc;
e114e473
CS		 1323}
1324
1325/**
1326 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
1327 * @p: the task object
1328 * @ioprio: unused
1329 *
1330 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1331 */
1332static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
1333{
bcdca225
CS		 1334 int rc;
1335
1336 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
1337 if (rc == 0)
ecfcc53f 1338 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
bcdca225 1339 return rc;
e114e473
CS		 1340}
1341
1342/**
1343 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
1344 * @p: the task object
1345 *
1346 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1347 */
1348static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
1349{
ecfcc53f 1350 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
e114e473
CS		 1351}
1352
1353/**
1354 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
1355 * @p: the task object
1356 * @policy: unused
1357 * @lp: unused
1358 *
1359 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1360 */
b0ae1981 1361static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
e114e473 1362{
bcdca225
CS		 1363 int rc;
1364
b0ae1981 1365 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
bcdca225 1366 if (rc == 0)
ecfcc53f 1367 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
bcdca225 1368 return rc;
e114e473
CS		 1369}
1370
1371/**
1372 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
1373 * @p: the task object
1374 *
1375 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1376 */
1377static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
1378{
ecfcc53f 1379 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
e114e473
CS		 1380}
1381
1382/**
1383 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
1384 * @p: the task object
1385 *
1386 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1387 */
1388static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
1389{
ecfcc53f 1390 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
e114e473
CS		 1391}
1392
1393/**
1394 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
1395 * @p: the task object
1396 * @info: unused
1397 * @sig: unused
1398 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
1399 *
1400 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1401 *
1402 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
1403 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
1404 */
1405static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
1406 int sig, u32 secid)
1407{
ecfcc53f
EB		 1408 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1409
1410 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1411 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
e114e473
CS		 1412 /*
1413 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
1414 * can write the receiver.
1415 */
1416 if (secid == 0)
676dac4b
CS		 1417 return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE,
1418 &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1419 /*
1420 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
1421 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
1422 * we can't take privilege into account.
1423 */
676dac4b
CS		 1424 return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid),
1425 smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1426}
1427
1428/**
1429 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
1430 * @p: task to wait for
1431 *
1432 * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise
1433 */
1434static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
1435{
ecfcc53f 1436 struct smk_audit_info ad;
676dac4b
CS		 1437 char *sp = smk_of_current();
1438 char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p));
e114e473
CS		 1439 int rc;
1440
ecfcc53f 1441 /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
676dac4b 1442 rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
e114e473 1443 if (rc == 0)
ecfcc53f 1444 goto out_log;
e114e473
CS		 1445
1446 /*
1447 * Allow the operation to succeed if either task
1448 * has privilege to perform operations that might
1449 * account for the smack labels having gotten to
1450 * be different in the first place.
1451 *
5cd9c58f 1452 * This breaks the strict subject/object access
e114e473
CS		 1453 * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
1454 * state into account in the decision as well as
1455 * the smack value.
1456 */
5cd9c58f 1457 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
ecfcc53f
EB		 1458 rc = 0;
1459 /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
1460 out_log:
1461 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1462 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
676dac4b 1463 smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 1464 return rc;
1465}
1466
1467/**
1468 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
1469 * @p: task to copy from
251a2a95 1470 * @inode: inode to copy to
e114e473
CS		 1471 *
1472 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
1473 */
1474static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
1475{
1476 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
676dac4b 1477 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
e114e473
CS		 1478}
1479
1480/*
1481 * Socket hooks.
1482 */
1483
1484/**
1485 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
1486 * @sk: the socket
1487 * @family: unused
251a2a95 1488 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
e114e473
CS		 1489 *
1490 * Assign Smack pointers to current
1491 *
1492 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
1493 */
1494static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1495{
676dac4b 1496 char *csp = smk_of_current();
e114e473
CS		 1497 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1498
1499 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
1500 if (ssp == NULL)
1501 return -ENOMEM;
1502
1503 ssp->smk_in = csp;
1504 ssp->smk_out = csp;
1505 ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
1506
1507 sk->sk_security = ssp;
1508
1509 return 0;
1510}
1511
1512/**
1513 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
1514 * @sk: the socket
1515 *
1516 * Clears the blob pointer
1517 */
1518static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
1519{
1520 kfree(sk->sk_security);
1521}
1522
07feee8f
PM		 1523/**
1524* smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
1525* @sip: the object end
1526*
1527* looks for host based access restrictions
1528*
1529* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
1530* hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
1531* taken before calling this function.
1532*
1533* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
1534*/
1535static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
1536{
1537 struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
1538 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
1539
1540 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
1541 return NULL;
1542
1543 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list)
1544 /*
1545 * we break after finding the first match because
1546 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
1547 * so we have found the most specific match
1548 */
1549 if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr ==
4303154e
EB		 1550 (siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
1551 /* we have found the special CIPSO option */
1552 if (snp->smk_label == smack_cipso_option)
1553 return NULL;
07feee8f 1554 return snp->smk_label;
4303154e 1555 }
07feee8f
PM		 1556
1557 return NULL;
1558}
1559
e114e473
CS		 1560/**
1561 * smack_set_catset - convert a capset to netlabel mls categories
1562 * @catset: the Smack categories
1563 * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
1564 *
1565 * Allocates and fills attr.mls.cat
1566 */
1567static void smack_set_catset(char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap)
1568{
1569 unsigned char *cp;
1570 unsigned char m;
1571 int cat;
1572 int rc;
1573 int byte;
1574
c60264c4 1575 if (!catset)
e114e473
CS		 1576 return;
1577
1578 sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
1579 sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
1580 sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
1581
1582 for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < SMK_LABELLEN; cp++, byte++)
1583 for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
1584 if ((m & *cp) == 0)
1585 continue;
1586 rc = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(sap->attr.mls.cat,
1587 cat, GFP_ATOMIC);
1588 }
1589}
1590
1591/**
1592 * smack_to_secattr - fill a secattr from a smack value
1593 * @smack: the smack value
1594 * @nlsp: where the result goes
1595 *
1596 * Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now.
1597 * It can be used to effect.
1598 * It can also be abused to effect when necessary.
1599 * Appologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
1600 */
1601static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
1602{
1603 struct smack_cipso cipso;
1604 int rc;
1605
6d3dc07c
CS		 1606 nlsp->domain = smack;
1607 nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
e114e473 1608
6d3dc07c
CS		 1609 rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
1610 if (rc == 0) {
1611 nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
1612 smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
1613 } else {
1614 nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
1615 smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
e114e473
CS		 1616 }
1617}
1618
1619/**
1620 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
1621 * @sk: the socket
6d3dc07c 1622 * @labeled: socket label scheme
e114e473
CS		 1623 *
1624 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
1625 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
1626 *
1627 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
1628 */
6d3dc07c 1629static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
e114e473 1630{
07feee8f 1631 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
e114e473 1632 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
6d3dc07c 1633 int rc = 0;
e114e473 1634
6d3dc07c
CS		 1635 /*
1636 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
1637 * packet labeling based on the label.
1638 * The case of a single label host is different, because
1639 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
1640 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
1641 * label.
1642 */
1643 local_bh_disable();
1644 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
1645
1646 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
1647 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
1648 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
1649 else {
1650 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
1651 smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
389fb800 1652 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
6d3dc07c
CS		 1653 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
1654 }
1655
1656 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
1657 local_bh_enable();
4bc87e62 1658
e114e473
CS		 1659 return rc;
1660}
1661
07feee8f
PM		 1662/**
1663 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
1664 * @sk: the socket
1665 * @sap: the destination address
1666 *
1667 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
1668 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
1669 *
1670 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
1671 *
1672 */
1673static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
1674{
1675 int rc;
1676 int sk_lbl;
1677 char *hostsp;
1678 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
ecfcc53f 1679 struct smk_audit_info ad;
07feee8f
PM		 1680
1681 rcu_read_lock();
1682 hostsp = smack_host_label(sap);
1683 if (hostsp != NULL) {
1684 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
ecfcc53f
EB		 1685#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
1686 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
1687 ad.a.u.net.family = sap->sin_family;
1688 ad.a.u.net.dport = sap->sin_port;
1689 ad.a.u.net.v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
1690#endif
1691 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
07feee8f
PM		 1692 } else {
1693 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
1694 rc = 0;
1695 }
1696 rcu_read_unlock();
1697 if (rc != 0)
1698 return rc;
1699
1700 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
1701}
1702
e114e473
CS		 1703/**
1704 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
1705 * @inode: the object
1706 * @name: attribute name
1707 * @value: attribute value
1708 * @size: size of the attribute
1709 * @flags: unused
1710 *
1711 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
1712 *
1713 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
1714 */
1715static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
1716 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1717{
1718 char *sp;
1719 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
1720 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1721 struct socket *sock;
4bc87e62 1722 int rc = 0;
e114e473 1723
4303154e 1724 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LABELLEN || size == 0)
e114e473
CS		 1725 return -EACCES;
1726
1727 sp = smk_import(value, size);
1728 if (sp == NULL)
1729 return -EINVAL;
1730
1731 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1732 nsp->smk_inode = sp;
ddd29ec6 1733 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
e114e473
CS		 1734 return 0;
1735 }
1736 /*
1737 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1738 */
1739 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1740 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1741
1742 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2e1d146a 1743 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
e114e473
CS		 1744 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1745
1746 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1747
1748 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1749 ssp->smk_in = sp;
1750 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
1751 ssp->smk_out = sp;
b4e0d5f0
CS		 1752 if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) {
1753 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
1754 if (rc != 0)
1755 printk(KERN_WARNING
1756 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
1757 __func__, -rc);
1758 }
e114e473
CS		 1759 } else
1760 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1761
1762 return 0;
1763}
1764
1765/**
1766 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
1767 * @sock: the socket
1768 * @family: protocol family
1769 * @type: unused
1770 * @protocol: unused
1771 * @kern: unused
1772 *
1773 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
1774 *
1775 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
1776 */
1777static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
1778 int type, int protocol, int kern)
1779{
2e1d146a 1780 if (family != PF_INET || sock->sk == NULL)
e114e473
CS		 1781 return 0;
1782 /*
1783 * Set the outbound netlbl.
1784 */
6d3dc07c
CS		 1785 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
1786}
1787
6d3dc07c
CS		 1788/**
1789 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
1790 * @sock: the socket
1791 * @sap: the other end
1792 * @addrlen: size of sap
1793 *
1794 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
1795 *
1796 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
1797 */
1798static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
1799 int addrlen)
1800{
6d3dc07c
CS		 1801 if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
1802 return 0;
6d3dc07c
CS		 1803 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
1804 return -EINVAL;
1805
07feee8f 1806 return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
e114e473
CS		 1807}
1808
1809/**
1810 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
1811 * @flags: the S_ value
1812 *
1813 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
1814 */
1815static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
1816{
1817 int may = 0;
1818
1819 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
1820 may |= MAY_READ;
1821 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
1822 may |= MAY_WRITE;
1823 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
1824 may |= MAY_EXEC;
1825
1826 return may;
1827}
1828
1829/**
1830 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
1831 * @msg: the object
1832 *
1833 * Returns 0
1834 */
1835static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
1836{
676dac4b 1837 msg->security = smk_of_current();
e114e473
CS		 1838 return 0;
1839}
1840
1841/**
1842 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
1843 * @msg: the object
1844 *
1845 * Clears the blob pointer
1846 */
1847static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
1848{
1849 msg->security = NULL;
1850}
1851
1852/**
1853 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
1854 * @shp: the object
1855 *
1856 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
1857 */
1858static char *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
1859{
1860 return (char *)shp->shm_perm.security;
1861}
1862
1863/**
1864 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
1865 * @shp: the object
1866 *
1867 * Returns 0
1868 */
1869static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
1870{
1871 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
1872
676dac4b 1873 isp->security = smk_of_current();
e114e473
CS		 1874 return 0;
1875}
1876
1877/**
1878 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
1879 * @shp: the object
1880 *
1881 * Clears the blob pointer
1882 */
1883static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
1884{
1885 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
1886
1887 isp->security = NULL;
1888}
1889
ecfcc53f
EB		 1890/**
1891 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
1892 * @shp : the object
1893 * @access : access requested
1894 *
1895 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
1896 */
1897static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
1898{
1899 char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
1900 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1901
1902#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
1903 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
1904 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
1905#endif
1906 return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
1907}
1908
e114e473
CS		 1909/**
1910 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
1911 * @shp: the object
1912 * @shmflg: access requested
1913 *
1914 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
1915 */
1916static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
1917{
e114e473
CS		 1918 int may;
1919
1920 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
ecfcc53f 1921 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
e114e473
CS		 1922}
1923
1924/**
1925 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
1926 * @shp: the object
1927 * @cmd: what it wants to do
1928 *
1929 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
1930 */
1931static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
1932{
e114e473
CS		 1933 int may;
1934
1935 switch (cmd) {
1936 case IPC_STAT:
1937 case SHM_STAT:
1938 may = MAY_READ;
1939 break;
1940 case IPC_SET:
1941 case SHM_LOCK:
1942 case SHM_UNLOCK:
1943 case IPC_RMID:
1944 may = MAY_READWRITE;
1945 break;
1946 case IPC_INFO:
1947 case SHM_INFO:
1948 /*
1949 * System level information.
1950 */
1951 return 0;
1952 default:
1953 return -EINVAL;
1954 }
ecfcc53f 1955 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
e114e473
CS		 1956}
1957
1958/**
1959 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
1960 * @shp: the object
1961 * @shmaddr: unused
1962 * @shmflg: access requested
1963 *
1964 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
1965 */
1966static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
1967 int shmflg)
1968{
e114e473
CS		 1969 int may;
1970
1971 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
ecfcc53f 1972 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
e114e473
CS		 1973}
1974
1975/**
1976 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
1977 * @sma: the object
1978 *
1979 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
1980 */
1981static char *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
1982{
1983 return (char *)sma->sem_perm.security;
1984}
1985
1986/**
1987 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
1988 * @sma: the object
1989 *
1990 * Returns 0
1991 */
1992static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
1993{
1994 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
1995
676dac4b 1996 isp->security = smk_of_current();
e114e473
CS		 1997 return 0;
1998}
1999
2000/**
2001 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
2002 * @sma: the object
2003 *
2004 * Clears the blob pointer
2005 */
2006static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
2007{
2008 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
2009
2010 isp->security = NULL;
2011}
2012
ecfcc53f
EB		 2013/**
2014 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
2015 * @sma : the object
2016 * @access : access requested
2017 *
2018 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2019 */
2020static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
2021{
2022 char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
2023 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2024
2025#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2026 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2027 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
2028#endif
2029 return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2030}
2031
e114e473
CS		 2032/**
2033 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
2034 * @sma: the object
2035 * @semflg: access requested
2036 *
2037 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2038 */
2039static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
2040{
e114e473
CS		 2041 int may;
2042
2043 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
ecfcc53f 2044 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
e114e473
CS		 2045}
2046
2047/**
2048 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
2049 * @sma: the object
2050 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2051 *
2052 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2053 */
2054static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
2055{
e114e473
CS		 2056 int may;
2057
2058 switch (cmd) {
2059 case GETPID:
2060 case GETNCNT:
2061 case GETZCNT:
2062 case GETVAL:
2063 case GETALL:
2064 case IPC_STAT:
2065 case SEM_STAT:
2066 may = MAY_READ;
2067 break;
2068 case SETVAL:
2069 case SETALL:
2070 case IPC_RMID:
2071 case IPC_SET:
2072 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2073 break;
2074 case IPC_INFO:
2075 case SEM_INFO:
2076 /*
2077 * System level information
2078 */
2079 return 0;
2080 default:
2081 return -EINVAL;
2082 }
2083
ecfcc53f 2084 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
e114e473
CS		 2085}
2086
2087/**
2088 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
2089 * @sma: the object
2090 * @sops: unused
2091 * @nsops: unused
2092 * @alter: unused
2093 *
2094 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
2095 *
2096 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
2097 */
2098static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
2099 unsigned nsops, int alter)
2100{
ecfcc53f 2101 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
e114e473
CS		 2102}
2103
2104/**
2105 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
2106 * @msq: the object
2107 *
2108 * Returns 0
2109 */
2110static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
2111{
2112 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
2113
676dac4b 2114 kisp->security = smk_of_current();
e114e473
CS		 2115 return 0;
2116}
2117
2118/**
2119 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
2120 * @msq: the object
2121 *
2122 * Clears the blob pointer
2123 */
2124static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
2125{
2126 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
2127
2128 kisp->security = NULL;
2129}
2130
2131/**
2132 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
2133 * @msq: the object
2134 *
2135 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2136 */
2137static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
2138{
2139 return (char *)msq->q_perm.security;
2140}
2141
ecfcc53f
EB		 2142/**
2143 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
2144 * @msq : the msq
2145 * @access : access requested
2146 *
2147 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
2148 */
2149static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
2150{
2151 char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
2152 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2153
2154#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2155 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2156 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
2157#endif
2158 return smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
2159}
2160
e114e473
CS		 2161/**
2162 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
2163 * @msq: the object
2164 * @msqflg: access requested
2165 *
2166 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2167 */
2168static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
2169{
e114e473
CS		 2170 int may;
2171
2172 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
ecfcc53f 2173 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
e114e473
CS		 2174}
2175
2176/**
2177 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
2178 * @msq: the object
2179 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2180 *
2181 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2182 */
2183static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
2184{
e114e473
CS		 2185 int may;
2186
2187 switch (cmd) {
2188 case IPC_STAT:
2189 case MSG_STAT:
2190 may = MAY_READ;
2191 break;
2192 case IPC_SET:
2193 case IPC_RMID:
2194 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2195 break;
2196 case IPC_INFO:
2197 case MSG_INFO:
2198 /*
2199 * System level information
2200 */
2201 return 0;
2202 default:
2203 return -EINVAL;
2204 }
2205
ecfcc53f 2206 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
e114e473
CS		 2207}
2208
2209/**
2210 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
2211 * @msq: the object
2212 * @msg: unused
2213 * @msqflg: access requested
2214 *
2215 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2216 */
2217static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
2218 int msqflg)
2219{
ecfcc53f 2220 int may;
e114e473 2221
ecfcc53f
EB		 2222 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
2223 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
e114e473
CS		 2224}
2225
2226/**
2227 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
2228 * @msq: the object
2229 * @msg: unused
2230 * @target: unused
2231 * @type: unused
2232 * @mode: unused
2233 *
2234 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
2235 */
2236static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
2237 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
2238{
ecfcc53f 2239 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
e114e473
CS		 2240}
2241
2242/**
2243 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
2244 * @ipp: the object permissions
2245 * @flag: access requested
2246 *
2247 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
2248 */
2249static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
2250{
2251 char *isp = ipp->security;
ecfcc53f
EB		 2252 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
2253 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473 2254
ecfcc53f
EB		 2255#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2256 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2257 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
2258#endif
2259 return smk_curacc(isp, may, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 2260}
2261
d20bdda6
AD		 2262/**
2263 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
251a2a95 2264 * @ipp: the object permissions
d20bdda6
AD		 2265 * @secid: where result will be saved
2266 */
2267static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
2268{
2269 char *smack = ipp->security;
2270
2271 *secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
2272}
2273
e114e473
CS		 2274/**
2275 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3e62cbb8 2276 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
e114e473
CS		 2277 * @inode: the object
2278 *
2279 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
2280 */
2281static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
2282{
2283 struct super_block *sbp;
2284 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
2285 struct inode_smack *isp;
676dac4b 2286 char *csp = smk_of_current();
e114e473
CS		 2287 char *fetched;
2288 char *final;
5c6d1125
JS		 2289 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
2290 int transflag = 0;
e114e473
CS		 2291 struct dentry *dp;
2292
2293 if (inode == NULL)
2294 return;
2295
2296 isp = inode->i_security;
2297
2298 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
2299 /*
2300 * If the inode is already instantiated
2301 * take the quick way out
2302 */
2303 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
2304 goto unlockandout;
2305
2306 sbp = inode->i_sb;
2307 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
2308 /*
2309 * We're going to use the superblock default label
2310 * if there's no label on the file.
2311 */
2312 final = sbsp->smk_default;
2313
e97dcb0e
CS		 2314 /*
2315 * If this is the root inode the superblock
2316 * may be in the process of initialization.
2317 * If that is the case use the root value out
2318 * of the superblock.
2319 */
2320 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
2321 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
2322 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2323 goto unlockandout;
2324 }
2325
e114e473
CS		 2326 /*
2327 * This is pretty hackish.
2328 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
2329 * file system specific code, but it does help
2330 * with keeping it simple.
2331 */
2332 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
2333 case SMACK_MAGIC:
2334 /*
2335 * Casey says that it's a little embarassing
2336 * that the smack file system doesn't do
2337 * extended attributes.
2338 */
2339 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2340 break;
2341 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
2342 /*
2343 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
2344 */
2345 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2346 break;
2347 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
2348 /*
2349 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
2350 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
2351 * pty with respect.
2352 */
2353 final = csp;
2354 break;
2355 case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
2356 /*
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2357 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
2358 * structures associated with the task involved.
e114e473 2359 */
b4e0d5f0 2360 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
e114e473
CS		 2361 break;
2362 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
2363 /*
2364 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
2365 * The superblock default suffices.
2366 */
2367 break;
2368 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
2369 /*
2370 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
2371 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
2372 * getting recreated on every reboot.
2373 */
2374 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2375 /*
2376 * No break.
2377 *
2378 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
2379 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
2380 * to set mount options simulate setting the
2381 * superblock default.
2382 */
2383 default:
2384 /*
2385 * This isn't an understood special case.
2386 * Get the value from the xattr.
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2387 */
2388
2389 /*
2390 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
2391 */
2392 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
2393 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2394 break;
2395 }
2396 /*
e114e473
CS		 2397 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
2398 * Use the aforeapplied default.
2399 * It would be curious if the label of the task
2400 * does not match that assigned.
2401 */
2402 if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
2403 break;
2404 /*
2405 * Get the dentry for xattr.
2406 */
3e62cbb8 2407 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
676dac4b 2408 fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
5c6d1125 2409 if (fetched != NULL) {
e114e473 2410 final = fetched;
5c6d1125
JS		 2411 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
2412 trattr[0] = '\0';
2413 inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
2414 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
2415 trattr, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
2416 if (strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
2417 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) == 0)
2418 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
2419 }
2420 }
2421 isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
676dac4b 2422
e114e473
CS		 2423 dput(dp);
2424 break;
2425 }
2426
2427 if (final == NULL)
2428 isp->smk_inode = csp;
2429 else
2430 isp->smk_inode = final;
2431
5c6d1125 2432 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
e114e473
CS		 2433
2434unlockandout:
2435 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
2436 return;
2437}
2438
2439/**
2440 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
2441 * @p: the object task
2442 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
2443 * @value: where to put the result
2444 *
2445 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
2446 *
2447 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
2448 */
2449static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
2450{
2451 char *cp;
2452 int slen;
2453
2454 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
2455 return -EINVAL;
2456
676dac4b 2457 cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL);
e114e473
CS		 2458 if (cp == NULL)
2459 return -ENOMEM;
2460
2461 slen = strlen(cp);
2462 *value = cp;
2463 return slen;
2464}
2465
2466/**
2467 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
2468 * @p: the object task
2469 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
2470 * @value: the value to set
2471 * @size: the size of the value
2472 *
2473 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
2474 * is permitted and only with privilege
2475 *
2476 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
2477 */
2478static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
2479 void *value, size_t size)
2480{
676dac4b 2481 struct task_smack *tsp;
5c6d1125 2482 struct task_smack *oldtsp;
d84f4f99 2483 struct cred *new;
e114e473
CS		 2484 char *newsmack;
2485
e114e473
CS		 2486 /*
2487 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
2488 * and supports no sane use case.
2489 */
2490 if (p != current)
2491 return -EPERM;
2492
5cd9c58f
DH		 2493 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2494 return -EPERM;
2495
e114e473
CS		 2496 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
2497 return -EINVAL;
2498
2499 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
2500 return -EINVAL;
2501
2502 newsmack = smk_import(value, size);
2503 if (newsmack == NULL)
2504 return -EINVAL;
2505
6d3dc07c
CS		 2506 /*
2507 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
2508 */
2509 if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
2510 return -EPERM;
2511
5c6d1125 2512 oldtsp = p->cred->security;
d84f4f99 2513 new = prepare_creds();
6d3dc07c 2514 if (new == NULL)
d84f4f99 2515 return -ENOMEM;
676dac4b
CS		 2516 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
2517 if (tsp == NULL) {
2518 kfree(new);
2519 return -ENOMEM;
2520 }
2521 tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
5c6d1125 2522 tsp->smk_forked = oldtsp->smk_forked;
676dac4b 2523 new->security = tsp;
d84f4f99 2524 commit_creds(new);
e114e473
CS		 2525 return size;
2526}
2527
2528/**
2529 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
2530 * @sock: one socket
2531 * @other: the other socket
2532 * @newsk: unused
2533 *
2534 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
2535 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
2536 */
2537static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
2538 struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk)
2539{
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2540 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2541 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
ecfcc53f 2542 struct smk_audit_info ad;
b4e0d5f0 2543 int rc = 0;
e114e473 2544
ecfcc53f
EB		 2545 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2546 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2547
2548 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
2549 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2550
2551 return rc;
e114e473
CS		 2552}
2553
2554/**
2555 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
2556 * @sock: one socket
2557 * @other: the other socket
2558 *
2559 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
2560 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
2561 */
2562static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
2563{
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2564 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2565 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
ecfcc53f 2566 struct smk_audit_info ad;
b4e0d5f0 2567 int rc = 0;
e114e473 2568
ecfcc53f
EB		 2569 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2570 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2571
2572 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
2573 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2574
2575 return rc;
e114e473
CS		 2576}
2577
6d3dc07c
CS		 2578/**
2579 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
2580 * @sock: the socket
251a2a95 2581 * @msg: the message
6d3dc07c
CS		 2582 * @size: the size of the message
2583 *
2584 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
2585 * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
2586 * label host.
2587 */
2588static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
2589 int size)
2590{
2591 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
6d3dc07c
CS		 2592
2593 /*
2594 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
2595 */
da34d424 2596 if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
6d3dc07c
CS		 2597 return 0;
2598
07feee8f 2599 return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
6d3dc07c
CS		 2600}
2601
2602
e114e473 2603/**
251a2a95 2604 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
e114e473
CS		 2605 * @sap: netlabel secattr
2606 * @sip: where to put the result
2607 *
2608 * Copies a smack label into sip
2609 */
2610static void smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, char *sip)
2611{
2612 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
6d3dc07c 2613 char *sp;
e114e473
CS		 2614 int pcat;
2615
6d3dc07c 2616 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
e114e473 2617 /*
6d3dc07c 2618 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
e114e473
CS		 2619 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
2620 * behaving the way we expect it to.
2621 *
6d3dc07c 2622 * Get the categories, if any
e114e473
CS		 2623 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
2624 * for the packet fall back on the network
2625 * ambient value.
2626 */
6d3dc07c
CS		 2627 memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
2628 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
2629 for (pcat = -1;;) {
2630 pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
2631 sap->attr.mls.cat, pcat + 1);
2632 if (pcat < 0)
2633 break;
2634 smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
2635 }
2636 /*
2637 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
2638 * we are already done. WeeHee.
2639 */
2640 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
2641 memcpy(sip, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
2642 return;
2643 }
2644 /*
2645 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not
2646 * a direct mapping.
2647 */
2648 smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack, sip);
e114e473
CS		 2649 return;
2650 }
6d3dc07c
CS		 2651 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
2652 /*
2653 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
2654 */
2655 sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
2656 /*
2657 * This has got to be a bug because it is
2658 * impossible to specify a fallback without
2659 * specifying the label, which will ensure
2660 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
2661 * secid is from a fallback.
2662 */
2663 BUG_ON(sp == NULL);
2664 strncpy(sip, sp, SMK_MAXLEN);
e114e473
CS		 2665 return;
2666 }
2667 /*
6d3dc07c
CS		 2668 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
2669 * for the packet fall back on the network
2670 * ambient value.
e114e473 2671 */
6d3dc07c 2672 strncpy(sip, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
e114e473
CS		 2673 return;
2674}
2675
2676/**
2677 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
2678 * @sk: socket
2679 * @skb: packet
2680 *
2681 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
2682 */
2683static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
2684{
2685 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2686 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2687 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
6d3dc07c 2688 char *csp;
e114e473 2689 int rc;
ecfcc53f 2690 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473
CS		 2691 if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
2692 return 0;
2693
2694 /*
2695 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
2696 */
e114e473 2697 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
6d3dc07c 2698
e114e473 2699 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
6d3dc07c 2700 if (rc == 0) {
e114e473 2701 smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
6d3dc07c
CS		 2702 csp = smack;
2703 } else
2704 csp = smack_net_ambient;
2705
e114e473 2706 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
6d3dc07c 2707
ecfcc53f
EB		 2708#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2709 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2710 ad.a.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
8964be4a 2711 ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
ecfcc53f
EB		 2712 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
2713#endif
e114e473
CS		 2714 /*
2715 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
2716 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
2717 * This is the simplist possible security model
2718 * for networking.
2719 */
ecfcc53f 2720 rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
a8134296
PM		 2721 if (rc != 0)
2722 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
2723 return rc;
e114e473
CS		 2724}
2725
2726/**
2727 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
2728 * @sock: the socket
2729 * @optval: user's destination
2730 * @optlen: size thereof
251a2a95 2731 * @len: max thereof
e114e473
CS		 2732 *
2733 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
2734 */
2735static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
2736 char __user *optval,
2737 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
2738{
2739 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2740 int slen;
2741 int rc = 0;
2742
2743 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2744 slen = strlen(ssp->smk_packet) + 1;
2745
2746 if (slen > len)
2747 rc = -ERANGE;
2748 else if (copy_to_user(optval, ssp->smk_packet, slen) != 0)
2749 rc = -EFAULT;
2750
2751 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
2752 rc = -EFAULT;
2753
2754 return rc;
2755}
2756
2757
2758/**
2759 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
b4e0d5f0 2760 * @sock: the peer socket
e114e473
CS		 2761 * @skb: packet data
2762 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
2763 *
2764 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
2765 */
2766static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
2767 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
2768
2769{
2770 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
b4e0d5f0 2771 struct socket_smack *sp;
e114e473 2772 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2773 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
2774 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
e114e473
CS		 2775 int rc;
2776
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2777 if (skb != NULL) {
2778 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
2779 family = PF_INET;
2780 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
2781 family = PF_INET6;
e114e473 2782 }
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2783 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
2784 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
e114e473 2785
b4e0d5f0
CS		 2786 if (family == PF_UNIX) {
2787 sp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2788 s = smack_to_secid(sp->smk_out);
2789 } else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
2790 /*
2791 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
2792 */
2793 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2794 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
2795 if (rc == 0) {
2796 smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
2797 s = smack_to_secid(smack);
2798 }
2799 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2800 }
2801 *secid = s;
e114e473
CS		 2802 if (s == 0)
2803 return -EINVAL;
e114e473
CS		 2804 return 0;
2805}
2806
2807/**
07feee8f
PM		 2808 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
2809 * @sk: child sock
2810 * @parent: parent socket
e114e473 2811 *
07feee8f
PM		 2812 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
2813 * is creating the new socket.
e114e473
CS		 2814 */
2815static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
2816{
2817 struct socket_smack *ssp;
e114e473 2818
07feee8f
PM		 2819 if (sk == NULL ||
2820 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
e114e473
CS		 2821 return;
2822
2823 ssp = sk->sk_security;
676dac4b 2824 ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current();
07feee8f 2825 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
e114e473
CS		 2826}
2827
2828/**
2829 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
2830 * @sk: socket involved
2831 * @skb: packet
2832 * @req: unused
2833 *
2834 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
2835 * the socket, otherwise an error code
2836 */
2837static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
2838 struct request_sock *req)
2839{
07feee8f 2840 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
e114e473 2841 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
07feee8f
PM		 2842 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2843 struct sockaddr_in addr;
2844 struct iphdr *hdr;
e114e473
CS		 2845 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
2846 int rc;
ecfcc53f 2847 struct smk_audit_info ad;
e114e473 2848
07feee8f
PM		 2849 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
2850 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
2851 family = PF_INET;
e114e473 2852
07feee8f
PM		 2853 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2854 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
e114e473 2855 if (rc == 0)
07feee8f 2856 smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
e114e473
CS		 2857 else
2858 strncpy(smack, smack_known_huh.smk_known, SMK_MAXLEN);
07feee8f
PM		 2859 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2860
ecfcc53f
EB		 2861#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2862 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2863 ad.a.u.net.family = family;
8964be4a 2864 ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
ecfcc53f
EB		 2865 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
2866#endif
e114e473 2867 /*
07feee8f
PM		 2868 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
2869 * here. Read access is not required.
e114e473 2870 */
ecfcc53f 2871 rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
07feee8f
PM		 2872 if (rc != 0)
2873 return rc;
2874
2875 /*
2876 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
2877 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
2878 */
2879 req->peer_secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
2880
2881 /*
2882 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
2883 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
2884 * propogate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
2885 */
2886 hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
2887 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
2888 rcu_read_lock();
2889 if (smack_host_label(&addr) == NULL) {
2890 rcu_read_unlock();
2891 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2892 smack_to_secattr(smack, &secattr);
2893 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
2894 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2895 } else {
2896 rcu_read_unlock();
2897 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
2898 }
e114e473
CS		 2899
2900 return rc;
2901}
2902
07feee8f
PM		 2903/**
2904 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
2905 * @sk: the new socket
2906 * @req: the connection's request_sock
2907 *
2908 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
2909 */
2910static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
2911 const struct request_sock *req)
2912{
2913 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2914 char *smack;
2915
2916 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
2917 smack = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
2918 strncpy(ssp->smk_packet, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
2919 } else
2920 ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
2921}
2922
e114e473
CS		 2923/*
2924 * Key management security hooks
2925 *
2926 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
2927 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
2928 * If you care about keys please have a look.
2929 */
2930#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
2931
2932/**
2933 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
2934 * @key: object
d84f4f99 2935 * @cred: the credentials to use
e114e473
CS		 2936 * @flags: unused
2937 *
2938 * No allocation required
2939 *
2940 * Returns 0
2941 */
d84f4f99 2942static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
e114e473
CS		 2943 unsigned long flags)
2944{
676dac4b 2945 key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security);
e114e473
CS		 2946 return 0;
2947}
2948
2949/**
2950 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
2951 * @key: the object
2952 *
2953 * Clear the blob pointer
2954 */
2955static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
2956{
2957 key->security = NULL;
2958}
2959
2960/*
2961 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
2962 * @key_ref: gets to the object
d84f4f99 2963 * @cred: the credentials to use
e114e473
CS		 2964 * @perm: unused
2965 *
2966 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
2967 * an error code otherwise
2968 */
2969static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
d84f4f99 2970 const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
e114e473
CS		 2971{
2972 struct key *keyp;
ecfcc53f 2973 struct smk_audit_info ad;
676dac4b 2974 char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
e114e473
CS		 2975
2976 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
2977 if (keyp == NULL)
2978 return -EINVAL;
2979 /*
2980 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
2981 * it may do so.
2982 */
2983 if (keyp->security == NULL)
2984 return 0;
2985 /*
2986 * This should not occur
2987 */
676dac4b 2988 if (tsp == NULL)
e114e473 2989 return -EACCES;
ecfcc53f
EB		 2990#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2991 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
2992 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
2993 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
2994#endif
676dac4b 2995 return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security,
ecfcc53f 2996 MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
e114e473
CS		 2997}
2998#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
2999
d20bdda6
AD		 3000/*
3001 * Smack Audit hooks
3002 *
3003 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
3004 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
3005 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
3006 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
3007 *
3008 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
3009 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
3010 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
3011 * model where nearly everything is a label.
3012 */
3013#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3014
3015/**
3016 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
3017 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
3018 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
3019 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
3020 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
3021 *
3022 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
3023 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
3024 */
3025static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
3026{
3027 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
3028 *rule = NULL;
3029
3030 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3031 return -EINVAL;
3032
5af75d8d 3033 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
d20bdda6
AD		 3034 return -EINVAL;
3035
3036 *rule = smk_import(rulestr, 0);
3037
3038 return 0;
3039}
3040
3041/**
3042 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
3043 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
3044 *
3045 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
3046 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
3047 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
3048 */
3049static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
3050{
3051 struct audit_field *f;
3052 int i;
3053
3054 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
3055 f = &krule->fields[i];
3056
3057 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3058 return 1;
3059 }
3060
3061 return 0;
3062}
3063
3064/**
3065 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
3066 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
3067 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
3068 * @op: required testing operator
3069 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
3070 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
3071 *
3072 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
3073 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
3074 */
3075static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
3076 struct audit_context *actx)
3077{
3078 char *smack;
3079 char *rule = vrule;
3080
3081 if (!rule) {
3082 audit_log(actx, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3083 "Smack: missing rule\n");
3084 return -ENOENT;
3085 }
3086
3087 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3088 return 0;
3089
3090 smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
3091
3092 /*
3093 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
3094 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
3095 * label.
3096 */
5af75d8d 3097 if (op == Audit_equal)
d20bdda6 3098 return (rule == smack);
5af75d8d 3099 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
d20bdda6
AD		 3100 return (rule != smack);
3101
3102 return 0;
3103}
3104
3105/**
3106 * smack_audit_rule_free - free smack rule representation
3107 * @vrule: rule to be freed.
3108 *
3109 * No memory was allocated.
3110 */
3111static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
3112{
3113 /* No-op */
3114}
3115
3116#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3117
251a2a95 3118/**
e114e473
CS		 3119 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
3120 * @secid: incoming integer
3121 * @secdata: destination
3122 * @seclen: how long it is
3123 *
3124 * Exists for networking code.
3125 */
3126static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
3127{
3128 char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
3129
d5630b9d
EP		 3130 if (secdata)
3131 *secdata = sp;
e114e473
CS		 3132 *seclen = strlen(sp);
3133 return 0;
3134}
3135
251a2a95 3136/**
4bc87e62
CS		 3137 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
3138 * @secdata: smack label
3139 * @seclen: how long result is
3140 * @secid: outgoing integer
3141 *
3142 * Exists for audit and networking code.
3143 */
e52c1764 3144static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4bc87e62
CS		 3145{
3146 *secid = smack_to_secid(secdata);
3147 return 0;
3148}
3149
251a2a95 3150/**
e114e473 3151 * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
251a2a95
RD		 3152 * @secdata: unused
3153 * @seclen: unused
e114e473
CS		 3154 *
3155 * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
3156 */
3157static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
3158{
3159}
3160
1ee65e37
DQ		 3161static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
3162{
3163 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
3164}
3165
3166static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
3167{
3168 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
3169}
3170
3171static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
3172{
3173 int len = 0;
3174 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
3175
3176 if (len < 0)
3177 return len;
3178 *ctxlen = len;
3179 return 0;
3180}
3181
076c54c5
AD		 3182struct security_operations smack_ops = {
3183 .name = "smack",
3184
9e48858f 3185 .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check,
5cd9c58f 3186 .ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
e114e473 3187 .syslog = smack_syslog,
e114e473
CS		 3188
3189 .sb_alloc_security = smack_sb_alloc_security,
3190 .sb_free_security = smack_sb_free_security,
3191 .sb_copy_data = smack_sb_copy_data,
3192 .sb_kern_mount = smack_sb_kern_mount,
3193 .sb_statfs = smack_sb_statfs,
3194 .sb_mount = smack_sb_mount,
3195 .sb_umount = smack_sb_umount,
3196
676dac4b
CS		 3197 .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds,
3198
e114e473
CS		 3199 .inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security,
3200 .inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security,
3201 .inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security,
3202 .inode_link = smack_inode_link,
3203 .inode_unlink = smack_inode_unlink,
3204 .inode_rmdir = smack_inode_rmdir,
3205 .inode_rename = smack_inode_rename,
3206 .inode_permission = smack_inode_permission,
3207 .inode_setattr = smack_inode_setattr,
3208 .inode_getattr = smack_inode_getattr,
3209 .inode_setxattr = smack_inode_setxattr,
3210 .inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr,
3211 .inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr,
3212 .inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr,
3213 .inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity,
3214 .inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity,
3215 .inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity,
d20bdda6 3216 .inode_getsecid = smack_inode_getsecid,
e114e473
CS		 3217
3218 .file_permission = smack_file_permission,
3219 .file_alloc_security = smack_file_alloc_security,
3220 .file_free_security = smack_file_free_security,
3221 .file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl,
3222 .file_lock = smack_file_lock,
3223 .file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl,
3224 .file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner,
3225 .file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
3226 .file_receive = smack_file_receive,
3227
ee18d64c 3228 .cred_alloc_blank = smack_cred_alloc_blank,
f1752eec 3229 .cred_free = smack_cred_free,
d84f4f99 3230 .cred_prepare = smack_cred_prepare,
ee18d64c 3231 .cred_transfer = smack_cred_transfer,
3a3b7ce9
DH		 3232 .kernel_act_as = smack_kernel_act_as,
3233 .kernel_create_files_as = smack_kernel_create_files_as,
e114e473
CS		 3234 .task_setpgid = smack_task_setpgid,
3235 .task_getpgid = smack_task_getpgid,
3236 .task_getsid = smack_task_getsid,
3237 .task_getsecid = smack_task_getsecid,
3238 .task_setnice = smack_task_setnice,
3239 .task_setioprio = smack_task_setioprio,
3240 .task_getioprio = smack_task_getioprio,
3241 .task_setscheduler = smack_task_setscheduler,
3242 .task_getscheduler = smack_task_getscheduler,
3243 .task_movememory = smack_task_movememory,
3244 .task_kill = smack_task_kill,
3245 .task_wait = smack_task_wait,
e114e473
CS		 3246 .task_to_inode = smack_task_to_inode,
3247
3248 .ipc_permission = smack_ipc_permission,
d20bdda6 3249 .ipc_getsecid = smack_ipc_getsecid,
e114e473
CS		 3250
3251 .msg_msg_alloc_security = smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
3252 .msg_msg_free_security = smack_msg_msg_free_security,
3253
3254 .msg_queue_alloc_security = smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
3255 .msg_queue_free_security = smack_msg_queue_free_security,
3256 .msg_queue_associate = smack_msg_queue_associate,
3257 .msg_queue_msgctl = smack_msg_queue_msgctl,
3258 .msg_queue_msgsnd = smack_msg_queue_msgsnd,
3259 .msg_queue_msgrcv = smack_msg_queue_msgrcv,
3260
3261 .shm_alloc_security = smack_shm_alloc_security,
3262 .shm_free_security = smack_shm_free_security,
3263 .shm_associate = smack_shm_associate,
3264 .shm_shmctl = smack_shm_shmctl,
3265 .shm_shmat = smack_shm_shmat,
3266
3267 .sem_alloc_security = smack_sem_alloc_security,
3268 .sem_free_security = smack_sem_free_security,
3269 .sem_associate = smack_sem_associate,
3270 .sem_semctl = smack_sem_semctl,
3271 .sem_semop = smack_sem_semop,
3272
e114e473
CS		 3273 .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate,
3274
3275 .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr,
3276 .setprocattr = smack_setprocattr,
3277
3278 .unix_stream_connect = smack_unix_stream_connect,
3279 .unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send,
3280
3281 .socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create,
6d3dc07c
CS		 3282 .socket_connect = smack_socket_connect,
3283 .socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg,
e114e473
CS		 3284 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
3285 .socket_getpeersec_stream = smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
3286 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
3287 .sk_alloc_security = smack_sk_alloc_security,
3288 .sk_free_security = smack_sk_free_security,
3289 .sock_graft = smack_sock_graft,
3290 .inet_conn_request = smack_inet_conn_request,
07feee8f 3291 .inet_csk_clone = smack_inet_csk_clone,
d20bdda6 3292
e114e473
CS		 3293 /* key management security hooks */
3294#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
3295 .key_alloc = smack_key_alloc,
3296 .key_free = smack_key_free,
3297 .key_permission = smack_key_permission,
3298#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
d20bdda6
AD		 3299
3300 /* Audit hooks */
3301#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3302 .audit_rule_init = smack_audit_rule_init,
3303 .audit_rule_known = smack_audit_rule_known,
3304 .audit_rule_match = smack_audit_rule_match,
3305 .audit_rule_free = smack_audit_rule_free,
3306#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3307
e114e473 3308 .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx,
4bc87e62 3309 .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid,
e114e473 3310 .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx,
1ee65e37
DQ		 3311 .inode_notifysecctx = smack_inode_notifysecctx,
3312 .inode_setsecctx = smack_inode_setsecctx,
3313 .inode_getsecctx = smack_inode_getsecctx,
e114e473
CS		 3314};
3315
7198e2ee
EB		 3316
3317static __init void init_smack_know_list(void)
3318{
3319 list_add(&smack_known_huh.list, &smack_known_list);
3320 list_add(&smack_known_hat.list, &smack_known_list);
3321 list_add(&smack_known_star.list, &smack_known_list);
3322 list_add(&smack_known_floor.list, &smack_known_list);
3323 list_add(&smack_known_invalid.list, &smack_known_list);
3324 list_add(&smack_known_web.list, &smack_known_list);
3325}
3326
e114e473
CS		 3327/**
3328 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
3329 *
3330 * Returns 0
3331 */
3332static __init int smack_init(void)
3333{
d84f4f99 3334 struct cred *cred;
676dac4b 3335 struct task_smack *tsp;
d84f4f99 3336
676dac4b
CS		 3337 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
3338 if (tsp == NULL)
3339 return -ENOMEM;
3340
3341 if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) {
3342 kfree(tsp);
076c54c5 3343 return 0;
676dac4b 3344 }
076c54c5 3345
e114e473
CS		 3346 printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
3347
3348 /*
3349 * Set the security state for the initial task.
3350 */
d84f4f99 3351 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
676dac4b
CS		 3352 tsp->smk_forked = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
3353 tsp->smk_task = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
3354 cred->security = tsp;
e114e473 3355
421f91d2 3356 /* initialize the smack_know_list */
7198e2ee 3357 init_smack_know_list();
e114e473
CS		 3358 /*
3359 * Initialize locks
3360 */
e114e473
CS		 3361 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock);
3362 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock);
3363 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock);
3364 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_cipsolock);
3365 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_cipsolock);
3366
3367 /*
3368 * Register with LSM
3369 */
3370 if (register_security(&smack_ops))
3371 panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
3372
3373 return 0;
3374}
3375
3376/*
3377 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
3378 * all processes and objects when they are created.
3379 */
3380security_initcall(smack_init);
Linux 6.x block layer and io_uring tree(s)