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1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Author: | |
5 | * David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> | |
6 | * | |
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
8 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
9 | * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. | |
10 | * | |
11 | * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt | |
12 | */ | |
13 | ||
14 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> | |
15 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
16 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
17 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
18 | #include <linux/parser.h> | |
19 | #include <linux/string.h> | |
20 | #include <keys/user-type.h> | |
21 | #include <keys/trusted-type.h> | |
22 | #include <linux/key-type.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/rcupdate.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/crypto.h> | |
25 | #include <crypto/hash.h> | |
26 | #include <crypto/sha.h> | |
27 | #include <linux/capability.h> | |
28 | #include <linux/tpm.h> | |
29 | #include <linux/tpm_command.h> | |
30 | ||
31 | #include "trusted_defined.h" | |
32 | ||
33 | static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; | |
34 | static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; | |
35 | ||
36 | struct sdesc { | |
37 | struct shash_desc shash; | |
38 | char ctx[]; | |
39 | }; | |
40 | ||
41 | static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; | |
42 | static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; | |
43 | ||
44 | static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg) | |
45 | { | |
46 | struct sdesc *sdesc; | |
47 | int size; | |
48 | ||
49 | size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg); | |
50 | sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); | |
51 | if (!sdesc) | |
52 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
53 | sdesc->shash.tfm = alg; | |
54 | sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0; | |
55 | return sdesc; | |
56 | } | |
57 | ||
58 | static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, const unsigned int datalen, | |
59 | unsigned char *digest) | |
60 | { | |
61 | struct sdesc *sdesc; | |
62 | int ret; | |
63 | ||
64 | sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); | |
65 | if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { | |
66 | pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); | |
67 | return PTR_ERR(sdesc); | |
68 | } | |
69 | ||
70 | ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); | |
71 | kfree(sdesc); | |
72 | return ret; | |
73 | } | |
74 | ||
75 | static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, | |
76 | const unsigned int keylen, ...) | |
77 | { | |
78 | struct sdesc *sdesc; | |
79 | va_list argp; | |
80 | unsigned int dlen; | |
81 | unsigned char *data; | |
82 | int ret; | |
83 | ||
84 | sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg); | |
85 | if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { | |
86 | pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); | |
87 | return PTR_ERR(sdesc); | |
88 | } | |
89 | ||
90 | ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen); | |
91 | if (ret < 0) | |
92 | goto out; | |
93 | ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); | |
94 | if (ret < 0) | |
95 | goto out; | |
96 | ||
97 | va_start(argp, keylen); | |
98 | for (;;) { | |
99 | dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); | |
100 | if (dlen == 0) | |
101 | break; | |
102 | data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); | |
103 | if (data == NULL) | |
104 | return -EINVAL; | |
105 | ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); | |
106 | if (ret < 0) | |
107 | goto out; | |
108 | } | |
109 | va_end(argp); | |
110 | ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); | |
111 | out: | |
112 | kfree(sdesc); | |
113 | return ret; | |
114 | } | |
115 | ||
116 | /* | |
117 | * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM | |
118 | */ | |
119 | static uint32_t TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, | |
120 | const unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, | |
121 | unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...) | |
122 | { | |
123 | unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
124 | struct sdesc *sdesc; | |
125 | unsigned int dlen; | |
126 | unsigned char *data; | |
127 | unsigned char c; | |
128 | int ret; | |
129 | va_list argp; | |
130 | ||
131 | sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); | |
132 | if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { | |
133 | pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); | |
134 | return PTR_ERR(sdesc); | |
135 | } | |
136 | ||
137 | c = h3; | |
138 | ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); | |
139 | if (ret < 0) | |
140 | goto out; | |
141 | va_start(argp, h3); | |
142 | for (;;) { | |
143 | dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); | |
144 | if (dlen == 0) | |
145 | break; | |
146 | data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); | |
147 | ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); | |
148 | if (ret < 0) | |
149 | goto out; | |
150 | } | |
151 | va_end(argp); | |
152 | ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); | |
153 | if (!ret) | |
154 | TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, | |
155 | paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, | |
156 | TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); | |
157 | out: | |
158 | kfree(sdesc); | |
159 | return ret; | |
160 | } | |
161 | ||
162 | /* | |
163 | * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM | |
164 | */ | |
165 | static uint32_t TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, | |
166 | const uint32_t command, | |
167 | const unsigned char *ononce, | |
168 | const unsigned char *key, | |
169 | const unsigned int keylen, ...) | |
170 | { | |
171 | uint32_t bufsize; | |
172 | uint16_t tag; | |
173 | uint32_t ordinal; | |
174 | uint32_t result; | |
175 | unsigned char *enonce; | |
176 | unsigned char *continueflag; | |
177 | unsigned char *authdata; | |
178 | unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
179 | unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
180 | struct sdesc *sdesc; | |
181 | unsigned int dlen; | |
182 | unsigned int dpos; | |
183 | va_list argp; | |
184 | int ret; | |
185 | ||
186 | bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); | |
187 | tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); | |
188 | ordinal = command; | |
189 | result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); | |
190 | if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) | |
191 | return 0; | |
192 | if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND) | |
193 | return -EINVAL; | |
194 | authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; | |
195 | continueflag = authdata - 1; | |
196 | enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; | |
197 | ||
198 | sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); | |
199 | if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { | |
200 | pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); | |
201 | return PTR_ERR(sdesc); | |
202 | } | |
203 | ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); | |
204 | if (ret < 0) | |
205 | goto out; | |
206 | ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, | |
207 | sizeof result); | |
208 | if (ret < 0) | |
209 | goto out; | |
210 | ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, | |
211 | sizeof ordinal); | |
212 | if (ret < 0) | |
213 | goto out; | |
214 | va_start(argp, keylen); | |
215 | for (;;) { | |
216 | dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); | |
217 | if (dlen == 0) | |
218 | break; | |
219 | dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); | |
220 | ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); | |
221 | if (ret < 0) | |
222 | goto out; | |
223 | } | |
224 | va_end(argp); | |
225 | ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); | |
226 | if (ret < 0) | |
227 | goto out; | |
228 | ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, | |
229 | TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, | |
230 | 1, continueflag, 0, 0); | |
231 | if (ret < 0) | |
232 | goto out; | |
233 | if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) | |
234 | ret = -EINVAL; | |
235 | out: | |
236 | kfree(sdesc); | |
237 | return ret; | |
238 | } | |
239 | ||
240 | /* | |
241 | * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM | |
242 | */ | |
243 | static uint32_t TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, | |
244 | const uint32_t command, | |
245 | const unsigned char *ononce, | |
246 | const unsigned char *key1, | |
247 | const unsigned int keylen1, | |
248 | const unsigned char *key2, | |
249 | const unsigned int keylen2, ...) | |
250 | { | |
251 | uint32_t bufsize; | |
252 | uint16_t tag; | |
253 | uint32_t ordinal; | |
254 | uint32_t result; | |
255 | unsigned char *enonce1; | |
256 | unsigned char *continueflag1; | |
257 | unsigned char *authdata1; | |
258 | unsigned char *enonce2; | |
259 | unsigned char *continueflag2; | |
260 | unsigned char *authdata2; | |
261 | unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
262 | unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
263 | unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
264 | struct sdesc *sdesc; | |
265 | unsigned int dlen; | |
266 | unsigned int dpos; | |
267 | va_list argp; | |
268 | int ret; | |
269 | ||
270 | bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); | |
271 | tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); | |
272 | ordinal = command; | |
273 | result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); | |
274 | ||
275 | if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) | |
276 | return 0; | |
277 | if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND) | |
278 | return -EINVAL; | |
279 | authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1 | |
280 | + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
281 | authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
282 | continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1; | |
283 | continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1; | |
284 | enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; | |
285 | enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; | |
286 | ||
287 | sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); | |
288 | if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { | |
289 | pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); | |
290 | return PTR_ERR(sdesc); | |
291 | } | |
292 | ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); | |
293 | if (ret < 0) | |
294 | goto out; | |
295 | ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, | |
296 | sizeof result); | |
297 | if (ret < 0) | |
298 | goto out; | |
299 | ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, | |
300 | sizeof ordinal); | |
301 | if (ret < 0) | |
302 | goto out; | |
303 | ||
304 | va_start(argp, keylen2); | |
305 | for (;;) { | |
306 | dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); | |
307 | if (dlen == 0) | |
308 | break; | |
309 | dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); | |
310 | ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); | |
311 | if (ret < 0) | |
312 | goto out; | |
313 | } | |
314 | ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); | |
315 | if (ret < 0) | |
316 | goto out; | |
317 | ||
318 | ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, | |
319 | paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, | |
320 | TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0); | |
321 | if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) { | |
322 | ret = -EINVAL; | |
323 | goto out; | |
324 | } | |
325 | ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, | |
326 | paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2, | |
327 | TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0); | |
328 | if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) | |
329 | ret = -EINVAL; | |
330 | out: | |
331 | kfree(sdesc); | |
332 | return ret; | |
333 | } | |
334 | ||
335 | /* | |
336 | * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our | |
337 | * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. | |
338 | */ | |
339 | static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd, | |
340 | size_t buflen) | |
341 | { | |
342 | int rc; | |
343 | ||
344 | dump_tpm_buf(cmd); | |
345 | rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen); | |
346 | dump_tpm_buf(cmd); | |
347 | if (rc > 0) | |
348 | /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */ | |
349 | rc = -EPERM; | |
350 | return rc; | |
351 | } | |
352 | ||
353 | /* | |
354 | * get a random value from TPM | |
355 | */ | |
356 | static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len) | |
357 | { | |
358 | int ret; | |
359 | ||
360 | INIT_BUF(tb); | |
361 | store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); | |
362 | store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE); | |
363 | store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM); | |
364 | store32(tb, len); | |
365 | ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data); | |
366 | memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len); | |
367 | ||
368 | return ret; | |
369 | } | |
370 | ||
371 | static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len) | |
372 | { | |
373 | struct tpm_buf *tb; | |
374 | int ret; | |
375 | ||
376 | tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); | |
377 | if (!tb) | |
378 | return -ENOMEM; | |
379 | ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len); | |
380 | ||
381 | kfree(tb); | |
382 | return ret; | |
383 | } | |
384 | ||
385 | /* | |
386 | * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. | |
387 | * | |
388 | * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed. | |
389 | * This uses the tpm driver's extend function. | |
390 | */ | |
391 | static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) | |
392 | { | |
393 | unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
394 | ||
395 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
396 | return -EPERM; | |
397 | my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
398 | return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; | |
399 | } | |
400 | ||
401 | /* | |
402 | * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session | |
403 | */ | |
404 | static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, | |
405 | const unsigned char *key, const uint16_t type, | |
406 | const uint32_t handle) | |
407 | { | |
408 | unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; | |
409 | unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; | |
410 | int ret; | |
411 | ||
412 | ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
413 | if (ret < 0) | |
414 | return ret; | |
415 | ||
416 | INIT_BUF(tb); | |
417 | store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); | |
418 | store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE); | |
419 | store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP); | |
420 | store16(tb, type); | |
421 | store32(tb, handle); | |
422 | storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
423 | ||
424 | ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); | |
425 | if (ret < 0) | |
426 | return ret; | |
427 | ||
428 | s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); | |
429 | memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]), | |
430 | TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
431 | memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + | |
432 | TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
433 | ret = TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, | |
434 | enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0); | |
435 | return ret; | |
436 | } | |
437 | ||
438 | /* | |
439 | * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session | |
440 | */ | |
441 | static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) | |
442 | { | |
443 | int ret; | |
444 | ||
445 | INIT_BUF(tb); | |
446 | store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); | |
447 | store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); | |
448 | store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); | |
449 | ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); | |
450 | if (ret < 0) | |
451 | return ret; | |
452 | ||
453 | *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); | |
454 | memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)], | |
455 | TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
456 | return ret; | |
457 | } | |
458 | ||
459 | struct tpm_digests { | |
460 | unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
461 | unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
462 | unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2]; | |
463 | unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
464 | unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; | |
465 | }; | |
466 | ||
467 | /* | |
468 | * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on | |
469 | * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. | |
470 | */ | |
471 | static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, const uint16_t keytype, | |
472 | const uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, | |
473 | const unsigned char *data, const uint32_t datalen, | |
474 | unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, | |
475 | const unsigned char *blobauth, | |
476 | const unsigned char *pcrinfo, const uint32_t pcrinfosize) | |
477 | { | |
478 | struct osapsess sess; | |
479 | struct tpm_digests *td; | |
480 | unsigned char cont; | |
481 | uint32_t ordinal; | |
482 | uint32_t pcrsize; | |
483 | uint32_t datsize; | |
484 | int sealinfosize; | |
485 | int encdatasize; | |
486 | int storedsize; | |
487 | int ret; | |
488 | int i; | |
489 | ||
490 | /* alloc some work space for all the hashes */ | |
491 | td = kmalloc(sizeof *td, GFP_KERNEL); | |
492 | if (!td) | |
493 | return -ENOMEM; | |
494 | ||
495 | /* get session for sealing key */ | |
496 | ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle); | |
497 | if (ret < 0) | |
498 | return ret; | |
499 | dump_sess(&sess); | |
500 | ||
501 | /* calculate encrypted authorization value */ | |
502 | memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
503 | memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
504 | ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash); | |
505 | if (ret < 0) | |
506 | return ret; | |
507 | ||
508 | ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
509 | if (ret < 0) | |
510 | return ret; | |
511 | ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); | |
512 | datsize = htonl(datalen); | |
513 | pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); | |
514 | cont = 0; | |
515 | ||
516 | /* encrypt data authorization key */ | |
517 | for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i) | |
518 | td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i]; | |
519 | ||
520 | /* calculate authorization HMAC value */ | |
521 | if (pcrinfosize == 0) { | |
522 | /* no pcr info specified */ | |
523 | TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, | |
524 | sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), | |
525 | &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, td->encauth, | |
526 | sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, sizeof(uint32_t), | |
527 | &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0); | |
528 | } else { | |
529 | /* pcr info specified */ | |
530 | TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, | |
531 | sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), | |
532 | &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, td->encauth, | |
533 | sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, pcrinfosize, | |
534 | pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, | |
535 | data, 0, 0); | |
536 | } | |
537 | ||
538 | /* build and send the TPM request packet */ | |
539 | INIT_BUF(tb); | |
540 | store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); | |
541 | store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen); | |
542 | store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL); | |
543 | store32(tb, keyhandle); | |
544 | storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
545 | store32(tb, pcrinfosize); | |
546 | storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize); | |
547 | store32(tb, datalen); | |
548 | storebytes(tb, data, datalen); | |
549 | store32(tb, sess.handle); | |
550 | storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
551 | store8(tb, cont); | |
552 | storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
553 | ||
554 | ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); | |
555 | if (ret < 0) | |
556 | return ret; | |
557 | ||
558 | /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */ | |
559 | sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)); | |
560 | encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + | |
561 | sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize); | |
562 | storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize + | |
563 | sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize; | |
564 | ||
565 | /* check the HMAC in the response */ | |
566 | ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret, | |
567 | SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0, | |
568 | 0); | |
569 | ||
570 | /* copy the returned blob to caller */ | |
571 | memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize); | |
572 | *bloblen = storedsize; | |
573 | return ret; | |
574 | } | |
575 | ||
576 | /* | |
577 | * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob | |
578 | */ | |
579 | static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, | |
580 | const uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, | |
581 | const unsigned char *blob, const int bloblen, | |
582 | const unsigned char *blobauth, | |
583 | unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen) | |
584 | { | |
585 | unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; | |
586 | unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; | |
587 | unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; | |
588 | unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
589 | unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
590 | uint32_t authhandle1 = 0; | |
591 | uint32_t authhandle2 = 0; | |
592 | unsigned char cont = 0; | |
593 | uint32_t ordinal; | |
594 | uint32_t keyhndl; | |
595 | int ret; | |
596 | ||
597 | /* sessions for unsealing key and data */ | |
598 | ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1); | |
599 | if (ret < 0) { | |
600 | pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
601 | return ret; | |
602 | } | |
603 | ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2); | |
604 | if (ret < 0) { | |
605 | pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
606 | return ret; | |
607 | } | |
608 | ||
609 | ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); | |
610 | keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); | |
611 | ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
612 | if (ret < 0) { | |
613 | pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
614 | return ret; | |
615 | } | |
616 | TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, | |
617 | enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), | |
618 | &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); | |
619 | TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, | |
620 | enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), | |
621 | &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); | |
622 | ||
623 | /* build and send TPM request packet */ | |
624 | INIT_BUF(tb); | |
625 | store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND); | |
626 | store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen); | |
627 | store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); | |
628 | store32(tb, keyhandle); | |
629 | storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen); | |
630 | store32(tb, authhandle1); | |
631 | storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
632 | store8(tb, cont); | |
633 | storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
634 | store32(tb, authhandle2); | |
635 | storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); | |
636 | store8(tb, cont); | |
637 | storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
638 | ||
639 | ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); | |
640 | if (ret < 0) { | |
641 | pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
642 | return ret; | |
643 | } | |
644 | ||
645 | *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); | |
646 | ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, | |
647 | keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, | |
648 | blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, | |
649 | sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET, | |
650 | *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0, | |
651 | 0); | |
652 | if (ret < 0) | |
653 | pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
654 | memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen); | |
655 | return ret; | |
656 | } | |
657 | ||
658 | /* | |
659 | * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key | |
660 | */ | |
661 | static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, | |
662 | struct trusted_key_options *o) | |
663 | { | |
664 | struct tpm_buf *tb; | |
665 | int ret; | |
666 | ||
667 | tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); | |
668 | if (!tb) | |
669 | return -ENOMEM; | |
670 | ||
671 | /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ | |
672 | p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; | |
673 | ||
674 | ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, | |
675 | p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, | |
676 | o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); | |
677 | if (ret < 0) | |
678 | pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
679 | ||
680 | kfree(tb); | |
681 | return ret; | |
682 | } | |
683 | ||
684 | /* | |
685 | * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key | |
686 | */ | |
687 | static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, | |
688 | struct trusted_key_options *o) | |
689 | { | |
690 | struct tpm_buf *tb; | |
691 | int ret; | |
692 | ||
693 | tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); | |
694 | if (!tb) | |
695 | return -ENOMEM; | |
696 | ||
697 | ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, | |
698 | o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); | |
699 | /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ | |
700 | p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; | |
701 | ||
702 | if (ret < 0) | |
703 | pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
704 | ||
705 | kfree(tb); | |
706 | return ret; | |
707 | } | |
708 | ||
709 | enum { | |
710 | Opt_err = -1, | |
711 | Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, | |
712 | Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, | |
713 | Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable | |
714 | }; | |
715 | ||
716 | static const match_table_t key_tokens = { | |
717 | {Opt_new, "new"}, | |
718 | {Opt_load, "load"}, | |
719 | {Opt_update, "update"}, | |
720 | {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"}, | |
721 | {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"}, | |
722 | {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"}, | |
723 | {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"}, | |
724 | {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"}, | |
725 | {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"}, | |
726 | {Opt_err, NULL} | |
727 | }; | |
728 | ||
729 | /* can have zero or more token= options */ | |
730 | static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, | |
731 | struct trusted_key_options *opt) | |
732 | { | |
733 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; | |
734 | char *p = c; | |
735 | int token; | |
736 | int res; | |
737 | unsigned long handle; | |
738 | unsigned long lock; | |
739 | ||
740 | while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { | |
741 | if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') | |
742 | continue; | |
743 | token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args); | |
744 | ||
745 | switch (token) { | |
746 | case Opt_pcrinfo: | |
747 | opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; | |
748 | if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) | |
749 | return -EINVAL; | |
750 | hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, opt->pcrinfo_len); | |
751 | break; | |
752 | case Opt_keyhandle: | |
753 | res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); | |
754 | if (res < 0) | |
755 | return -EINVAL; | |
756 | opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; | |
757 | opt->keyhandle = handle; | |
758 | break; | |
759 | case Opt_keyauth: | |
760 | if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) | |
761 | return -EINVAL; | |
762 | hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
763 | break; | |
764 | case Opt_blobauth: | |
765 | if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) | |
766 | return -EINVAL; | |
767 | hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
768 | break; | |
769 | case Opt_migratable: | |
770 | if (*args[0].from == '0') | |
771 | pay->migratable = 0; | |
772 | else | |
773 | return -EINVAL; | |
774 | break; | |
775 | case Opt_pcrlock: | |
776 | res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); | |
777 | if (res < 0) | |
778 | return -EINVAL; | |
779 | opt->pcrlock = lock; | |
780 | break; | |
781 | default: | |
782 | return -EINVAL; | |
783 | } | |
784 | } | |
785 | return 0; | |
786 | } | |
787 | ||
788 | /* | |
789 | * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the | |
790 | * payload and options structures | |
791 | * | |
792 | * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. | |
793 | */ | |
794 | static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, | |
795 | struct trusted_key_options *o) | |
796 | { | |
797 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; | |
798 | long keylen; | |
799 | int ret = -EINVAL; | |
800 | int key_cmd; | |
801 | char *c; | |
802 | ||
803 | /* main command */ | |
804 | c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); | |
805 | if (!c) | |
806 | return -EINVAL; | |
807 | key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args); | |
808 | switch (key_cmd) { | |
809 | case Opt_new: | |
810 | /* first argument is key size */ | |
811 | c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); | |
812 | if (!c) | |
813 | return -EINVAL; | |
814 | ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen); | |
815 | if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) | |
816 | return -EINVAL; | |
817 | p->key_len = keylen; | |
818 | ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); | |
819 | if (ret < 0) | |
820 | return ret; | |
821 | ret = Opt_new; | |
822 | break; | |
823 | case Opt_load: | |
824 | /* first argument is sealed blob */ | |
825 | c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); | |
826 | if (!c) | |
827 | return -EINVAL; | |
828 | p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2; | |
829 | if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) | |
830 | return -EINVAL; | |
831 | hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len); | |
832 | ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); | |
833 | if (ret < 0) | |
834 | return ret; | |
835 | ret = Opt_load; | |
836 | break; | |
837 | case Opt_update: | |
838 | /* all arguments are options */ | |
839 | ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); | |
840 | if (ret < 0) | |
841 | return ret; | |
842 | ret = Opt_update; | |
843 | break; | |
844 | case Opt_err: | |
845 | return -EINVAL; | |
846 | break; | |
847 | } | |
848 | return ret; | |
849 | } | |
850 | ||
851 | static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) | |
852 | { | |
853 | struct trusted_key_options *options; | |
854 | ||
855 | options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL); | |
856 | if (!options) | |
857 | return options; | |
858 | ||
859 | /* set any non-zero defaults */ | |
860 | options->keytype = SRK_keytype; | |
861 | options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; | |
862 | return options; | |
863 | } | |
864 | ||
865 | static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) | |
866 | { | |
867 | struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL; | |
868 | int ret; | |
869 | ||
870 | ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p); | |
871 | if (ret < 0) | |
872 | return p; | |
873 | p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL); | |
874 | ||
875 | /* migratable by default */ | |
876 | p->migratable = 1; | |
877 | return p; | |
878 | } | |
879 | ||
880 | /* | |
881 | * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key | |
882 | * | |
883 | * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a | |
884 | * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key, | |
885 | * adding it to the specified keyring. | |
886 | * | |
887 | * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. | |
888 | */ | |
889 | static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, | |
890 | const size_t datalen) | |
891 | { | |
892 | struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; | |
893 | struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; | |
894 | char *datablob; | |
895 | int ret = 0; | |
896 | int key_cmd; | |
897 | ||
898 | if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) | |
899 | return -EINVAL; | |
900 | ||
901 | datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | |
902 | if (!datablob) | |
903 | return -ENOMEM; | |
904 | memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); | |
905 | datablob[datalen] = '\0'; | |
906 | ||
907 | options = trusted_options_alloc(); | |
908 | if (!options) { | |
909 | ret = -ENOMEM; | |
910 | goto out; | |
911 | } | |
912 | payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key); | |
913 | if (!payload) { | |
914 | ret = -ENOMEM; | |
915 | goto out; | |
916 | } | |
917 | ||
918 | key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options); | |
919 | if (key_cmd < 0) { | |
920 | ret = key_cmd; | |
921 | goto out; | |
922 | } | |
923 | ||
924 | dump_payload(payload); | |
925 | dump_options(options); | |
926 | ||
927 | switch (key_cmd) { | |
928 | case Opt_load: | |
929 | ret = key_unseal(payload, options); | |
930 | dump_payload(payload); | |
931 | dump_options(options); | |
932 | if (ret < 0) | |
933 | pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
934 | break; | |
935 | case Opt_new: | |
936 | ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len); | |
937 | if (ret < 0) { | |
938 | pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
939 | goto out; | |
940 | } | |
941 | ret = key_seal(payload, options); | |
942 | if (ret < 0) | |
943 | pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
944 | break; | |
945 | default: | |
946 | ret = -EINVAL; | |
947 | goto out; | |
948 | } | |
949 | if (!ret && options->pcrlock) | |
950 | ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); | |
951 | out: | |
952 | kfree(datablob); | |
953 | kfree(options); | |
954 | if (!ret) | |
955 | rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, payload); | |
956 | else | |
957 | kfree(payload); | |
958 | return ret; | |
959 | } | |
960 | ||
961 | static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) | |
962 | { | |
963 | struct trusted_key_payload *p; | |
964 | ||
965 | p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); | |
966 | memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); | |
967 | kfree(p); | |
968 | } | |
969 | ||
970 | /* | |
971 | * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values | |
972 | */ | |
973 | static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, | |
974 | const size_t datalen) | |
975 | { | |
976 | struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; | |
977 | struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; | |
978 | struct trusted_key_options *new_o; | |
979 | char *datablob; | |
980 | int ret = 0; | |
981 | ||
982 | if (!p->migratable) | |
983 | return -EPERM; | |
984 | if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) | |
985 | return -EINVAL; | |
986 | ||
987 | datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | |
988 | if (!datablob) | |
989 | return -ENOMEM; | |
990 | new_o = trusted_options_alloc(); | |
991 | if (!new_o) { | |
992 | ret = -ENOMEM; | |
993 | goto out; | |
994 | } | |
995 | new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key); | |
996 | if (!new_p) { | |
997 | ret = -ENOMEM; | |
998 | goto out; | |
999 | } | |
1000 | ||
1001 | memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); | |
1002 | datablob[datalen] = '\0'; | |
1003 | ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); | |
1004 | if (ret != Opt_update) { | |
1005 | ret = -EINVAL; | |
1006 | goto out; | |
1007 | } | |
1008 | /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ | |
1009 | new_p->migratable = p->migratable; | |
1010 | new_p->key_len = p->key_len; | |
1011 | memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len); | |
1012 | dump_payload(p); | |
1013 | dump_payload(new_p); | |
1014 | ||
1015 | ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o); | |
1016 | if (ret < 0) { | |
1017 | pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
1018 | kfree(new_p); | |
1019 | goto out; | |
1020 | } | |
1021 | if (new_o->pcrlock) { | |
1022 | ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock); | |
1023 | if (ret < 0) { | |
1024 | pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); | |
1025 | kfree(new_p); | |
1026 | goto out; | |
1027 | } | |
1028 | } | |
1029 | rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_p); | |
1030 | call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); | |
1031 | out: | |
1032 | kfree(datablob); | |
1033 | kfree(new_o); | |
1034 | return ret; | |
1035 | } | |
1036 | ||
1037 | /* | |
1038 | * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. | |
1039 | * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. | |
1040 | */ | |
1041 | static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, | |
1042 | size_t buflen) | |
1043 | { | |
1044 | struct trusted_key_payload *p; | |
1045 | char *ascii_buf; | |
1046 | char *bufp; | |
1047 | int i; | |
1048 | ||
1049 | p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data, | |
1050 | rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem)); | |
1051 | if (!p) | |
1052 | return -EINVAL; | |
1053 | if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) | |
1054 | return 2 * p->blob_len; | |
1055 | ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1056 | if (!ascii_buf) | |
1057 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1058 | ||
1059 | bufp = ascii_buf; | |
1060 | for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) | |
1061 | bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, p->blob[i]); | |
1062 | if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { | |
1063 | kfree(ascii_buf); | |
1064 | return -EFAULT; | |
1065 | } | |
1066 | kfree(ascii_buf); | |
1067 | return 2 * p->blob_len; | |
1068 | } | |
1069 | ||
1070 | /* | |
1071 | * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data | |
1072 | */ | |
1073 | static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) | |
1074 | { | |
1075 | struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; | |
1076 | ||
1077 | if (!p) | |
1078 | return; | |
1079 | memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); | |
1080 | kfree(key->payload.data); | |
1081 | } | |
1082 | ||
1083 | struct key_type key_type_trusted = { | |
1084 | .name = "trusted", | |
1085 | .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, | |
1086 | .update = trusted_update, | |
1087 | .match = user_match, | |
1088 | .destroy = trusted_destroy, | |
1089 | .describe = user_describe, | |
1090 | .read = trusted_read, | |
1091 | }; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); | |
1094 | ||
1095 | static void trusted_shash_release(void) | |
1096 | { | |
1097 | if (hashalg) | |
1098 | crypto_free_shash(hashalg); | |
1099 | if (hmacalg) | |
1100 | crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); | |
1101 | } | |
1102 | ||
1103 | static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) | |
1104 | { | |
1105 | int ret; | |
1106 | ||
1107 | hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); | |
1108 | if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { | |
1109 | pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", | |
1110 | hmac_alg); | |
1111 | return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); | |
1112 | } | |
1113 | ||
1114 | hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); | |
1115 | if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { | |
1116 | pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", | |
1117 | hash_alg); | |
1118 | ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); | |
1119 | goto hashalg_fail; | |
1120 | } | |
1121 | ||
1122 | return 0; | |
1123 | ||
1124 | hashalg_fail: | |
1125 | crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); | |
1126 | return ret; | |
1127 | } | |
1128 | ||
1129 | static int __init init_trusted(void) | |
1130 | { | |
1131 | int ret; | |
1132 | ||
1133 | ret = trusted_shash_alloc(); | |
1134 | if (ret < 0) | |
1135 | return ret; | |
1136 | ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); | |
1137 | if (ret < 0) | |
1138 | trusted_shash_release(); | |
1139 | return ret; | |
1140 | } | |
1141 | ||
1142 | static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) | |
1143 | { | |
1144 | trusted_shash_release(); | |
1145 | unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); | |
1146 | } | |
1147 | ||
1148 | late_initcall(init_trusted); | |
1149 | module_exit(cleanup_trusted); | |
1150 | ||
1151 | MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); |