Merge branch 'fix/acer-alc889-fix' into fix/hda
[linux-2.6-block.git] / security / integrity / evm / evm_main.c
CommitLineData
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1/*
2 * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
3 *
4 * Author:
5 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
6 * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
7 *
8 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
9 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
10 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
11 *
12 * File: evm_main.c
13 * implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
14 * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
15 */
16
17#include <linux/module.h>
18#include <linux/crypto.h>
19#include <linux/xattr.h>
20#include <linux/integrity.h>
3e1be52d 21#include <linux/evm.h>
d46eb369 22#include <crypto/hash.h>
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23#include "evm.h"
24
25int evm_initialized;
26
27char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
15647eb3 28char *evm_hash = "sha1";
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29
30char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
31#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
32 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
33#endif
34#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
35 XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
36#endif
37 XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
38 NULL
39};
40
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41static int evm_fixmode;
42static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
43{
44 if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
45 evm_fixmode = 1;
46 return 0;
47}
48__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
49
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50static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
51{
52 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
53 char **xattr;
54 int error;
55 int count = 0;
56
57 if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
58 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
59
60 for (xattr = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattr != NULL; xattr++) {
61 error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, *xattr, NULL, 0);
62 if (error < 0) {
63 if (error == -ENODATA)
64 continue;
65 return error;
66 }
67 count++;
68 }
69
70 return count;
71}
72
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73/*
74 * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
75 *
76 * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes
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77 * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr.
78 *
79 * For performance:
80 * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
81 * HMAC.)
82 * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available.
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83 *
84 * Returns integrity status
85 */
86static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
87 const char *xattr_name,
88 char *xattr_value,
89 size_t xattr_value_len,
90 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
91{
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92 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
93 struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc;
566be59a 94 enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
15647eb3 95 int rc, xattr_len;
66dbc325 96
7102ebcd 97 if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
24e0198e 98 return iint->evm_status;
66dbc325 99
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100 /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
101
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102 /* first need to know the sig type */
103 rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
104 GFP_NOFS);
105 if (rc <= 0) {
106 if (rc == 0)
107 evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; /* empty */
108 else if (rc == -ENODATA) {
109 rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
110 if (rc > 0)
111 evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
112 else if (rc == 0)
113 evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
114 }
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115 goto out;
116 }
66dbc325 117
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118 xattr_len = rc - 1;
119
120 /* check value type */
121 switch (xattr_data->type) {
122 case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
123 rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
124 xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
125 if (rc)
126 break;
127 rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
128 sizeof(calc.digest));
129 if (rc)
130 rc = -EINVAL;
131 break;
132 case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
133 rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
134 xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
135 if (rc)
136 break;
137 rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
138 xattr_data->digest, xattr_len,
139 calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
140 if (!rc) {
141 /* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */
142 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
143 xattr_value_len);
144 }
145 break;
146 default:
147 rc = -EINVAL;
148 break;
149 }
150
151 if (rc)
152 evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ?
153 INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
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154out:
155 if (iint)
156 iint->evm_status = evm_status;
15647eb3 157 kfree(xattr_data);
7102ebcd 158 return evm_status;
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159}
160
161static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
162{
163 char **xattrname;
164 int namelen;
165 int found = 0;
166
167 namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
168 for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
169 if ((strlen(*xattrname) == namelen)
170 && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, *xattrname, namelen) == 0)) {
171 found = 1;
172 break;
173 }
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174 if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
175 *xattrname + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
176 strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
177 found = 1;
178 break;
179 }
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180 }
181 return found;
182}
183
184/**
185 * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr
186 * @dentry: object of the verify xattr
187 * @xattr_name: requested xattr
188 * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
189 * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
190 *
191 * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
192 * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
193 * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC.
194 *
195 * Returns the xattr integrity status.
196 *
197 * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
198 * is executed.
199 */
200enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
201 const char *xattr_name,
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202 void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
203 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
66dbc325 204{
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205 if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
206 return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
207
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208 if (!iint) {
209 iint = integrity_iint_find(dentry->d_inode);
210 if (!iint)
211 return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
212 }
213 return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
66dbc325 214 xattr_value_len, iint);
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215}
216EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
217
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218/*
219 * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity
220 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
221 *
222 * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are
223 * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode.
224 */
225static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
226{
227 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
228
229 if (!evm_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
230 return 0;
231 return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
232}
233
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234/*
235 * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
236 *
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237 * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the
238 * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid.
239 *
240 * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
241 * affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
242 * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
243 * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
244 * doesn't exist, to be updated.
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245 */
246static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
247 const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
248{
249 enum integrity_status evm_status;
250
251 if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
252 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
253 return -EPERM;
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254 } else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) {
255 if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
256 return 0;
257 evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
258 if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
566be59a 259 (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
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260 return 0;
261 return -EPERM;
262 }
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263 evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
264 return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
265}
266
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267/**
268 * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
269 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
270 * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
271 * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
272 * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
273 *
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274 * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
275 * the current value is valid.
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276 */
277int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
278 const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
279{
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280 return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
281 xattr_value_len);
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282}
283
284/**
285 * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
286 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
287 * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
288 *
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289 * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
290 * the current value is valid.
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291 */
292int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
293{
a924ce0b 294 return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
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295}
296
297/**
298 * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
299 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
300 * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
301 * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
302 * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
303 *
304 * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
305 *
306 * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
307 * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's
308 * i_mutex lock.
309 */
310void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
311 const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
312{
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313 if (!evm_initialized || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)
314 && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
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315 return;
316
317 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
318 return;
319}
320
321/**
322 * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
323 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
324 * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
325 *
326 * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
327 */
328void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
329{
330 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
331
332 if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
333 return;
334
335 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
336 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
337 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
338 return;
339}
340
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341/**
342 * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
343 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
344 */
345int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
346{
347 unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
348 enum integrity_status evm_status;
349
a924ce0b 350 if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
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351 return 0;
352 evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
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353 if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
354 (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
355 return 0;
356 return -EPERM;
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357}
358
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359/**
360 * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
361 * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
362 * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
363 *
364 * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID
365 * changes.
366 *
367 * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
368 * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
369 */
370void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
371{
372 if (!evm_initialized)
373 return;
374
375 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
376 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
377 return;
378}
379
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380/*
381 * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm
382 */
383int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
384 const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
385 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
386{
387 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data;
388 int rc;
389
390 if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
5a4730ba 391 return 0;
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392
393 xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
394 if (!xattr_data)
395 return -ENOMEM;
396
397 xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
398 rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
399 if (rc < 0)
400 goto out;
401
402 evm_xattr->value = xattr_data;
403 evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data);
404 evm_xattr->name = kstrdup(XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
405 return 0;
406out:
407 kfree(xattr_data);
408 return rc;
409}
410EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
411
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412static int __init init_evm(void)
413{
414 int error;
415
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416 error = evm_init_secfs();
417 if (error < 0) {
418 printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n");
419 goto err;
420 }
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421
422 return 0;
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423err:
424 return error;
425}
426
427static void __exit cleanup_evm(void)
428{
429 evm_cleanup_secfs();
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430 if (hmac_tfm)
431 crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm);
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432 if (hash_tfm)
433 crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
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434}
435
436/*
437 * evm_display_config - list the EVM protected security extended attributes
438 */
439static int __init evm_display_config(void)
440{
441 char **xattrname;
442
443 for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++)
444 printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname);
445 return 0;
446}
447
448pure_initcall(evm_display_config);
449late_initcall(init_evm);
450
451MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Extended Verification Module");
452MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");