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1da177e4 LT |
1 | /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o |
2 | * | |
3 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
4 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
5 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
6 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
7 | * | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
c59ede7b | 10 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
11 | #include <linux/module.h> |
12 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
13 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
14 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
15 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
16 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
17 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
18 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
19 | #include <linux/swap.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
20 | #include <linux/skbuff.h> |
21 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
22 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
b5376771 | 25 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
b460cbc5 | 26 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
1da177e4 | 27 | |
72c2d582 AM |
28 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES |
29 | /* | |
30 | * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem | |
31 | * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow this capability to | |
32 | * be available in the default configuration. | |
33 | */ | |
34 | # define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_FULL_SET | |
35 | #else /* ie. ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
36 | # define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET | |
37 | #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
38 | ||
39 | kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET; /* systemwide capability bound */ | |
40 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset); | |
41 | ||
42 | /* Global security state */ | |
43 | ||
44 | unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */ | |
45 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits); | |
46 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
47 | int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
48 | { | |
49 | NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective; | |
50 | return 0; | |
51 | } | |
52 | ||
c7bdb545 | 53 | int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) |
1da177e4 | 54 | { |
c7bdb545 | 55 | if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap)) |
1da177e4 LT |
56 | return -EPERM; |
57 | return 0; | |
58 | } | |
59 | ||
60 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); | |
61 | ||
62 | int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) | |
63 | { | |
64 | /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ | |
65 | if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap)) | |
66 | return 0; | |
67 | return -EPERM; | |
68 | } | |
69 | ||
70 | int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) | |
71 | { | |
72 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) | |
73 | return -EPERM; | |
74 | return 0; | |
75 | } | |
76 | ||
77 | int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) | |
78 | { | |
79 | /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ | |
d4eb82c7 CW |
80 | if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) && |
81 | !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) | |
1da177e4 LT |
82 | return -EPERM; |
83 | return 0; | |
84 | } | |
85 | ||
86 | int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
87 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
88 | { | |
89 | /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ | |
90 | *effective = cap_t (target->cap_effective); | |
91 | *inheritable = cap_t (target->cap_inheritable); | |
92 | *permitted = cap_t (target->cap_permitted); | |
93 | return 0; | |
94 | } | |
95 | ||
72c2d582 AM |
96 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES |
97 | ||
98 | static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target) | |
99 | { | |
100 | /* | |
101 | * No support for remote process capability manipulation with | |
102 | * filesystem capability support. | |
103 | */ | |
104 | return (target != current); | |
105 | } | |
106 | ||
107 | static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) | |
108 | { | |
109 | /* | |
110 | * return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited | |
111 | * to the old permitted set. | |
112 | */ | |
113 | return !cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP); | |
114 | } | |
115 | ||
116 | #else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
117 | ||
118 | static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; } | |
119 | static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; } | |
120 | ||
121 | #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
122 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
123 | int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
124 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
125 | { | |
72c2d582 AM |
126 | if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) { |
127 | return -EPERM; | |
128 | } | |
129 | if (cap_inh_is_capped() | |
130 | && !cap_issubset(*inheritable, | |
131 | cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable, | |
132 | current->cap_permitted))) { | |
133 | /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
134 | return -EPERM; |
135 | } | |
136 | ||
137 | /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ | |
138 | if (!cap_issubset (*permitted, | |
139 | cap_combine (target->cap_permitted, | |
140 | current->cap_permitted))) { | |
141 | return -EPERM; | |
142 | } | |
143 | ||
144 | /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */ | |
145 | if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) { | |
146 | return -EPERM; | |
147 | } | |
148 | ||
149 | return 0; | |
150 | } | |
151 | ||
152 | void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
153 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
154 | { | |
155 | target->cap_effective = *effective; | |
156 | target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; | |
157 | target->cap_permitted = *permitted; | |
158 | } | |
159 | ||
b5376771 SH |
160 | static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
161 | { | |
162 | cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable); | |
163 | cap_clear(bprm->cap_permitted); | |
164 | bprm->cap_effective = false; | |
165 | } | |
166 | ||
167 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES | |
168 | ||
169 | int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
170 | { | |
171 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
172 | int error; | |
173 | ||
174 | if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) | |
175 | return 0; | |
176 | ||
177 | error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); | |
178 | if (error <= 0) | |
179 | return 0; | |
180 | return 1; | |
181 | } | |
182 | ||
183 | int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
184 | { | |
185 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
186 | ||
187 | if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr) | |
188 | return 0; | |
189 | ||
190 | return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS); | |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
193 | static inline int cap_from_disk(__le32 *caps, struct linux_binprm *bprm, | |
194 | int size) | |
195 | { | |
196 | __u32 magic_etc; | |
197 | ||
198 | if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ) | |
199 | return -EINVAL; | |
200 | ||
201 | magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps[0]); | |
202 | ||
203 | switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) { | |
204 | case VFS_CAP_REVISION: | |
205 | if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) | |
206 | bprm->cap_effective = true; | |
207 | else | |
208 | bprm->cap_effective = false; | |
209 | bprm->cap_permitted = to_cap_t( le32_to_cpu(caps[1]) ); | |
210 | bprm->cap_inheritable = to_cap_t( le32_to_cpu(caps[2]) ); | |
211 | return 0; | |
212 | default: | |
213 | return -EINVAL; | |
214 | } | |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
217 | /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */ | |
218 | static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
219 | { | |
220 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
221 | int rc = 0; | |
222 | __le32 v1caps[XATTR_CAPS_SZ]; | |
223 | struct inode *inode; | |
224 | ||
225 | if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) { | |
226 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
227 | return 0; | |
228 | } | |
229 | ||
230 | dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); | |
231 | inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
232 | if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) | |
233 | goto out; | |
234 | ||
235 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &v1caps, | |
236 | XATTR_CAPS_SZ); | |
237 | if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { | |
238 | /* no data, that's ok */ | |
239 | rc = 0; | |
240 | goto out; | |
241 | } | |
242 | if (rc < 0) | |
243 | goto out; | |
244 | ||
245 | rc = cap_from_disk(v1caps, bprm, rc); | |
246 | if (rc) | |
247 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", | |
248 | __FUNCTION__, rc, bprm->filename); | |
249 | ||
250 | out: | |
251 | dput(dentry); | |
252 | if (rc) | |
253 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
254 | ||
255 | return rc; | |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
258 | #else | |
259 | int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
260 | { | |
261 | return 0; | |
262 | } | |
263 | ||
264 | int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
265 | { | |
266 | return 0; | |
267 | } | |
268 | ||
269 | static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
270 | { | |
271 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
272 | return 0; | |
273 | } | |
274 | #endif | |
275 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
276 | int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
277 | { | |
b5376771 | 278 | int ret; |
1da177e4 | 279 | |
b5376771 SH |
280 | ret = get_file_caps(bprm); |
281 | if (ret) | |
282 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_file_caps returned %d for %s\n", | |
283 | __FUNCTION__, ret, bprm->filename); | |
1da177e4 LT |
284 | |
285 | /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root | |
286 | * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three | |
287 | * capability sets for the file. | |
288 | * | |
289 | * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable | |
290 | * and permitted sets of the executable file. | |
291 | */ | |
292 | ||
293 | if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) { | |
294 | if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) { | |
295 | cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable); | |
296 | cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted); | |
297 | } | |
298 | if (bprm->e_uid == 0) | |
b5376771 | 299 | bprm->cap_effective = true; |
1da177e4 | 300 | } |
b5376771 SH |
301 | |
302 | return ret; | |
1da177e4 LT |
303 | } |
304 | ||
305 | void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) | |
306 | { | |
307 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ | |
308 | kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working; | |
309 | ||
310 | new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset); | |
311 | working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable, | |
312 | current->cap_inheritable); | |
313 | new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working); | |
314 | ||
315 | if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid || | |
316 | !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { | |
6c5d5238 | 317 | set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); |
b5376771 | 318 | current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
319 | |
320 | if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { | |
321 | if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { | |
322 | bprm->e_uid = current->uid; | |
323 | bprm->e_gid = current->gid; | |
324 | } | |
325 | if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) { | |
326 | new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted, | |
327 | current->cap_permitted); | |
328 | } | |
329 | } | |
330 | } | |
331 | ||
332 | current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; | |
333 | current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; | |
334 | ||
335 | /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set | |
336 | * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual | |
337 | * capability rules */ | |
b460cbc5 | 338 | if (!is_global_init(current)) { |
1da177e4 | 339 | current->cap_permitted = new_permitted; |
b5376771 SH |
340 | current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_effective ? |
341 | new_permitted : 0; | |
1da177e4 LT |
342 | } |
343 | ||
344 | /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */ | |
345 | ||
346 | current->keep_capabilities = 0; | |
347 | } | |
348 | ||
349 | int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
350 | { | |
b5376771 SH |
351 | if (current->uid != 0) { |
352 | if (bprm->cap_effective) | |
353 | return 1; | |
354 | if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_permitted)) | |
355 | return 1; | |
356 | if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_inheritable)) | |
357 | return 1; | |
358 | } | |
359 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
360 | return (current->euid != current->uid || |
361 | current->egid != current->gid); | |
362 | } | |
363 | ||
364 | int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, | |
365 | size_t size, int flags) | |
366 | { | |
b5376771 SH |
367 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
368 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
369 | return -EPERM; | |
370 | return 0; | |
371 | } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
1da177e4 LT |
372 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
373 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
374 | return -EPERM; | |
375 | return 0; | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
378 | int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
379 | { | |
b5376771 SH |
380 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
381 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
382 | return -EPERM; | |
383 | return 0; | |
384 | } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
1da177e4 LT |
385 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
386 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
387 | return -EPERM; | |
388 | return 0; | |
389 | } | |
390 | ||
391 | /* moved from kernel/sys.c. */ | |
392 | /* | |
393 | * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of | |
394 | * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid. | |
395 | * | |
396 | * 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of | |
397 | * {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are | |
398 | * cleared. | |
399 | * | |
400 | * 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective | |
401 | * capabilities of the process are cleared. | |
402 | * | |
403 | * 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective | |
404 | * capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities. | |
405 | * | |
406 | * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should | |
407 | * never happen. | |
408 | * | |
409 | * -astor | |
410 | * | |
411 | * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99 | |
412 | * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it | |
413 | * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and | |
414 | * effective sets will be retained. | |
415 | * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some | |
416 | * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges! | |
417 | * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital | |
418 | * files.. | |
419 | * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this. | |
420 | */ | |
421 | static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid, | |
422 | int old_suid) | |
423 | { | |
424 | if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) && | |
425 | (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) && | |
426 | !current->keep_capabilities) { | |
427 | cap_clear (current->cap_permitted); | |
428 | cap_clear (current->cap_effective); | |
429 | } | |
430 | if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) { | |
431 | cap_clear (current->cap_effective); | |
432 | } | |
433 | if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) { | |
434 | current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted; | |
435 | } | |
436 | } | |
437 | ||
438 | int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, | |
439 | int flags) | |
440 | { | |
441 | switch (flags) { | |
442 | case LSM_SETID_RE: | |
443 | case LSM_SETID_ID: | |
444 | case LSM_SETID_RES: | |
445 | /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */ | |
446 | if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { | |
447 | cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid); | |
448 | } | |
449 | break; | |
450 | case LSM_SETID_FS: | |
451 | { | |
452 | uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid; | |
453 | ||
454 | /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */ | |
455 | ||
456 | /* | |
457 | * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities? | |
458 | * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here. | |
459 | */ | |
460 | ||
461 | if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { | |
462 | if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) { | |
463 | cap_t (current->cap_effective) &= | |
464 | ~CAP_FS_MASK; | |
465 | } | |
466 | if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) { | |
467 | cap_t (current->cap_effective) |= | |
468 | (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) & | |
469 | CAP_FS_MASK); | |
470 | } | |
471 | } | |
472 | break; | |
473 | } | |
474 | default: | |
475 | return -EINVAL; | |
476 | } | |
477 | ||
478 | return 0; | |
479 | } | |
480 | ||
b5376771 SH |
481 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES |
482 | /* | |
483 | * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and | |
484 | * task_setnice, assumes that | |
485 | * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed | |
486 | * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes, | |
487 | * then those actions should be allowed | |
488 | * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but | |
489 | * yet with increased caps. | |
490 | * So we check for increased caps on the target process. | |
491 | */ | |
492 | static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p) | |
493 | { | |
494 | if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) && | |
495 | !__capable(current, CAP_SYS_NICE)) | |
496 | return -EPERM; | |
497 | return 0; | |
498 | } | |
499 | ||
500 | int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, | |
501 | struct sched_param *lp) | |
502 | { | |
503 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
504 | } | |
505 | ||
506 | int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
507 | { | |
508 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
509 | } | |
510 | ||
511 | int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
512 | { | |
513 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
514 | } | |
515 | ||
516 | int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, | |
517 | int sig, u32 secid) | |
518 | { | |
519 | if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) | |
520 | return 0; | |
521 | ||
522 | if (secid) | |
523 | /* | |
524 | * Signal sent as a particular user. | |
525 | * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the | |
526 | * only thing we can do at the moment. | |
527 | * Used only by usb drivers? | |
528 | */ | |
529 | return 0; | |
530 | if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) | |
531 | return 0; | |
532 | if (capable(CAP_KILL)) | |
533 | return 0; | |
534 | ||
535 | return -EPERM; | |
536 | } | |
537 | #else | |
538 | int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, | |
539 | struct sched_param *lp) | |
540 | { | |
541 | return 0; | |
542 | } | |
543 | int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
544 | { | |
545 | return 0; | |
546 | } | |
547 | int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
548 | { | |
549 | return 0; | |
550 | } | |
551 | int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, | |
552 | int sig, u32 secid) | |
553 | { | |
554 | return 0; | |
555 | } | |
556 | #endif | |
557 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
558 | void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p) |
559 | { | |
560 | p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET; | |
561 | p->cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET; | |
562 | p->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; | |
563 | p->keep_capabilities = 0; | |
564 | return; | |
565 | } | |
566 | ||
567 | int cap_syslog (int type) | |
568 | { | |
569 | if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
570 | return -EPERM; | |
571 | return 0; | |
572 | } | |
573 | ||
34b4e4aa | 574 | int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) |
1da177e4 LT |
575 | { |
576 | int cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
577 | ||
578 | if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) | |
579 | cap_sys_admin = 1; | |
34b4e4aa | 580 | return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); |
1da177e4 LT |
581 | } |
582 |