Document the order of arguments for cap_issubset. It's not instantly clear
[linux-2.6-block.git] / security / commoncap.c
CommitLineData
e338d263 1/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
1da177e4
LT
2 *
3 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
4 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
5 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
6 * (at your option) any later version.
7 *
8 */
9
c59ede7b 10#include <linux/capability.h>
1da177e4
LT
11#include <linux/module.h>
12#include <linux/init.h>
13#include <linux/kernel.h>
14#include <linux/security.h>
15#include <linux/file.h>
16#include <linux/mm.h>
17#include <linux/mman.h>
18#include <linux/pagemap.h>
19#include <linux/swap.h>
1da177e4
LT
20#include <linux/skbuff.h>
21#include <linux/netlink.h>
22#include <linux/ptrace.h>
23#include <linux/xattr.h>
24#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
b5376771 25#include <linux/mount.h>
b460cbc5 26#include <linux/sched.h>
3898b1b4
AM
27#include <linux/prctl.h>
28#include <linux/securebits.h>
72c2d582 29
1da177e4
LT
30int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
31{
32 NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
33 return 0;
34}
35
c7bdb545 36int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
1da177e4 37{
c7bdb545 38 if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
1da177e4
LT
39 return -EPERM;
40 return 0;
41}
42
43EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
44
a6dbb1ef
AM
45/*
46 * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
47 * function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable()
48 * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable()
49 * returns 1 for this case.
50 */
1da177e4
LT
51int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
52{
53 /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
54 if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
55 return 0;
56 return -EPERM;
57}
58
59int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
60{
61 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
62 return -EPERM;
63 return 0;
64}
65
5cd9c58f 66int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
1da177e4
LT
67{
68 /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
5cd9c58f
DH
69 if (cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
70 return 0;
71 if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
72 return 0;
73 return -EPERM;
74}
75
76int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
77{
78 /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
79 if (cap_issubset(current->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted))
80 return 0;
81 if (has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
82 return 0;
83 return -EPERM;
1da177e4
LT
84}
85
86int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
87 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
88{
89 /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
e338d263
AM
90 *effective = target->cap_effective;
91 *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
92 *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
1da177e4
LT
93 return 0;
94}
95
72c2d582
AM
96#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
97
98static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target)
99{
100 /*
101 * No support for remote process capability manipulation with
102 * filesystem capability support.
103 */
104 return (target != current);
105}
106
107static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
108{
109 /*
a6dbb1ef
AM
110 * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
111 * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
112 * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
72c2d582 113 */
a6dbb1ef 114 return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
72c2d582
AM
115}
116
1209726c
AM
117static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
118
72c2d582
AM
119#else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
120
121static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; }
122static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }
1209726c
AM
123static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
124{
125 return !capable(CAP_SETPCAP);
126}
72c2d582
AM
127
128#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
129
1da177e4
LT
130int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
131 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
132{
72c2d582
AM
133 if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) {
134 return -EPERM;
135 }
136 if (cap_inh_is_capped()
137 && !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
138 cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
139 current->cap_permitted))) {
140 /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
1da177e4
LT
141 return -EPERM;
142 }
3b7391de
SH
143 if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
144 cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
145 current->cap_bset))) {
146 /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
147 return -EPERM;
148 }
1da177e4
LT
149
150 /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
151 if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
152 cap_combine (target->cap_permitted,
153 current->cap_permitted))) {
154 return -EPERM;
155 }
156
157 /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
158 if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
159 return -EPERM;
160 }
161
162 return 0;
163}
164
165void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
166 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
167{
168 target->cap_effective = *effective;
169 target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
170 target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
171}
172
b5376771
SH
173static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
174{
5459c164 175 cap_clear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted);
b5376771
SH
176 bprm->cap_effective = false;
177}
178
179#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
180
181int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
182{
183 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
184 int error;
185
186 if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
187 return 0;
188
189 error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
190 if (error <= 0)
191 return 0;
192 return 1;
193}
194
195int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
196{
197 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
198
199 if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
200 return 0;
201
202 return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
203}
204
e338d263
AM
205static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
206 struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size)
b5376771
SH
207{
208 __u32 magic_etc;
e338d263 209 unsigned tocopy, i;
5459c164 210 int ret;
b5376771 211
e338d263 212 if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
b5376771
SH
213 return -EINVAL;
214
e338d263 215 magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
b5376771
SH
216
217 switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
e338d263
AM
218 case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
219 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
220 return -EINVAL;
221 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
222 break;
223 case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
224 if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
225 return -EINVAL;
226 tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
227 break;
b5376771
SH
228 default:
229 return -EINVAL;
230 }
e338d263
AM
231
232 if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) {
233 bprm->cap_effective = true;
234 } else {
235 bprm->cap_effective = false;
236 }
237
5459c164
AM
238 ret = 0;
239
240 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
241 __u32 value_cpu;
242
243 if (i >= tocopy) {
244 /*
245 * Legacy capability sets have no upper bits
246 */
247 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] = 0;
248 continue;
249 }
250 /*
251 * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
252 */
253 value_cpu = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
254 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] =
255 (current->cap_bset.cap[i] & value_cpu) |
256 (current->cap_inheritable.cap[i] &
257 le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable));
258 if (value_cpu & ~bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i]) {
259 /*
260 * insufficient to execute correctly
261 */
262 ret = -EPERM;
263 }
e338d263
AM
264 }
265
5459c164
AM
266 /*
267 * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
268 * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
269 * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
270 */
271 return bprm->cap_effective ? ret : 0;
b5376771
SH
272}
273
274/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
275static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
276{
277 struct dentry *dentry;
278 int rc = 0;
e338d263 279 struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
b5376771
SH
280 struct inode *inode;
281
3318a386
SH
282 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
283
1f29fae2
SH
284 if (!file_caps_enabled)
285 return 0;
286
3318a386 287 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
b5376771 288 return 0;
b5376771
SH
289
290 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
291 inode = dentry->d_inode;
292 if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
293 goto out;
294
e338d263
AM
295 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps,
296 XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
b5376771
SH
297 if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
298 /* no data, that's ok */
299 rc = 0;
300 goto out;
301 }
302 if (rc < 0)
303 goto out;
304
e338d263 305 rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
5459c164 306 if (rc == -EINVAL)
b5376771 307 printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
5459c164 308 __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
b5376771
SH
309
310out:
311 dput(dentry);
312 if (rc)
313 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
314
315 return rc;
316}
317
318#else
319int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
320{
321 return 0;
322}
323
324int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
325{
326 return 0;
327}
328
329static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
330{
331 bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
332 return 0;
333}
334#endif
335
1da177e4
LT
336int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
337{
b5376771 338 int ret;
1da177e4 339
b5376771 340 ret = get_file_caps(bprm);
1da177e4 341
5459c164
AM
342 if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
343 /*
344 * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
345 * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
346 * capability sets for the file.
347 *
348 * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective
349 * bit.
350 */
1da177e4 351 if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
5459c164
AM
352 /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
353 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_combine(
354 current->cap_bset, current->cap_inheritable
355 );
356 bprm->cap_effective = (bprm->e_uid == 0);
357 ret = 0;
1da177e4 358 }
1da177e4 359 }
b5376771
SH
360
361 return ret;
1da177e4
LT
362}
363
364void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
365{
1da177e4 366 if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
5459c164
AM
367 !cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
368 current->cap_permitted)) {
6c5d5238 369 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
b5376771 370 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
1da177e4
LT
371
372 if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
373 if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
374 bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
375 bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
376 }
1209726c 377 if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) {
5459c164
AM
378 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_intersect(
379 bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
380 current->cap_permitted);
1da177e4
LT
381 }
382 }
383 }
384
385 current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
386 current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
387
388 /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
389 * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
390 * capability rules */
b460cbc5 391 if (!is_global_init(current)) {
5459c164 392 current->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
e338d263 393 if (bprm->cap_effective)
5459c164 394 current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
e338d263
AM
395 else
396 cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
1da177e4
LT
397 }
398
399 /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
400
3898b1b4 401 current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
1da177e4
LT
402}
403
404int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
405{
b5376771
SH
406 if (current->uid != 0) {
407 if (bprm->cap_effective)
408 return 1;
5459c164 409 if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted))
b5376771
SH
410 return 1;
411 }
412
1da177e4
LT
413 return (current->euid != current->uid ||
414 current->egid != current->gid);
415}
416
8f0cfa52
DH
417int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
418 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1da177e4 419{
b5376771
SH
420 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
421 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
422 return -EPERM;
423 return 0;
424 } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
1da177e4
LT
425 sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
426 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
427 return -EPERM;
428 return 0;
429}
430
8f0cfa52 431int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1da177e4 432{
b5376771
SH
433 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
434 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
435 return -EPERM;
436 return 0;
437 } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
1da177e4
LT
438 sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
439 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
440 return -EPERM;
441 return 0;
442}
443
444/* moved from kernel/sys.c. */
445/*
446 * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
447 * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
448 *
449 * 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
450 * {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
451 * cleared.
452 *
453 * 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
454 * capabilities of the process are cleared.
455 *
456 * 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
457 * capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
458 *
459 * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
460 * never happen.
461 *
462 * -astor
463 *
464 * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
465 * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
466 * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
467 * effective sets will be retained.
468 * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
469 * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
470 * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
471 * files..
472 * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
473 */
474static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
475 int old_suid)
476{
477 if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
478 (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
3898b1b4 479 !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
1da177e4
LT
480 cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
481 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
482 }
483 if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
484 cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
485 }
486 if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
487 current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
488 }
489}
490
491int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
492 int flags)
493{
494 switch (flags) {
495 case LSM_SETID_RE:
496 case LSM_SETID_ID:
497 case LSM_SETID_RES:
498 /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
499 if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
500 cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
501 }
502 break;
503 case LSM_SETID_FS:
504 {
505 uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid;
506
507 /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
508
509 /*
510 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
511 * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
512 */
513
514 if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
515 if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
e338d263
AM
516 current->cap_effective =
517 cap_drop_fs_set(
518 current->cap_effective);
1da177e4
LT
519 }
520 if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
e338d263
AM
521 current->cap_effective =
522 cap_raise_fs_set(
523 current->cap_effective,
524 current->cap_permitted);
1da177e4
LT
525 }
526 }
527 break;
528 }
529 default:
530 return -EINVAL;
531 }
532
533 return 0;
534}
535
b5376771
SH
536#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
537/*
538 * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
539 * task_setnice, assumes that
540 * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
541 * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
542 * then those actions should be allowed
543 * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
544 * yet with increased caps.
545 * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
546 */
de45e806 547static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
b5376771
SH
548{
549 if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
5cd9c58f 550 !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
b5376771
SH
551 return -EPERM;
552 return 0;
553}
554
555int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
556 struct sched_param *lp)
557{
558 return cap_safe_nice(p);
559}
560
561int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
562{
563 return cap_safe_nice(p);
564}
565
566int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
567{
568 return cap_safe_nice(p);
569}
570
3b7391de
SH
571/*
572 * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
573 * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
574 * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
575 * this task could get inconsistent info. There can be no
576 * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
577 */
3898b1b4 578static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
3b7391de
SH
579{
580 if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
581 return -EPERM;
582 if (!cap_valid(cap))
583 return -EINVAL;
584 cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
585 return 0;
586}
3898b1b4 587
b5376771
SH
588#else
589int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
590 struct sched_param *lp)
591{
592 return 0;
593}
594int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
595{
596 return 0;
597}
598int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
599{
600 return 0;
601}
b5376771
SH
602#endif
603
3898b1b4
AM
604int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
605 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
606{
607 long error = 0;
608
609 switch (option) {
610 case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
611 if (!cap_valid(arg2))
612 error = -EINVAL;
613 else
614 error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
615 break;
616#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
617 case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
618 error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
619 break;
620
621 /*
622 * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
623 * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
624 * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
625 * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
626 *
627 * Note:
628 *
629 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
630 * issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
631 * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
632 * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
633 * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
634 * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
635 *
636 * will ensure that the current process and all of its
637 * children will be locked into a pure
638 * capability-based-privilege environment.
639 */
640 case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
641 if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
642 & (current->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
643 || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
644 & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
645 || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
646 || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) { /*[4]*/
647 /*
648 * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
649 * [2] no unlocking of locks
650 * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
651 * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
652 * the "sendmail capabilities bug")
653 */
654 error = -EPERM; /* cannot change a locked bit */
655 } else {
656 current->securebits = arg2;
657 }
658 break;
659 case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
660 error = current->securebits;
661 break;
662
663#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
664
665 case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
666 if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
667 error = 1;
668 break;
669 case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
670 if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
671 error = -EINVAL;
672 else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
673 error = -EPERM;
674 else if (arg2)
675 current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
676 else
677 current->securebits &=
678 ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
679 break;
680
681 default:
682 /* No functionality available - continue with default */
683 return 0;
684 }
685
686 /* Functionality provided */
687 *rc_p = error;
688 return 1;
689}
690
1da177e4
LT
691void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
692{
e338d263
AM
693 cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
694 cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
695 cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
3898b1b4 696 p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
1da177e4
LT
697 return;
698}
699
700int cap_syslog (int type)
701{
702 if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
703 return -EPERM;
704 return 0;
705}
706
34b4e4aa 707int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1da177e4
LT
708{
709 int cap_sys_admin = 0;
710
711 if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
712 cap_sys_admin = 1;
34b4e4aa 713 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1da177e4
LT
714}
715