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1da177e4 LT |
1 | # |
2 | # Security configuration | |
3 | # | |
4 | ||
5 | menu "Security options" | |
6 | ||
f0894940 | 7 | source security/keys/Kconfig |
1da177e4 | 8 | |
eaf06b24 DR |
9 | config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT |
10 | bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" | |
11 | default n | |
12 | help | |
13 | This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel | |
14 | syslog via dmesg(8). | |
15 | ||
16 | If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced | |
17 | unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). | |
18 | ||
19 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
20 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
21 | config SECURITY |
22 | bool "Enable different security models" | |
2c40579b | 23 | depends on SYSFS |
2813893f | 24 | depends on MULTIUSER |
1da177e4 LT |
25 | help |
26 | This allows you to choose different security modules to be | |
27 | configured into your kernel. | |
28 | ||
29 | If this option is not selected, the default Linux security | |
30 | model will be used. | |
31 | ||
32 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
33 | ||
da31894e EP |
34 | config SECURITYFS |
35 | bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" | |
36 | help | |
37 | This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by | |
3323eec9 MZ |
38 | the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is |
39 | not used by SELinux or SMACK. | |
da31894e EP |
40 | |
41 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
42 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
43 | config SECURITY_NETWORK |
44 | bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" | |
45 | depends on SECURITY | |
46 | help | |
47 | This enables the socket and networking security hooks. | |
48 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
49 | implement socket and networking access controls. | |
50 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
df71837d TJ |
51 | |
52 | config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM | |
53 | bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" | |
54 | depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK | |
55 | help | |
56 | This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. | |
57 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
58 | implement per-packet access controls based on labels | |
59 | derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are | |
60 | designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized | |
61 | to communicate unlabelled data can send without using | |
62 | IPSec. | |
63 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
1da177e4 | 64 | |
be6d3e56 KT |
65 | config SECURITY_PATH |
66 | bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" | |
67 | depends on SECURITY | |
68 | help | |
69 | This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. | |
70 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
71 | implement pathname based access controls. | |
72 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
73 | ||
31625340 JC |
74 | config INTEL_TXT |
75 | bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" | |
69575d38 | 76 | depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT |
31625340 JC |
77 | help |
78 | This option enables support for booting the kernel with the | |
79 | Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize | |
80 | Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch | |
81 | of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this | |
82 | will have no effect. | |
83 | ||
3c556e41 | 84 | Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and |
31625340 JC |
85 | initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to |
86 | create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which | |
87 | helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning | |
88 | correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside | |
89 | of the kernel itself. | |
90 | ||
91 | Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having | |
92 | confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that | |
3c556e41 | 93 | it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for |
31625340 JC |
94 | providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. |
95 | ||
96 | See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information | |
97 | about Intel(R) TXT. | |
98 | See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. | |
99 | See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable | |
100 | Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. | |
101 | ||
102 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. | |
103 | ||
788084ab | 104 | config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR |
024e6cb4 | 105 | int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" |
788084ab | 106 | depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX |
530b099d | 107 | default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) |
a58578e4 | 108 | default 65536 |
788084ab EP |
109 | help |
110 | This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected | |
111 | from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages | |
112 | can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. | |
113 | ||
114 | For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space | |
115 | a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. | |
116 | On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. | |
117 | Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map | |
118 | this low address space will need the permission specific to the | |
119 | systems running LSM. | |
120 | ||
f5509cc1 KC |
121 | config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR |
122 | bool | |
123 | help | |
124 | The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for | |
125 | validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in | |
126 | support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. | |
127 | ||
f5509cc1 KC |
128 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY |
129 | bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" | |
6040e576 | 130 | depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR |
f5509cc1 KC |
131 | select BUG |
132 | help | |
133 | This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when | |
134 | copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and | |
135 | copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that | |
136 | are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple | |
137 | separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack, | |
138 | or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes | |
139 | of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. | |
140 | ||
8e1f74ea KC |
141 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN |
142 | bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages" | |
143 | depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
80a77045 | 144 | depends on EXPERT |
8e1f74ea KC |
145 | help |
146 | When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP, | |
147 | hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are, | |
148 | however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all | |
149 | been removed. This config is intended to be used only while | |
150 | trying to find such users. | |
151 | ||
64e90a8a GKH |
152 | config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER |
153 | bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary" | |
154 | help | |
155 | By default, the kernel can call many different userspace | |
156 | binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel | |
157 | interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined | |
158 | either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration | |
159 | option. However, some of these are dynamically created at | |
160 | runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up. | |
161 | To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these | |
162 | calls through a single executable that can not have its name | |
163 | changed. | |
164 | ||
165 | Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant | |
166 | "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument | |
167 | passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick | |
168 | and choose what real programs are called. | |
169 | ||
170 | If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be | |
171 | disabled, choose this option and then set | |
172 | STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string. | |
173 | ||
174 | config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH | |
175 | string "Path to the static usermode helper binary" | |
176 | depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER | |
177 | default "/sbin/usermode-helper" | |
178 | help | |
179 | The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper | |
180 | program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will | |
181 | be in the first argument passed to this program on the command | |
182 | line. | |
183 | ||
184 | If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled, | |
185 | specify an empty string here (i.e. ""). | |
186 | ||
1da177e4 | 187 | source security/selinux/Kconfig |
e114e473 | 188 | source security/smack/Kconfig |
00d7d6f8 | 189 | source security/tomoyo/Kconfig |
f9ad1af5 | 190 | source security/apparmor/Kconfig |
9b091556 | 191 | source security/loadpin/Kconfig |
2d514487 | 192 | source security/yama/Kconfig |
1da177e4 | 193 | |
f381c272 | 194 | source security/integrity/Kconfig |
3323eec9 | 195 | |
6e65f92f JJ |
196 | choice |
197 | prompt "Default security module" | |
198 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX | |
199 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK | |
200 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
f9ad1af5 | 201 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR |
6e65f92f JJ |
202 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
203 | ||
204 | help | |
205 | Select the security module that will be used by default if the | |
206 | kernel parameter security= is not specified. | |
207 | ||
208 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX | |
209 | bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y | |
210 | ||
211 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
212 | bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y | |
213 | ||
214 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
215 | bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y | |
216 | ||
f9ad1af5 JJ |
217 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
218 | bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y | |
219 | ||
6e65f92f JJ |
220 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
221 | bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" | |
222 | ||
223 | endchoice | |
224 | ||
225 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY | |
226 | string | |
227 | default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX | |
228 | default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
229 | default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
f9ad1af5 | 230 | default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
6e65f92f JJ |
231 | default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
232 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
233 | endmenu |
234 |