Commit | Line | Data |
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eb492e01 AB |
1 | /* |
2 | BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux | |
3 | Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies). | |
4 | ||
5 | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
6 | it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as | |
7 | published by the Free Software Foundation; | |
8 | ||
9 | THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS | |
10 | OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, | |
11 | FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. | |
12 | IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY | |
13 | CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES | |
14 | WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN | |
15 | ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF | |
16 | OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. | |
17 | ||
18 | ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS, | |
19 | COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS | |
20 | SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED. | |
21 | */ | |
22 | ||
300acfde | 23 | #include <linux/debugfs.h> |
8c520a59 | 24 | #include <linux/scatterlist.h> |
a4770e11 | 25 | #include <linux/crypto.h> |
28a220aa | 26 | #include <crypto/aes.h> |
329d8230 | 27 | #include <crypto/algapi.h> |
8c520a59 | 28 | #include <crypto/b128ops.h> |
71af2f6b | 29 | #include <crypto/hash.h> |
47eb2ac8 | 30 | #include <crypto/kpp.h> |
8c520a59 | 31 | |
eb492e01 AB |
32 | #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h> |
33 | #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h> | |
34 | #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h> | |
2b64d153 | 35 | #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h> |
ac4b7236 | 36 | |
58771c1c | 37 | #include "ecdh_helper.h" |
ac4b7236 | 38 | #include "smp.h" |
d22ef0bc | 39 | |
2fd36558 JH |
40 | #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \ |
41 | ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data) | |
42 | ||
c7a3d57d JH |
43 | /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want |
44 | * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys | |
45 | * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions. | |
46 | */ | |
47 | #ifdef DEBUG | |
48 | #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \ | |
49 | ##__VA_ARGS__) | |
50 | #else | |
51 | #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \ | |
52 | ##__VA_ARGS__) | |
53 | #endif | |
54 | ||
b28b4943 | 55 | #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd) |
b28b4943 | 56 | |
3b19146d JH |
57 | /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */ |
58 | #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY); | |
59 | ||
17b02e62 | 60 | #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000) |
5d3de7df | 61 | |
d7a5a11d | 62 | #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \ |
a62da6f1 | 63 | 0x3f : 0x07) |
0edb14de | 64 | #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07 |
065a13e2 | 65 | |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
66 | /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */ |
67 | #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80 | |
68 | ||
533e35d4 JH |
69 | enum { |
70 | SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, | |
71 | SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, | |
72 | SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, | |
73 | SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, | |
74 | SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, | |
65668776 | 75 | SMP_FLAG_SC, |
d8f8edbe | 76 | SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, |
aeb7d461 | 77 | SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, |
38606f14 | 78 | SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, |
d3e54a87 | 79 | SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, |
1a8bab4f JH |
80 | SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, |
81 | SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, | |
a62da6f1 | 82 | SMP_FLAG_CT2, |
533e35d4 | 83 | }; |
4bc58f51 | 84 | |
88a479d9 | 85 | struct smp_dev { |
60a27d65 | 86 | /* Secure Connections OOB data */ |
94f14e47 | 87 | bool local_oob; |
60a27d65 | 88 | u8 local_pk[64]; |
fb334fee | 89 | u8 local_rand[16]; |
60a27d65 MH |
90 | bool debug_key; |
91 | ||
71af2f6b | 92 | struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; |
47eb2ac8 | 93 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
88a479d9 MH |
94 | }; |
95 | ||
4bc58f51 | 96 | struct smp_chan { |
b68fda68 JH |
97 | struct l2cap_conn *conn; |
98 | struct delayed_work security_timer; | |
b28b4943 | 99 | unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */ |
b68fda68 | 100 | |
4bc58f51 JH |
101 | u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */ |
102 | u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */ | |
103 | u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */ | |
104 | u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */ | |
105 | u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */ | |
106 | u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */ | |
882fafad JH |
107 | u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */ |
108 | u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */ | |
4bc58f51 JH |
109 | u8 enc_key_size; |
110 | u8 remote_key_dist; | |
111 | bdaddr_t id_addr; | |
112 | u8 id_addr_type; | |
113 | u8 irk[16]; | |
114 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; | |
115 | struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk; | |
116 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; | |
117 | struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk; | |
118 | struct smp_irk *remote_irk; | |
6a77083a | 119 | u8 *link_key; |
4a74d658 | 120 | unsigned long flags; |
783e0574 | 121 | u8 method; |
38606f14 | 122 | u8 passkey_round; |
6a7bd103 | 123 | |
3b19146d JH |
124 | /* Secure Connections variables */ |
125 | u8 local_pk[64]; | |
d8f8edbe JH |
126 | u8 remote_pk[64]; |
127 | u8 dhkey[32]; | |
760b018b | 128 | u8 mackey[16]; |
3b19146d | 129 | |
71af2f6b | 130 | struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; |
47eb2ac8 | 131 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
4bc58f51 JH |
132 | }; |
133 | ||
aeb7d461 JH |
134 | /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core |
135 | * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the | |
136 | * private debug key. | |
137 | */ | |
138 | static const u8 debug_pk[64] = { | |
139 | 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, | |
140 | 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, | |
141 | 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, | |
142 | 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20, | |
143 | ||
144 | 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74, | |
145 | 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76, | |
146 | 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63, | |
147 | 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc, | |
148 | }; | |
149 | ||
150 | static const u8 debug_sk[32] = { | |
151 | 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58, | |
152 | 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a, | |
153 | 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74, | |
154 | 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f, | |
155 | }; | |
156 | ||
8a2936f4 | 157 | static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len) |
d22ef0bc | 158 | { |
8a2936f4 | 159 | size_t i; |
d22ef0bc | 160 | |
8a2936f4 JH |
161 | for (i = 0; i < len; i++) |
162 | dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i]; | |
d22ef0bc AB |
163 | } |
164 | ||
06edf8de JH |
165 | /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions |
166 | * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6. | |
167 | */ | |
168 | ||
71af2f6b | 169 | static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
170 | size_t len, u8 mac[16]) |
171 | { | |
172 | uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX]; | |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
173 | int err; |
174 | ||
175 | if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX) | |
176 | return -EFBIG; | |
177 | ||
178 | if (!tfm) { | |
179 | BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); | |
180 | return -EINVAL; | |
181 | } | |
182 | ||
cbbbe3e2 JH |
183 | /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */ |
184 | swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); | |
185 | swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len); | |
186 | ||
c7a3d57d JH |
187 | SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m); |
188 | SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k); | |
cbbbe3e2 | 189 | |
71af2f6b | 190 | err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
191 | if (err) { |
192 | BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); | |
193 | return err; | |
194 | } | |
195 | ||
ec0bf6ed | 196 | err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb); |
cbbbe3e2 | 197 | if (err) { |
71af2f6b | 198 | BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err); |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
199 | return err; |
200 | } | |
201 | ||
202 | swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16); | |
203 | ||
c7a3d57d | 204 | SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac); |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
205 | |
206 | return 0; | |
207 | } | |
208 | ||
71af2f6b HX |
209 | static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], |
210 | const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16]) | |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
211 | { |
212 | u8 m[65]; | |
213 | int err; | |
214 | ||
c7a3d57d JH |
215 | SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u); |
216 | SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v); | |
217 | SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z); | |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
218 | |
219 | m[0] = z; | |
220 | memcpy(m + 1, v, 32); | |
221 | memcpy(m + 33, u, 32); | |
222 | ||
223 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res); | |
224 | if (err) | |
225 | return err; | |
226 | ||
c7a3d57d | 227 | SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); |
cbbbe3e2 JH |
228 | |
229 | return err; | |
230 | } | |
231 | ||
71af2f6b | 232 | static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32], |
4da50de8 JH |
233 | const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7], |
234 | const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) | |
760b018b JH |
235 | { |
236 | /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in | |
237 | * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII | |
238 | * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a | |
239 | * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little | |
240 | * endian format. | |
241 | */ | |
242 | const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 }; | |
243 | const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60, | |
244 | 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c }; | |
245 | const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 }; | |
246 | u8 m[53], t[16]; | |
247 | int err; | |
248 | ||
c7a3d57d JH |
249 | SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w); |
250 | SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); | |
251 | SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2); | |
760b018b JH |
252 | |
253 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t); | |
254 | if (err) | |
255 | return err; | |
256 | ||
c7a3d57d | 257 | SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t); |
760b018b JH |
258 | |
259 | memcpy(m, length, 2); | |
260 | memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7); | |
261 | memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7); | |
262 | memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16); | |
263 | memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16); | |
264 | memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4); | |
265 | ||
266 | m[52] = 0; /* Counter */ | |
267 | ||
268 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey); | |
269 | if (err) | |
270 | return err; | |
271 | ||
c7a3d57d | 272 | SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey); |
760b018b JH |
273 | |
274 | m[52] = 1; /* Counter */ | |
275 | ||
276 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk); | |
277 | if (err) | |
278 | return err; | |
279 | ||
c7a3d57d | 280 | SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk); |
760b018b JH |
281 | |
282 | return 0; | |
283 | } | |
284 | ||
71af2f6b | 285 | static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], |
4da50de8 | 286 | const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16], |
760b018b JH |
287 | const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7], |
288 | u8 res[16]) | |
289 | { | |
290 | u8 m[65]; | |
291 | int err; | |
292 | ||
c7a3d57d JH |
293 | SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w); |
294 | SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); | |
295 | SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2); | |
760b018b JH |
296 | |
297 | memcpy(m, a2, 7); | |
298 | memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7); | |
299 | memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3); | |
300 | memcpy(m + 17, r, 16); | |
301 | memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16); | |
302 | memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16); | |
303 | ||
304 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res); | |
305 | if (err) | |
306 | return err; | |
307 | ||
203de21b | 308 | SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); |
760b018b JH |
309 | |
310 | return err; | |
311 | } | |
312 | ||
71af2f6b | 313 | static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32], |
191dc7fe JH |
314 | const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val) |
315 | { | |
316 | u8 m[80], tmp[16]; | |
317 | int err; | |
318 | ||
c7a3d57d JH |
319 | SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u); |
320 | SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v); | |
321 | SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y); | |
191dc7fe JH |
322 | |
323 | memcpy(m, y, 16); | |
324 | memcpy(m + 16, v, 32); | |
325 | memcpy(m + 48, u, 32); | |
326 | ||
327 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp); | |
328 | if (err) | |
329 | return err; | |
330 | ||
331 | *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp); | |
332 | *val %= 1000000; | |
333 | ||
c7a3d57d | 334 | SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val); |
191dc7fe JH |
335 | |
336 | return 0; | |
337 | } | |
338 | ||
71af2f6b | 339 | static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], |
06edf8de JH |
340 | const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16]) |
341 | { | |
342 | int err; | |
343 | ||
344 | SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id); | |
345 | ||
346 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res); | |
347 | if (err) | |
348 | return err; | |
349 | ||
350 | SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); | |
351 | ||
352 | return err; | |
353 | } | |
354 | ||
a62da6f1 JH |
355 | static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], |
356 | const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16]) | |
357 | { | |
358 | int err; | |
359 | ||
360 | SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt); | |
361 | ||
362 | err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res); | |
363 | if (err) | |
364 | return err; | |
365 | ||
366 | SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); | |
367 | ||
368 | return err; | |
369 | } | |
370 | ||
06edf8de JH |
371 | /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1, |
372 | * s1 and ah. | |
373 | */ | |
374 | ||
28a220aa | 375 | static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r) |
d22ef0bc | 376 | { |
28a220aa | 377 | struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx; |
943a732a | 378 | uint8_t tmp[16], data[16]; |
201a5929 | 379 | int err; |
d22ef0bc | 380 | |
011c391a JH |
381 | SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r); |
382 | ||
943a732a | 383 | /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */ |
8a2936f4 | 384 | swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); |
943a732a | 385 | |
28a220aa | 386 | err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, tmp, 16); |
d22ef0bc AB |
387 | if (err) { |
388 | BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); | |
389 | return err; | |
390 | } | |
391 | ||
943a732a | 392 | /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */ |
8a2936f4 | 393 | swap_buf(r, data, 16); |
943a732a | 394 | |
28a220aa | 395 | aes_encrypt(&ctx, data, data); |
d22ef0bc | 396 | |
943a732a | 397 | /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */ |
8a2936f4 | 398 | swap_buf(data, r, 16); |
943a732a | 399 | |
011c391a JH |
400 | SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r); |
401 | ||
28a220aa | 402 | memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof (ctx)); |
d22ef0bc AB |
403 | return err; |
404 | } | |
405 | ||
28a220aa | 406 | static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16], |
06edf8de JH |
407 | const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, |
408 | const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16]) | |
6a77083a | 409 | { |
06edf8de | 410 | u8 p1[16], p2[16]; |
6a77083a JH |
411 | int err; |
412 | ||
011c391a JH |
413 | SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r); |
414 | SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra); | |
415 | SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres); | |
416 | ||
06edf8de | 417 | memset(p1, 0, 16); |
6a77083a | 418 | |
06edf8de JH |
419 | /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */ |
420 | p1[0] = _iat; | |
421 | p1[1] = _rat; | |
422 | memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7); | |
423 | memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7); | |
424 | ||
011c391a | 425 | SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1); |
06edf8de JH |
426 | |
427 | /* res = r XOR p1 */ | |
428 | u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1); | |
429 | ||
430 | /* res = e(k, res) */ | |
28a220aa | 431 | err = smp_e(k, res); |
06edf8de JH |
432 | if (err) { |
433 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
6a77083a | 434 | return err; |
06edf8de | 435 | } |
6a77083a | 436 | |
011c391a JH |
437 | /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */ |
438 | memcpy(p2, ra, 6); | |
439 | memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6); | |
440 | memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4); | |
441 | ||
442 | SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2); | |
443 | ||
06edf8de JH |
444 | /* res = res XOR p2 */ |
445 | u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2); | |
446 | ||
447 | /* res = e(k, res) */ | |
28a220aa | 448 | err = smp_e(k, res); |
06edf8de JH |
449 | if (err) |
450 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
451 | ||
452 | return err; | |
453 | } | |
454 | ||
28a220aa | 455 | static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16], |
06edf8de JH |
456 | const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16]) |
457 | { | |
458 | int err; | |
459 | ||
460 | /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */ | |
461 | memcpy(_r, r2, 8); | |
462 | memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8); | |
463 | ||
28a220aa | 464 | err = smp_e(k, _r); |
06edf8de JH |
465 | if (err) |
466 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
6a77083a JH |
467 | |
468 | return err; | |
469 | } | |
470 | ||
28a220aa | 471 | static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3]) |
60478054 | 472 | { |
943a732a | 473 | u8 _res[16]; |
60478054 JH |
474 | int err; |
475 | ||
476 | /* r' = padding || r */ | |
943a732a JH |
477 | memcpy(_res, r, 3); |
478 | memset(_res + 3, 0, 13); | |
60478054 | 479 | |
28a220aa | 480 | err = smp_e(irk, _res); |
60478054 JH |
481 | if (err) { |
482 | BT_ERR("Encrypt error"); | |
483 | return err; | |
484 | } | |
485 | ||
486 | /* The output of the random address function ah is: | |
c5080d42 | 487 | * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24 |
60478054 JH |
488 | * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits |
489 | * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the | |
490 | * result of ah. | |
491 | */ | |
943a732a | 492 | memcpy(res, _res, 3); |
60478054 JH |
493 | |
494 | return 0; | |
495 | } | |
496 | ||
cd082797 JH |
497 | bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], |
498 | const bdaddr_t *bdaddr) | |
60478054 | 499 | { |
defce9e8 | 500 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
60478054 JH |
501 | u8 hash[3]; |
502 | int err; | |
503 | ||
defce9e8 JH |
504 | if (!chan || !chan->data) |
505 | return false; | |
506 | ||
56860245 | 507 | bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk); |
60478054 | 508 | |
28a220aa | 509 | err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash); |
60478054 JH |
510 | if (err) |
511 | return false; | |
512 | ||
329d8230 | 513 | return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3); |
60478054 JH |
514 | } |
515 | ||
cd082797 | 516 | int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) |
b1e2b3ae | 517 | { |
defce9e8 | 518 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
b1e2b3ae JH |
519 | int err; |
520 | ||
defce9e8 JH |
521 | if (!chan || !chan->data) |
522 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
523 | ||
b1e2b3ae JH |
524 | get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3); |
525 | ||
526 | rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */ | |
527 | rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */ | |
528 | ||
28a220aa | 529 | err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b); |
b1e2b3ae JH |
530 | if (err < 0) |
531 | return err; | |
532 | ||
56860245 | 533 | bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa); |
b1e2b3ae JH |
534 | |
535 | return 0; | |
536 | } | |
537 | ||
60a27d65 MH |
538 | int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16]) |
539 | { | |
540 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; | |
541 | struct smp_dev *smp; | |
542 | int err; | |
543 | ||
544 | if (!chan || !chan->data) | |
545 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
546 | ||
547 | smp = chan->data; | |
548 | ||
549 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { | |
56860245 | 550 | bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys"); |
c0153b0b TA |
551 | err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk); |
552 | if (err) | |
553 | return err; | |
60a27d65 | 554 | memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64); |
60a27d65 MH |
555 | smp->debug_key = true; |
556 | } else { | |
557 | while (true) { | |
c0153b0b TA |
558 | /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */ |
559 | err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk); | |
a2976416 TA |
560 | if (err) |
561 | return err; | |
60a27d65 MH |
562 | |
563 | /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that | |
564 | * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key. | |
565 | */ | |
c0153b0b | 566 | if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64)) |
60a27d65 MH |
567 | break; |
568 | } | |
569 | smp->debug_key = false; | |
570 | } | |
571 | ||
572 | SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); | |
573 | SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32); | |
60a27d65 | 574 | |
fb334fee | 575 | get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16); |
60a27d65 MH |
576 | |
577 | err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk, | |
fb334fee | 578 | smp->local_rand, 0, hash); |
60a27d65 MH |
579 | if (err < 0) |
580 | return err; | |
581 | ||
fb334fee | 582 | memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16); |
60a27d65 | 583 | |
94f14e47 JH |
584 | smp->local_oob = true; |
585 | ||
60a27d65 MH |
586 | return 0; |
587 | } | |
588 | ||
5d88cc73 | 589 | static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) |
eb492e01 | 590 | { |
5d88cc73 | 591 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
b68fda68 | 592 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
5d88cc73 JH |
593 | struct kvec iv[2]; |
594 | struct msghdr msg; | |
eb492e01 | 595 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
596 | if (!chan) |
597 | return; | |
eb492e01 | 598 | |
5d88cc73 | 599 | BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code); |
eb492e01 | 600 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
601 | iv[0].iov_base = &code; |
602 | iv[0].iov_len = 1; | |
eb492e01 | 603 | |
5d88cc73 JH |
604 | iv[1].iov_base = data; |
605 | iv[1].iov_len = len; | |
eb492e01 | 606 | |
5d88cc73 | 607 | memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); |
eb492e01 | 608 | |
aa563d7b | 609 | iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iv, 2, 1 + len); |
eb492e01 | 610 | |
5d88cc73 | 611 | l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len); |
e2dcd113 | 612 | |
b68fda68 JH |
613 | if (!chan->data) |
614 | return; | |
615 | ||
616 | smp = chan->data; | |
617 | ||
618 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
1b0921d6 | 619 | schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT); |
eb492e01 AB |
620 | } |
621 | ||
d2eb9e10 | 622 | static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq) |
2b64d153 | 623 | { |
d2eb9e10 JH |
624 | if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) { |
625 | if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) | |
626 | return BT_SECURITY_FIPS; | |
627 | else | |
628 | return BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
629 | } else { | |
2b64d153 | 630 | return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
d2eb9e10 | 631 | } |
2b64d153 BG |
632 | } |
633 | ||
634 | static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level) | |
635 | { | |
636 | switch (sec_level) { | |
d2eb9e10 | 637 | case BT_SECURITY_FIPS: |
2b64d153 BG |
638 | case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: |
639 | return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
640 | case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: | |
641 | return SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
642 | default: | |
643 | return SMP_AUTH_NONE; | |
644 | } | |
645 | } | |
646 | ||
b8e66eac | 647 | static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, |
f1560463 MH |
648 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, |
649 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq) | |
b8e66eac | 650 | { |
5d88cc73 JH |
651 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
652 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
fd349c02 JH |
653 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
654 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
02b05bd8 | 655 | u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; |
54790f73 | 656 | |
d7a5a11d | 657 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) { |
7ee4ea36 MH |
658 | local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
659 | remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
54790f73 | 660 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING; |
2b64d153 BG |
661 | } else { |
662 | authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
54790f73 VCG |
663 | } |
664 | ||
d7a5a11d | 665 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING)) |
fd349c02 JH |
666 | remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
667 | ||
d7a5a11d | 668 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY)) |
863efaf2 JH |
669 | local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
670 | ||
d7a5a11d | 671 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) && |
02b05bd8 JH |
672 | (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) { |
673 | struct oob_data *oob_data; | |
674 | u8 bdaddr_type; | |
675 | ||
d7a5a11d | 676 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) { |
df8e1a4c JH |
677 | local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; |
678 | remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; | |
679 | } | |
02b05bd8 JH |
680 | |
681 | if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC) | |
682 | bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; | |
683 | else | |
684 | bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM; | |
685 | ||
686 | oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst, | |
687 | bdaddr_type); | |
4775a4ea | 688 | if (oob_data && oob_data->present) { |
1a8bab4f | 689 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags); |
02b05bd8 | 690 | oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT; |
a29b0733 | 691 | memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16); |
02b05bd8 | 692 | memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16); |
bc07cd69 MH |
693 | SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf); |
694 | SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr); | |
02b05bd8 JH |
695 | } |
696 | ||
df8e1a4c JH |
697 | } else { |
698 | authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC; | |
699 | } | |
700 | ||
54790f73 VCG |
701 | if (rsp == NULL) { |
702 | req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; | |
02b05bd8 | 703 | req->oob_flag = oob_flag; |
30d65e08 | 704 | req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size; |
fd349c02 JH |
705 | req->init_key_dist = local_dist; |
706 | req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
0edb14de | 707 | req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); |
fd349c02 JH |
708 | |
709 | smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
54790f73 VCG |
710 | return; |
711 | } | |
712 | ||
713 | rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; | |
02b05bd8 | 714 | rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag; |
30d65e08 | 715 | rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size; |
fd349c02 JH |
716 | rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; |
717 | rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; | |
0edb14de | 718 | rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); |
fd349c02 JH |
719 | |
720 | smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; | |
b8e66eac VCG |
721 | } |
722 | ||
3158c50c VCG |
723 | static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size) |
724 | { | |
5d88cc73 | 725 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
2fd36558 | 726 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
5d88cc73 | 727 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
1c1def09 | 728 | |
49c06c9e ŁR |
729 | if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS && |
730 | max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) | |
731 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
732 | ||
30d65e08 | 733 | if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size || |
2fd36558 | 734 | max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) |
3158c50c VCG |
735 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
736 | ||
f7aa611a | 737 | smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size; |
3158c50c VCG |
738 | |
739 | return 0; | |
740 | } | |
741 | ||
6f48e260 JH |
742 | static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
743 | { | |
744 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
745 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
923e2414 | 746 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
6f48e260 JH |
747 | bool complete; |
748 | ||
749 | BUG_ON(!smp); | |
750 | ||
751 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
6f48e260 | 752 | |
6f48e260 | 753 | complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); |
923e2414 | 754 | mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete); |
6f48e260 | 755 | |
276812ec MH |
756 | kzfree(smp->csrk); |
757 | kzfree(smp->slave_csrk); | |
758 | kzfree(smp->link_key); | |
6f48e260 | 759 | |
71af2f6b | 760 | crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); |
47eb2ac8 | 761 | crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh); |
6f48e260 | 762 | |
923e2414 JH |
763 | /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key |
764 | * support hasn't been explicitly enabled. | |
765 | */ | |
766 | if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG && | |
d7a5a11d | 767 | !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) { |
923e2414 JH |
768 | list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); |
769 | kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); | |
770 | smp->ltk = NULL; | |
771 | } | |
772 | ||
6f48e260 JH |
773 | /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ |
774 | if (!complete) { | |
775 | if (smp->ltk) { | |
970d0f1b JH |
776 | list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); |
777 | kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); | |
6f48e260 JH |
778 | } |
779 | ||
780 | if (smp->slave_ltk) { | |
970d0f1b JH |
781 | list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list); |
782 | kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu); | |
6f48e260 JH |
783 | } |
784 | ||
785 | if (smp->remote_irk) { | |
adae20cb JH |
786 | list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); |
787 | kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); | |
6f48e260 JH |
788 | } |
789 | } | |
790 | ||
791 | chan->data = NULL; | |
276812ec | 792 | kzfree(smp); |
923e2414 | 793 | hci_conn_drop(hcon); |
6f48e260 JH |
794 | } |
795 | ||
84794e11 | 796 | static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason) |
4f957a76 | 797 | { |
bab73cb6 | 798 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
b68fda68 | 799 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
bab73cb6 | 800 | |
84794e11 | 801 | if (reason) |
4f957a76 | 802 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), |
f1560463 | 803 | &reason); |
4f957a76 | 804 | |
e1e930f5 | 805 | mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); |
f1c09c07 | 806 | |
fc75cc86 | 807 | if (chan->data) |
f1c09c07 | 808 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); |
4f957a76 BG |
809 | } |
810 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
811 | #define JUST_WORKS 0x00 |
812 | #define JUST_CFM 0x01 | |
813 | #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02 | |
814 | #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03 | |
815 | #define REQ_OOB 0x04 | |
5e3d3d9b | 816 | #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05 |
2b64d153 BG |
817 | #define OVERLAP 0xFF |
818 | ||
819 | static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = { | |
820 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
821 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
822 | { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, | |
823 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, | |
824 | { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP }, | |
825 | }; | |
826 | ||
5e3d3d9b JH |
827 | static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = { |
828 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
829 | { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, | |
830 | { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY }, | |
831 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, | |
832 | { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, | |
833 | }; | |
834 | ||
581370cc JH |
835 | static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) |
836 | { | |
2bcd4003 JH |
837 | /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets |
838 | * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators. | |
839 | */ | |
581370cc JH |
840 | if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || |
841 | remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) | |
2bcd4003 | 842 | return JUST_CFM; |
581370cc | 843 | |
5e3d3d9b JH |
844 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) |
845 | return sc_method[remote_io][local_io]; | |
846 | ||
581370cc JH |
847 | return gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; |
848 | } | |
849 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
850 | static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, |
851 | u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) | |
852 | { | |
853 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
854 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
855 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
2b64d153 | 856 | u32 passkey = 0; |
d1d900f8 | 857 | int ret; |
2b64d153 BG |
858 | |
859 | /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */ | |
860 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); | |
4a74d658 | 861 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
862 | |
863 | BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io); | |
864 | ||
2bcd4003 JH |
865 | /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming |
866 | * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM | |
867 | * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this | |
868 | * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the | |
869 | * table. | |
870 | */ | |
581370cc | 871 | if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM)) |
783e0574 | 872 | smp->method = JUST_CFM; |
2b64d153 | 873 | else |
783e0574 | 874 | smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); |
2b64d153 | 875 | |
a82505c7 | 876 | /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ |
783e0574 JH |
877 | if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, |
878 | &smp->flags)) | |
879 | smp->method = JUST_WORKS; | |
a82505c7 | 880 | |
02f3e254 | 881 | /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */ |
783e0574 JH |
882 | if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && |
883 | hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) | |
884 | smp->method = JUST_WORKS; | |
02f3e254 | 885 | |
92516cd9 SS |
886 | /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK and ask user-space for |
887 | * confirmation */ | |
783e0574 | 888 | if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) { |
d1d900f8 | 889 | ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
92516cd9 SS |
890 | hcon->type, |
891 | hcon->dst_type, | |
892 | passkey, 1); | |
d1d900f8 GR |
893 | if (ret) |
894 | return ret; | |
92516cd9 | 895 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
896 | return 0; |
897 | } | |
898 | ||
19c5ce9c JH |
899 | /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we |
900 | * can only recover the just-works case. | |
901 | */ | |
902 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) | |
903 | return -EINVAL; | |
904 | ||
2b64d153 | 905 | /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */ |
783e0574 | 906 | if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) { |
4a74d658 | 907 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags); |
5eb596f5 JH |
908 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
909 | hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
910 | } | |
2b64d153 BG |
911 | |
912 | /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master | |
913 | * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey. | |
914 | */ | |
783e0574 | 915 | if (smp->method == OVERLAP) { |
40bef302 | 916 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
783e0574 | 917 | smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY; |
2b64d153 | 918 | else |
783e0574 | 919 | smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY; |
2b64d153 BG |
920 | } |
921 | ||
01ad34d2 | 922 | /* Generate random passkey. */ |
783e0574 | 923 | if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) { |
943a732a | 924 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
2b64d153 BG |
925 | get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); |
926 | passkey %= 1000000; | |
943a732a | 927 | put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); |
2b64d153 | 928 | BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey); |
4a74d658 | 929 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
930 | } |
931 | ||
783e0574 | 932 | if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) |
ce39fb4e | 933 | ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
272d90df | 934 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); |
783e0574 | 935 | else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM) |
4eb65e66 JH |
936 | ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
937 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, | |
938 | passkey, 1); | |
2b64d153 | 939 | else |
01ad34d2 | 940 | ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
272d90df | 941 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, |
39adbffe | 942 | passkey, 0); |
2b64d153 | 943 | |
2b64d153 BG |
944 | return ret; |
945 | } | |
946 | ||
1cc61144 | 947 | static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) |
8aab4757 | 948 | { |
8aab4757 | 949 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
8aab4757 VCG |
950 | struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; |
951 | int ret; | |
8aab4757 VCG |
952 | |
953 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
954 | ||
28a220aa | 955 | ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, |
b1cd5fd9 | 956 | conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, |
943a732a JH |
957 | conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, |
958 | cp.confirm_val); | |
1cc61144 JH |
959 | if (ret) |
960 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
8aab4757 | 961 | |
4a74d658 | 962 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 | 963 | |
8aab4757 VCG |
964 | smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
965 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
966 | if (conn->hcon->out) |
967 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
968 | else | |
969 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
970 | ||
1cc61144 | 971 | return 0; |
8aab4757 VCG |
972 | } |
973 | ||
861580a9 | 974 | static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) |
8aab4757 | 975 | { |
8aab4757 VCG |
976 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
977 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
861580a9 | 978 | u8 confirm[16]; |
8aab4757 VCG |
979 | int ret; |
980 | ||
8aab4757 VCG |
981 | BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); |
982 | ||
28a220aa | 983 | ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, |
b1cd5fd9 | 984 | hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, |
943a732a | 985 | hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm); |
861580a9 JH |
986 | if (ret) |
987 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
8aab4757 | 988 | |
329d8230 | 989 | if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) { |
2064ee33 MH |
990 | bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed " |
991 | "(confirmation values mismatch)"); | |
861580a9 | 992 | return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
8aab4757 VCG |
993 | } |
994 | ||
995 | if (hcon->out) { | |
fe39c7b2 MH |
996 | u8 stk[16]; |
997 | __le64 rand = 0; | |
998 | __le16 ediv = 0; | |
8aab4757 | 999 | |
28a220aa | 1000 | smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); |
8aab4757 | 1001 | |
861580a9 JH |
1002 | if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) |
1003 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
8aab4757 | 1004 | |
8b76ce34 | 1005 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size); |
f7aa611a | 1006 | hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; |
fe59a05f | 1007 | set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); |
8aab4757 | 1008 | } else { |
fff3490f | 1009 | u8 stk[16], auth; |
fe39c7b2 MH |
1010 | __le64 rand = 0; |
1011 | __le16 ediv = 0; | |
8aab4757 | 1012 | |
943a732a JH |
1013 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
1014 | smp->prnd); | |
8aab4757 | 1015 | |
28a220aa | 1016 | smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); |
8aab4757 | 1017 | |
fff3490f JH |
1018 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
1019 | auth = 1; | |
1020 | else | |
1021 | auth = 0; | |
1022 | ||
7d5843b7 JH |
1023 | /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the |
1024 | * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master | |
1025 | * STK never needs to be stored). | |
1026 | */ | |
ce39fb4e | 1027 | hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, |
2ceba539 | 1028 | SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); |
8aab4757 VCG |
1029 | } |
1030 | ||
861580a9 | 1031 | return 0; |
8aab4757 VCG |
1032 | } |
1033 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
1034 | static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
1035 | { | |
1036 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1037 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1038 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1039 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
1040 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
1041 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
1042 | bool persistent; | |
1043 | ||
cad20c27 JH |
1044 | if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { |
1045 | if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) | |
1046 | persistent = false; | |
1047 | else | |
1048 | persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY, | |
1049 | &hcon->flags); | |
1050 | } else { | |
1051 | /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if | |
1052 | * both sides had the bonding bit set in their | |
1053 | * authentication requests. | |
1054 | */ | |
1055 | persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & | |
1056 | SMP_AUTH_BONDING); | |
1057 | } | |
1058 | ||
44f1a7ab | 1059 | if (smp->remote_irk) { |
cad20c27 JH |
1060 | mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent); |
1061 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
1062 | /* Now that user space can be considered to know the |
1063 | * identity address track the connection based on it | |
b5ae344d | 1064 | * from now on (assuming this is an LE link). |
44f1a7ab | 1065 | */ |
b5ae344d JH |
1066 | if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) { |
1067 | bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr); | |
1068 | hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type; | |
1069 | queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work); | |
1070 | } | |
44f1a7ab JH |
1071 | } |
1072 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
1073 | if (smp->csrk) { |
1074 | smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
1075 | bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
1076 | mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); | |
1077 | } | |
1078 | ||
1079 | if (smp->slave_csrk) { | |
1080 | smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
1081 | bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
1082 | mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); | |
1083 | } | |
1084 | ||
1085 | if (smp->ltk) { | |
1086 | smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
1087 | bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
1088 | mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); | |
1089 | } | |
1090 | ||
1091 | if (smp->slave_ltk) { | |
1092 | smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
1093 | bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
1094 | mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); | |
1095 | } | |
6a77083a JH |
1096 | |
1097 | if (smp->link_key) { | |
e3befab9 JH |
1098 | struct link_key *key; |
1099 | u8 type; | |
1100 | ||
1101 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) | |
1102 | type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION; | |
1103 | else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) | |
1104 | type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256; | |
1105 | else | |
1106 | type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256; | |
1107 | ||
1108 | key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst, | |
1109 | smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent); | |
1110 | if (key) { | |
1111 | mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent); | |
1112 | ||
1113 | /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant | |
1114 | * flag is not set. | |
1115 | */ | |
d7a5a11d | 1116 | if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) && |
e3befab9 JH |
1117 | key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) { |
1118 | list_del_rcu(&key->list); | |
1119 | kfree_rcu(key, rcu); | |
1120 | } | |
1121 | } | |
6a77083a JH |
1122 | } |
1123 | } | |
1124 | ||
d3e54a87 JH |
1125 | static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1126 | { | |
1127 | struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; | |
1128 | u8 key_type, auth; | |
1129 | ||
1130 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) | |
1131 | key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG; | |
1132 | else | |
1133 | key_type = SMP_LTK_P256; | |
1134 | ||
1135 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) | |
1136 | auth = 1; | |
1137 | else | |
1138 | auth = 0; | |
1139 | ||
d3e54a87 JH |
1140 | smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, |
1141 | key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, | |
1142 | 0, 0); | |
1143 | } | |
1144 | ||
6a77083a JH |
1145 | static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1146 | { | |
a62da6f1 | 1147 | /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */ |
6a77083a JH |
1148 | const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c }; |
1149 | ||
1150 | smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1151 | if (!smp->link_key) | |
1152 | return; | |
1153 | ||
a62da6f1 | 1154 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) { |
151129df | 1155 | /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7031 */ |
a62da6f1 JH |
1156 | const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; |
1157 | ||
1158 | if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) { | |
1159 | kzfree(smp->link_key); | |
1160 | smp->link_key = NULL; | |
1161 | return; | |
1162 | } | |
1163 | } else { | |
1164 | /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */ | |
1165 | const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; | |
1166 | ||
1167 | if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) { | |
1168 | kzfree(smp->link_key); | |
1169 | smp->link_key = NULL; | |
1170 | return; | |
1171 | } | |
6a77083a JH |
1172 | } |
1173 | ||
1174 | if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) { | |
276812ec | 1175 | kzfree(smp->link_key); |
6a77083a JH |
1176 | smp->link_key = NULL; |
1177 | return; | |
1178 | } | |
44f1a7ab JH |
1179 | } |
1180 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
1181 | static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1182 | { | |
1183 | /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs | |
1184 | * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive | |
1185 | * them in the correct order. | |
1186 | */ | |
1187 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) | |
1188 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO); | |
1189 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) | |
1190 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); | |
1191 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) | |
1192 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
1193 | } | |
1194 | ||
b5ae344d JH |
1195 | static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1196 | { | |
a62da6f1 | 1197 | /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */ |
b5ae344d JH |
1198 | const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 }; |
1199 | struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; | |
1200 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
1201 | struct link_key *key; | |
1202 | ||
1203 | key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst); | |
1204 | if (!key) { | |
2064ee33 | 1205 | bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK"); |
b5ae344d JH |
1206 | return; |
1207 | } | |
1208 | ||
1209 | if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) | |
1210 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); | |
1211 | ||
a62da6f1 | 1212 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) { |
151129df | 1213 | /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7032 */ |
a62da6f1 JH |
1214 | const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; |
1215 | ||
1216 | if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk)) | |
1217 | return; | |
1218 | } else { | |
1219 | /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */ | |
1220 | const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; | |
1221 | ||
1222 | if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk)) | |
1223 | return; | |
1224 | } | |
b5ae344d JH |
1225 | |
1226 | if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk)) | |
1227 | return; | |
1228 | ||
1229 | sc_add_ltk(smp); | |
1230 | } | |
1231 | ||
d6268e86 | 1232 | static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) |
44f1a7ab JH |
1233 | { |
1234 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; | |
86d1407c | 1235 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
44f1a7ab JH |
1236 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
1237 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
1238 | __u8 *keydist; | |
1239 | ||
1240 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1241 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
1242 | rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; |
1243 | ||
1244 | /* The responder sends its keys first */ | |
b28b4943 JH |
1245 | if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) { |
1246 | smp_allow_key_dist(smp); | |
86d1407c | 1247 | return; |
b28b4943 | 1248 | } |
44f1a7ab JH |
1249 | |
1250 | req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
1251 | ||
1252 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1253 | keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; | |
1254 | *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; | |
1255 | } else { | |
1256 | keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; | |
1257 | *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; | |
1258 | } | |
1259 | ||
6a77083a | 1260 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
b5ae344d | 1261 | if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)) |
6a77083a | 1262 | sc_generate_link_key(smp); |
b5ae344d JH |
1263 | if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)) |
1264 | sc_generate_ltk(smp); | |
6a77083a JH |
1265 | |
1266 | /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1267 | *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
1268 | } | |
1269 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
1270 | BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); |
1271 | ||
1272 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { | |
1273 | struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; | |
1274 | struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; | |
1275 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; | |
1276 | u8 authenticated; | |
1277 | __le16 ediv; | |
1278 | __le64 rand; | |
1279 | ||
1fc62c52 JH |
1280 | /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of |
1281 | * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest | |
1282 | * of the value to zeroes. | |
1283 | */ | |
1284 | get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size); | |
1285 | memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, | |
1286 | sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size); | |
1287 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
1288 | get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); |
1289 | get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); | |
1290 | ||
1291 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); | |
1292 | ||
1293 | authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
1294 | ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, | |
1295 | SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, | |
1296 | smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); | |
1297 | smp->slave_ltk = ltk; | |
1298 | ||
1299 | ident.ediv = ediv; | |
1300 | ident.rand = rand; | |
1301 | ||
1302 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); | |
1303 | ||
1304 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; | |
1305 | } | |
1306 | ||
1307 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { | |
1308 | struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; | |
1309 | struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; | |
1310 | ||
1311 | memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); | |
1312 | ||
1313 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); | |
1314 | ||
1315 | /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address | |
1316 | * after the connection has been established. | |
1317 | * | |
1318 | * This is true even when the connection has been | |
1319 | * established using a resolvable random address. | |
1320 | */ | |
1321 | bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); | |
1322 | addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; | |
1323 | ||
1324 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), | |
1325 | &addrinfo); | |
1326 | ||
1327 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
1328 | } | |
1329 | ||
1330 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { | |
1331 | struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; | |
1332 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; | |
1333 | ||
1334 | /* Generate a new random key */ | |
1335 | get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); | |
1336 | ||
1337 | csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1338 | if (csrk) { | |
4cd3928a JH |
1339 | if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) |
1340 | csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED; | |
1341 | else | |
1342 | csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED; | |
44f1a7ab JH |
1343 | memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); |
1344 | } | |
1345 | smp->slave_csrk = csrk; | |
1346 | ||
1347 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); | |
1348 | ||
1349 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
1350 | } | |
1351 | ||
1352 | /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ | |
b28b4943 JH |
1353 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) { |
1354 | smp_allow_key_dist(smp); | |
86d1407c | 1355 | return; |
b28b4943 | 1356 | } |
44f1a7ab | 1357 | |
44f1a7ab JH |
1358 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); |
1359 | smp_notify_keys(conn); | |
1360 | ||
1361 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); | |
44f1a7ab JH |
1362 | } |
1363 | ||
b68fda68 JH |
1364 | static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work) |
1365 | { | |
1366 | struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, | |
1367 | security_timer.work); | |
1368 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
1369 | ||
1370 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1371 | ||
1e91c29e | 1372 | hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM); |
b68fda68 JH |
1373 | } |
1374 | ||
8aab4757 VCG |
1375 | static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
1376 | { | |
5d88cc73 | 1377 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
8aab4757 VCG |
1378 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
1379 | ||
f1560463 | 1380 | smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
fc75cc86 | 1381 | if (!smp) |
8aab4757 VCG |
1382 | return NULL; |
1383 | ||
71af2f6b | 1384 | smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); |
407cecf6 JH |
1385 | if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) { |
1386 | BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); | |
28a220aa | 1387 | goto zfree_smp; |
47eb2ac8 TA |
1388 | } |
1389 | ||
075f7732 | 1390 | smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0); |
47eb2ac8 TA |
1391 | if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) { |
1392 | BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); | |
1393 | goto free_shash; | |
407cecf6 JH |
1394 | } |
1395 | ||
8aab4757 | 1396 | smp->conn = conn; |
5d88cc73 | 1397 | chan->data = smp; |
8aab4757 | 1398 | |
b28b4943 JH |
1399 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL); |
1400 | ||
b68fda68 JH |
1401 | INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout); |
1402 | ||
8aab4757 VCG |
1403 | hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon); |
1404 | ||
1405 | return smp; | |
47eb2ac8 TA |
1406 | |
1407 | free_shash: | |
1408 | crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); | |
47eb2ac8 TA |
1409 | zfree_smp: |
1410 | kzfree(smp); | |
1411 | return NULL; | |
8aab4757 VCG |
1412 | } |
1413 | ||
760b018b JH |
1414 | static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) |
1415 | { | |
1416 | struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; | |
1417 | u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7]; | |
1418 | ||
1419 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1420 | na = smp->prnd; | |
1421 | nb = smp->rrnd; | |
1422 | } else { | |
1423 | na = smp->rrnd; | |
1424 | nb = smp->prnd; | |
1425 | } | |
1426 | ||
1427 | memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); | |
1428 | memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); | |
1429 | a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; | |
1430 | b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; | |
1431 | ||
1432 | return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk); | |
1433 | } | |
1434 | ||
38606f14 | 1435 | static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp) |
760b018b JH |
1436 | { |
1437 | struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; | |
1438 | struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check; | |
1439 | u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; | |
1440 | u8 io_cap[3], r[16]; | |
1441 | ||
760b018b JH |
1442 | memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); |
1443 | memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); | |
1444 | a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; | |
1445 | b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; | |
1446 | ||
1447 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1448 | local_addr = a; | |
1449 | remote_addr = b; | |
1450 | memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); | |
1451 | } else { | |
1452 | local_addr = b; | |
1453 | remote_addr = a; | |
1454 | memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); | |
1455 | } | |
1456 | ||
dddd3059 JH |
1457 | memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); |
1458 | ||
1459 | if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) | |
38606f14 | 1460 | put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r); |
760b018b | 1461 | |
a29b0733 JH |
1462 | if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) |
1463 | memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16); | |
1464 | ||
760b018b JH |
1465 | smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap, |
1466 | local_addr, remote_addr, check.e); | |
1467 | ||
1468 | smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check); | |
dddd3059 JH |
1469 | } |
1470 | ||
38606f14 JH |
1471 | static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1472 | { | |
1473 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
1474 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1475 | struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; | |
1476 | u8 r; | |
1477 | ||
1478 | r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01); | |
1479 | r |= 0x80; | |
1480 | ||
1481 | get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); | |
1482 | ||
1483 | if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r, | |
1484 | cfm.confirm_val)) | |
1485 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1486 | ||
1487 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); | |
1488 | ||
1489 | return 0; | |
1490 | } | |
1491 | ||
1492 | static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op) | |
1493 | { | |
1494 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
1495 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1496 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
1497 | u8 cfm[16], r; | |
1498 | ||
1499 | /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */ | |
1500 | if (smp->passkey_round >= 20) | |
1501 | return 0; | |
1502 | ||
1503 | switch (smp_op) { | |
1504 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: | |
1505 | r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01); | |
1506 | r |= 0x80; | |
1507 | ||
1508 | if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk, | |
1509 | smp->rrnd, r, cfm)) | |
1510 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1511 | ||
329d8230 | 1512 | if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16)) |
38606f14 JH |
1513 | return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
1514 | ||
1515 | smp->passkey_round++; | |
1516 | ||
1517 | if (smp->passkey_round == 20) { | |
1518 | /* Generate MacKey and LTK */ | |
1519 | if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk)) | |
1520 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1521 | } | |
1522 | ||
1523 | /* The round is only complete when the initiator | |
1524 | * receives pairing random. | |
1525 | */ | |
1526 | if (!hcon->out) { | |
1527 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, | |
1528 | sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); | |
d3e54a87 | 1529 | if (smp->passkey_round == 20) |
38606f14 | 1530 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); |
d3e54a87 | 1531 | else |
38606f14 | 1532 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); |
38606f14 JH |
1533 | return 0; |
1534 | } | |
1535 | ||
1536 | /* Start the next round */ | |
1537 | if (smp->passkey_round != 20) | |
1538 | return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0); | |
1539 | ||
1540 | /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */ | |
1541 | sc_dhkey_check(smp); | |
1542 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); | |
1543 | ||
1544 | break; | |
1545 | ||
1546 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: | |
1547 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) { | |
1548 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); | |
1549 | return 0; | |
1550 | } | |
1551 | ||
1552 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
1553 | ||
1554 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1555 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, | |
1556 | sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); | |
1557 | return 0; | |
1558 | } | |
1559 | ||
1560 | return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp); | |
1561 | ||
1562 | case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1563 | default: | |
1564 | /* Initiating device starts the round */ | |
1565 | if (!hcon->out) | |
1566 | return 0; | |
1567 | ||
1568 | BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name, | |
1569 | smp->passkey_round + 1); | |
1570 | ||
1571 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
1572 | ||
1573 | return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp); | |
1574 | } | |
1575 | ||
1576 | return 0; | |
1577 | } | |
1578 | ||
dddd3059 JH |
1579 | static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) |
1580 | { | |
38606f14 JH |
1581 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
1582 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1583 | u8 smp_op; | |
1584 | ||
1585 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); | |
1586 | ||
dddd3059 JH |
1587 | switch (mgmt_op) { |
1588 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: | |
1589 | smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); | |
1590 | return 0; | |
1591 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: | |
1592 | smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED); | |
1593 | return 0; | |
38606f14 JH |
1594 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: |
1595 | hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey); | |
1596 | smp->passkey_round = 0; | |
1597 | ||
1598 | if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) | |
1599 | smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM; | |
1600 | else | |
1601 | smp_op = 0; | |
1602 | ||
1603 | if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op)) | |
1604 | return -EIO; | |
1605 | ||
1606 | return 0; | |
dddd3059 JH |
1607 | } |
1608 | ||
d3e54a87 JH |
1609 | /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */ |
1610 | if (hcon->out) { | |
1611 | sc_dhkey_check(smp); | |
1612 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); | |
1613 | } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { | |
1614 | sc_dhkey_check(smp); | |
1615 | sc_add_ltk(smp); | |
1616 | } | |
760b018b JH |
1617 | |
1618 | return 0; | |
1619 | } | |
1620 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
1621 | int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) |
1622 | { | |
b10e8017 | 1623 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
5d88cc73 | 1624 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
2b64d153 BG |
1625 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
1626 | u32 value; | |
fc75cc86 | 1627 | int err; |
2b64d153 BG |
1628 | |
1629 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1630 | ||
fc75cc86 | 1631 | if (!conn) |
2b64d153 BG |
1632 | return -ENOTCONN; |
1633 | ||
5d88cc73 JH |
1634 | chan = conn->smp; |
1635 | if (!chan) | |
1636 | return -ENOTCONN; | |
1637 | ||
fc75cc86 JH |
1638 | l2cap_chan_lock(chan); |
1639 | if (!chan->data) { | |
1640 | err = -ENOTCONN; | |
1641 | goto unlock; | |
1642 | } | |
1643 | ||
5d88cc73 | 1644 | smp = chan->data; |
2b64d153 | 1645 | |
760b018b JH |
1646 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
1647 | err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey); | |
1648 | goto unlock; | |
1649 | } | |
1650 | ||
2b64d153 BG |
1651 | switch (mgmt_op) { |
1652 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: | |
1653 | value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); | |
943a732a | 1654 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
2b64d153 | 1655 | BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value); |
943a732a | 1656 | put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); |
19186c7b | 1657 | fallthrough; |
2b64d153 | 1658 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: |
4a74d658 | 1659 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
1660 | break; |
1661 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: | |
1662 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: | |
84794e11 | 1663 | smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); |
fc75cc86 JH |
1664 | err = 0; |
1665 | goto unlock; | |
2b64d153 | 1666 | default: |
84794e11 | 1667 | smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); |
fc75cc86 JH |
1668 | err = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
1669 | goto unlock; | |
2b64d153 BG |
1670 | } |
1671 | ||
fc75cc86 JH |
1672 | err = 0; |
1673 | ||
2b64d153 | 1674 | /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */ |
1cc61144 JH |
1675 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { |
1676 | u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp); | |
1677 | if (rsp) | |
1678 | smp_failure(conn, rsp); | |
1679 | } | |
2b64d153 | 1680 | |
fc75cc86 JH |
1681 | unlock: |
1682 | l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); | |
1683 | return err; | |
2b64d153 BG |
1684 | } |
1685 | ||
b5ae344d JH |
1686 | static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp, |
1687 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, | |
1688 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp) | |
1689 | { | |
1690 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
1691 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; | |
1692 | u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0; | |
1693 | ||
d7a5a11d | 1694 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) { |
b5ae344d JH |
1695 | local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
1696 | remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
1697 | } | |
1698 | ||
d7a5a11d | 1699 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING)) |
b5ae344d JH |
1700 | remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
1701 | ||
d7a5a11d | 1702 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY)) |
b5ae344d JH |
1703 | local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
1704 | ||
1705 | if (!rsp) { | |
1706 | memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req)); | |
1707 | ||
a62da6f1 | 1708 | req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2; |
b5ae344d JH |
1709 | req->init_key_dist = local_dist; |
1710 | req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
e3f6a257 | 1711 | req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size; |
b5ae344d JH |
1712 | |
1713 | smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
1714 | ||
1715 | return; | |
1716 | } | |
1717 | ||
1718 | memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp)); | |
1719 | ||
a62da6f1 | 1720 | rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2; |
e3f6a257 | 1721 | rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size; |
b5ae344d JH |
1722 | rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; |
1723 | rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; | |
1724 | ||
1725 | smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; | |
1726 | } | |
1727 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1728 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1729 | { |
3158c50c | 1730 | struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data; |
fc75cc86 | 1731 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
b3c6410b | 1732 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
8aab4757 | 1733 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
c7262e71 | 1734 | u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; |
8aab4757 | 1735 | int ret; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1736 | |
1737 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1738 | ||
c46b98be | 1739 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*req)) |
38e4a915 | 1740 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1741 | |
40bef302 | 1742 | if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
2b64d153 BG |
1743 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
1744 | ||
fc75cc86 | 1745 | if (!chan->data) |
8aab4757 | 1746 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
fc75cc86 | 1747 | else |
5d88cc73 | 1748 | smp = chan->data; |
8aab4757 | 1749 | |
d08fd0e7 AE |
1750 | if (!smp) |
1751 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
d26a2345 | 1752 | |
c05b9339 | 1753 | /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ |
0edb14de | 1754 | auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
c05b9339 | 1755 | |
d7a5a11d | 1756 | if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) && |
c05b9339 | 1757 | (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) |
b3c6410b JH |
1758 | return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
1759 | ||
d7a5a11d | 1760 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
903b71c7 JH |
1761 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; |
1762 | ||
1c1def09 VCG |
1763 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
1764 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req)); | |
3158c50c | 1765 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req)); |
88ba43b6 | 1766 | |
cb06d366 JH |
1767 | /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has |
1768 | * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the | |
1769 | * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use. | |
1770 | */ | |
94f14e47 | 1771 | if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob) |
58428563 JH |
1772 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags); |
1773 | ||
b5ae344d JH |
1774 | /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */ |
1775 | if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { | |
1776 | /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */ | |
08f63cc5 | 1777 | if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) && |
b7cb93e5 | 1778 | !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) |
b5ae344d JH |
1779 | return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED; |
1780 | ||
1781 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); | |
1782 | ||
1783 | build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp); | |
1784 | ||
a62da6f1 JH |
1785 | if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) |
1786 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags); | |
1787 | ||
b5ae344d JH |
1788 | key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); |
1789 | if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) | |
1790 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
1791 | ||
1792 | /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1793 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
1794 | ||
1795 | smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; | |
1796 | memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); | |
1797 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); | |
1798 | ||
1799 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); | |
1800 | return 0; | |
1801 | } | |
1802 | ||
5e3d3d9b JH |
1803 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth); |
1804 | ||
a62da6f1 | 1805 | if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) { |
5e3d3d9b JH |
1806 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); |
1807 | ||
a62da6f1 JH |
1808 | if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) |
1809 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags); | |
1810 | } | |
1811 | ||
5be5e275 | 1812 | if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) |
1afc2a1a JH |
1813 | sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
1814 | else | |
1815 | sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); | |
1816 | ||
c7262e71 JH |
1817 | if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) |
1818 | conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
fdde0a26 | 1819 | |
49c922bb | 1820 | /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ |
2ed8f65c JH |
1821 | if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { |
1822 | u8 method; | |
1823 | ||
1824 | method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability, | |
1825 | req->io_capability); | |
1826 | if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) | |
1827 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; | |
1828 | } | |
1829 | ||
3158c50c VCG |
1830 | key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); |
1831 | if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) | |
1832 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
88ba43b6 | 1833 | |
e84a6b13 | 1834 | get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); |
8aab4757 | 1835 | |
1c1def09 VCG |
1836 | smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; |
1837 | memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); | |
f01ead31 | 1838 | |
3158c50c | 1839 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); |
3b19146d JH |
1840 | |
1841 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); | |
1842 | ||
19c5ce9c JH |
1843 | /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the |
1844 | * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth | |
1845 | * req bits from our security request, which may create a false | |
1846 | * positive SC enablement. | |
1847 | */ | |
1848 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
1849 | ||
3b19146d JH |
1850 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
1851 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1852 | /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1853 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
1854 | /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */ | |
1855 | return 0; | |
3b19146d | 1856 | } |
da85e5e5 | 1857 | |
2b64d153 BG |
1858 | /* Request setup of TK */ |
1859 | ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability); | |
1860 | if (ret) | |
1861 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1862 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1863 | return 0; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1864 | } |
1865 | ||
3b19146d JH |
1866 | static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp) |
1867 | { | |
70157ef5 JH |
1868 | struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev; |
1869 | ||
56860245 | 1870 | bt_dev_dbg(hdev, ""); |
3b19146d | 1871 | |
1a8bab4f | 1872 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) { |
33d0c030 MH |
1873 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
1874 | struct smp_dev *smp_dev; | |
1875 | ||
1876 | if (!chan || !chan->data) | |
1877 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1878 | ||
1879 | smp_dev = chan->data; | |
1880 | ||
1881 | memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64); | |
fb334fee | 1882 | memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16); |
33d0c030 MH |
1883 | |
1884 | if (smp_dev->debug_key) | |
1885 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); | |
1886 | ||
1887 | goto done; | |
1888 | } | |
1889 | ||
d7a5a11d | 1890 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { |
70157ef5 | 1891 | BT_DBG("Using debug keys"); |
c0153b0b TA |
1892 | if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk)) |
1893 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
70157ef5 | 1894 | memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64); |
70157ef5 JH |
1895 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); |
1896 | } else { | |
1897 | while (true) { | |
c0153b0b TA |
1898 | /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */ |
1899 | if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk)) | |
70157ef5 | 1900 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
6c0dcc50 | 1901 | |
70157ef5 JH |
1902 | /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that |
1903 | * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key. | |
1904 | */ | |
c0153b0b | 1905 | if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64)) |
70157ef5 JH |
1906 | break; |
1907 | } | |
6c0dcc50 | 1908 | } |
3b19146d | 1909 | |
33d0c030 | 1910 | done: |
c7a3d57d | 1911 | SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); |
8e4e2ee5 | 1912 | SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32); |
3b19146d JH |
1913 | |
1914 | smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk); | |
1915 | ||
1916 | return 0; | |
1917 | } | |
1918 | ||
da85e5e5 | 1919 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 1920 | { |
3158c50c | 1921 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data; |
5d88cc73 JH |
1922 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
1923 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
0edb14de | 1924 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
3a7dbfb8 | 1925 | u8 key_size, auth; |
7d24ddcc | 1926 | int ret; |
88ba43b6 AB |
1927 | |
1928 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1929 | ||
c46b98be | 1930 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp)) |
38e4a915 | 1931 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 1932 | |
40bef302 | 1933 | if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
2b64d153 BG |
1934 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
1935 | ||
3158c50c VCG |
1936 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp)); |
1937 | ||
1c1def09 | 1938 | req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; |
da85e5e5 | 1939 | |
3158c50c VCG |
1940 | key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size); |
1941 | if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) | |
1942 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
1943 | ||
0edb14de | 1944 | auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
c05b9339 | 1945 | |
d7a5a11d | 1946 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
903b71c7 JH |
1947 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; |
1948 | ||
cb06d366 JH |
1949 | /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has |
1950 | * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the | |
1951 | * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use. | |
1952 | */ | |
94f14e47 | 1953 | if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob) |
58428563 JH |
1954 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags); |
1955 | ||
b5ae344d JH |
1956 | smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; |
1957 | memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp)); | |
1958 | ||
1959 | /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared | |
1960 | * some bits that we had enabled in our request. | |
1961 | */ | |
1962 | smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; | |
1963 | ||
a62da6f1 JH |
1964 | if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2)) |
1965 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags); | |
1966 | ||
b5ae344d JH |
1967 | /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */ |
1968 | if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { | |
1969 | /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1970 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
1971 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); | |
1972 | return 0; | |
1973 | } | |
1974 | ||
65668776 JH |
1975 | if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
1976 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); | |
d2eb9e10 JH |
1977 | else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
1978 | conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
65668776 | 1979 | |
49c922bb | 1980 | /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ |
2ed8f65c JH |
1981 | if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { |
1982 | u8 method; | |
1983 | ||
1984 | method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability, | |
1985 | rsp->io_capability); | |
1986 | if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) | |
1987 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; | |
1988 | } | |
1989 | ||
e84a6b13 | 1990 | get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); |
7d24ddcc | 1991 | |
fdcc4bec JH |
1992 | /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared |
1993 | * some bits that we had enabled in our request. | |
1994 | */ | |
1995 | smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; | |
1996 | ||
3b19146d JH |
1997 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
1998 | /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ | |
1999 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; | |
2000 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
2001 | return sc_send_public_key(smp); | |
2002 | } | |
2003 | ||
c05b9339 | 2004 | auth |= req->auth_req; |
2b64d153 | 2005 | |
476585ec | 2006 | ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability); |
2b64d153 BG |
2007 | if (ret) |
2008 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2009 | ||
4a74d658 | 2010 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
2b64d153 BG |
2011 | |
2012 | /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */ | |
4a74d658 | 2013 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) |
1cc61144 | 2014 | return smp_confirm(smp); |
da85e5e5 VCG |
2015 | |
2016 | return 0; | |
88ba43b6 AB |
2017 | } |
2018 | ||
dcee2b32 JH |
2019 | static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) |
2020 | { | |
2021 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
2022 | ||
2023 | BT_DBG(""); | |
2024 | ||
38606f14 JH |
2025 | if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) |
2026 | return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
2027 | ||
dcee2b32 JH |
2028 | if (conn->hcon->out) { |
2029 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), | |
2030 | smp->prnd); | |
2031 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
2032 | } | |
2033 | ||
2034 | return 0; | |
2035 | } | |
2036 | ||
19c5ce9c JH |
2037 | /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits |
2038 | * from our security request and thereby create the impression that | |
2039 | * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it. | |
2040 | */ | |
2041 | static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp) | |
2042 | { | |
2043 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
2044 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
2045 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
2046 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; | |
2047 | u8 auth; | |
2048 | ||
2049 | /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */ | |
2050 | if (hcon->out) | |
2051 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2052 | ||
2053 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) { | |
2064ee33 | 2054 | bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode"); |
19c5ce9c JH |
2055 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
2056 | } | |
2057 | ||
2064ee33 | 2058 | bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP"); |
19c5ce9c JH |
2059 | |
2060 | req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
2061 | rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
2062 | ||
2063 | /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */ | |
2064 | smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist); | |
2065 | ||
2066 | auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); | |
2067 | ||
2068 | if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) { | |
2064ee33 | 2069 | bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP"); |
19c5ce9c JH |
2070 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
2071 | } | |
2072 | ||
2073 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); | |
2074 | ||
2075 | return 0; | |
2076 | } | |
2077 | ||
da85e5e5 | 2078 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 2079 | { |
5d88cc73 JH |
2080 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
2081 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
7d24ddcc | 2082 | |
88ba43b6 AB |
2083 | BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); |
2084 | ||
c46b98be | 2085 | if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) |
38e4a915 | 2086 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 2087 | |
1c1def09 VCG |
2088 | memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); |
2089 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); | |
88ba43b6 | 2090 | |
19c5ce9c JH |
2091 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
2092 | int ret; | |
2093 | ||
2094 | /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */ | |
2095 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags)) | |
2096 | return sc_check_confirm(smp); | |
2097 | ||
2098 | BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm"); | |
2099 | ||
2100 | ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp); | |
2101 | if (ret) | |
2102 | return ret; | |
2103 | } | |
dcee2b32 | 2104 | |
b28b4943 | 2105 | if (conn->hcon->out) { |
943a732a JH |
2106 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
2107 | smp->prnd); | |
b28b4943 JH |
2108 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
2109 | return 0; | |
2110 | } | |
2111 | ||
2112 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) | |
1cc61144 | 2113 | return smp_confirm(smp); |
983f9814 MH |
2114 | |
2115 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); | |
da85e5e5 VCG |
2116 | |
2117 | return 0; | |
88ba43b6 AB |
2118 | } |
2119 | ||
da85e5e5 | 2120 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 | 2121 | { |
5d88cc73 JH |
2122 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
2123 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
191dc7fe | 2124 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
eed467b5 | 2125 | u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint; |
191dc7fe JH |
2126 | u32 passkey; |
2127 | int err; | |
7d24ddcc | 2128 | |
8aab4757 | 2129 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); |
3158c50c | 2130 | |
c46b98be | 2131 | if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd)) |
38e4a915 | 2132 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 2133 | |
943a732a | 2134 | memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); |
8aab4757 | 2135 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); |
e7e62c85 | 2136 | |
191dc7fe JH |
2137 | if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) |
2138 | return smp_random(smp); | |
2139 | ||
580039e8 JH |
2140 | if (hcon->out) { |
2141 | pkax = smp->local_pk; | |
2142 | pkbx = smp->remote_pk; | |
2143 | na = smp->prnd; | |
2144 | nb = smp->rrnd; | |
2145 | } else { | |
2146 | pkax = smp->remote_pk; | |
2147 | pkbx = smp->local_pk; | |
2148 | na = smp->rrnd; | |
2149 | nb = smp->prnd; | |
2150 | } | |
2151 | ||
a29b0733 JH |
2152 | if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { |
2153 | if (!hcon->out) | |
2154 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, | |
2155 | sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); | |
2156 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); | |
2157 | goto mackey_and_ltk; | |
2158 | } | |
2159 | ||
38606f14 JH |
2160 | /* Passkey entry has special treatment */ |
2161 | if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) | |
2162 | return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
2163 | ||
191dc7fe JH |
2164 | if (hcon->out) { |
2165 | u8 cfm[16]; | |
2166 | ||
2167 | err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk, | |
2168 | smp->rrnd, 0, cfm); | |
2169 | if (err) | |
2170 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2171 | ||
329d8230 | 2172 | if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16)) |
191dc7fe | 2173 | return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
191dc7fe JH |
2174 | } else { |
2175 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), | |
2176 | smp->prnd); | |
2177 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); | |
cee5f20f HC |
2178 | |
2179 | /* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */ | |
2180 | if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS) | |
2181 | goto mackey_and_ltk; | |
2182 | ||
2183 | /* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave | |
2184 | * the decision to user space since the remote device could | |
2185 | * be legitimate or malicious. | |
2186 | */ | |
2187 | if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, | |
2188 | hcon->role)) { | |
eed467b5 HC |
2189 | /* Set passkey to 0. The value can be any number since |
2190 | * it'll be ignored anyway. | |
2191 | */ | |
2192 | passkey = 0; | |
2193 | confirm_hint = 1; | |
2194 | goto confirm; | |
cee5f20f | 2195 | } |
191dc7fe JH |
2196 | } |
2197 | ||
a29b0733 | 2198 | mackey_and_ltk: |
760b018b JH |
2199 | /* Generate MacKey and LTK */ |
2200 | err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk); | |
2201 | if (err) | |
2202 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2203 | ||
ffee202a | 2204 | if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { |
dddd3059 | 2205 | if (hcon->out) { |
38606f14 | 2206 | sc_dhkey_check(smp); |
dddd3059 JH |
2207 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); |
2208 | } | |
2209 | return 0; | |
2210 | } | |
2211 | ||
38606f14 JH |
2212 | err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey); |
2213 | if (err) | |
2214 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2215 | ||
eed467b5 HC |
2216 | confirm_hint = 0; |
2217 | ||
2218 | confirm: | |
ffee202a SS |
2219 | if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) |
2220 | confirm_hint = 1; | |
2221 | ||
38606f14 | 2222 | err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, |
eed467b5 | 2223 | hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint); |
191dc7fe JH |
2224 | if (err) |
2225 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2226 | ||
38606f14 JH |
2227 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); |
2228 | ||
191dc7fe | 2229 | return 0; |
88ba43b6 AB |
2230 | } |
2231 | ||
f81cd823 | 2232 | static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) |
988c5997 | 2233 | { |
c9839a11 | 2234 | struct smp_ltk *key; |
988c5997 VCG |
2235 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
2236 | ||
f3a73d97 | 2237 | key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role); |
988c5997 | 2238 | if (!key) |
f81cd823 | 2239 | return false; |
988c5997 | 2240 | |
a6f7833c | 2241 | if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level) |
f81cd823 | 2242 | return false; |
4dab7864 | 2243 | |
51a8efd7 | 2244 | if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) |
f81cd823 | 2245 | return true; |
988c5997 | 2246 | |
8b76ce34 | 2247 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size); |
c9839a11 | 2248 | hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size; |
988c5997 | 2249 | |
fe59a05f JH |
2250 | /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */ |
2251 | clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); | |
2252 | ||
f81cd823 | 2253 | return true; |
988c5997 | 2254 | } |
f1560463 | 2255 | |
35dc6f83 JH |
2256 | bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level, |
2257 | enum smp_key_pref key_pref) | |
854f4727 JH |
2258 | { |
2259 | if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) | |
2260 | return true; | |
2261 | ||
35dc6f83 JH |
2262 | /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using |
2263 | * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the | |
2264 | * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK | |
2265 | * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we | |
2266 | * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits). | |
9ab65d60 | 2267 | */ |
35dc6f83 JH |
2268 | if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK && |
2269 | test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && | |
f3a73d97 | 2270 | hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role)) |
9ab65d60 JH |
2271 | return false; |
2272 | ||
854f4727 JH |
2273 | if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level) |
2274 | return true; | |
2275 | ||
2276 | return false; | |
2277 | } | |
2278 | ||
da85e5e5 | 2279 | static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
88ba43b6 AB |
2280 | { |
2281 | struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
2282 | struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; | |
f1cb9af5 | 2283 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
0edb14de | 2284 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
8aab4757 | 2285 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
c05b9339 | 2286 | u8 sec_level, auth; |
88ba43b6 AB |
2287 | |
2288 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
2289 | ||
c46b98be | 2290 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) |
38e4a915 | 2291 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 2292 | |
40bef302 | 2293 | if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
86ca9eac JH |
2294 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
2295 | ||
0edb14de | 2296 | auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
c05b9339 | 2297 | |
d7a5a11d | 2298 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
903b71c7 JH |
2299 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; |
2300 | ||
5be5e275 | 2301 | if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) |
1afc2a1a JH |
2302 | sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
2303 | else | |
2304 | sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); | |
2305 | ||
64e759f5 SJ |
2306 | if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) { |
2307 | /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we | |
2308 | * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3, | |
2309 | * Part H 2.4.6 | |
2310 | */ | |
2311 | smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level); | |
854f4727 | 2312 | return 0; |
64e759f5 | 2313 | } |
854f4727 | 2314 | |
c7262e71 JH |
2315 | if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) |
2316 | hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
feb45eb5 | 2317 | |
4dab7864 | 2318 | if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) |
988c5997 VCG |
2319 | return 0; |
2320 | ||
8aab4757 | 2321 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
c29d2444 JH |
2322 | if (!smp) |
2323 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
d26a2345 | 2324 | |
d7a5a11d | 2325 | if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) && |
c05b9339 | 2326 | (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) |
616d55be JH |
2327 | return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
2328 | ||
88ba43b6 | 2329 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
88ba43b6 | 2330 | |
da85e5e5 | 2331 | memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); |
c05b9339 | 2332 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth); |
88ba43b6 | 2333 | |
1c1def09 VCG |
2334 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
2335 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); | |
f01ead31 | 2336 | |
88ba43b6 | 2337 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
b28b4943 | 2338 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); |
f1cb9af5 | 2339 | |
da85e5e5 | 2340 | return 0; |
88ba43b6 AB |
2341 | } |
2342 | ||
cc110922 | 2343 | int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) |
eb492e01 | 2344 | { |
cc110922 | 2345 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
c68b7f12 | 2346 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
0a66cf20 | 2347 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
2b64d153 | 2348 | __u8 authreq; |
fc75cc86 | 2349 | int ret; |
eb492e01 | 2350 | |
3a0259bb VCG |
2351 | BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level); |
2352 | ||
0a66cf20 JH |
2353 | /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */ |
2354 | if (!conn) | |
2355 | return 1; | |
2356 | ||
d7a5a11d | 2357 | if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) |
2e65c9d2 AG |
2358 | return 1; |
2359 | ||
35dc6f83 | 2360 | if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) |
eb492e01 | 2361 | return 1; |
f1cb9af5 | 2362 | |
c7262e71 JH |
2363 | if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) |
2364 | hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
2365 | ||
40bef302 | 2366 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
c7262e71 JH |
2367 | if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) |
2368 | return 0; | |
d26a2345 | 2369 | |
d8949aad JH |
2370 | chan = conn->smp; |
2371 | if (!chan) { | |
2064ee33 | 2372 | bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available"); |
d8949aad JH |
2373 | return 1; |
2374 | } | |
2375 | ||
fc75cc86 JH |
2376 | l2cap_chan_lock(chan); |
2377 | ||
2378 | /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */ | |
2379 | if (chan->data) { | |
2380 | ret = 0; | |
2381 | goto unlock; | |
2382 | } | |
d26a2345 | 2383 | |
8aab4757 | 2384 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
fc75cc86 JH |
2385 | if (!smp) { |
2386 | ret = 1; | |
2387 | goto unlock; | |
2388 | } | |
2b64d153 BG |
2389 | |
2390 | authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level); | |
d26a2345 | 2391 | |
a62da6f1 | 2392 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) { |
d2eb9e10 | 2393 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC; |
a62da6f1 JH |
2394 | if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) |
2395 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2; | |
2396 | } | |
d2eb9e10 | 2397 | |
c2aa30db AP |
2398 | /* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs |
2399 | * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C | |
2e233644 | 2400 | */ |
c2aa30db AP |
2401 | if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) { |
2402 | /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level | |
2403 | * requires it. | |
2404 | */ | |
2405 | if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || | |
2406 | hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) | |
2407 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; | |
2408 | } | |
2e233644 | 2409 | |
40bef302 | 2410 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) { |
d26a2345 | 2411 | struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; |
f01ead31 | 2412 | |
2b64d153 | 2413 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq); |
1c1def09 VCG |
2414 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
2415 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); | |
f01ead31 | 2416 | |
eb492e01 | 2417 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
b28b4943 | 2418 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); |
eb492e01 AB |
2419 | } else { |
2420 | struct smp_cmd_security_req cp; | |
2b64d153 | 2421 | cp.auth_req = authreq; |
eb492e01 | 2422 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
b28b4943 | 2423 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ); |
eb492e01 AB |
2424 | } |
2425 | ||
4a74d658 | 2426 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); |
fc75cc86 | 2427 | ret = 0; |
edca792c | 2428 | |
fc75cc86 JH |
2429 | unlock: |
2430 | l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); | |
2431 | return ret; | |
eb492e01 AB |
2432 | } |
2433 | ||
cb28c306 MK |
2434 | int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, |
2435 | u8 addr_type) | |
c81d555a | 2436 | { |
cb28c306 MK |
2437 | struct hci_conn *hcon; |
2438 | struct l2cap_conn *conn; | |
c81d555a JH |
2439 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
2440 | struct smp_chan *smp; | |
cb28c306 MK |
2441 | int err; |
2442 | ||
2443 | err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type); | |
2444 | hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type); | |
2445 | ||
2446 | hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type); | |
2447 | if (!hcon) | |
2448 | goto done; | |
c81d555a | 2449 | |
cb28c306 | 2450 | conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
c81d555a | 2451 | if (!conn) |
cb28c306 | 2452 | goto done; |
c81d555a JH |
2453 | |
2454 | chan = conn->smp; | |
2455 | if (!chan) | |
cb28c306 | 2456 | goto done; |
c81d555a JH |
2457 | |
2458 | l2cap_chan_lock(chan); | |
2459 | ||
2460 | smp = chan->data; | |
2461 | if (smp) { | |
cb28c306 MK |
2462 | /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to |
2463 | * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */ | |
2464 | smp->ltk = NULL; | |
2465 | smp->slave_ltk = NULL; | |
2466 | smp->remote_irk = NULL; | |
2467 | ||
c81d555a JH |
2468 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags)) |
2469 | smp_failure(conn, 0); | |
2470 | else | |
2471 | smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED); | |
cb28c306 | 2472 | err = 0; |
c81d555a JH |
2473 | } |
2474 | ||
2475 | l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); | |
cb28c306 MK |
2476 | |
2477 | done: | |
2478 | return err; | |
c81d555a JH |
2479 | } |
2480 | ||
7034b911 VCG |
2481 | static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
2482 | { | |
16b90839 | 2483 | struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; |
5d88cc73 JH |
2484 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
2485 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
16b90839 | 2486 | |
c46b98be JH |
2487 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); |
2488 | ||
2489 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
38e4a915 | 2490 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 2491 | |
600a8749 AM |
2492 | /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */ |
2493 | if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK, | |
2494 | rp->ltk)) { | |
2495 | bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev, | |
2496 | "LTK blocked for %pMR", | |
2497 | &conn->hcon->dst); | |
2498 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
2499 | } | |
2500 | ||
b28b4943 | 2501 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT); |
6131ddc8 | 2502 | |
16b90839 VCG |
2503 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
2504 | ||
1c1def09 | 2505 | memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
16b90839 | 2506 | |
7034b911 VCG |
2507 | return 0; |
2508 | } | |
2509 | ||
2510 | static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
2511 | { | |
16b90839 | 2512 | struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data; |
5d88cc73 JH |
2513 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
2514 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
c9839a11 VCG |
2515 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
2516 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
23d0e128 | 2517 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; |
c9839a11 | 2518 | u8 authenticated; |
16b90839 | 2519 | |
c46b98be JH |
2520 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); |
2521 | ||
2522 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
38e4a915 | 2523 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
c46b98be | 2524 | |
9747a9f3 JH |
2525 | /* Mark the information as received */ |
2526 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; | |
2527 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
2528 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) |
2529 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); | |
196332f5 JH |
2530 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) |
2531 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
b28b4943 | 2532 | |
16b90839 | 2533 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
7034b911 | 2534 | |
ce39fb4e | 2535 | authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH); |
2ceba539 | 2536 | ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK, |
23d0e128 JH |
2537 | authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, |
2538 | rp->ediv, rp->rand); | |
2539 | smp->ltk = ltk; | |
c6e81e9a | 2540 | if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) |
d6268e86 | 2541 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
7034b911 VCG |
2542 | |
2543 | return 0; | |
2544 | } | |
2545 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
2546 | static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
2547 | { | |
2548 | struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
2549 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
2550 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
fd349c02 JH |
2551 | |
2552 | BT_DBG(""); | |
2553 | ||
2554 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) | |
38e4a915 | 2555 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
fd349c02 | 2556 | |
600a8749 AM |
2557 | /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */ |
2558 | if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_IRK, | |
2559 | info->irk)) { | |
2560 | bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev, | |
2561 | "Identity key blocked for %pMR", | |
2562 | &conn->hcon->dst); | |
2563 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
2564 | } | |
2565 | ||
b28b4943 | 2566 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO); |
6131ddc8 | 2567 | |
fd349c02 JH |
2568 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); |
2569 | ||
2570 | memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16); | |
2571 | ||
2572 | return 0; | |
2573 | } | |
2574 | ||
2575 | static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, | |
2576 | struct sk_buff *skb) | |
2577 | { | |
2578 | struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
2579 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
2580 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
fd349c02 JH |
2581 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
2582 | bdaddr_t rpa; | |
2583 | ||
2584 | BT_DBG(""); | |
2585 | ||
2586 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) | |
38e4a915 | 2587 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
fd349c02 | 2588 | |
9747a9f3 JH |
2589 | /* Mark the information as received */ |
2590 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
2591 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
2592 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) |
2593 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
2594 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
2595 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); |
2596 | ||
a9a58f86 JH |
2597 | /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending |
2598 | * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK | |
2599 | * as "identity information". However, since such | |
2600 | * implementations are not known of and in order to not over | |
2601 | * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never | |
2602 | * received an IRK for such a device. | |
e12af489 JH |
2603 | * |
2604 | * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public | |
2605 | * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for. | |
a9a58f86 | 2606 | */ |
e12af489 JH |
2607 | if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) || |
2608 | !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) { | |
2064ee33 | 2609 | bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address"); |
31dd624e | 2610 | goto distribute; |
a9a58f86 JH |
2611 | } |
2612 | ||
1d87b88b SJ |
2613 | /* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is |
2614 | * providing different address as identity information. | |
2615 | * | |
2616 | * Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug. | |
2617 | */ | |
2618 | if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) && | |
2619 | (bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) || | |
2620 | info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) { | |
2621 | bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, | |
2622 | "ignoring IRK with invalid identity address"); | |
2623 | goto distribute; | |
2624 | } | |
2625 | ||
fd349c02 JH |
2626 | bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr); |
2627 | smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type; | |
2628 | ||
2629 | if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type)) | |
2630 | bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst); | |
2631 | else | |
2632 | bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY); | |
2633 | ||
23d0e128 JH |
2634 | smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr, |
2635 | smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa); | |
fd349c02 | 2636 | |
31dd624e | 2637 | distribute: |
c6e81e9a JH |
2638 | if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) |
2639 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); | |
fd349c02 JH |
2640 | |
2641 | return 0; | |
2642 | } | |
2643 | ||
7ee4ea36 MH |
2644 | static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
2645 | { | |
2646 | struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
5d88cc73 JH |
2647 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
2648 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
7ee4ea36 MH |
2649 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; |
2650 | ||
2651 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
2652 | ||
2653 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
38e4a915 | 2654 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
7ee4ea36 | 2655 | |
7ee4ea36 MH |
2656 | /* Mark the information as received */ |
2657 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
2658 | ||
2659 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); | |
2660 | ||
7ee4ea36 MH |
2661 | csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); |
2662 | if (csrk) { | |
4cd3928a JH |
2663 | if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) |
2664 | csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED; | |
2665 | else | |
2666 | csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED; | |
7ee4ea36 MH |
2667 | memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); |
2668 | } | |
2669 | smp->csrk = csrk; | |
d6268e86 | 2670 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
7ee4ea36 MH |
2671 | |
2672 | return 0; | |
2673 | } | |
2674 | ||
5e3d3d9b JH |
2675 | static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp) |
2676 | { | |
2677 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
2678 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
2679 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote; | |
2680 | u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method; | |
2681 | ||
1a8bab4f JH |
2682 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) || |
2683 | test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) | |
a29b0733 JH |
2684 | return REQ_OOB; |
2685 | ||
5e3d3d9b JH |
2686 | /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs |
2687 | * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get | |
2688 | * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the | |
2689 | * first byte which contains the opcode. | |
2690 | */ | |
2691 | if (hcon->out) { | |
2692 | local = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
2693 | remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
2694 | } else { | |
2695 | local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
2696 | remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
2697 | } | |
2698 | ||
2699 | local_io = local->io_capability; | |
2700 | remote_io = remote->io_capability; | |
2701 | ||
2702 | local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); | |
2703 | remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); | |
2704 | ||
2705 | /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table, | |
2706 | * otherwise use JUST WORKS. | |
2707 | */ | |
2708 | if (local_mitm || remote_mitm) | |
2709 | method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); | |
2710 | else | |
2711 | method = JUST_WORKS; | |
2712 | ||
2713 | /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ | |
2714 | if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) | |
2715 | method = JUST_WORKS; | |
2716 | ||
2717 | return method; | |
2718 | } | |
2719 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
2720 | static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
2721 | { | |
2722 | struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data; | |
2723 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
2724 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
2725 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
5e3d3d9b | 2726 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
c0153b0b | 2727 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
cbbbe3e2 | 2728 | struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; |
d8f8edbe JH |
2729 | int err; |
2730 | ||
2731 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
2732 | ||
2733 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*key)) | |
2734 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
2735 | ||
2736 | memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64); | |
2737 | ||
a8ca617c JH |
2738 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) { |
2739 | err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk, | |
2740 | smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val); | |
2741 | if (err) | |
2742 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2743 | ||
329d8230 | 2744 | if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16)) |
a8ca617c JH |
2745 | return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
2746 | } | |
2747 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
2748 | /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving |
2749 | * the key from the initiating device. | |
2750 | */ | |
2751 | if (!hcon->out) { | |
2752 | err = sc_send_public_key(smp); | |
2753 | if (err) | |
2754 | return err; | |
2755 | } | |
2756 | ||
c7a3d57d | 2757 | SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk); |
e091526d | 2758 | SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32); |
d8f8edbe | 2759 | |
c0153b0b TA |
2760 | /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private |
2761 | * key was set/generated. | |
2762 | */ | |
2763 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) { | |
4ba5175f MK |
2764 | struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data; |
2765 | struct smp_dev *smp_dev; | |
2766 | ||
2767 | if (!hchan || !hchan->data) | |
2768 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2769 | ||
2770 | smp_dev = hchan->data; | |
c0153b0b TA |
2771 | |
2772 | tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh; | |
2773 | } else { | |
2774 | tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh; | |
2775 | } | |
2776 | ||
2777 | if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey)) | |
d8f8edbe JH |
2778 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
2779 | ||
c7a3d57d | 2780 | SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey); |
d8f8edbe JH |
2781 | |
2782 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags); | |
2783 | ||
5e3d3d9b JH |
2784 | smp->method = sc_select_method(smp); |
2785 | ||
2786 | BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method); | |
2787 | ||
2788 | /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */ | |
2789 | if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM) | |
2790 | hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; | |
2791 | else | |
2792 | hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS; | |
2793 | ||
329d8230 | 2794 | if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64)) |
aeb7d461 JH |
2795 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); |
2796 | ||
38606f14 JH |
2797 | if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) { |
2798 | get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify, | |
2799 | sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify)); | |
2800 | hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000; | |
2801 | hcon->passkey_entered = 0; | |
2802 | smp->passkey_round = 0; | |
2803 | if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, | |
2804 | hcon->dst_type, | |
2805 | hcon->passkey_notify, | |
2806 | hcon->passkey_entered)) | |
2807 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2808 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
2809 | return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
2810 | } | |
2811 | ||
94ea7257 | 2812 | if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { |
a29b0733 JH |
2813 | if (hcon->out) |
2814 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, | |
2815 | sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); | |
2816 | ||
2817 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
2818 | ||
2819 | return 0; | |
2820 | } | |
2821 | ||
38606f14 JH |
2822 | if (hcon->out) |
2823 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
2824 | ||
2825 | if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) { | |
2826 | if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, | |
2827 | hcon->dst_type)) | |
2828 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2829 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
2830 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); | |
2831 | return 0; | |
2832 | } | |
2833 | ||
cbbbe3e2 JH |
2834 | /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to |
2835 | * send the confirm value. | |
2836 | */ | |
2837 | if (conn->hcon->out) | |
2838 | return 0; | |
2839 | ||
2840 | err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, | |
2841 | 0, cfm.confirm_val); | |
2842 | if (err) | |
2843 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2844 | ||
2845 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); | |
2846 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
2847 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
2848 | return 0; |
2849 | } | |
2850 | ||
6433a9a2 JH |
2851 | static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
2852 | { | |
2853 | struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data; | |
2854 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
2855 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
2856 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
2857 | u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; | |
2858 | u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16]; | |
2859 | int err; | |
2860 | ||
2861 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
2862 | ||
2863 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*check)) | |
2864 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
2865 | ||
2866 | memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); | |
2867 | memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); | |
2868 | a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; | |
2869 | b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; | |
2870 | ||
2871 | if (hcon->out) { | |
2872 | local_addr = a; | |
2873 | remote_addr = b; | |
2874 | memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); | |
2875 | } else { | |
2876 | local_addr = b; | |
2877 | remote_addr = a; | |
2878 | memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); | |
2879 | } | |
2880 | ||
2881 | memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); | |
2882 | ||
38606f14 JH |
2883 | if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) |
2884 | put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r); | |
882fafad JH |
2885 | else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) |
2886 | memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16); | |
38606f14 | 2887 | |
6433a9a2 JH |
2888 | err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r, |
2889 | io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e); | |
2890 | if (err) | |
2891 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2892 | ||
329d8230 | 2893 | if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16)) |
6433a9a2 JH |
2894 | return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED; |
2895 | ||
d3e54a87 JH |
2896 | if (!hcon->out) { |
2897 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) { | |
2898 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags); | |
2899 | return 0; | |
2900 | } | |
d378a2d7 | 2901 | |
d3e54a87 JH |
2902 | /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */ |
2903 | sc_dhkey_check(smp); | |
2904 | } | |
d378a2d7 | 2905 | |
d3e54a87 | 2906 | sc_add_ltk(smp); |
6433a9a2 JH |
2907 | |
2908 | if (hcon->out) { | |
8b76ce34 | 2909 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size); |
6433a9a2 JH |
2910 | hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; |
2911 | } | |
2912 | ||
2913 | return 0; | |
2914 | } | |
2915 | ||
1408bb6e JH |
2916 | static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn, |
2917 | struct sk_buff *skb) | |
2918 | { | |
2919 | struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data; | |
2920 | ||
2921 | BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value); | |
2922 | ||
2923 | return 0; | |
2924 | } | |
2925 | ||
4befb867 | 2926 | static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) |
eb492e01 | 2927 | { |
5d88cc73 | 2928 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
7b9899db | 2929 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
b28b4943 | 2930 | struct smp_chan *smp; |
92381f5c | 2931 | __u8 code, reason; |
eb492e01 AB |
2932 | int err = 0; |
2933 | ||
8ae9b984 | 2934 | if (skb->len < 1) |
92381f5c | 2935 | return -EILSEQ; |
92381f5c | 2936 | |
d7a5a11d | 2937 | if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) { |
2e65c9d2 AG |
2938 | reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
2939 | goto done; | |
2940 | } | |
2941 | ||
92381f5c | 2942 | code = skb->data[0]; |
eb492e01 AB |
2943 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code)); |
2944 | ||
b28b4943 JH |
2945 | smp = chan->data; |
2946 | ||
2947 | if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX) | |
2948 | goto drop; | |
2949 | ||
24bd0bd9 | 2950 | if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)) |
b28b4943 JH |
2951 | goto drop; |
2952 | ||
2953 | /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are | |
2954 | * pairing request and security request. | |
8cf9fa12 | 2955 | */ |
b28b4943 JH |
2956 | if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ) |
2957 | goto drop; | |
8cf9fa12 | 2958 | |
eb492e01 AB |
2959 | switch (code) { |
2960 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ: | |
da85e5e5 | 2961 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb); |
eb492e01 AB |
2962 | break; |
2963 | ||
2964 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL: | |
84794e11 | 2965 | smp_failure(conn, 0); |
da85e5e5 | 2966 | err = -EPERM; |
eb492e01 AB |
2967 | break; |
2968 | ||
2969 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP: | |
da85e5e5 | 2970 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
2971 | break; |
2972 | ||
2973 | case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: | |
da85e5e5 | 2974 | reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
2975 | break; |
2976 | ||
eb492e01 | 2977 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: |
da85e5e5 | 2978 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
2979 | break; |
2980 | ||
eb492e01 | 2981 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: |
da85e5e5 | 2982 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb); |
88ba43b6 AB |
2983 | break; |
2984 | ||
eb492e01 | 2985 | case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: |
7034b911 VCG |
2986 | reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); |
2987 | break; | |
2988 | ||
eb492e01 | 2989 | case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: |
7034b911 VCG |
2990 | reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); |
2991 | break; | |
2992 | ||
eb492e01 | 2993 | case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: |
fd349c02 JH |
2994 | reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb); |
2995 | break; | |
2996 | ||
eb492e01 | 2997 | case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: |
fd349c02 JH |
2998 | reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb); |
2999 | break; | |
3000 | ||
eb492e01 | 3001 | case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: |
7ee4ea36 | 3002 | reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb); |
7034b911 VCG |
3003 | break; |
3004 | ||
d8f8edbe JH |
3005 | case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: |
3006 | reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb); | |
3007 | break; | |
3008 | ||
6433a9a2 JH |
3009 | case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK: |
3010 | reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb); | |
3011 | break; | |
3012 | ||
1408bb6e JH |
3013 | case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY: |
3014 | reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb); | |
3015 | break; | |
3016 | ||
eb492e01 AB |
3017 | default: |
3018 | BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); | |
eb492e01 | 3019 | reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
3a0259bb | 3020 | goto done; |
eb492e01 AB |
3021 | } |
3022 | ||
3a0259bb | 3023 | done: |
9b7b18ef JH |
3024 | if (!err) { |
3025 | if (reason) | |
3026 | smp_failure(conn, reason); | |
8ae9b984 | 3027 | kfree_skb(skb); |
9b7b18ef JH |
3028 | } |
3029 | ||
eb492e01 | 3030 | return err; |
b28b4943 JH |
3031 | |
3032 | drop: | |
2064ee33 MH |
3033 | bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", |
3034 | code, &hcon->dst); | |
b28b4943 JH |
3035 | kfree_skb(skb); |
3036 | return 0; | |
eb492e01 | 3037 | } |
7034b911 | 3038 | |
70db83c4 JH |
3039 | static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) |
3040 | { | |
3041 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
3042 | ||
3043 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
3044 | ||
fc75cc86 | 3045 | if (chan->data) |
5d88cc73 | 3046 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); |
5d88cc73 | 3047 | |
70db83c4 JH |
3048 | conn->smp = NULL; |
3049 | l2cap_chan_put(chan); | |
3050 | } | |
3051 | ||
b5ae344d JH |
3052 | static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
3053 | { | |
3054 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
3055 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
3056 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
3057 | struct smp_cmd_pairing req; | |
3058 | struct smp_chan *smp; | |
3059 | ||
3060 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
3061 | ||
3062 | /* Only new pairings are interesting */ | |
3063 | if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags)) | |
3064 | return; | |
3065 | ||
3066 | /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */ | |
3067 | if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) | |
3068 | return; | |
3069 | ||
3070 | /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */ | |
3071 | if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) | |
3072 | return; | |
3073 | ||
3074 | /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */ | |
d7a5a11d | 3075 | if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) |
b5ae344d JH |
3076 | return; |
3077 | ||
3078 | /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */ | |
3079 | if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) && | |
b7cb93e5 | 3080 | !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) |
b5ae344d JH |
3081 | return; |
3082 | ||
3083 | /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */ | |
d7a5a11d | 3084 | if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) |
b5ae344d JH |
3085 | return; |
3086 | ||
3087 | /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */ | |
3088 | if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon)) | |
3089 | return; | |
3090 | ||
3091 | /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */ | |
3092 | if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR)) | |
3093 | return; | |
3094 | ||
3095 | /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */ | |
3096 | if (chan->data) | |
3097 | return; | |
3098 | ||
3099 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); | |
3100 | if (!smp) { | |
2064ee33 | 3101 | bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR"); |
b5ae344d JH |
3102 | return; |
3103 | } | |
3104 | ||
3105 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); | |
3106 | ||
3107 | BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name); | |
3108 | ||
3109 | /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */ | |
3110 | build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL); | |
3111 | ||
3112 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; | |
3113 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req)); | |
3114 | ||
3115 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req); | |
3116 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); | |
3117 | } | |
3118 | ||
44f1a7ab JH |
3119 | static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
3120 | { | |
b68fda68 | 3121 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
44f1a7ab JH |
3122 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
3123 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
3124 | ||
3125 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
3126 | ||
b5ae344d JH |
3127 | if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { |
3128 | bredr_pairing(chan); | |
ef8efe4b | 3129 | return; |
b5ae344d | 3130 | } |
ef8efe4b | 3131 | |
86d1407c JH |
3132 | if (!smp) |
3133 | return; | |
b68fda68 | 3134 | |
84bc0db5 JH |
3135 | if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) |
3136 | return; | |
3137 | ||
86d1407c JH |
3138 | cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer); |
3139 | ||
d6268e86 | 3140 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
44f1a7ab JH |
3141 | } |
3142 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
3143 | static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
3144 | { | |
3145 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
b5ae344d | 3146 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
70db83c4 JH |
3147 | |
3148 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
3149 | ||
7883746b JH |
3150 | /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own |
3151 | * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the | |
3152 | * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in | |
3153 | * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont | |
3154 | * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called. | |
3155 | */ | |
70db83c4 | 3156 | conn->smp = chan; |
b5ae344d JH |
3157 | |
3158 | if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) | |
3159 | bredr_pairing(chan); | |
70db83c4 JH |
3160 | } |
3161 | ||
4befb867 JH |
3162 | static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) |
3163 | { | |
3164 | int err; | |
3165 | ||
3166 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
3167 | ||
3168 | err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb); | |
3169 | if (err) { | |
b68fda68 | 3170 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
4befb867 | 3171 | |
b68fda68 JH |
3172 | if (smp) |
3173 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
4befb867 | 3174 | |
1e91c29e | 3175 | hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); |
4befb867 JH |
3176 | } |
3177 | ||
3178 | return err; | |
3179 | } | |
3180 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
3181 | static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, |
3182 | unsigned long hdr_len, | |
3183 | unsigned long len, int nb) | |
3184 | { | |
3185 | struct sk_buff *skb; | |
3186 | ||
3187 | skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
3188 | if (!skb) | |
3189 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
3190 | ||
3191 | skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX; | |
a4368ff3 | 3192 | bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan; |
70db83c4 JH |
3193 | |
3194 | return skb; | |
3195 | } | |
3196 | ||
3197 | static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { | |
3198 | .name = "Security Manager", | |
3199 | .ready = smp_ready_cb, | |
5d88cc73 | 3200 | .recv = smp_recv_cb, |
70db83c4 JH |
3201 | .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb, |
3202 | .teardown = smp_teardown_cb, | |
44f1a7ab | 3203 | .resume = smp_resume_cb, |
70db83c4 JH |
3204 | |
3205 | .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection, | |
70db83c4 JH |
3206 | .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, |
3207 | .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, | |
3208 | .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, | |
3209 | .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, | |
70db83c4 JH |
3210 | .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, |
3211 | .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, | |
70db83c4 JH |
3212 | }; |
3213 | ||
3214 | static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) | |
3215 | { | |
3216 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
3217 | ||
3218 | BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan); | |
3219 | ||
3220 | chan = l2cap_chan_create(); | |
3221 | if (!chan) | |
3222 | return NULL; | |
3223 | ||
3224 | chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; | |
3225 | chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops; | |
3226 | chan->scid = pchan->scid; | |
3227 | chan->dcid = chan->scid; | |
3228 | chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; | |
3229 | chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; | |
3230 | chan->mode = pchan->mode; | |
3231 | ||
abe84903 JH |
3232 | /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to |
3233 | * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel | |
3234 | * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep | |
3235 | * warnings. | |
3236 | */ | |
3237 | atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); | |
3238 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
3239 | BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); |
3240 | ||
3241 | return chan; | |
3242 | } | |
3243 | ||
3244 | static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = { | |
3245 | .name = "Security Manager Root", | |
3246 | .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb, | |
3247 | ||
3248 | /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */ | |
3249 | .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, | |
3250 | .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb, | |
3251 | .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv, | |
3252 | .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, | |
3253 | .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown, | |
3254 | .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready, | |
3255 | .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, | |
3256 | .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, | |
3257 | .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume, | |
3258 | .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, | |
3259 | .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, | |
70db83c4 JH |
3260 | }; |
3261 | ||
ef8efe4b | 3262 | static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid) |
711eafe3 | 3263 | { |
70db83c4 | 3264 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
88a479d9 | 3265 | struct smp_dev *smp; |
71af2f6b | 3266 | struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; |
47eb2ac8 | 3267 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
70db83c4 | 3268 | |
ef8efe4b | 3269 | if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) { |
88a479d9 | 3270 | smp = NULL; |
ef8efe4b JH |
3271 | goto create_chan; |
3272 | } | |
711eafe3 | 3273 | |
88a479d9 MH |
3274 | smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL); |
3275 | if (!smp) | |
3276 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
3277 | ||
71af2f6b | 3278 | tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); |
6e2dc6d1 MH |
3279 | if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { |
3280 | BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); | |
6e2dc6d1 MH |
3281 | kzfree(smp); |
3282 | return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac); | |
3283 | } | |
3284 | ||
075f7732 | 3285 | tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0); |
47eb2ac8 TA |
3286 | if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) { |
3287 | BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); | |
3288 | crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); | |
47eb2ac8 TA |
3289 | kzfree(smp); |
3290 | return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh); | |
3291 | } | |
3292 | ||
94f14e47 | 3293 | smp->local_oob = false; |
6e2dc6d1 | 3294 | smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac; |
47eb2ac8 | 3295 | smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh; |
88a479d9 | 3296 | |
ef8efe4b | 3297 | create_chan: |
70db83c4 JH |
3298 | chan = l2cap_chan_create(); |
3299 | if (!chan) { | |
63511f6d | 3300 | if (smp) { |
71af2f6b | 3301 | crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); |
47eb2ac8 | 3302 | crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh); |
63511f6d MH |
3303 | kzfree(smp); |
3304 | } | |
ef8efe4b | 3305 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
70db83c4 JH |
3306 | } |
3307 | ||
88a479d9 | 3308 | chan->data = smp; |
defce9e8 | 3309 | |
ef8efe4b | 3310 | l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid); |
70db83c4 JH |
3311 | |
3312 | l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); | |
3313 | ||
157029ba | 3314 | if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) { |
39e3e744 JH |
3315 | u8 bdaddr_type; |
3316 | ||
3317 | hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type); | |
3318 | ||
3319 | if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC) | |
157029ba | 3320 | chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; |
39e3e744 JH |
3321 | else |
3322 | chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM; | |
157029ba MH |
3323 | } else { |
3324 | bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr); | |
ef8efe4b | 3325 | chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR; |
157029ba MH |
3326 | } |
3327 | ||
70db83c4 JH |
3328 | chan->state = BT_LISTEN; |
3329 | chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC; | |
3330 | chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; | |
3331 | chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops; | |
3332 | ||
abe84903 JH |
3333 | /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */ |
3334 | atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT); | |
3335 | ||
ef8efe4b | 3336 | return chan; |
711eafe3 JH |
3337 | } |
3338 | ||
ef8efe4b | 3339 | static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
711eafe3 | 3340 | { |
88a479d9 | 3341 | struct smp_dev *smp; |
70db83c4 | 3342 | |
ef8efe4b | 3343 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); |
711eafe3 | 3344 | |
88a479d9 MH |
3345 | smp = chan->data; |
3346 | if (smp) { | |
defce9e8 | 3347 | chan->data = NULL; |
71af2f6b | 3348 | crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); |
47eb2ac8 | 3349 | crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh); |
88a479d9 | 3350 | kzfree(smp); |
711eafe3 | 3351 | } |
70db83c4 | 3352 | |
70db83c4 | 3353 | l2cap_chan_put(chan); |
711eafe3 | 3354 | } |
ef8efe4b | 3355 | |
300acfde MH |
3356 | static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file, |
3357 | char __user *user_buf, | |
3358 | size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | |
3359 | { | |
3360 | struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data; | |
3361 | char buf[3]; | |
3362 | ||
b7cb93e5 | 3363 | buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N'; |
300acfde MH |
3364 | buf[1] = '\n'; |
3365 | buf[2] = '\0'; | |
3366 | return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2); | |
3367 | } | |
3368 | ||
3369 | static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file, | |
3370 | const char __user *user_buf, | |
3371 | size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | |
3372 | { | |
3373 | struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data; | |
300acfde | 3374 | bool enable; |
3bf5e97d | 3375 | int err; |
300acfde | 3376 | |
3bf5e97d AS |
3377 | err = kstrtobool_from_user(user_buf, count, &enable); |
3378 | if (err) | |
3379 | return err; | |
300acfde | 3380 | |
b7cb93e5 | 3381 | if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) |
300acfde MH |
3382 | return -EALREADY; |
3383 | ||
3384 | if (enable) { | |
3385 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
3386 | ||
3387 | chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR); | |
3388 | if (IS_ERR(chan)) | |
3389 | return PTR_ERR(chan); | |
3390 | ||
3391 | hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan; | |
3392 | } else { | |
3393 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
3394 | ||
3395 | chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; | |
3396 | hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; | |
3397 | smp_del_chan(chan); | |
3398 | } | |
3399 | ||
b7cb93e5 | 3400 | hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP); |
300acfde MH |
3401 | |
3402 | return count; | |
3403 | } | |
3404 | ||
3405 | static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = { | |
3406 | .open = simple_open, | |
3407 | .read = force_bredr_smp_read, | |
3408 | .write = force_bredr_smp_write, | |
3409 | .llseek = default_llseek, | |
3410 | }; | |
3411 | ||
ef8efe4b JH |
3412 | int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) |
3413 | { | |
3414 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
3415 | ||
3416 | BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); | |
3417 | ||
7e7ec445 MH |
3418 | /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then |
3419 | * there is also no need to register any SMP channel. | |
3420 | */ | |
3421 | if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev)) | |
3422 | return 0; | |
3423 | ||
2b8df323 MH |
3424 | if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) { |
3425 | chan = hdev->smp_data; | |
3426 | hdev->smp_data = NULL; | |
3427 | smp_del_chan(chan); | |
3428 | } | |
3429 | ||
ef8efe4b JH |
3430 | chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP); |
3431 | if (IS_ERR(chan)) | |
3432 | return PTR_ERR(chan); | |
3433 | ||
3434 | hdev->smp_data = chan; | |
3435 | ||
300acfde MH |
3436 | /* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections |
3437 | * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present. | |
3438 | * | |
3439 | * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs | |
3440 | * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting | |
3441 | * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections. | |
3442 | */ | |
3443 | if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) { | |
3444 | debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs, | |
3445 | hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops); | |
83ebb9ec SJ |
3446 | |
3447 | /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */ | |
3448 | if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) | |
3449 | return 0; | |
300acfde | 3450 | } |
ef8efe4b | 3451 | |
2b8df323 MH |
3452 | if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) { |
3453 | chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; | |
3454 | hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; | |
3455 | smp_del_chan(chan); | |
3456 | } | |
3457 | ||
ef8efe4b JH |
3458 | chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR); |
3459 | if (IS_ERR(chan)) { | |
3460 | int err = PTR_ERR(chan); | |
3461 | chan = hdev->smp_data; | |
3462 | hdev->smp_data = NULL; | |
3463 | smp_del_chan(chan); | |
3464 | return err; | |
3465 | } | |
3466 | ||
3467 | hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan; | |
3468 | ||
3469 | return 0; | |
3470 | } | |
3471 | ||
3472 | void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev) | |
3473 | { | |
3474 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
3475 | ||
3476 | if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) { | |
3477 | chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; | |
3478 | hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; | |
3479 | smp_del_chan(chan); | |
3480 | } | |
3481 | ||
3482 | if (hdev->smp_data) { | |
3483 | chan = hdev->smp_data; | |
3484 | hdev->smp_data = NULL; | |
3485 | smp_del_chan(chan); | |
3486 | } | |
3487 | } | |
0a2b0f04 JH |
3488 | |
3489 | #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP) | |
3490 | ||
47eb2ac8 | 3491 | static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh) |
71653eb6 | 3492 | { |
c0153b0b | 3493 | u8 pk[64]; |
a2976416 | 3494 | int err; |
71653eb6 | 3495 | |
c0153b0b | 3496 | err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk); |
a2976416 TA |
3497 | if (err) |
3498 | return err; | |
71653eb6 | 3499 | |
c0153b0b TA |
3500 | err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk); |
3501 | if (err) | |
3502 | return err; | |
71653eb6 | 3503 | |
329d8230 | 3504 | if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64)) |
71653eb6 MH |
3505 | return -EINVAL; |
3506 | ||
3507 | return 0; | |
3508 | } | |
3509 | ||
28a220aa | 3510 | static int __init test_ah(void) |
cfc4198e JH |
3511 | { |
3512 | const u8 irk[16] = { | |
3513 | 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, | |
3514 | 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; | |
3515 | const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 }; | |
3516 | const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d }; | |
3517 | u8 res[3]; | |
3518 | int err; | |
3519 | ||
28a220aa | 3520 | err = smp_ah(irk, r, res); |
cfc4198e JH |
3521 | if (err) |
3522 | return err; | |
3523 | ||
329d8230 | 3524 | if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3)) |
cfc4198e JH |
3525 | return -EINVAL; |
3526 | ||
3527 | return 0; | |
3528 | } | |
3529 | ||
28a220aa | 3530 | static int __init test_c1(void) |
cfc4198e JH |
3531 | { |
3532 | const u8 k[16] = { | |
3533 | 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, | |
3534 | 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; | |
3535 | const u8 r[16] = { | |
3536 | 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63, | |
3537 | 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 }; | |
3538 | const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 }; | |
3539 | const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 }; | |
3540 | const u8 _iat = 0x01; | |
3541 | const u8 _rat = 0x00; | |
3542 | const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } }; | |
3543 | const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } }; | |
3544 | const u8 exp[16] = { | |
3545 | 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2, | |
3546 | 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e }; | |
3547 | u8 res[16]; | |
3548 | int err; | |
3549 | ||
28a220aa | 3550 | err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res); |
cfc4198e JH |
3551 | if (err) |
3552 | return err; | |
3553 | ||
329d8230 | 3554 | if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
cfc4198e JH |
3555 | return -EINVAL; |
3556 | ||
3557 | return 0; | |
3558 | } | |
3559 | ||
28a220aa | 3560 | static int __init test_s1(void) |
cfc4198e JH |
3561 | { |
3562 | const u8 k[16] = { | |
3563 | 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, | |
3564 | 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; | |
3565 | const u8 r1[16] = { | |
3566 | 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 }; | |
3567 | const u8 r2[16] = { | |
3568 | 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 }; | |
3569 | const u8 exp[16] = { | |
3570 | 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b, | |
3571 | 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a }; | |
3572 | u8 res[16]; | |
3573 | int err; | |
3574 | ||
28a220aa | 3575 | err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res); |
cfc4198e JH |
3576 | if (err) |
3577 | return err; | |
3578 | ||
329d8230 | 3579 | if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
cfc4198e JH |
3580 | return -EINVAL; |
3581 | ||
3582 | return 0; | |
3583 | } | |
3584 | ||
71af2f6b | 3585 | static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3586 | { |
3587 | const u8 u[32] = { | |
3588 | 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, | |
3589 | 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, | |
3590 | 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, | |
3591 | 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 }; | |
3592 | const u8 v[32] = { | |
3593 | 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b, | |
3594 | 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59, | |
3595 | 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90, | |
3596 | 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 }; | |
3597 | const u8 x[16] = { | |
3598 | 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, | |
3599 | 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; | |
3600 | const u8 z = 0x00; | |
3601 | const u8 exp[16] = { | |
3602 | 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1, | |
3603 | 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 }; | |
3604 | u8 res[16]; | |
3605 | int err; | |
3606 | ||
3607 | err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res); | |
3608 | if (err) | |
3609 | return err; | |
3610 | ||
329d8230 | 3611 | if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3612 | return -EINVAL; |
3613 | ||
3614 | return 0; | |
3615 | } | |
3616 | ||
71af2f6b | 3617 | static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3618 | { |
3619 | const u8 w[32] = { | |
3620 | 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86, | |
3621 | 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99, | |
3622 | 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, | |
3623 | 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; | |
3624 | const u8 n1[16] = { | |
3625 | 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, | |
3626 | 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; | |
3627 | const u8 n2[16] = { | |
3628 | 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, | |
3629 | 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; | |
3630 | const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 }; | |
3631 | const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 }; | |
3632 | const u8 exp_ltk[16] = { | |
3633 | 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98, | |
3634 | 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 }; | |
3635 | const u8 exp_mackey[16] = { | |
3636 | 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd, | |
3637 | 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 }; | |
3638 | u8 mackey[16], ltk[16]; | |
3639 | int err; | |
3640 | ||
3641 | err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk); | |
3642 | if (err) | |
3643 | return err; | |
3644 | ||
329d8230 | 3645 | if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16)) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3646 | return -EINVAL; |
3647 | ||
329d8230 | 3648 | if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16)) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3649 | return -EINVAL; |
3650 | ||
3651 | return 0; | |
3652 | } | |
3653 | ||
71af2f6b | 3654 | static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3655 | { |
3656 | const u8 w[16] = { | |
3657 | 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd, | |
3658 | 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 }; | |
3659 | const u8 n1[16] = { | |
3660 | 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, | |
3661 | 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; | |
3662 | const u8 n2[16] = { | |
3663 | 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, | |
3664 | 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; | |
3665 | const u8 r[16] = { | |
3666 | 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08, | |
3667 | 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 }; | |
3668 | const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 }; | |
3669 | const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 }; | |
3670 | const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 }; | |
3671 | const u8 exp[16] = { | |
3672 | 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2, | |
3673 | 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 }; | |
3674 | u8 res[16]; | |
3675 | int err; | |
3676 | ||
3677 | err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res); | |
3678 | if (err) | |
3679 | return err; | |
3680 | ||
329d8230 | 3681 | if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3682 | return -EINVAL; |
3683 | ||
3684 | return 0; | |
3685 | } | |
3686 | ||
71af2f6b | 3687 | static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3688 | { |
3689 | const u8 u[32] = { | |
3690 | 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, | |
3691 | 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, | |
3692 | 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, | |
3693 | 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 }; | |
3694 | const u8 v[32] = { | |
3695 | 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b, | |
3696 | 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59, | |
3697 | 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90, | |
3698 | 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 }; | |
3699 | const u8 x[16] = { | |
3700 | 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, | |
3701 | 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; | |
3702 | const u8 y[16] = { | |
3703 | 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, | |
3704 | 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; | |
3705 | const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000; | |
3706 | u32 val; | |
3707 | int err; | |
3708 | ||
3709 | err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val); | |
3710 | if (err) | |
3711 | return err; | |
3712 | ||
3713 | if (val != exp_val) | |
3714 | return -EINVAL; | |
3715 | ||
3716 | return 0; | |
3717 | } | |
3718 | ||
71af2f6b | 3719 | static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3720 | { |
3721 | const u8 w[16] = { | |
3722 | 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, | |
3723 | 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; | |
3724 | const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c }; | |
3725 | const u8 exp[16] = { | |
3726 | 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8, | |
3727 | 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d }; | |
3728 | u8 res[16]; | |
3729 | int err; | |
3730 | ||
3731 | err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res); | |
3732 | if (err) | |
3733 | return err; | |
3734 | ||
329d8230 | 3735 | if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
fb2969a3 JH |
3736 | return -EINVAL; |
3737 | ||
3738 | return 0; | |
3739 | } | |
3740 | ||
64dd374e MH |
3741 | static char test_smp_buffer[32]; |
3742 | ||
3743 | static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf, | |
3744 | size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | |
3745 | { | |
3746 | return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer, | |
3747 | strlen(test_smp_buffer)); | |
3748 | } | |
3749 | ||
3750 | static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = { | |
3751 | .open = simple_open, | |
3752 | .read = test_smp_read, | |
3753 | .llseek = default_llseek, | |
3754 | }; | |
3755 | ||
28a220aa | 3756 | static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, |
47eb2ac8 | 3757 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh) |
0a2b0f04 | 3758 | { |
255047b0 MH |
3759 | ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime; |
3760 | unsigned long long duration; | |
cfc4198e JH |
3761 | int err; |
3762 | ||
255047b0 MH |
3763 | calltime = ktime_get(); |
3764 | ||
47eb2ac8 | 3765 | err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh); |
71653eb6 MH |
3766 | if (err) { |
3767 | BT_ERR("debug_key test failed"); | |
3768 | goto done; | |
3769 | } | |
3770 | ||
28a220aa | 3771 | err = test_ah(); |
cfc4198e JH |
3772 | if (err) { |
3773 | BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed"); | |
64dd374e | 3774 | goto done; |
cfc4198e JH |
3775 | } |
3776 | ||
28a220aa | 3777 | err = test_c1(); |
cfc4198e JH |
3778 | if (err) { |
3779 | BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed"); | |
64dd374e | 3780 | goto done; |
cfc4198e JH |
3781 | } |
3782 | ||
28a220aa | 3783 | err = test_s1(); |
cfc4198e JH |
3784 | if (err) { |
3785 | BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed"); | |
64dd374e | 3786 | goto done; |
cfc4198e JH |
3787 | } |
3788 | ||
fb2969a3 JH |
3789 | err = test_f4(tfm_cmac); |
3790 | if (err) { | |
3791 | BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed"); | |
64dd374e | 3792 | goto done; |
fb2969a3 JH |
3793 | } |
3794 | ||
3795 | err = test_f5(tfm_cmac); | |
3796 | if (err) { | |
3797 | BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed"); | |
64dd374e | 3798 | goto done; |
fb2969a3 JH |
3799 | } |
3800 | ||
3801 | err = test_f6(tfm_cmac); | |
3802 | if (err) { | |
3803 | BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed"); | |
64dd374e | 3804 | goto done; |
fb2969a3 JH |
3805 | } |
3806 | ||
3807 | err = test_g2(tfm_cmac); | |
3808 | if (err) { | |
3809 | BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed"); | |
64dd374e | 3810 | goto done; |
fb2969a3 JH |
3811 | } |
3812 | ||
3813 | err = test_h6(tfm_cmac); | |
3814 | if (err) { | |
3815 | BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed"); | |
64dd374e | 3816 | goto done; |
fb2969a3 JH |
3817 | } |
3818 | ||
255047b0 MH |
3819 | rettime = ktime_get(); |
3820 | delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime); | |
3821 | duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10; | |
3822 | ||
5ced2464 | 3823 | BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration); |
0a2b0f04 | 3824 | |
64dd374e MH |
3825 | done: |
3826 | if (!err) | |
3827 | snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), | |
3828 | "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration); | |
3829 | else | |
3830 | snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n"); | |
3831 | ||
3832 | debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL, | |
3833 | &test_smp_fops); | |
3834 | ||
3835 | return err; | |
0a2b0f04 JH |
3836 | } |
3837 | ||
3838 | int __init bt_selftest_smp(void) | |
3839 | { | |
71af2f6b | 3840 | struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; |
47eb2ac8 | 3841 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
0a2b0f04 JH |
3842 | int err; |
3843 | ||
3d234b33 | 3844 | tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); |
0a2b0f04 JH |
3845 | if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { |
3846 | BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); | |
0a2b0f04 JH |
3847 | return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac); |
3848 | } | |
3849 | ||
075f7732 | 3850 | tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0); |
47eb2ac8 TA |
3851 | if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) { |
3852 | BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); | |
3853 | crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); | |
47eb2ac8 TA |
3854 | return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh); |
3855 | } | |
3856 | ||
28a220aa | 3857 | err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh); |
0a2b0f04 | 3858 | |
71af2f6b | 3859 | crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); |
47eb2ac8 | 3860 | crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh); |
0a2b0f04 JH |
3861 | |
3862 | return err; | |
3863 | } | |
3864 | ||
3865 | #endif |