ublk: honor IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK for handling control command
[linux-block.git] / mm / usercopy.c
CommitLineData
d2912cb1 1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2/*
3 * This implements the various checks for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY*,
4 * which are designed to protect kernel memory from needless exposure
5 * and overwrite under many unintended conditions. This code is based
6 * on PAX_USERCOPY, which is:
7 *
8 * Copyright (C) 2001-2016 PaX Team, Bradley Spengler, Open Source
9 * Security Inc.
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10 */
11#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
12
13#include <linux/mm.h>
314eed30 14#include <linux/highmem.h>
f15be1b8 15#include <linux/kstrtox.h>
f5509cc1 16#include <linux/slab.h>
5b825c3a 17#include <linux/sched.h>
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18#include <linux/sched/task.h>
19#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
96dc4f9f 20#include <linux/thread_info.h>
0aef499f 21#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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22#include <linux/atomic.h>
23#include <linux/jump_label.h>
f5509cc1 24#include <asm/sections.h>
0b3eb091 25#include "slab.h"
f5509cc1 26
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27/*
28 * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
29 * stack frame (if possible).
30 *
31 * Returns:
32 * NOT_STACK: not at all on the stack
33 * GOOD_FRAME: fully within a valid stack frame
2792d84e 34 * GOOD_STACK: within the current stack (when can't frame-check exactly)
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35 * BAD_STACK: error condition (invalid stack position or bad stack frame)
36 */
37static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
38{
39 const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current);
40 const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
41 int ret;
42
43 /* Object is not on the stack at all. */
44 if (obj + len <= stack || stackend <= obj)
45 return NOT_STACK;
46
47 /*
48 * Reject: object partially overlaps the stack (passing the
5ce1be0e 49 * check above means at least one end is within the stack,
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50 * so if this check fails, the other end is outside the stack).
51 */
52 if (obj < stack || stackend < obj + len)
53 return BAD_STACK;
54
55 /* Check if object is safely within a valid frame. */
56 ret = arch_within_stack_frames(stack, stackend, obj, len);
57 if (ret)
58 return ret;
59
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60 /* Finally, check stack depth if possible. */
61#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
62 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP)) {
63 if ((void *)current_stack_pointer < obj + len)
64 return BAD_STACK;
65 } else {
66 if (obj < (void *)current_stack_pointer)
67 return BAD_STACK;
68 }
69#endif
70
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71 return GOOD_STACK;
72}
73
b394d468 74/*
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75 * If these functions are reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found
76 * an unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
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77 * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
78 * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
79 * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
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80 * For cache objects, it is checking that only the whitelisted range of
81 * bytes for a given cache is being accessed (via the cache's usersize and
82 * useroffset fields). To adjust a cache whitelist, use the usercopy-aware
83 * kmem_cache_create_usercopy() function to create the cache (and
84 * carefully audit the whitelist range).
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85 */
86void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
87 bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
88 unsigned long len)
f5509cc1 89{
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90 pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
91 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
92 to_user ? "from" : "to",
93 name ? : "unknown?!",
94 detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
95 offset, len);
96
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97 /*
98 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
99 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
100 * Oops code, so that is used here instead.
101 */
102 BUG();
103}
104
105/* Returns true if any portion of [ptr,ptr+n) over laps with [low,high). */
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106static bool overlaps(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
107 unsigned long low, unsigned long high)
f5509cc1 108{
f4e6e289 109 const unsigned long check_low = ptr;
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110 unsigned long check_high = check_low + n;
111
112 /* Does not overlap if entirely above or entirely below. */
94cd97af 113 if (check_low >= high || check_high <= low)
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114 return false;
115
116 return true;
117}
118
119/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */
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120static inline void check_kernel_text_object(const unsigned long ptr,
121 unsigned long n, bool to_user)
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122{
123 unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
124 unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
125 unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear;
126
127 if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
f4e6e289 128 usercopy_abort("kernel text", NULL, to_user, ptr - textlow, n);
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129
130 /*
131 * Some architectures have virtual memory mappings with a secondary
132 * mapping of the kernel text, i.e. there is more than one virtual
133 * kernel address that points to the kernel image. It is usually
134 * when there is a separate linear physical memory mapping, in that
135 * __pa() is not just the reverse of __va(). This can be detected
136 * and checked:
137 */
46f6236a 138 textlow_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(textlow);
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139 /* No different mapping: we're done. */
140 if (textlow_linear == textlow)
f4e6e289 141 return;
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142
143 /* Check the secondary mapping... */
46f6236a 144 texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(texthigh);
f5509cc1 145 if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
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146 usercopy_abort("linear kernel text", NULL, to_user,
147 ptr - textlow_linear, n);
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148}
149
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150static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
151 bool to_user)
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152{
153 /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
95153169 154 if (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr)
f4e6e289 155 usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n);
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156
157 /* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
158 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(ptr))
f4e6e289 159 usercopy_abort("null address", NULL, to_user, ptr, n);
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160}
161
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162static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
163 bool to_user)
8e1f74ea 164{
170b2c35 165 unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
1dfbe9fc 166 unsigned long offset;
0b3eb091 167 struct folio *folio;
8e1f74ea 168
4e140f59 169 if (is_kmap_addr(ptr)) {
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170 offset = offset_in_page(ptr);
171 if (n > PAGE_SIZE - offset)
172 usercopy_abort("kmap", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
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173 return;
174 }
175
0aef499f 176 if (is_vmalloc_addr(ptr)) {
35fb9ae4 177 struct vmap_area *area = find_vmap_area(addr);
0aef499f 178
993d0b28 179 if (!area)
0aef499f 180 usercopy_abort("vmalloc", "no area", to_user, 0, n);
0aef499f 181
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182 if (n > area->va_end - addr) {
183 offset = addr - area->va_start;
0aef499f 184 usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
1dfbe9fc 185 }
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186 return;
187 }
188
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189 if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
190 return;
191
4e140f59 192 folio = virt_to_folio(ptr);
8e1f74ea 193
0b3eb091 194 if (folio_test_slab(folio)) {
f4e6e289 195 /* Check slab allocator for flags and size. */
0b3eb091 196 __check_heap_object(ptr, n, folio_slab(folio), to_user);
ab502103 197 } else if (folio_test_large(folio)) {
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198 offset = ptr - folio_address(folio);
199 if (n > folio_size(folio) - offset)
ab502103 200 usercopy_abort("page alloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
f4e6e289 201 }
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202}
203
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204static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(bypass_usercopy_checks);
205
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206/*
207 * Validates that the given object is:
208 * - not bogus address
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209 * - fully contained by stack (or stack frame, when available)
210 * - fully within SLAB object (or object whitelist area, when available)
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211 * - not in kernel text
212 */
213void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
214{
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215 if (static_branch_unlikely(&bypass_usercopy_checks))
216 return;
217
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218 /* Skip all tests if size is zero. */
219 if (!n)
220 return;
221
222 /* Check for invalid addresses. */
f4e6e289 223 check_bogus_address((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
f5509cc1 224
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225 /* Check for bad stack object. */
226 switch (check_stack_object(ptr, n)) {
227 case NOT_STACK:
228 /* Object is not touching the current process stack. */
229 break;
230 case GOOD_FRAME:
231 case GOOD_STACK:
232 /*
233 * Object is either in the correct frame (when it
234 * is possible to check) or just generally on the
235 * process stack (when frame checking not available).
236 */
237 return;
238 default:
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239 usercopy_abort("process stack", NULL, to_user,
240#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER
241 IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP) ?
242 ptr - (void *)current_stack_pointer :
243 (void *)current_stack_pointer - ptr,
244#else
245 0,
246#endif
247 n);
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248 }
249
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250 /* Check for bad heap object. */
251 check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user);
252
f5509cc1 253 /* Check for object in kernel to avoid text exposure. */
f4e6e289 254 check_kernel_text_object((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
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255}
256EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
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257
258static bool enable_checks __initdata = true;
259
260static int __init parse_hardened_usercopy(char *str)
261{
f15be1b8 262 if (kstrtobool(str, &enable_checks))
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263 pr_warn("Invalid option string for hardened_usercopy: '%s'\n",
264 str);
265 return 1;
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266}
267
268__setup("hardened_usercopy=", parse_hardened_usercopy);
269
270static int __init set_hardened_usercopy(void)
271{
272 if (enable_checks == false)
273 static_branch_enable(&bypass_usercopy_checks);
274 return 1;
275}
276
277late_initcall(set_hardened_usercopy);