Commit | Line | Data |
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1da177e4 LT |
1 | /* |
2 | * linux/kernel/seccomp.c | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2004-2005 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com> | |
5 | * | |
e2cfabdf WD |
6 | * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc. |
7 | * Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility. | |
10 | * | |
11 | * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls. | |
12 | * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form | |
13 | * of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters. | |
1da177e4 LT |
14 | */ |
15 | ||
e2cfabdf | 16 | #include <linux/atomic.h> |
85e7bac3 | 17 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
5b101740 | 18 | #include <linux/compat.h> |
e2cfabdf WD |
19 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
20 | #include <linux/seccomp.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
21 | |
22 | /* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */ | |
e2cfabdf WD |
23 | |
24 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER | |
25 | #include <asm/syscall.h> | |
26 | #include <linux/filter.h> | |
fb0fadf9 | 27 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
e2cfabdf WD |
28 | #include <linux/security.h> |
29 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
30 | #include <linux/tracehook.h> | |
31 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> | |
32 | ||
33 | /** | |
34 | * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs | |
35 | * | |
36 | * @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime. | |
37 | * get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance | |
38 | * outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this | |
39 | * is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks. | |
40 | * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter | |
41 | * @len: the number of instructions in the program | |
119ce5c8 | 42 | * @insnsi: the BPF program instructions to evaluate |
e2cfabdf WD |
43 | * |
44 | * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev | |
45 | * pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting | |
46 | * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter. | |
47 | * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which | |
48 | * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory. This is similar to | |
49 | * how namespaces work. | |
50 | * | |
51 | * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached | |
52 | * to a task_struct (other than @usage). | |
53 | */ | |
54 | struct seccomp_filter { | |
55 | atomic_t usage; | |
56 | struct seccomp_filter *prev; | |
57 | unsigned short len; /* Instruction count */ | |
bd4cf0ed | 58 | struct sock_filter_int insnsi[]; |
e2cfabdf WD |
59 | }; |
60 | ||
61 | /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */ | |
62 | #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter)) | |
63 | ||
bd4cf0ed | 64 | /* |
e2cfabdf WD |
65 | * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage |
66 | * as per the specific architecture. | |
67 | */ | |
bd4cf0ed | 68 | static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data *sd) |
e2cfabdf | 69 | { |
bd4cf0ed AS |
70 | struct task_struct *task = current; |
71 | struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(task); | |
2eac7648 | 72 | unsigned long args[6]; |
e2cfabdf | 73 | |
bd4cf0ed | 74 | sd->nr = syscall_get_nr(task, regs); |
0b747172 | 75 | sd->arch = syscall_get_arch(); |
2eac7648 DB |
76 | syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 0, 6, args); |
77 | sd->args[0] = args[0]; | |
78 | sd->args[1] = args[1]; | |
79 | sd->args[2] = args[2]; | |
80 | sd->args[3] = args[3]; | |
81 | sd->args[4] = args[4]; | |
82 | sd->args[5] = args[5]; | |
bd4cf0ed | 83 | sd->instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(task); |
e2cfabdf WD |
84 | } |
85 | ||
86 | /** | |
87 | * seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code | |
88 | * @filter: filter to verify | |
89 | * @flen: length of filter | |
90 | * | |
91 | * Takes a previously checked filter (by sk_chk_filter) and | |
92 | * redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data | |
93 | * and related data through seccomp_bpf_load. It also | |
94 | * enforces length and alignment checking of those loads. | |
95 | * | |
96 | * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not. | |
97 | */ | |
98 | static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) | |
99 | { | |
100 | int pc; | |
101 | for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) { | |
102 | struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc]; | |
103 | u16 code = ftest->code; | |
104 | u32 k = ftest->k; | |
105 | ||
106 | switch (code) { | |
107 | case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS: | |
bd4cf0ed | 108 | ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_ABS; |
e2cfabdf WD |
109 | /* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */ |
110 | if (k >= sizeof(struct seccomp_data) || k & 3) | |
111 | return -EINVAL; | |
112 | continue; | |
113 | case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN: | |
bd4cf0ed | 114 | ftest->code = BPF_LD | BPF_IMM; |
e2cfabdf WD |
115 | ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data); |
116 | continue; | |
117 | case BPF_S_LDX_W_LEN: | |
bd4cf0ed | 118 | ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM; |
e2cfabdf WD |
119 | ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data); |
120 | continue; | |
121 | /* Explicitly include allowed calls. */ | |
122 | case BPF_S_RET_K: | |
123 | case BPF_S_RET_A: | |
124 | case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K: | |
125 | case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X: | |
126 | case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K: | |
127 | case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X: | |
128 | case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K: | |
129 | case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X: | |
130 | case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X: | |
131 | case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K: | |
132 | case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X: | |
133 | case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K: | |
134 | case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X: | |
d1327479 NS |
135 | case BPF_S_ALU_XOR_K: |
136 | case BPF_S_ALU_XOR_X: | |
e2cfabdf WD |
137 | case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K: |
138 | case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X: | |
139 | case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K: | |
140 | case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X: | |
141 | case BPF_S_ALU_NEG: | |
142 | case BPF_S_LD_IMM: | |
143 | case BPF_S_LDX_IMM: | |
144 | case BPF_S_MISC_TAX: | |
145 | case BPF_S_MISC_TXA: | |
146 | case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K: | |
147 | case BPF_S_LD_MEM: | |
148 | case BPF_S_LDX_MEM: | |
149 | case BPF_S_ST: | |
150 | case BPF_S_STX: | |
151 | case BPF_S_JMP_JA: | |
152 | case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K: | |
153 | case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_X: | |
154 | case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K: | |
155 | case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_X: | |
156 | case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K: | |
157 | case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X: | |
158 | case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K: | |
159 | case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_X: | |
bd4cf0ed | 160 | sk_decode_filter(ftest, ftest); |
e2cfabdf WD |
161 | continue; |
162 | default: | |
163 | return -EINVAL; | |
164 | } | |
165 | } | |
166 | return 0; | |
167 | } | |
168 | ||
169 | /** | |
170 | * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @syscall | |
171 | * @syscall: number of the current system call | |
172 | * | |
173 | * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes. | |
174 | */ | |
175 | static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall) | |
176 | { | |
177 | struct seccomp_filter *f; | |
bd4cf0ed | 178 | struct seccomp_data sd; |
acf3b2c7 WD |
179 | u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; |
180 | ||
181 | /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */ | |
182 | if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL)) | |
183 | return SECCOMP_RET_KILL; | |
184 | ||
bd4cf0ed AS |
185 | populate_seccomp_data(&sd); |
186 | ||
e2cfabdf WD |
187 | /* |
188 | * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return | |
acf3b2c7 | 189 | * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA). |
e2cfabdf WD |
190 | */ |
191 | for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) { | |
bd4cf0ed | 192 | u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter_int_seccomp(&sd, f->insnsi); |
acf3b2c7 WD |
193 | if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) |
194 | ret = cur_ret; | |
e2cfabdf WD |
195 | } |
196 | return ret; | |
197 | } | |
198 | ||
199 | /** | |
200 | * seccomp_attach_filter: Attaches a seccomp filter to current. | |
201 | * @fprog: BPF program to install | |
202 | * | |
203 | * Returns 0 on success or an errno on failure. | |
204 | */ | |
205 | static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) | |
206 | { | |
207 | struct seccomp_filter *filter; | |
208 | unsigned long fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter); | |
209 | unsigned long total_insns = fprog->len; | |
bd4cf0ed AS |
210 | struct sock_filter *fp; |
211 | int new_len; | |
e2cfabdf WD |
212 | long ret; |
213 | ||
214 | if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS) | |
215 | return -EINVAL; | |
216 | ||
217 | for (filter = current->seccomp.filter; filter; filter = filter->prev) | |
218 | total_insns += filter->len + 4; /* include a 4 instr penalty */ | |
219 | if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH) | |
220 | return -ENOMEM; | |
221 | ||
222 | /* | |
119ce5c8 | 223 | * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has |
e2cfabdf WD |
224 | * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs. |
225 | * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the | |
226 | * behavior of privileged children. | |
227 | */ | |
228 | if (!current->no_new_privs && | |
229 | security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), | |
230 | CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0) | |
231 | return -EACCES; | |
232 | ||
bd4cf0ed AS |
233 | fp = kzalloc(fp_size, GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN); |
234 | if (!fp) | |
e2cfabdf | 235 | return -ENOMEM; |
e2cfabdf WD |
236 | |
237 | /* Copy the instructions from fprog. */ | |
238 | ret = -EFAULT; | |
bd4cf0ed AS |
239 | if (copy_from_user(fp, fprog->filter, fp_size)) |
240 | goto free_prog; | |
e2cfabdf WD |
241 | |
242 | /* Check and rewrite the fprog via the skb checker */ | |
bd4cf0ed | 243 | ret = sk_chk_filter(fp, fprog->len); |
e2cfabdf | 244 | if (ret) |
bd4cf0ed | 245 | goto free_prog; |
e2cfabdf WD |
246 | |
247 | /* Check and rewrite the fprog for seccomp use */ | |
bd4cf0ed AS |
248 | ret = seccomp_check_filter(fp, fprog->len); |
249 | if (ret) | |
250 | goto free_prog; | |
251 | ||
252 | /* Convert 'sock_filter' insns to 'sock_filter_int' insns */ | |
253 | ret = sk_convert_filter(fp, fprog->len, NULL, &new_len); | |
254 | if (ret) | |
255 | goto free_prog; | |
256 | ||
257 | /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */ | |
0acf07d2 | 258 | ret = -ENOMEM; |
bd4cf0ed AS |
259 | filter = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter) + |
260 | sizeof(struct sock_filter_int) * new_len, | |
261 | GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN); | |
262 | if (!filter) | |
263 | goto free_prog; | |
264 | ||
265 | ret = sk_convert_filter(fp, fprog->len, filter->insnsi, &new_len); | |
e2cfabdf | 266 | if (ret) |
bd4cf0ed | 267 | goto free_filter; |
0acf07d2 | 268 | kfree(fp); |
bd4cf0ed AS |
269 | |
270 | atomic_set(&filter->usage, 1); | |
271 | filter->len = new_len; | |
e2cfabdf WD |
272 | |
273 | /* | |
274 | * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its | |
275 | * task reference. | |
276 | */ | |
277 | filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter; | |
278 | current->seccomp.filter = filter; | |
279 | return 0; | |
bd4cf0ed AS |
280 | |
281 | free_filter: | |
e2cfabdf | 282 | kfree(filter); |
bd4cf0ed AS |
283 | free_prog: |
284 | kfree(fp); | |
e2cfabdf WD |
285 | return ret; |
286 | } | |
287 | ||
288 | /** | |
289 | * seccomp_attach_user_filter - attaches a user-supplied sock_fprog | |
290 | * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog. | |
291 | * | |
292 | * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise. | |
293 | */ | |
864f32a5 | 294 | static long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter) |
e2cfabdf WD |
295 | { |
296 | struct sock_fprog fprog; | |
297 | long ret = -EFAULT; | |
298 | ||
299 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
300 | if (is_compat_task()) { | |
301 | struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32; | |
302 | if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32))) | |
303 | goto out; | |
304 | fprog.len = fprog32.len; | |
305 | fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter); | |
306 | } else /* falls through to the if below. */ | |
307 | #endif | |
308 | if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog))) | |
309 | goto out; | |
310 | ret = seccomp_attach_filter(&fprog); | |
311 | out: | |
312 | return ret; | |
313 | } | |
314 | ||
315 | /* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */ | |
316 | void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
317 | { | |
318 | struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter; | |
319 | if (!orig) | |
320 | return; | |
321 | /* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */ | |
322 | atomic_inc(&orig->usage); | |
323 | } | |
324 | ||
325 | /* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */ | |
326 | void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
327 | { | |
328 | struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter; | |
329 | /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */ | |
330 | while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) { | |
331 | struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig; | |
332 | orig = orig->prev; | |
333 | kfree(freeme); | |
334 | } | |
335 | } | |
bb6ea430 WD |
336 | |
337 | /** | |
338 | * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation | |
339 | * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland | |
340 | * @reason: filter-supplied reason code to send to userland (via si_errno) | |
341 | * | |
342 | * Forces a SIGSYS with a code of SYS_SECCOMP and related sigsys info. | |
343 | */ | |
344 | static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason) | |
345 | { | |
346 | struct siginfo info; | |
347 | memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); | |
348 | info.si_signo = SIGSYS; | |
349 | info.si_code = SYS_SECCOMP; | |
350 | info.si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current); | |
351 | info.si_errno = reason; | |
5e937a9a | 352 | info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch(); |
bb6ea430 WD |
353 | info.si_syscall = syscall; |
354 | force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current); | |
355 | } | |
e2cfabdf | 356 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ |
1da177e4 LT |
357 | |
358 | /* | |
359 | * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn. | |
360 | * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit | |
361 | * to limit the stack allocations too. | |
362 | */ | |
363 | static int mode1_syscalls[] = { | |
364 | __NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn, | |
365 | 0, /* null terminated */ | |
366 | }; | |
367 | ||
5b101740 | 368 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
1da177e4 LT |
369 | static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = { |
370 | __NR_seccomp_read_32, __NR_seccomp_write_32, __NR_seccomp_exit_32, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32, | |
371 | 0, /* null terminated */ | |
372 | }; | |
373 | #endif | |
374 | ||
acf3b2c7 | 375 | int __secure_computing(int this_syscall) |
1da177e4 LT |
376 | { |
377 | int mode = current->seccomp.mode; | |
e2cfabdf WD |
378 | int exit_sig = 0; |
379 | int *syscall; | |
8156b451 | 380 | u32 ret; |
1da177e4 LT |
381 | |
382 | switch (mode) { | |
e2cfabdf | 383 | case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: |
1da177e4 | 384 | syscall = mode1_syscalls; |
5b101740 RM |
385 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
386 | if (is_compat_task()) | |
1da177e4 LT |
387 | syscall = mode1_syscalls_32; |
388 | #endif | |
389 | do { | |
390 | if (*syscall == this_syscall) | |
acf3b2c7 | 391 | return 0; |
1da177e4 | 392 | } while (*++syscall); |
e2cfabdf | 393 | exit_sig = SIGKILL; |
8156b451 | 394 | ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL; |
1da177e4 | 395 | break; |
e2cfabdf | 396 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER |
8156b451 WD |
397 | case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: { |
398 | int data; | |
87b526d3 | 399 | struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current); |
acf3b2c7 WD |
400 | ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall); |
401 | data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; | |
8156b451 WD |
402 | ret &= SECCOMP_RET_ACTION; |
403 | switch (ret) { | |
acf3b2c7 WD |
404 | case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: |
405 | /* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */ | |
87b526d3 | 406 | syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, |
acf3b2c7 WD |
407 | -data, 0); |
408 | goto skip; | |
bb6ea430 WD |
409 | case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: |
410 | /* Show the handler the original registers. */ | |
87b526d3 | 411 | syscall_rollback(current, regs); |
bb6ea430 WD |
412 | /* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */ |
413 | seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data); | |
414 | goto skip; | |
fb0fadf9 WD |
415 | case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: |
416 | /* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */ | |
87b526d3 AL |
417 | if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) { |
418 | syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, | |
419 | -ENOSYS, 0); | |
fb0fadf9 | 420 | goto skip; |
87b526d3 | 421 | } |
fb0fadf9 WD |
422 | /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */ |
423 | ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data); | |
424 | /* | |
425 | * The delivery of a fatal signal during event | |
426 | * notification may silently skip tracer notification. | |
427 | * Terminating the task now avoids executing a system | |
428 | * call that may not be intended. | |
429 | */ | |
430 | if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) | |
431 | break; | |
87b526d3 AL |
432 | if (syscall_get_nr(current, regs) < 0) |
433 | goto skip; /* Explicit request to skip. */ | |
434 | ||
fb0fadf9 | 435 | return 0; |
acf3b2c7 WD |
436 | case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: |
437 | return 0; | |
438 | case SECCOMP_RET_KILL: | |
439 | default: | |
440 | break; | |
441 | } | |
e2cfabdf WD |
442 | exit_sig = SIGSYS; |
443 | break; | |
8156b451 | 444 | } |
e2cfabdf | 445 | #endif |
1da177e4 LT |
446 | default: |
447 | BUG(); | |
448 | } | |
449 | ||
450 | #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG | |
451 | dump_stack(); | |
452 | #endif | |
acf3b2c7 | 453 | audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret); |
e2cfabdf | 454 | do_exit(exit_sig); |
8156b451 | 455 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER |
acf3b2c7 WD |
456 | skip: |
457 | audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret); | |
8156b451 | 458 | #endif |
acf3b2c7 | 459 | return -1; |
1da177e4 | 460 | } |
1d9d02fe AA |
461 | |
462 | long prctl_get_seccomp(void) | |
463 | { | |
464 | return current->seccomp.mode; | |
465 | } | |
466 | ||
e2cfabdf WD |
467 | /** |
468 | * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode | |
469 | * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use | |
470 | * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER | |
471 | * | |
472 | * This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of | |
473 | * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters. Every filter | |
474 | * successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system | |
475 | * call the task makes. | |
476 | * | |
477 | * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed. | |
478 | * | |
479 | * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. | |
480 | */ | |
481 | long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter) | |
1d9d02fe | 482 | { |
e2cfabdf | 483 | long ret = -EINVAL; |
1d9d02fe | 484 | |
e2cfabdf WD |
485 | if (current->seccomp.mode && |
486 | current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode) | |
1d9d02fe AA |
487 | goto out; |
488 | ||
e2cfabdf WD |
489 | switch (seccomp_mode) { |
490 | case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: | |
491 | ret = 0; | |
cf99abac AA |
492 | #ifdef TIF_NOTSC |
493 | disable_TSC(); | |
494 | #endif | |
e2cfabdf WD |
495 | break; |
496 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER | |
497 | case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: | |
498 | ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter); | |
499 | if (ret) | |
500 | goto out; | |
501 | break; | |
502 | #endif | |
503 | default: | |
504 | goto out; | |
1d9d02fe AA |
505 | } |
506 | ||
e2cfabdf WD |
507 | current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode; |
508 | set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP); | |
509 | out: | |
1d9d02fe AA |
510 | return ret; |
511 | } |