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85c8721f | 1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. | |
5 | * All Rights Reserved. | |
6 | * | |
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
8 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
9 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
10 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
11 | * | |
12 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
13 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
14 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
15 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
16 | * | |
17 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
18 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | |
19 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | |
20 | * | |
21 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, | |
24 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in | |
27 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by | |
28 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. | |
29 | * | |
30 | */ | |
31 | ||
32 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
33 | #include <asm/atomic.h> | |
34 | #include <asm/types.h> | |
35 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
36 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
01116105 | 37 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
3ec3b2fb | 38 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
39 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
40 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
41 | #include <linux/time.h> | |
42 | #include <asm/unistd.h> | |
43 | ||
44 | /* 0 = no checking | |
45 | 1 = put_count checking | |
46 | 2 = verbose put_count checking | |
47 | */ | |
48 | #define AUDIT_DEBUG 0 | |
49 | ||
50 | /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */ | |
51 | extern int audit_enabled; | |
52 | ||
53 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | |
54 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | |
55 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | |
56 | ||
57 | /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the | |
58 | * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from | |
59 | * path_lookup. */ | |
60 | #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7 | |
61 | ||
62 | /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using | |
63 | a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by | |
64 | the syscall filter. */ | |
65 | enum audit_state { | |
66 | AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context. | |
67 | * No syscall-specific audit records can | |
68 | * be generated. */ | |
69 | AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
70 | * but don't necessarily fill it in at | |
71 | * syscall entry time (i.e., filter | |
72 | * instead). */ | |
73 | AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
74 | * and always fill it in at syscall | |
75 | * entry time. This makes a full | |
76 | * syscall record available if some | |
77 | * other part of the kernel decides it | |
78 | * should be recorded. */ | |
79 | AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
80 | * always fill it in at syscall entry | |
81 | * time, and always write out the audit | |
82 | * record at syscall exit time. */ | |
83 | }; | |
84 | ||
85 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and | |
86 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved | |
87 | * pointers at syscall exit time). | |
88 | * | |
89 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ | |
90 | struct audit_names { | |
91 | const char *name; | |
92 | unsigned long ino; | |
93 | dev_t dev; | |
94 | umode_t mode; | |
95 | uid_t uid; | |
96 | gid_t gid; | |
97 | dev_t rdev; | |
98 | }; | |
99 | ||
100 | struct audit_aux_data { | |
101 | struct audit_aux_data *next; | |
102 | int type; | |
103 | }; | |
104 | ||
105 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 | |
106 | ||
107 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl { | |
108 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
109 | struct ipc_perm p; | |
110 | unsigned long qbytes; | |
111 | uid_t uid; | |
112 | gid_t gid; | |
113 | mode_t mode; | |
114 | }; | |
115 | ||
3ec3b2fb DW |
116 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { |
117 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
118 | int nargs; | |
119 | unsigned long args[0]; | |
120 | }; | |
121 | ||
122 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr { | |
123 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
124 | int len; | |
125 | char a[0]; | |
126 | }; | |
127 | ||
01116105 SS |
128 | struct audit_aux_data_path { |
129 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
130 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
131 | struct vfsmount *mnt; | |
132 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
133 | |
134 | /* The per-task audit context. */ | |
135 | struct audit_context { | |
136 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ | |
137 | enum audit_state state; | |
138 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ | |
139 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ | |
140 | uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */ | |
141 | int major; /* syscall number */ | |
142 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ | |
143 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ | |
2fd6f58b | 144 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
1da177e4 LT |
145 | int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ |
146 | int name_count; | |
147 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; | |
8f37d47c DW |
148 | struct dentry * pwd; |
149 | struct vfsmount * pwdmnt; | |
1da177e4 LT |
150 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ |
151 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
152 | ||
153 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ | |
154 | pid_t pid; | |
155 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; | |
156 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; | |
157 | unsigned long personality; | |
2fd6f58b | 158 | int arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
159 | |
160 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
161 | int put_count; | |
162 | int ino_count; | |
163 | #endif | |
164 | }; | |
165 | ||
166 | /* Public API */ | |
167 | /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation | |
168 | * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at | |
169 | * syscall exit time. */ | |
0f45aa18 DW |
170 | static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { |
171 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]), | |
172 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]), | |
173 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]), | |
174 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), | |
175 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), | |
176 | #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5 | |
177 | #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser | |
178 | #endif | |
179 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
180 | |
181 | struct audit_entry { | |
182 | struct list_head list; | |
183 | struct rcu_head rcu; | |
184 | struct audit_rule rule; | |
185 | }; | |
186 | ||
7ca00264 DW |
187 | extern int audit_pid; |
188 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
189 | /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from |
190 | * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */ | |
191 | static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) | |
192 | { | |
193 | int i; | |
194 | ||
195 | if (a->flags != b->flags) | |
196 | return 1; | |
197 | ||
198 | if (a->action != b->action) | |
199 | return 1; | |
200 | ||
201 | if (a->field_count != b->field_count) | |
202 | return 1; | |
203 | ||
204 | for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) { | |
205 | if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i] | |
206 | || a->values[i] != b->values[i]) | |
207 | return 1; | |
208 | } | |
209 | ||
210 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) | |
211 | if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i]) | |
212 | return 1; | |
213 | ||
214 | return 0; | |
215 | } | |
216 | ||
217 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
218 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
219 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
0f45aa18 DW |
220 | static inline void audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, |
221 | struct list_head *list) | |
1da177e4 | 222 | { |
0f45aa18 DW |
223 | if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) { |
224 | entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; | |
1da177e4 LT |
225 | list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); |
226 | } else { | |
227 | list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); | |
228 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
229 | } |
230 | ||
231 | static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head) | |
232 | { | |
233 | struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); | |
234 | kfree(e); | |
235 | } | |
236 | ||
237 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
238 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
239 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
240 | static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
241 | struct list_head *list) | |
242 | { | |
243 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
244 | ||
245 | /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only | |
246 | * deletion routine. */ | |
247 | list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
248 | if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
249 | list_del_rcu(&e->list); | |
250 | call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); | |
251 | return 0; | |
252 | } | |
253 | } | |
0f45aa18 | 254 | return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */ |
1da177e4 LT |
255 | } |
256 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
257 | /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during |
258 | * AUDIT_ADD. */ | |
259 | static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) | |
260 | { | |
261 | int i; | |
262 | ||
263 | if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER | |
264 | && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE | |
265 | && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) | |
266 | return -1; | |
267 | if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) | |
268 | return -1; | |
0f45aa18 DW |
269 | if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) |
270 | return -1; | |
1da177e4 LT |
271 | |
272 | d->flags = s->flags; | |
273 | d->action = s->action; | |
274 | d->field_count = s->field_count; | |
275 | for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) { | |
276 | d->fields[i] = s->fields[i]; | |
277 | d->values[i] = s->values[i]; | |
278 | } | |
279 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i]; | |
280 | return 0; | |
281 | } | |
282 | ||
c94c257c SH |
283 | int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, |
284 | uid_t loginuid) | |
1da177e4 | 285 | { |
1da177e4 LT |
286 | struct audit_entry *entry; |
287 | int err = 0; | |
0f45aa18 DW |
288 | int i; |
289 | unsigned listnr; | |
1da177e4 LT |
290 | |
291 | switch (type) { | |
292 | case AUDIT_LIST: | |
293 | /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are | |
294 | always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ | |
0f45aa18 DW |
295 | for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { |
296 | list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list) | |
297 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, | |
298 | &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); | |
299 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
300 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0); |
301 | break; | |
302 | case AUDIT_ADD: | |
303 | if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
304 | return -ENOMEM; | |
305 | if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) { | |
306 | kfree(entry); | |
307 | return -EINVAL; | |
308 | } | |
0f45aa18 DW |
309 | listnr = entry->rule.flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; |
310 | audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); | |
c0404993 | 311 | audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, |
bccf6ae0 | 312 | "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); |
1da177e4 LT |
313 | break; |
314 | case AUDIT_DEL: | |
0f45aa18 DW |
315 | listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; |
316 | if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) | |
317 | return -EINVAL; | |
318 | ||
319 | err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); | |
320 | if (!err) | |
321 | audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, | |
322 | "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); | |
1da177e4 LT |
323 | break; |
324 | default: | |
325 | return -EINVAL; | |
326 | } | |
327 | ||
328 | return err; | |
329 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
330 | |
331 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 | |
332 | * otherwise. */ | |
333 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
334 | struct audit_rule *rule, | |
335 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
336 | enum audit_state *state) | |
337 | { | |
338 | int i, j; | |
339 | ||
340 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
341 | u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE; | |
342 | u32 value = rule->values[i]; | |
343 | int result = 0; | |
344 | ||
345 | switch (field) { | |
346 | case AUDIT_PID: | |
347 | result = (tsk->pid == value); | |
348 | break; | |
349 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
350 | result = (tsk->uid == value); | |
351 | break; | |
352 | case AUDIT_EUID: | |
353 | result = (tsk->euid == value); | |
354 | break; | |
355 | case AUDIT_SUID: | |
356 | result = (tsk->suid == value); | |
357 | break; | |
358 | case AUDIT_FSUID: | |
359 | result = (tsk->fsuid == value); | |
360 | break; | |
361 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
362 | result = (tsk->gid == value); | |
363 | break; | |
364 | case AUDIT_EGID: | |
365 | result = (tsk->egid == value); | |
366 | break; | |
367 | case AUDIT_SGID: | |
368 | result = (tsk->sgid == value); | |
369 | break; | |
370 | case AUDIT_FSGID: | |
371 | result = (tsk->fsgid == value); | |
372 | break; | |
373 | case AUDIT_PERS: | |
374 | result = (tsk->personality == value); | |
375 | break; | |
2fd6f58b | 376 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
377 | if (ctx) | |
378 | result = (ctx->arch == value); | |
379 | break; | |
1da177e4 LT |
380 | |
381 | case AUDIT_EXIT: | |
382 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
383 | result = (ctx->return_code == value); | |
384 | break; | |
385 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: | |
386 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
2fd6f58b | 387 | result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
1da177e4 LT |
388 | break; |
389 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: | |
390 | if (ctx) { | |
391 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
392 | if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { | |
393 | ++result; | |
394 | break; | |
395 | } | |
396 | } | |
397 | } | |
398 | break; | |
399 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: | |
400 | if (ctx) { | |
401 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
402 | if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { | |
403 | ++result; | |
404 | break; | |
405 | } | |
406 | } | |
407 | } | |
408 | break; | |
409 | case AUDIT_INODE: | |
410 | if (ctx) { | |
411 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
412 | if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) { | |
413 | ++result; | |
414 | break; | |
415 | } | |
416 | } | |
417 | } | |
418 | break; | |
419 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
420 | result = 0; | |
421 | if (ctx) | |
422 | result = (ctx->loginuid == value); | |
423 | break; | |
424 | case AUDIT_ARG0: | |
425 | case AUDIT_ARG1: | |
426 | case AUDIT_ARG2: | |
427 | case AUDIT_ARG3: | |
428 | if (ctx) | |
429 | result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value); | |
430 | break; | |
431 | } | |
432 | ||
433 | if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE) | |
434 | result = !result; | |
435 | if (!result) | |
436 | return 0; | |
437 | } | |
438 | switch (rule->action) { | |
439 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
440 | case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; | |
441 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
442 | } | |
443 | return 1; | |
444 | } | |
445 | ||
446 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is | |
447 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task | |
448 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. | |
449 | */ | |
450 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
451 | { | |
452 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
453 | enum audit_state state; | |
454 | ||
455 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
0f45aa18 | 456 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
1da177e4 LT |
457 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { |
458 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
459 | return state; | |
460 | } | |
461 | } | |
462 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
463 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
464 | } | |
465 | ||
466 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the | |
467 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is | |
23f32d18 | 468 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
1da177e4 LT |
469 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
470 | */ | |
471 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
472 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
473 | struct list_head *list) | |
474 | { | |
475 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
476 | enum audit_state state; | |
477 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); | |
478 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
479 | ||
480 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
481 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
482 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit | |
483 | && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { | |
484 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
485 | return state; | |
486 | } | |
487 | } | |
488 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
489 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
490 | } | |
491 | ||
0f45aa18 DW |
492 | int audit_filter_user(struct task_struct *tsk, int type) |
493 | { | |
494 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
495 | enum audit_state state; | |
496 | ||
497 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
498 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) { | |
499 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { | |
500 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
501 | return state != AUDIT_DISABLED; | |
502 | } | |
503 | } | |
504 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
505 | return 1; /* Audit by default */ | |
506 | ||
507 | } | |
508 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
509 | /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ |
510 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
511 | int return_valid, | |
512 | int return_code) | |
513 | { | |
514 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
515 | ||
516 | if (likely(!context)) | |
517 | return NULL; | |
518 | context->return_valid = return_valid; | |
519 | context->return_code = return_code; | |
520 | ||
521 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) { | |
522 | enum audit_state state; | |
0f45aa18 | 523 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
1da177e4 LT |
524 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
525 | context->auditable = 1; | |
526 | } | |
527 | ||
528 | context->pid = tsk->pid; | |
529 | context->uid = tsk->uid; | |
530 | context->gid = tsk->gid; | |
531 | context->euid = tsk->euid; | |
532 | context->suid = tsk->suid; | |
533 | context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid; | |
534 | context->egid = tsk->egid; | |
535 | context->sgid = tsk->sgid; | |
536 | context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; | |
537 | context->personality = tsk->personality; | |
538 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; | |
539 | return context; | |
540 | } | |
541 | ||
542 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) | |
543 | { | |
544 | int i; | |
545 | ||
546 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
547 | if (context->auditable | |
548 | ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { | |
549 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" | |
550 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" | |
551 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", | |
552 | __LINE__, | |
553 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, | |
554 | context->name_count, context->put_count, | |
555 | context->ino_count); | |
556 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
557 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
558 | context->names[i].name, | |
559 | context->names[i].name); | |
560 | dump_stack(); | |
561 | return; | |
562 | } | |
563 | #endif | |
564 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
565 | context->put_count = 0; | |
566 | context->ino_count = 0; | |
567 | #endif | |
568 | ||
569 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
570 | if (context->names[i].name) | |
571 | __putname(context->names[i].name); | |
572 | context->name_count = 0; | |
8f37d47c DW |
573 | if (context->pwd) |
574 | dput(context->pwd); | |
575 | if (context->pwdmnt) | |
576 | mntput(context->pwdmnt); | |
577 | context->pwd = NULL; | |
578 | context->pwdmnt = NULL; | |
1da177e4 LT |
579 | } |
580 | ||
581 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) | |
582 | { | |
583 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
584 | ||
585 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { | |
01116105 SS |
586 | if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) { |
587 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
588 | dput(axi->dentry); | |
589 | mntput(axi->mnt); | |
590 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
591 | context->aux = aux->next; |
592 | kfree(aux); | |
593 | } | |
594 | } | |
595 | ||
596 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, | |
597 | enum audit_state state) | |
598 | { | |
599 | uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid; | |
600 | ||
601 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); | |
602 | context->state = state; | |
603 | context->loginuid = loginuid; | |
604 | } | |
605 | ||
606 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) | |
607 | { | |
608 | struct audit_context *context; | |
609 | ||
610 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
611 | return NULL; | |
612 | audit_zero_context(context, state); | |
613 | return context; | |
614 | } | |
615 | ||
616 | /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context | |
617 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the | |
618 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is | |
619 | * needed. */ | |
620 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
621 | { | |
622 | struct audit_context *context; | |
623 | enum audit_state state; | |
624 | ||
625 | if (likely(!audit_enabled)) | |
626 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ | |
627 | ||
628 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk); | |
629 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
630 | return 0; | |
631 | ||
632 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { | |
633 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); | |
634 | return -ENOMEM; | |
635 | } | |
636 | ||
637 | /* Preserve login uid */ | |
638 | context->loginuid = -1; | |
639 | if (current->audit_context) | |
640 | context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid; | |
641 | ||
642 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
643 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); | |
644 | return 0; | |
645 | } | |
646 | ||
647 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) | |
648 | { | |
649 | struct audit_context *previous; | |
650 | int count = 0; | |
651 | ||
652 | do { | |
653 | previous = context->previous; | |
654 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { | |
655 | ++count; | |
656 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" | |
657 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", | |
658 | context->serial, context->major, | |
659 | context->name_count, count); | |
660 | } | |
661 | audit_free_names(context); | |
662 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
663 | kfree(context); | |
664 | context = previous; | |
665 | } while (context); | |
666 | if (count >= 10) | |
667 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); | |
668 | } | |
669 | ||
219f0817 SS |
670 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
671 | { | |
672 | char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; | |
673 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
674 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
675 | ||
676 | get_task_comm(name, current); | |
99e45eea DW |
677 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
678 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); | |
219f0817 SS |
679 | |
680 | if (!mm) | |
681 | return; | |
682 | ||
683 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
684 | vma = mm->mmap; | |
685 | while (vma) { | |
686 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
687 | vma->vm_file) { | |
688 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", | |
689 | vma->vm_file->f_dentry, | |
690 | vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt); | |
691 | break; | |
692 | } | |
693 | vma = vma->vm_next; | |
694 | } | |
695 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
696 | } | |
697 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
698 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context) |
699 | { | |
700 | int i; | |
701 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
7551ced3 | 702 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
1da177e4 | 703 | |
c0404993 | 704 | ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1da177e4 LT |
705 | if (!ab) |
706 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
bccf6ae0 DW |
707 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
708 | context->arch, context->major); | |
1da177e4 LT |
709 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
710 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); | |
711 | if (context->return_valid) | |
2fd6f58b | 712 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
713 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", | |
714 | context->return_code); | |
1da177e4 LT |
715 | audit_log_format(ab, |
716 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" | |
326e9c8b SG |
717 | " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
718 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" | |
719 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u", | |
1da177e4 LT |
720 | context->argv[0], |
721 | context->argv[1], | |
722 | context->argv[2], | |
723 | context->argv[3], | |
724 | context->name_count, | |
725 | context->pid, | |
726 | context->loginuid, | |
727 | context->uid, | |
728 | context->gid, | |
729 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, | |
730 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid); | |
219f0817 | 731 | audit_log_task_info(ab); |
1da177e4 | 732 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1da177e4 | 733 | |
7551ced3 | 734 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
c0404993 SG |
735 | |
736 | ab = audit_log_start(context, aux->type); | |
1da177e4 LT |
737 | if (!ab) |
738 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
739 | ||
1da177e4 | 740 | switch (aux->type) { |
c0404993 | 741 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1da177e4 LT |
742 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; |
743 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
326e9c8b | 744 | " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x", |
1da177e4 | 745 | axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode); |
3ec3b2fb DW |
746 | break; } |
747 | ||
748 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { | |
749 | int i; | |
750 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux; | |
751 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs); | |
752 | for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++) | |
753 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]); | |
754 | break; } | |
755 | ||
756 | case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: { | |
757 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux; | |
758 | ||
759 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); | |
760 | audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len); | |
761 | break; } | |
01116105 SS |
762 | |
763 | case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: { | |
764 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
765 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt); | |
01116105 SS |
766 | break; } |
767 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
768 | } |
769 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1da177e4 LT |
770 | } |
771 | ||
8f37d47c DW |
772 | if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) { |
773 | ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_CWD); | |
774 | if (ab) { | |
775 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt); | |
776 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
777 | } | |
778 | } | |
1da177e4 | 779 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
c0404993 | 780 | ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_PATH); |
1da177e4 LT |
781 | if (!ab) |
782 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
8f37d47c | 783 | |
1da177e4 | 784 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); |
83c7d091 | 785 | if (context->names[i].name) { |
786 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
787 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); | |
788 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
789 | if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1) |
790 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" | |
326e9c8b | 791 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", |
1da177e4 LT |
792 | context->names[i].ino, |
793 | MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
794 | MINOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
795 | context->names[i].mode, | |
796 | context->names[i].uid, | |
797 | context->names[i].gid, | |
798 | MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), | |
799 | MINOR(context->names[i].rdev)); | |
800 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
801 | } | |
802 | } | |
803 | ||
804 | /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and | |
805 | * __put_task_struct. */ | |
806 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
807 | { | |
808 | struct audit_context *context; | |
809 | ||
810 | task_lock(tsk); | |
811 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); | |
812 | task_unlock(tsk); | |
813 | ||
814 | if (likely(!context)) | |
815 | return; | |
816 | ||
817 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit | |
818 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */ | |
7ca00264 | 819 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid) |
1da177e4 LT |
820 | audit_log_exit(context); |
821 | ||
822 | audit_free_context(context); | |
823 | } | |
824 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
825 | /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the |
826 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or | |
827 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the | |
828 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, | |
829 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it | |
830 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it | |
831 | * be written). */ | |
2fd6f58b | 832 | void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, |
1da177e4 LT |
833 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
834 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) | |
835 | { | |
836 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
837 | enum audit_state state; | |
838 | ||
839 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
840 | ||
841 | /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system | |
842 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of | |
843 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new | |
844 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you | |
845 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) | |
846 | * | |
847 | * i386 no | |
848 | * x86_64 no | |
849 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S) | |
850 | * | |
851 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner | |
852 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. | |
853 | */ | |
854 | if (context->in_syscall) { | |
855 | struct audit_context *newctx; | |
856 | ||
857 | #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old) | |
858 | /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */ | |
859 | if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old) | |
860 | return; | |
861 | #endif | |
862 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
863 | printk(KERN_ERR | |
864 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" | |
865 | " entering syscall=%d\n", | |
866 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); | |
867 | #endif | |
868 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); | |
869 | if (newctx) { | |
870 | newctx->previous = context; | |
871 | context = newctx; | |
872 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; | |
873 | } else { | |
874 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we | |
875 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname | |
876 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is | |
877 | * to abandon auditing. */ | |
878 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
879 | } | |
880 | } | |
881 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); | |
882 | ||
883 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
884 | return; | |
885 | ||
2fd6f58b | 886 | context->arch = arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
887 | context->major = major; |
888 | context->argv[0] = a1; | |
889 | context->argv[1] = a2; | |
890 | context->argv[2] = a3; | |
891 | context->argv[3] = a4; | |
892 | ||
893 | state = context->state; | |
894 | if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) | |
0f45aa18 | 895 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
1da177e4 LT |
896 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) |
897 | return; | |
898 | ||
899 | context->serial = audit_serial(); | |
900 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; | |
901 | context->in_syscall = 1; | |
902 | context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT); | |
903 | } | |
904 | ||
905 | /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as | |
906 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from | |
907 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit | |
908 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, | |
909 | * free the names stored from getname(). */ | |
2fd6f58b | 910 | void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) |
1da177e4 LT |
911 | { |
912 | struct audit_context *context; | |
913 | ||
914 | get_task_struct(tsk); | |
915 | task_lock(tsk); | |
2fd6f58b | 916 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); |
1da177e4 LT |
917 | task_unlock(tsk); |
918 | ||
919 | /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have | |
920 | * called __put_task_struct. */ | |
921 | if (likely(!context)) | |
922 | return; | |
923 | ||
7ca00264 | 924 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable && context->pid != audit_pid) |
1da177e4 LT |
925 | audit_log_exit(context); |
926 | ||
927 | context->in_syscall = 0; | |
928 | context->auditable = 0; | |
2fd6f58b | 929 | |
1da177e4 LT |
930 | if (context->previous) { |
931 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; | |
932 | context->previous = NULL; | |
933 | audit_free_context(context); | |
934 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; | |
935 | } else { | |
936 | audit_free_names(context); | |
937 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
938 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
939 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
940 | } | |
941 | put_task_struct(tsk); | |
942 | } | |
943 | ||
944 | /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */ | |
945 | void audit_getname(const char *name) | |
946 | { | |
947 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
948 | ||
949 | if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name) | |
950 | return; | |
951 | ||
952 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
953 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
954 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", | |
955 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
956 | dump_stack(); | |
957 | #endif | |
958 | return; | |
959 | } | |
960 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); | |
961 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; | |
962 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
963 | ++context->name_count; | |
8f37d47c DW |
964 | if (!context->pwd) { |
965 | read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
966 | context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd); | |
967 | context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt); | |
968 | read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
969 | } | |
970 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
971 | } |
972 | ||
973 | /* Intercept a putname request. Called from | |
974 | * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from | |
975 | * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall | |
976 | * exit. */ | |
977 | void audit_putname(const char *name) | |
978 | { | |
979 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
980 | ||
981 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
982 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
983 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
984 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", | |
985 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
986 | if (context->name_count) { | |
987 | int i; | |
988 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
989 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
990 | context->names[i].name, | |
991 | context->names[i].name); | |
992 | } | |
993 | #endif | |
994 | __putname(name); | |
995 | } | |
996 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
997 | else { | |
998 | ++context->put_count; | |
999 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { | |
1000 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" | |
1001 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" | |
1002 | " put_count=%d\n", | |
1003 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
1004 | context->serial, context->major, | |
1005 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, | |
1006 | context->put_count); | |
1007 | dump_stack(); | |
1008 | } | |
1009 | } | |
1010 | #endif | |
1011 | } | |
1012 | ||
1013 | /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from | |
1014 | * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */ | |
1015 | void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode) | |
1016 | { | |
1017 | int idx; | |
1018 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1019 | ||
1020 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1021 | return; | |
1022 | if (context->name_count | |
1023 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name | |
1024 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) | |
1025 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
1026 | else if (context->name_count > 1 | |
1027 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name | |
1028 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) | |
1029 | idx = context->name_count - 2; | |
1030 | else { | |
1031 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no | |
1032 | * associated name? */ | |
1033 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED) | |
1034 | return; | |
1035 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1036 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1037 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1038 | ++context->ino_count; | |
1039 | #endif | |
1040 | } | |
1041 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1042 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | |
1043 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1044 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1045 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1046 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
1047 | } | |
1048 | ||
bfb4496e DW |
1049 | void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
1050 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) | |
1da177e4 | 1051 | { |
bfb4496e DW |
1052 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
1053 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; | |
1054 | *serial = ctx->serial; | |
1055 | ctx->auditable = 1; | |
1da177e4 LT |
1056 | } |
1057 | ||
456be6cd | 1058 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) |
1da177e4 | 1059 | { |
456be6cd | 1060 | if (task->audit_context) { |
c0404993 SG |
1061 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1062 | ||
1063 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, AUDIT_LOGIN); | |
1064 | if (ab) { | |
1065 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " | |
326e9c8b | 1066 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u", |
c0404993 SG |
1067 | task->pid, task->uid, |
1068 | task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid); | |
1069 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1070 | } | |
456be6cd | 1071 | task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid; |
1da177e4 LT |
1072 | } |
1073 | return 0; | |
1074 | } | |
1075 | ||
1076 | uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) | |
1077 | { | |
1078 | return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1; | |
1079 | } | |
1080 | ||
1081 | int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) | |
1082 | { | |
1083 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax; | |
1084 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1085 | ||
1086 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1087 | return 0; | |
1088 | ||
1089 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1090 | if (!ax) | |
1091 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | ax->qbytes = qbytes; | |
1094 | ax->uid = uid; | |
1095 | ax->gid = gid; | |
1096 | ax->mode = mode; | |
1097 | ||
c0404993 | 1098 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC; |
1da177e4 LT |
1099 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
1100 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1101 | return 0; | |
1102 | } | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1103 | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1104 | int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
1105 | { | |
1106 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax; | |
1107 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1108 | ||
1109 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1110 | return 0; | |
1111 | ||
1112 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1113 | if (!ax) | |
1114 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1115 | ||
1116 | ax->nargs = nargs; | |
1117 | memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
1118 | ||
1119 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; | |
1120 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1121 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1122 | return 0; | |
1123 | } | |
1124 | ||
1125 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) | |
1126 | { | |
1127 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax; | |
1128 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1129 | ||
1130 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1131 | return 0; | |
1132 | ||
1133 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1134 | if (!ax) | |
1135 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1136 | ||
1137 | ax->len = len; | |
1138 | memcpy(ax->a, a, len); | |
1139 | ||
1140 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR; | |
1141 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1142 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1143 | return 0; | |
1144 | } | |
1145 | ||
01116105 SS |
1146 | int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) |
1147 | { | |
1148 | struct audit_aux_data_path *ax; | |
1149 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1150 | ||
1151 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1152 | return 0; | |
1153 | ||
1154 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1155 | if (!ax) | |
1156 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1157 | ||
1158 | ax->dentry = dget(dentry); | |
1159 | ax->mnt = mntget(mnt); | |
1160 | ||
1161 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH; | |
1162 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1163 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1164 | return 0; | |
1165 | } | |
1166 | ||
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1167 | void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
1168 | { | |
1169 | extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; | |
1170 | extern uid_t audit_sig_uid; | |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1171 | |
1172 | if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->pid == audit_pid)) { | |
1173 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) { | |
1174 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
1175 | audit_sig_pid = current->pid; | |
1176 | if (ctx) | |
1177 | audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid; | |
1178 | else | |
1179 | audit_sig_uid = current->uid; | |
1180 | } | |
1181 | } | |
1182 | } | |
1183 |