Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
85c8721f | 1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. | |
73241ccc | 5 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
b63862f4 | 6 | * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation |
1da177e4 LT |
7 | * All Rights Reserved. |
8 | * | |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
10 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
11 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
12 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
13 | * | |
14 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
15 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
16 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
17 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
18 | * | |
19 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
20 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | |
21 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> | |
24 | * | |
25 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, | |
26 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. | |
27 | * | |
28 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in | |
29 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by | |
30 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. | |
31 | * | |
b63862f4 DK |
32 | * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was |
33 | * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. | |
34 | * | |
73241ccc AG |
35 | * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional |
36 | * filesystem information. | |
8c8570fb DK |
37 | * |
38 | * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> | |
39 | * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. | |
1da177e4 LT |
40 | */ |
41 | ||
42 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
1da177e4 | 43 | #include <asm/types.h> |
715b49ef | 44 | #include <asm/atomic.h> |
73241ccc AG |
45 | #include <asm/types.h> |
46 | #include <linux/fs.h> | |
47 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
48 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
49 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
01116105 | 50 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
3ec3b2fb | 51 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
52 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
53 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
54 | #include <linux/time.h> | |
f6a789d1 | 55 | #include <linux/kthread.h> |
5bb289b5 | 56 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
f5561964 | 57 | #include <linux/compiler.h> |
1da177e4 | 58 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
8c8570fb | 59 | #include <linux/security.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
60 | |
61 | /* 0 = no checking | |
62 | 1 = put_count checking | |
63 | 2 = verbose put_count checking | |
64 | */ | |
65 | #define AUDIT_DEBUG 0 | |
66 | ||
67 | /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */ | |
68 | extern int audit_enabled; | |
69 | ||
70 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | |
71 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | |
72 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | |
73 | ||
74 | /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the | |
75 | * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from | |
76 | * path_lookup. */ | |
77 | #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7 | |
78 | ||
79 | /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using | |
80 | a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by | |
81 | the syscall filter. */ | |
82 | enum audit_state { | |
83 | AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context. | |
84 | * No syscall-specific audit records can | |
85 | * be generated. */ | |
86 | AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
87 | * but don't necessarily fill it in at | |
88 | * syscall entry time (i.e., filter | |
89 | * instead). */ | |
90 | AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
91 | * and always fill it in at syscall | |
92 | * entry time. This makes a full | |
93 | * syscall record available if some | |
94 | * other part of the kernel decides it | |
95 | * should be recorded. */ | |
96 | AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context, | |
97 | * always fill it in at syscall entry | |
98 | * time, and always write out the audit | |
99 | * record at syscall exit time. */ | |
100 | }; | |
101 | ||
102 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and | |
103 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved | |
104 | * pointers at syscall exit time). | |
105 | * | |
106 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ | |
107 | struct audit_names { | |
108 | const char *name; | |
109 | unsigned long ino; | |
73241ccc | 110 | unsigned long pino; |
1da177e4 LT |
111 | dev_t dev; |
112 | umode_t mode; | |
113 | uid_t uid; | |
114 | gid_t gid; | |
115 | dev_t rdev; | |
8c8570fb | 116 | char *ctx; |
1da177e4 LT |
117 | }; |
118 | ||
119 | struct audit_aux_data { | |
120 | struct audit_aux_data *next; | |
121 | int type; | |
122 | }; | |
123 | ||
124 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 | |
125 | ||
126 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl { | |
127 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
128 | struct ipc_perm p; | |
129 | unsigned long qbytes; | |
130 | uid_t uid; | |
131 | gid_t gid; | |
132 | mode_t mode; | |
8c8570fb | 133 | char *ctx; |
1da177e4 LT |
134 | }; |
135 | ||
3ec3b2fb DW |
136 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { |
137 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
138 | int nargs; | |
139 | unsigned long args[0]; | |
140 | }; | |
141 | ||
142 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr { | |
143 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
144 | int len; | |
145 | char a[0]; | |
146 | }; | |
147 | ||
01116105 SS |
148 | struct audit_aux_data_path { |
149 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
150 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
151 | struct vfsmount *mnt; | |
152 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
153 | |
154 | /* The per-task audit context. */ | |
155 | struct audit_context { | |
156 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ | |
157 | enum audit_state state; | |
158 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ | |
159 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ | |
160 | uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */ | |
161 | int major; /* syscall number */ | |
162 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ | |
163 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ | |
2fd6f58b | 164 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
1da177e4 LT |
165 | int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ |
166 | int name_count; | |
167 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; | |
8f37d47c DW |
168 | struct dentry * pwd; |
169 | struct vfsmount * pwdmnt; | |
1da177e4 LT |
170 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ |
171 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
172 | ||
173 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ | |
174 | pid_t pid; | |
175 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; | |
176 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; | |
177 | unsigned long personality; | |
2fd6f58b | 178 | int arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
179 | |
180 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
181 | int put_count; | |
182 | int ino_count; | |
183 | #endif | |
184 | }; | |
185 | ||
186 | /* Public API */ | |
187 | /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation | |
188 | * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at | |
189 | * syscall exit time. */ | |
0f45aa18 DW |
190 | static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { |
191 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]), | |
192 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]), | |
193 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]), | |
194 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), | |
195 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), | |
c8edc80c DK |
196 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]), |
197 | #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6 | |
0f45aa18 DW |
198 | #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser |
199 | #endif | |
200 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
201 | |
202 | struct audit_entry { | |
203 | struct list_head list; | |
204 | struct rcu_head rcu; | |
205 | struct audit_rule rule; | |
206 | }; | |
207 | ||
7ca00264 DW |
208 | extern int audit_pid; |
209 | ||
3c789a19 AG |
210 | /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from |
211 | * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */ | |
212 | static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) | |
213 | { | |
214 | int i; | |
215 | ||
216 | if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER | |
217 | && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE | |
218 | && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) | |
219 | return -1; | |
220 | if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) | |
221 | return -1; | |
222 | if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) | |
223 | return -1; | |
224 | ||
225 | d->flags = s->flags; | |
226 | d->action = s->action; | |
227 | d->field_count = s->field_count; | |
228 | for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) { | |
229 | d->fields[i] = s->fields[i]; | |
230 | d->values[i] = s->values[i]; | |
231 | } | |
232 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i]; | |
233 | return 0; | |
234 | } | |
235 | ||
1da177e4 | 236 | /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from |
3c789a19 | 237 | * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and |
1da177e4 | 238 | * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */ |
3c789a19 | 239 | static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) |
1da177e4 LT |
240 | { |
241 | int i; | |
242 | ||
243 | if (a->flags != b->flags) | |
244 | return 1; | |
245 | ||
246 | if (a->action != b->action) | |
247 | return 1; | |
248 | ||
249 | if (a->field_count != b->field_count) | |
250 | return 1; | |
251 | ||
252 | for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) { | |
253 | if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i] | |
254 | || a->values[i] != b->values[i]) | |
255 | return 1; | |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
258 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) | |
259 | if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i]) | |
260 | return 1; | |
261 | ||
262 | return 0; | |
263 | } | |
264 | ||
265 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
266 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
267 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
3c789a19 | 268 | static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, |
0f45aa18 | 269 | struct list_head *list) |
1da177e4 | 270 | { |
3c789a19 | 271 | struct audit_entry *entry; |
b63862f4 | 272 | int i; |
3c789a19 AG |
273 | |
274 | /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only | |
275 | * addition routine. */ | |
276 | list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) { | |
277 | if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) { | |
278 | return -EEXIST; | |
279 | } | |
280 | } | |
281 | ||
b63862f4 DK |
282 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { |
283 | if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) | |
284 | return -EINVAL; | |
285 | if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE ) | |
286 | rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL; | |
287 | else if ( (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) == 0 ) | |
288 | rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_EQUAL; | |
289 | rule->fields[i] &= (~AUDIT_NEGATE); | |
290 | } | |
291 | ||
3c789a19 AG |
292 | if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) |
293 | return -ENOMEM; | |
294 | if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) { | |
295 | kfree(entry); | |
296 | return -EINVAL; | |
297 | } | |
298 | ||
0f45aa18 DW |
299 | if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) { |
300 | entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; | |
1da177e4 LT |
301 | list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); |
302 | } else { | |
303 | list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); | |
304 | } | |
3c789a19 AG |
305 | |
306 | return 0; | |
1da177e4 LT |
307 | } |
308 | ||
3c789a19 | 309 | static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head) |
1da177e4 LT |
310 | { |
311 | struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); | |
312 | kfree(e); | |
313 | } | |
314 | ||
315 | /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via | |
316 | * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by | |
317 | * audit_netlink_sem. */ | |
318 | static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, | |
319 | struct list_head *list) | |
320 | { | |
321 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
322 | ||
323 | /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only | |
324 | * deletion routine. */ | |
325 | list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { | |
326 | if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { | |
327 | list_del_rcu(&e->list); | |
328 | call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); | |
329 | return 0; | |
330 | } | |
331 | } | |
0f45aa18 | 332 | return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */ |
1da177e4 LT |
333 | } |
334 | ||
f6a789d1 DW |
335 | static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) |
336 | { | |
337 | int pid, seq; | |
338 | int *dest = _dest; | |
339 | struct audit_entry *entry; | |
340 | int i; | |
341 | ||
342 | pid = dest[0]; | |
343 | seq = dest[1]; | |
344 | kfree(dest); | |
345 | ||
346 | down(&audit_netlink_sem); | |
347 | ||
348 | /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are | |
349 | always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ | |
350 | for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { | |
351 | list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list) | |
352 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, | |
353 | &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); | |
354 | } | |
355 | audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0); | |
356 | ||
357 | up(&audit_netlink_sem); | |
358 | return 0; | |
359 | } | |
360 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
361 | /** |
362 | * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type | |
363 | * @type: audit message type | |
364 | * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages | |
365 | * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages | |
366 | * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number | |
367 | * @data: payload data | |
368 | * @loginuid: loginuid of sender | |
369 | */ | |
c94c257c SH |
370 | int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, |
371 | uid_t loginuid) | |
1da177e4 | 372 | { |
f6a789d1 DW |
373 | struct task_struct *tsk; |
374 | int *dest; | |
1da177e4 | 375 | int err = 0; |
0f45aa18 | 376 | unsigned listnr; |
1da177e4 LT |
377 | |
378 | switch (type) { | |
379 | case AUDIT_LIST: | |
f6a789d1 DW |
380 | /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill |
381 | * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for | |
382 | * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to | |
383 | * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl | |
384 | * trying to _send_ the stuff */ | |
385 | ||
386 | dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); | |
387 | if (!dest) | |
388 | return -ENOMEM; | |
389 | dest[0] = pid; | |
390 | dest[1] = seq; | |
391 | ||
392 | tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules"); | |
393 | if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { | |
394 | kfree(dest); | |
395 | err = PTR_ERR(tsk); | |
0f45aa18 | 396 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
397 | break; |
398 | case AUDIT_ADD: | |
3c789a19 AG |
399 | listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; |
400 | if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) | |
1da177e4 | 401 | return -EINVAL; |
3c789a19 AG |
402 | |
403 | err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); | |
404 | if (!err) | |
405 | audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, | |
406 | "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); | |
1da177e4 LT |
407 | break; |
408 | case AUDIT_DEL: | |
0f45aa18 DW |
409 | listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; |
410 | if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) | |
411 | return -EINVAL; | |
412 | ||
413 | err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); | |
414 | if (!err) | |
9ad9ad38 | 415 | audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, |
0f45aa18 | 416 | "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); |
1da177e4 LT |
417 | break; |
418 | default: | |
419 | return -EINVAL; | |
420 | } | |
421 | ||
422 | return err; | |
423 | } | |
1da177e4 | 424 | |
b63862f4 DK |
425 | static int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right) |
426 | { | |
427 | switch (op) { | |
428 | case AUDIT_EQUAL: | |
429 | return (left == right); | |
430 | case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL: | |
431 | return (left != right); | |
432 | case AUDIT_LESS_THAN: | |
433 | return (left < right); | |
434 | case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL: | |
435 | return (left <= right); | |
436 | case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN: | |
437 | return (left > right); | |
438 | case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL: | |
439 | return (left >= right); | |
440 | default: | |
441 | return -EINVAL; | |
442 | } | |
443 | } | |
444 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
445 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 |
446 | * otherwise. */ | |
447 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
448 | struct audit_rule *rule, | |
449 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
450 | enum audit_state *state) | |
451 | { | |
452 | int i, j; | |
453 | ||
454 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
b63862f4 DK |
455 | u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; |
456 | u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; | |
1da177e4 LT |
457 | u32 value = rule->values[i]; |
458 | int result = 0; | |
459 | ||
460 | switch (field) { | |
461 | case AUDIT_PID: | |
b63862f4 | 462 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
463 | break; |
464 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
b63862f4 | 465 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
466 | break; |
467 | case AUDIT_EUID: | |
b63862f4 | 468 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
469 | break; |
470 | case AUDIT_SUID: | |
b63862f4 | 471 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
472 | break; |
473 | case AUDIT_FSUID: | |
b63862f4 | 474 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
475 | break; |
476 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
b63862f4 | 477 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
478 | break; |
479 | case AUDIT_EGID: | |
b63862f4 | 480 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
481 | break; |
482 | case AUDIT_SGID: | |
b63862f4 | 483 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
484 | break; |
485 | case AUDIT_FSGID: | |
b63862f4 | 486 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
487 | break; |
488 | case AUDIT_PERS: | |
b63862f4 | 489 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, op, value); |
1da177e4 | 490 | break; |
2fd6f58b | 491 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
b63862f4 DK |
492 | if (ctx) |
493 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, op, value); | |
2fd6f58b | 494 | break; |
1da177e4 LT |
495 | |
496 | case AUDIT_EXIT: | |
497 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
b63862f4 | 498 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
499 | break; |
500 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: | |
b01f2cc1 DW |
501 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { |
502 | if (value) | |
b63862f4 | 503 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
b01f2cc1 | 504 | else |
b63862f4 | 505 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); |
b01f2cc1 | 506 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
507 | break; |
508 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: | |
509 | if (ctx) { | |
510 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
b63862f4 | 511 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) { |
1da177e4 LT |
512 | ++result; |
513 | break; | |
514 | } | |
515 | } | |
516 | } | |
517 | break; | |
518 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: | |
519 | if (ctx) { | |
520 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
b63862f4 | 521 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) { |
1da177e4 LT |
522 | ++result; |
523 | break; | |
524 | } | |
525 | } | |
526 | } | |
527 | break; | |
528 | case AUDIT_INODE: | |
529 | if (ctx) { | |
530 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
73241ccc AG |
531 | if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value) || |
532 | audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, op, value)) { | |
1da177e4 LT |
533 | ++result; |
534 | break; | |
535 | } | |
536 | } | |
537 | } | |
538 | break; | |
539 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
540 | result = 0; | |
541 | if (ctx) | |
b63862f4 | 542 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
543 | break; |
544 | case AUDIT_ARG0: | |
545 | case AUDIT_ARG1: | |
546 | case AUDIT_ARG2: | |
547 | case AUDIT_ARG3: | |
548 | if (ctx) | |
b63862f4 | 549 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0], op, value); |
1da177e4 LT |
550 | break; |
551 | } | |
552 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
553 | if (!result) |
554 | return 0; | |
555 | } | |
556 | switch (rule->action) { | |
557 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
558 | case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; | |
559 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
560 | } | |
561 | return 1; | |
562 | } | |
563 | ||
564 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is | |
565 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task | |
566 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. | |
567 | */ | |
568 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
569 | { | |
570 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
571 | enum audit_state state; | |
572 | ||
573 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
0f45aa18 | 574 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
1da177e4 LT |
575 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { |
576 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
577 | return state; | |
578 | } | |
579 | } | |
580 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
581 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
582 | } | |
583 | ||
584 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the | |
585 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is | |
23f32d18 | 586 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
b0dd25a8 | 587 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
1da177e4 LT |
588 | */ |
589 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
590 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
591 | struct list_head *list) | |
592 | { | |
593 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
c3896495 | 594 | enum audit_state state; |
1da177e4 | 595 | |
351bb722 | 596 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
f7056d64 DW |
597 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; |
598 | ||
1da177e4 | 599 | rcu_read_lock(); |
c3896495 | 600 | if (!list_empty(list)) { |
b63862f4 DK |
601 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
602 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
603 | ||
604 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
605 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit | |
606 | && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { | |
607 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
608 | return state; | |
609 | } | |
610 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
611 | } |
612 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
613 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
614 | } | |
615 | ||
5bb289b5 | 616 | static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, |
b63862f4 DK |
617 | struct audit_rule *rule, |
618 | enum audit_state *state) | |
5bb289b5 DW |
619 | { |
620 | int i; | |
621 | ||
622 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
b63862f4 DK |
623 | u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; |
624 | u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; | |
5bb289b5 DW |
625 | u32 value = rule->values[i]; |
626 | int result = 0; | |
627 | ||
628 | switch (field) { | |
629 | case AUDIT_PID: | |
b63862f4 | 630 | result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, op, value); |
5bb289b5 DW |
631 | break; |
632 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
b63862f4 | 633 | result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, op, value); |
5bb289b5 DW |
634 | break; |
635 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
b63862f4 | 636 | result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, op, value); |
5bb289b5 DW |
637 | break; |
638 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
b63862f4 | 639 | result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, op, value); |
5bb289b5 DW |
640 | break; |
641 | } | |
642 | ||
5bb289b5 DW |
643 | if (!result) |
644 | return 0; | |
645 | } | |
646 | switch (rule->action) { | |
647 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
648 | case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; | |
649 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
650 | } | |
651 | return 1; | |
652 | } | |
653 | ||
654 | int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type) | |
0f45aa18 DW |
655 | { |
656 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
657 | enum audit_state state; | |
4a4cd633 | 658 | int ret = 1; |
0f45aa18 DW |
659 | |
660 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
661 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) { | |
5bb289b5 | 662 | if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) { |
4a4cd633 DW |
663 | if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) |
664 | ret = 0; | |
665 | break; | |
0f45aa18 DW |
666 | } |
667 | } | |
668 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
4a4cd633 | 669 | |
993e2d41 | 670 | return ret; /* Audit by default */ |
0f45aa18 DW |
671 | } |
672 | ||
c8edc80c DK |
673 | int audit_filter_type(int type) |
674 | { | |
675 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
676 | int result = 0; | |
677 | ||
678 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
679 | if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE])) | |
680 | goto unlock_and_return; | |
681 | ||
682 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE], | |
683 | list) { | |
684 | struct audit_rule *rule = &e->rule; | |
685 | int i; | |
686 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
687 | u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; | |
688 | u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; | |
689 | u32 value = rule->values[i]; | |
690 | if ( field == AUDIT_MSGTYPE ) { | |
691 | result = audit_comparator(type, op, value); | |
692 | if (!result) | |
693 | break; | |
694 | } | |
695 | } | |
696 | if (result) | |
697 | goto unlock_and_return; | |
698 | } | |
699 | unlock_and_return: | |
700 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
701 | return result; | |
702 | } | |
703 | ||
704 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
705 | /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ |
706 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
707 | int return_valid, | |
708 | int return_code) | |
709 | { | |
710 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
711 | ||
712 | if (likely(!context)) | |
713 | return NULL; | |
714 | context->return_valid = return_valid; | |
715 | context->return_code = return_code; | |
716 | ||
21af6c4f | 717 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) { |
1da177e4 | 718 | enum audit_state state; |
0f45aa18 | 719 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
1da177e4 LT |
720 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
721 | context->auditable = 1; | |
722 | } | |
723 | ||
724 | context->pid = tsk->pid; | |
725 | context->uid = tsk->uid; | |
726 | context->gid = tsk->gid; | |
727 | context->euid = tsk->euid; | |
728 | context->suid = tsk->suid; | |
729 | context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid; | |
730 | context->egid = tsk->egid; | |
731 | context->sgid = tsk->sgid; | |
732 | context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; | |
733 | context->personality = tsk->personality; | |
734 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; | |
735 | return context; | |
736 | } | |
737 | ||
738 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) | |
739 | { | |
740 | int i; | |
741 | ||
742 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
743 | if (context->auditable | |
744 | ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { | |
73241ccc | 745 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" |
1da177e4 LT |
746 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" |
747 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", | |
73241ccc | 748 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
1da177e4 LT |
749 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, |
750 | context->name_count, context->put_count, | |
751 | context->ino_count); | |
8c8570fb | 752 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
1da177e4 LT |
753 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, |
754 | context->names[i].name, | |
73241ccc | 755 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
8c8570fb | 756 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
757 | dump_stack(); |
758 | return; | |
759 | } | |
760 | #endif | |
761 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
762 | context->put_count = 0; | |
763 | context->ino_count = 0; | |
764 | #endif | |
765 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
766 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
767 | char *p = context->names[i].ctx; | |
768 | context->names[i].ctx = NULL; | |
769 | kfree(p); | |
1da177e4 LT |
770 | if (context->names[i].name) |
771 | __putname(context->names[i].name); | |
8c8570fb | 772 | } |
1da177e4 | 773 | context->name_count = 0; |
8f37d47c DW |
774 | if (context->pwd) |
775 | dput(context->pwd); | |
776 | if (context->pwdmnt) | |
777 | mntput(context->pwdmnt); | |
778 | context->pwd = NULL; | |
779 | context->pwdmnt = NULL; | |
1da177e4 LT |
780 | } |
781 | ||
782 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) | |
783 | { | |
784 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
785 | ||
786 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { | |
01116105 SS |
787 | if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) { |
788 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
789 | dput(axi->dentry); | |
790 | mntput(axi->mnt); | |
791 | } | |
8c8570fb DK |
792 | if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) { |
793 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; | |
794 | if (axi->ctx) | |
795 | kfree(axi->ctx); | |
796 | } | |
797 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
798 | context->aux = aux->next; |
799 | kfree(aux); | |
800 | } | |
801 | } | |
802 | ||
803 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, | |
804 | enum audit_state state) | |
805 | { | |
806 | uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid; | |
807 | ||
808 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); | |
809 | context->state = state; | |
810 | context->loginuid = loginuid; | |
811 | } | |
812 | ||
813 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) | |
814 | { | |
815 | struct audit_context *context; | |
816 | ||
817 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
818 | return NULL; | |
819 | audit_zero_context(context, state); | |
820 | return context; | |
821 | } | |
822 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
823 | /** |
824 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task | |
825 | * @tsk: task | |
826 | * | |
827 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context | |
1da177e4 LT |
828 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
829 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
830 | * needed. |
831 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
832 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
833 | { | |
834 | struct audit_context *context; | |
835 | enum audit_state state; | |
836 | ||
837 | if (likely(!audit_enabled)) | |
838 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ | |
839 | ||
840 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk); | |
841 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
842 | return 0; | |
843 | ||
844 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { | |
845 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); | |
846 | return -ENOMEM; | |
847 | } | |
848 | ||
849 | /* Preserve login uid */ | |
850 | context->loginuid = -1; | |
851 | if (current->audit_context) | |
852 | context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid; | |
853 | ||
854 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
855 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); | |
856 | return 0; | |
857 | } | |
858 | ||
859 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) | |
860 | { | |
861 | struct audit_context *previous; | |
862 | int count = 0; | |
863 | ||
864 | do { | |
865 | previous = context->previous; | |
866 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { | |
867 | ++count; | |
868 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" | |
869 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", | |
870 | context->serial, context->major, | |
871 | context->name_count, count); | |
872 | } | |
873 | audit_free_names(context); | |
874 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
875 | kfree(context); | |
876 | context = previous; | |
877 | } while (context); | |
878 | if (count >= 10) | |
879 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); | |
880 | } | |
881 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
882 | static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask) |
883 | { | |
884 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
885 | ssize_t len = 0; | |
886 | ||
887 | len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0); | |
888 | if (len < 0) { | |
889 | if (len != -EINVAL) | |
890 | goto error_path; | |
891 | return; | |
892 | } | |
893 | ||
894 | ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask); | |
895 | if (!ctx) { | |
896 | goto error_path; | |
897 | return; | |
898 | } | |
899 | ||
900 | len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len); | |
901 | if (len < 0 ) | |
902 | goto error_path; | |
903 | ||
904 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); | |
905 | ||
906 | error_path: | |
907 | if (ctx) | |
908 | kfree(ctx); | |
909 | audit_panic("security_getprocattr error in audit_log_task_context"); | |
910 | return; | |
911 | } | |
912 | ||
913 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask) | |
219f0817 SS |
914 | { |
915 | char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; | |
916 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
917 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
918 | ||
919 | get_task_comm(name, current); | |
99e45eea DW |
920 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
921 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); | |
219f0817 SS |
922 | |
923 | if (!mm) | |
924 | return; | |
925 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
926 | /* |
927 | * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have | |
928 | * NULL current->mm and we won't get here. | |
929 | */ | |
219f0817 SS |
930 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
931 | vma = mm->mmap; | |
932 | while (vma) { | |
933 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
934 | vma->vm_file) { | |
935 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", | |
936 | vma->vm_file->f_dentry, | |
937 | vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt); | |
938 | break; | |
939 | } | |
940 | vma = vma->vm_next; | |
941 | } | |
942 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
8c8570fb | 943 | audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask); |
219f0817 SS |
944 | } |
945 | ||
9796fdd8 | 946 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) |
1da177e4 LT |
947 | { |
948 | int i; | |
949 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
7551ced3 | 950 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
1da177e4 | 951 | |
f5561964 | 952 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1da177e4 LT |
953 | if (!ab) |
954 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
bccf6ae0 DW |
955 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
956 | context->arch, context->major); | |
1da177e4 LT |
957 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
958 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); | |
959 | if (context->return_valid) | |
2fd6f58b | 960 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
961 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", | |
962 | context->return_code); | |
1da177e4 LT |
963 | audit_log_format(ab, |
964 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" | |
326e9c8b SG |
965 | " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
966 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" | |
967 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u", | |
1da177e4 LT |
968 | context->argv[0], |
969 | context->argv[1], | |
970 | context->argv[2], | |
971 | context->argv[3], | |
972 | context->name_count, | |
973 | context->pid, | |
974 | context->loginuid, | |
975 | context->uid, | |
976 | context->gid, | |
977 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, | |
978 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid); | |
8c8570fb | 979 | audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask); |
1da177e4 | 980 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1da177e4 | 981 | |
7551ced3 | 982 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
c0404993 | 983 | |
ef20c8c1 | 984 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type); |
1da177e4 LT |
985 | if (!ab) |
986 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
987 | ||
1da177e4 | 988 | switch (aux->type) { |
c0404993 | 989 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1da177e4 LT |
990 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; |
991 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
8c8570fb DK |
992 | " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s", |
993 | axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx); | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
994 | break; } |
995 | ||
996 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { | |
997 | int i; | |
998 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux; | |
999 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs); | |
1000 | for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++) | |
1001 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]); | |
1002 | break; } | |
1003 | ||
1004 | case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: { | |
1005 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux; | |
1006 | ||
1007 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); | |
1008 | audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len); | |
1009 | break; } | |
01116105 SS |
1010 | |
1011 | case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: { | |
1012 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
1013 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt); | |
01116105 SS |
1014 | break; } |
1015 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1016 | } |
1017 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1da177e4 LT |
1018 | } |
1019 | ||
8f37d47c | 1020 | if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) { |
ef20c8c1 | 1021 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD); |
8f37d47c DW |
1022 | if (ab) { |
1023 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt); | |
1024 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1025 | } | |
1026 | } | |
1da177e4 | 1027 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
73241ccc AG |
1028 | unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino; |
1029 | unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino; | |
1030 | ||
ef20c8c1 | 1031 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH); |
1da177e4 LT |
1032 | if (!ab) |
1033 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
8f37d47c | 1034 | |
1da177e4 | 1035 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); |
73241ccc AG |
1036 | |
1037 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
1038 | if (context->names[i].name) | |
83c7d091 | 1039 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); |
73241ccc AG |
1040 | else |
1041 | audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); | |
1042 | ||
1043 | if (pino != (unsigned long)-1) | |
1044 | audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino); | |
1045 | if (ino != (unsigned long)-1) | |
1046 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino); | |
1047 | if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1)) | |
1048 | audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" | |
1049 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", | |
1050 | MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
1051 | MINOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
1052 | context->names[i].mode, | |
1053 | context->names[i].uid, | |
1054 | context->names[i].gid, | |
1055 | MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), | |
1da177e4 | 1056 | MINOR(context->names[i].rdev)); |
8c8570fb DK |
1057 | if (context->names[i].ctx) { |
1058 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", | |
1059 | context->names[i].ctx); | |
1060 | } | |
1061 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1062 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1063 | } | |
1064 | } | |
1065 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1066 | /** |
1067 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context | |
1068 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free | |
1069 | * | |
1070 | * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct. | |
1071 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1072 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
1073 | { | |
1074 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1075 | ||
1076 | task_lock(tsk); | |
1077 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); | |
1078 | task_unlock(tsk); | |
1079 | ||
1080 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1081 | return; | |
1082 | ||
1083 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit | |
f5561964 DW |
1084 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. |
1085 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this | |
1086 | * in the context of the idle thread */ | |
f7056d64 | 1087 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) |
f5561964 | 1088 | audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC); |
1da177e4 LT |
1089 | |
1090 | audit_free_context(context); | |
1091 | } | |
1092 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1093 | /** |
1094 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry | |
1095 | * @tsk: task being audited | |
1096 | * @arch: architecture type | |
1097 | * @major: major syscall type (function) | |
1098 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 | |
1099 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 | |
1100 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 | |
1101 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 | |
1102 | * | |
1103 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the | |
1da177e4 LT |
1104 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
1105 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the | |
1106 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, | |
1107 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it | |
1108 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
1109 | * be written). |
1110 | */ | |
2fd6f58b | 1111 | void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, |
1da177e4 LT |
1112 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
1113 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) | |
1114 | { | |
1115 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
1116 | enum audit_state state; | |
1117 | ||
1118 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
1119 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1120 | /* |
1121 | * This happens only on certain architectures that make system | |
1da177e4 LT |
1122 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of |
1123 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new | |
1124 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you | |
1125 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) | |
1126 | * | |
1127 | * i386 no | |
1128 | * x86_64 no | |
1129 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S) | |
1130 | * | |
1131 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner | |
1132 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. | |
1133 | */ | |
1134 | if (context->in_syscall) { | |
1135 | struct audit_context *newctx; | |
1136 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1137 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
1138 | printk(KERN_ERR | |
1139 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" | |
1140 | " entering syscall=%d\n", | |
1141 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); | |
1142 | #endif | |
1143 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); | |
1144 | if (newctx) { | |
1145 | newctx->previous = context; | |
1146 | context = newctx; | |
1147 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; | |
1148 | } else { | |
1149 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we | |
1150 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname | |
1151 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is | |
1152 | * to abandon auditing. */ | |
1153 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
1154 | } | |
1155 | } | |
1156 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); | |
1157 | ||
1158 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
1159 | return; | |
1160 | ||
2fd6f58b | 1161 | context->arch = arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
1162 | context->major = major; |
1163 | context->argv[0] = a1; | |
1164 | context->argv[1] = a2; | |
1165 | context->argv[2] = a3; | |
1166 | context->argv[3] = a4; | |
1167 | ||
1168 | state = context->state; | |
1169 | if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) | |
0f45aa18 | 1170 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
1da177e4 LT |
1171 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) |
1172 | return; | |
1173 | ||
ce625a80 | 1174 | context->serial = 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
1175 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; |
1176 | context->in_syscall = 1; | |
1177 | context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT); | |
1178 | } | |
1179 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1180 | /** |
1181 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call | |
1182 | * @tsk: task being audited | |
1183 | * @valid: success/failure flag | |
1184 | * @return_code: syscall return value | |
1185 | * | |
1186 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as | |
1da177e4 LT |
1187 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from |
1188 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit | |
1189 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
1190 | * free the names stored from getname(). |
1191 | */ | |
2fd6f58b | 1192 | void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) |
1da177e4 LT |
1193 | { |
1194 | struct audit_context *context; | |
1195 | ||
1196 | get_task_struct(tsk); | |
1197 | task_lock(tsk); | |
2fd6f58b | 1198 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); |
1da177e4 LT |
1199 | task_unlock(tsk); |
1200 | ||
1201 | /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have | |
1202 | * called __put_task_struct. */ | |
1203 | if (likely(!context)) | |
413a1c75 | 1204 | goto out; |
1da177e4 | 1205 | |
f7056d64 | 1206 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) |
f5561964 | 1207 | audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL); |
1da177e4 LT |
1208 | |
1209 | context->in_syscall = 0; | |
1210 | context->auditable = 0; | |
2fd6f58b | 1211 | |
1da177e4 LT |
1212 | if (context->previous) { |
1213 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; | |
1214 | context->previous = NULL; | |
1215 | audit_free_context(context); | |
1216 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; | |
1217 | } else { | |
1218 | audit_free_names(context); | |
1219 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
1da177e4 LT |
1220 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
1221 | } | |
413a1c75 | 1222 | out: |
1da177e4 LT |
1223 | put_task_struct(tsk); |
1224 | } | |
1225 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1226 | /** |
1227 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list | |
1228 | * @name: name to add | |
1229 | * | |
1230 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. | |
1231 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). | |
1232 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1233 | void audit_getname(const char *name) |
1234 | { | |
1235 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1236 | ||
1237 | if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name) | |
1238 | return; | |
1239 | ||
1240 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
1241 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
1242 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", | |
1243 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
1244 | dump_stack(); | |
1245 | #endif | |
1246 | return; | |
1247 | } | |
1248 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); | |
1249 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; | |
1250 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1251 | ++context->name_count; | |
8f37d47c DW |
1252 | if (!context->pwd) { |
1253 | read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
1254 | context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd); | |
1255 | context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt); | |
1256 | read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
1257 | } | |
1258 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1259 | } |
1260 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1261 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request |
1262 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname | |
1263 | * | |
1264 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, | |
1265 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. | |
1266 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). | |
1267 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1268 | void audit_putname(const char *name) |
1269 | { | |
1270 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1271 | ||
1272 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
1273 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
1274 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
1275 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", | |
1276 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
1277 | if (context->name_count) { | |
1278 | int i; | |
1279 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
1280 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
1281 | context->names[i].name, | |
73241ccc | 1282 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
1da177e4 LT |
1283 | } |
1284 | #endif | |
1285 | __putname(name); | |
1286 | } | |
1287 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1288 | else { | |
1289 | ++context->put_count; | |
1290 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { | |
1291 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" | |
1292 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" | |
1293 | " put_count=%d\n", | |
1294 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
1295 | context->serial, context->major, | |
1296 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, | |
1297 | context->put_count); | |
1298 | dump_stack(); | |
1299 | } | |
1300 | } | |
1301 | #endif | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
1304 | void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode) |
1305 | { | |
1306 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1307 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
1308 | int len = 0; | |
1309 | ||
1310 | if (!security_inode_xattr_getsuffix()) | |
1311 | return; | |
1312 | ||
1313 | len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, (char *)security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(), NULL, 0, 0); | |
1314 | if (len < 0) | |
1315 | goto error_path; | |
1316 | ||
1317 | ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1318 | if (!ctx) | |
1319 | goto error_path; | |
1320 | ||
1321 | len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, (char *)security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(), ctx, len, 0); | |
1322 | if (len < 0) | |
1323 | goto error_path; | |
1324 | ||
1325 | kfree(context->names[idx].ctx); | |
1326 | context->names[idx].ctx = ctx; | |
1327 | return; | |
1328 | ||
1329 | error_path: | |
1330 | if (ctx) | |
1331 | kfree(ctx); | |
1332 | audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context"); | |
1333 | return; | |
1334 | } | |
1335 | ||
1336 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1337 | /** |
1338 | * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup | |
1339 | * @name: name being audited | |
1340 | * @inode: inode being audited | |
1341 | * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup()) | |
1342 | * | |
1343 | * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). | |
1344 | */ | |
73241ccc | 1345 | void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) |
1da177e4 LT |
1346 | { |
1347 | int idx; | |
1348 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1349 | ||
1350 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1351 | return; | |
1352 | if (context->name_count | |
1353 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name | |
1354 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) | |
1355 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
1356 | else if (context->name_count > 1 | |
1357 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name | |
1358 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) | |
1359 | idx = context->name_count - 2; | |
1360 | else { | |
1361 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no | |
1362 | * associated name? */ | |
1363 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED) | |
1364 | return; | |
1365 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1366 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1367 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1368 | ++context->ino_count; | |
1369 | #endif | |
1370 | } | |
ae7b961b DW |
1371 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; |
1372 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1373 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1374 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1375 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
8c8570fb | 1376 | audit_inode_context(idx, inode); |
73241ccc AG |
1377 | if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) && |
1378 | (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) { | |
1379 | context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1380 | context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino; | |
1381 | } else { | |
1382 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1383 | context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1384 | } | |
1385 | } | |
1386 | ||
1387 | /** | |
1388 | * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects | |
1389 | * @dname: inode's dentry name | |
1390 | * @inode: inode being audited | |
1391 | * @pino: inode number of dentry parent | |
1392 | * | |
1393 | * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode | |
1394 | * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. | |
1395 | * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. | |
1396 | * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after | |
1397 | * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object | |
1398 | * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during | |
1399 | * unsuccessful attempts. | |
1400 | */ | |
1401 | void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode, | |
1402 | unsigned long pino) | |
1403 | { | |
1404 | int idx; | |
1405 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1406 | ||
1407 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1408 | return; | |
1409 | ||
1410 | /* determine matching parent */ | |
1411 | if (dname) | |
1412 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) | |
1413 | if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) { | |
1414 | const char *n; | |
1415 | const char *name = context->names[idx].name; | |
1416 | int dlen = strlen(dname); | |
1417 | int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0; | |
1418 | ||
1419 | if (nlen < dlen) | |
1420 | continue; | |
1421 | ||
1422 | /* disregard trailing slashes */ | |
1423 | n = name + nlen - 1; | |
1424 | while ((*n == '/') && (n > name)) | |
1425 | n--; | |
1426 | ||
1427 | /* find last path component */ | |
1428 | n = n - dlen + 1; | |
1429 | if (n < name) | |
1430 | continue; | |
1431 | else if (n > name) { | |
1432 | if (*--n != '/') | |
1433 | continue; | |
1434 | else | |
1435 | n++; | |
1436 | } | |
1437 | ||
1438 | if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0) | |
1439 | goto update_context; | |
1440 | } | |
1441 | ||
1442 | /* catch-all in case match not found */ | |
1443 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1444 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1445 | context->names[idx].pino = pino; | |
1446 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1447 | context->ino_count++; | |
1448 | #endif | |
1449 | ||
1450 | update_context: | |
1451 | if (inode) { | |
1452 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1453 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | |
1454 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1455 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1456 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1457 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
8c8570fb | 1458 | audit_inode_context(idx, inode); |
73241ccc | 1459 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
1460 | } |
1461 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1462 | /** |
1463 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values | |
1464 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task | |
1465 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context | |
1466 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context | |
1467 | * | |
1468 | * Also sets the context as auditable. | |
1469 | */ | |
bfb4496e DW |
1470 | void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
1471 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) | |
1da177e4 | 1472 | { |
ce625a80 DW |
1473 | if (!ctx->serial) |
1474 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); | |
bfb4496e DW |
1475 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
1476 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; | |
1477 | *serial = ctx->serial; | |
1478 | ctx->auditable = 1; | |
1da177e4 LT |
1479 | } |
1480 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1481 | /** |
1482 | * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid | |
1483 | * @task: task whose audit context is being modified | |
1484 | * @loginuid: loginuid value | |
1485 | * | |
1486 | * Returns 0. | |
1487 | * | |
1488 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). | |
1489 | */ | |
456be6cd | 1490 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) |
1da177e4 | 1491 | { |
456be6cd | 1492 | if (task->audit_context) { |
c0404993 SG |
1493 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1494 | ||
9ad9ad38 | 1495 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); |
c0404993 SG |
1496 | if (ab) { |
1497 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " | |
326e9c8b | 1498 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u", |
c0404993 SG |
1499 | task->pid, task->uid, |
1500 | task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid); | |
1501 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1502 | } | |
456be6cd | 1503 | task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid; |
1da177e4 LT |
1504 | } |
1505 | return 0; | |
1506 | } | |
1507 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1508 | /** |
1509 | * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context | |
1510 | * @ctx: the audit_context | |
1511 | * | |
1512 | * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL. | |
1513 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1514 | uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) |
1515 | { | |
1516 | return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1; | |
1517 | } | |
1518 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
1519 | static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
1520 | { | |
1521 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1522 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
1523 | int len = 0; | |
1524 | ||
1525 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1526 | return NULL; | |
1527 | ||
1528 | len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0); | |
1529 | if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
1530 | goto ret; | |
1531 | if (len < 0) | |
1532 | goto error_path; | |
1533 | ||
1534 | ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1535 | if (!ctx) | |
1536 | goto error_path; | |
1537 | ||
1538 | len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len); | |
1539 | if (len < 0) | |
1540 | goto error_path; | |
1541 | ||
1542 | return ctx; | |
1543 | ||
1544 | error_path: | |
1545 | kfree(ctx); | |
1546 | audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context"); | |
1547 | ret: | |
1548 | return NULL; | |
1549 | } | |
1550 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1551 | /** |
1552 | * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc | |
1553 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes | |
1554 | * @uid: msgq user id | |
1555 | * @gid: msgq group id | |
1556 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) | |
1557 | * | |
1558 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1559 | */ | |
8c8570fb | 1560 | int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
1da177e4 LT |
1561 | { |
1562 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax; | |
1563 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1564 | ||
1565 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1566 | return 0; | |
1567 | ||
8c8570fb | 1568 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); |
1da177e4 LT |
1569 | if (!ax) |
1570 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1571 | ||
1572 | ax->qbytes = qbytes; | |
1573 | ax->uid = uid; | |
1574 | ax->gid = gid; | |
1575 | ax->mode = mode; | |
8c8570fb | 1576 | ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp); |
1da177e4 | 1577 | |
c0404993 | 1578 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC; |
1da177e4 LT |
1579 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
1580 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1581 | return 0; | |
1582 | } | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1583 | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
1584 | /** |
1585 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall | |
1586 | * @nargs: number of args | |
1587 | * @args: args array | |
1588 | * | |
1589 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1590 | */ | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1591 | int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
1592 | { | |
1593 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax; | |
1594 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1595 | ||
1596 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1597 | return 0; | |
1598 | ||
1599 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1600 | if (!ax) | |
1601 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1602 | ||
1603 | ax->nargs = nargs; | |
1604 | memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
1605 | ||
1606 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; | |
1607 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1608 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1609 | return 0; | |
1610 | } | |
1611 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1612 | /** |
1613 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto | |
1614 | * @len: data length in user space | |
1615 | * @a: data address in kernel space | |
1616 | * | |
1617 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1618 | */ | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1619 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
1620 | { | |
1621 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax; | |
1622 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1623 | ||
1624 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1625 | return 0; | |
1626 | ||
1627 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1628 | if (!ax) | |
1629 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1630 | ||
1631 | ax->len = len; | |
1632 | memcpy(ax->a, a, len); | |
1633 | ||
1634 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR; | |
1635 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1636 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1637 | return 0; | |
1638 | } | |
1639 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1640 | /** |
1641 | * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions | |
1642 | * @dentry: dentry to record | |
1643 | * @mnt: mnt to record | |
1644 | * | |
1645 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1646 | * | |
1647 | * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit() | |
1648 | */ | |
01116105 SS |
1649 | int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) |
1650 | { | |
1651 | struct audit_aux_data_path *ax; | |
1652 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1653 | ||
1654 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1655 | return 0; | |
1656 | ||
1657 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1658 | if (!ax) | |
1659 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1660 | ||
1661 | ax->dentry = dget(dentry); | |
1662 | ax->mnt = mntget(mnt); | |
1663 | ||
1664 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH; | |
1665 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1666 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1667 | return 0; | |
1668 | } | |
1669 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1670 | /** |
1671 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem | |
1672 | * @sig: signal value | |
1673 | * @t: task being signaled | |
1674 | * | |
1675 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) | |
1676 | * and uid that is doing that. | |
1677 | */ | |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1678 | void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
1679 | { | |
1680 | extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; | |
1681 | extern uid_t audit_sig_uid; | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1682 | |
582edda5 | 1683 | if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) { |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1684 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) { |
1685 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
1686 | audit_sig_pid = current->pid; | |
1687 | if (ctx) | |
1688 | audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid; | |
1689 | else | |
1690 | audit_sig_uid = current->uid; | |
1691 | } | |
1692 | } | |
1693 | } |