fs: port privilege checking helpers to mnt_idmap
[linux-block.git] / include / linux / capability.h
CommitLineData
b2441318 1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
1da177e4
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2/*
3 * This is <linux/capability.h>
4 *
b5376771 5 * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
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6 * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
7 * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
8 *
9 * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
10 *
bcf56442 11 * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
b5376771 12 */
1da177e4
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13#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
14#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
15
607ca46e 16#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
2fec30e2 17#include <linux/uidgid.h>
ca05a99a
AM
18
19#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
20#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
1da177e4 21
9fa91d99 22extern int file_caps_enabled;
9fa91d99 23
1da177e4 24typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
ca05a99a 25 __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
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26} kernel_cap_t;
27
2fec30e2 28/* same as vfs_ns_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
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29struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
30 __u32 magic_etc;
31 kernel_cap_t permitted;
32 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
2fec30e2 33 kuid_t rootid;
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EP
34};
35
e338d263 36#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
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37#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
38
1da177e4 39
935d8aab 40struct file;
1a48e2ac 41struct inode;
3486740a 42struct dentry;
db3f6001 43struct task_struct;
3486740a 44struct user_namespace;
39f60c1c 45struct mnt_idmap;
3486740a 46
3486740a 47extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
3486740a
SH
48extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
49
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50/*
51 * Internal kernel functions only
52 */
b5376771 53
e338d263 54#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
ca05a99a 55 for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
e338d263 56
0ad30b8f
SH
57/*
58 * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
59 *
60 * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
61 * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
62 *
63 * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
64 *
65 * We could also define fsmask as follows:
66 * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
67 * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
68 */
69
e338d263 70# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
0ad30b8f 71 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
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72 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
73 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
74 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
75 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
76
e114e473
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77# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
78
ca05a99a 79#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
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80# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
81#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
82
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EP
83#define CAP_LAST_U32 ((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1)
84#define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1)
85
25f2ea9f 86# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
7d8b6c63 87# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }})
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88# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
89 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
90 CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
76a67ec6 91# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
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SH
92 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
93 CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
e338d263 94
ca05a99a 95#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
e338d263 96
e338d263 97# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
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98
99#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
100#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
101#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
102
103#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
104do { \
105 unsigned __capi; \
106 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
107 c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
108 } \
109} while (0)
110
111#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
112do { \
113 unsigned __capi; \
114 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
115 c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
116 } \
117} while (0)
118
119static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
120 const kernel_cap_t b)
121{
122 kernel_cap_t dest;
123 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
124 return dest;
125}
1da177e4 126
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127static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
128 const kernel_cap_t b)
129{
130 kernel_cap_t dest;
131 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
132 return dest;
133}
1da177e4 134
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135static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
136 const kernel_cap_t drop)
137{
138 kernel_cap_t dest;
139 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
140 return dest;
141}
1da177e4 142
e338d263
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143static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
144{
145 kernel_cap_t dest;
146 CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
147 return dest;
148}
1da177e4 149
e42852bf 150static inline bool cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
e338d263
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151{
152 unsigned __capi;
153 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
154 if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
e42852bf 155 return false;
e338d263 156 }
e42852bf 157 return true;
e338d263 158}
1da177e4 159
9d36be76
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160/*
161 * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
e42852bf
YB
162 * return true if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
163 * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return true
164 * return false if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
165 * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return false
9d36be76 166 */
e42852bf 167static inline bool cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
e338d263
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168{
169 kernel_cap_t dest;
170 dest = cap_drop(a, set);
171 return cap_isclear(dest);
172}
1da177e4 173
e338d263 174/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
1da177e4 175
e338d263 176static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4 177{
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178 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
179 return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
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180}
181
e338d263
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182static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
183 const kernel_cap_t permitted)
1da177e4 184{
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185 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
186 return cap_combine(a,
187 cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
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188}
189
e338d263 190static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4 191{
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192 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
193 return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
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194}
195
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196static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
197 const kernel_cap_t permitted)
198{
199 const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
200 return cap_combine(a,
201 cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
202}
1da177e4 203
2813893f 204#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
3263245d
SH
205extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
206extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
207 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
208extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
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209extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
210 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
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211extern bool capable(int cap);
212extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
98f368e9 213extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
40852275 214extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
2813893f
IM
215#else
216static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
217{
218 return true;
219}
220static inline bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
221 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
222{
223 return true;
224}
225static inline bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
226{
227 return true;
228}
229static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
230 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
231{
232 return true;
233}
234static inline bool capable(int cap)
235{
236 return true;
237}
238static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
239{
240 return true;
241}
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242static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
243{
244 return true;
245}
40852275
MM
246static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
247{
248 return true;
249}
2813893f 250#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
0558c1bf 251bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns,
9452e93e 252 struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
0558c1bf 253 const struct inode *inode);
9452e93e 254bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
0558c1bf 255 const struct inode *inode, int cap);
935d8aab 256extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
64b875f7 257extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
98073728
AB
258static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
259{
260 return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
261}
c59ede7b 262
a17b53c4
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263static inline bool bpf_capable(void)
264{
265 return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
266}
267
124ea650
AR
268static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
269{
270 return ns_capable(ns, CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
271 ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
272}
273
851f7ff5 274/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
39f60c1c 275int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
71bc356f
CB
276 const struct dentry *dentry,
277 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
851f7ff5 278
39f60c1c 279int cap_convert_nscap(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
e65ce2a5 280 const void **ivalue, size_t size);
8db6c34f 281
1da177e4 282#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */